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The Introduction

1. Hard Core Cartel against Competition Law

A free market system based on both freedom of contract and protection of property
principles operates challenged by demand and supply. Under a free market system,
demand by consumers and supply by producers determine the price and quantity of a
product in a market. Competition policy leads suppliers to compete among themselves
in sales terms or conditions. Competition toward attracting consumers through lower
prices is an important principle for working a free market. Competition law is supposed
to protect the functioning of the market.
However, it is against competition law principle for competitors to conspire to fix
prices or to limit output. Price-fixing is the artificial setting or maintenance of prices at
a certain level, usually higher than the level which would be normal without the pricefixing agreement. Sometimes, the competitors collude to maintain a level of production
pre-arranged by themselves. Price-fixing and output restriction are typical to hard core
1

cartels. The hard core cartels cause diverse negative aspects to the economy.
The hard core cartels take away consumers' benefits that competition among
suppliers would have otherwise produced. Consumers in the normal markets purchase
products by paying the price set by market mechanisms through the competition of
suppliers. However, in a market where the sellers have agreed to set the price or the

1

Refer to Chapter 1, II, A for the definition of the 'cartel'.

quantity of the product, consumers cannot avoid paying the higher price than in a

Moreove

market without the collusion.

the Clay1

In addition, cartels cause price-inflexibility regardless of a change in economic

the carte

circumstances, thereby leading to malfunctions in a free market system. Such
malfunction is due to restraining competition among suppliers as an essential element

own con

of the free market mechanism.

establisl
law in t1

2. Spreading Competition Laws to the International Community

success:
cartels,

The U.S., as a leader in competition law enforcing countries2, has developed

states ii

sophisticated jurisprudence in competition law since 1890 when it adopted the Sherman

regulati

Act, the first modem competition law in the world. Price-fixing or output restriction has

Oth

been treated as illegal under the application of the Sherman Act since United States v.

compel

Trans-Missouri Freight Association ( 1897)3 • Through accumulated cases4 , the judicial

than a :

branch in the U.S. has developed per se approach to hard core cartels without allowing

Ho

reasonable justifications for the type of cartel. In addition, in the late 20th century,

as the ·

especially since the 1990s, the U.S. has pursued the strongest antitrust penalty regime
by punishing individuals as well as enterprises with heavy fmes and even imprisonment.

2

Competition law is the law which regulates the behaviors of competing corporations
in free market.
3
166 u.s. 290 (1897)
4
Id. at 333. Joint Traffic Ass 'n v. U.S., 171 U.S. 505, 560, 565 (1898); Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. U.S., 310 U.S. 150,60 S.Ct. 811(1940); U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S.
131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260 (1948); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 78
S.Ct. 514,2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958); U.S. v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct. 1321,
16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966); Int 'Ass 'n o.fMachinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477
F.Supp.553, 558 (1979).
2
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Moreover, the strict penalty has been strengthened with civil actions under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act, which provide treble damages for recovery of victimized consumers of
the cartels.
The European Union (EU), although some member countries have developed their
own competition laws,5 had not enforced competition law seriously until the Treaty
establishing the European Community (EC) adopted a chapter regarding competition
law in the late 1950s. EU devoted significant input to its enforcement, which turned out
successful. Recently, the Competition Commission of the EU has actively investigated
6

cartels, both domestic and international, with the threat of severe punishment. Member
states in the EU also have operated effective competition laws, including cartel
regulations, under the influence of rigorous EU enforcement.
Other countries, facing domestic and international challenges, have developed
competition laws reflecting their respective economic and political situations. More
than a hundred countries have antitrust statutes as of2008. 7
However, not all the countries with competition laws enforce the laws as seriously
as the U.S. or EU. Only eight countries8 provided criminal liability for both individuals

5

The United Kingdom created a major competition law principle, rule of reason, in the
18th century. Germany also adopted cartel regulations in the late 19th century. France
also had competition law provisions. But their legislations grew loose or ineffective, so
they did not evolve into so sophisticated law principle as the U.S. law. Refer to Ch.2 for
in-detail.
6
Refer to the international vitamin and graphite electrodes cartel cases under ch. 1.
7
International Competition Network has a contact list of 100 competition authorities as
of 2008, at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/pdfi'ICN_Contact_List. pdf
(visited on Sep. 4, 2008). See also Statement by Germany, United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (2005), available at http://www.unctad.org
8
Austria, U.K, Canada, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Korea, and Norway. See id. Baker
mentioned only seven countries in 2001. The United Kingdom was added in 2005.
Scott D. Hammond, Charting New Waters in International Cartel Prosecutions, 20

3

and enterprises as of 2005. Moreover, even these countries had indicated a very short

adopte

history of major prosecution in numerous cartel cases. Even the EU revealed, there has

goods .

been no jail sentence against individuals.9

to negc

In spite of this situation, there has been strong pressure toward widespread

Minist

regulation against cartels in the international community. The United Nations

discus:

Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has held conferences on

directi

international competition law since 1980 when the United Nations (UN) passed a

compf

recommendation regarding the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (the UN Set). On the other hand,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommended
that its member countries should adopt criminal sanctions in order to create a deterrent

Tl

against future cartels and to provide an incentive for cartel participants to co-operate

desire

with cartel investigations under the so-called amnesty program. 10 In addition to the

Trade

OECD recommendation, International Competition Network (ICN) has held regular

penal

conferences to discuss diverse topics among which the topic of effective enforcement

indivi

of criminal penalty against cartels is a heated issue. Moreover, at the 1996 Singapore

admi1

World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, competition policy was

prose
its es

NAT'L lNST. OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2 (Mar. 2, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj .gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.pdf
9
Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and
Bid-rigging, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 693, 710; Competition Committee Survey of
OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead, at 29 (2003); Scott
D. Hammond, supra note 5.
10
OECD, Hard Core Cartels, 2000 REPORT by OECD Competition Committee 46,
available at http://www.oecd.org/competition: OECD, Recommendation of the Council
concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels (Mar.25 1998), available at
http://www.oecd.org/competition
4
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adopted among four main issues that a multilateral agreement should include besides
goods and services. The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) has around twenty subjects
to negotiate, although now trying to overcome its deadlock after the Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference of 2005, and included competition policy as a major subject to
discuss. Still, the WTO has focused on restrictions on cross-border cartels under its
directions, one of which proposed to discuss further a multilateral agreement in
competition policy.

12

3. Hurdles to Leveling Cartel Regulations up to International Laws

The rigorous approach from the international community leaves much room to be
desired. For example, regulatory authorities in South Korea, such as the Korea Fair
Trade Commission (KFTC) and public prosecutors, do not frequently apply criminal
penalties against cartels although the penalties are available for punishing both
individuals and enterprises. The KFTC has treated cartels, in most cases, with imposing
administrative fines or surcharges rather than with filing complaints to public
prosecutors 13 • Concretely, only 3.6% of all the cartel cases that KFTC has treated since
its establishment are referred to the public prosecutor's office with a KFTC criminal
11

The four Singapore issues are investment, competition, transparency in government
procurement, and trade facilitation. See 3D/FORUM-ASIA, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE
WTO 32, at http://www.3dthree.orglen!complement.php?IDcomplement=36
12
0 G Dayaratna Banda and John Whalley, Beyond Goods and Services: Competition
Policy, Investment, Mutual Recognition, Movement of Persons, and Broader
Cooperation Provisions ofRecent FTAs Involving ASEAN Countries, 14 National
Bureau of Economic Research (Mar. 2005).
13
Without filing the complaint, public prosecutors in South Korea can not prosecute
enterprises and their members who violated competition law under Article 71 of the
Monopoly Restraint and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) in South Korea.

5
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report. The other 96.4% of cases have been treated under the KFTC with corrective

a quest

orders, surcharges, recommendations, and warnings. 14 Moreover, officers working for

would

competition-regulating authorities in developing countries, whom the author met during

Extend

2006 annual meeting of American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, revealed

extrate

their policies with focus on regulating the monopolization of markets rather than on

will n<

punishing cartel activity. 15

the ap]

Furthermore, competition policy was the first dropped topic out of the four

provid

Singapore issues in the DDA multi-lateral negotiation at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial

achie\

Conference. Negotiation on the whole DDA discontinued after the 2005 Hong Kong

mostl;

Ministerial Conference due to a disagreement between developing countries and

regula

industrialized countries. 16 The different positions reflecting diverse economic situations,
such as fears of developing countries that their industries might be negatively affected

consi!

and hesitancies of industrialized countries to persuade developing countries due to

focus

complex internal problems, have barred further negotiations in the competition policy.

focus
endw

4. The Topic Question and Hypothesis of the Thesis

effec1

In ore
This dissertation will suggest a solution to the challenges of reaching a binding

grout

international cartel regulation, which is currently in a standstill. The thesis started with

deve:

KFTC, il-,;.{.3 ~ iQl mjJ..i [whitepaper] 551 (2004).
The author attended 2006 annual conference of antitrust law provided by American
Bar Association (ABA), and met officers who worked for competition authorities in
developing countries, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Vietnam, etc. They told to me that
they had been focusing on regulating monopolization rather than cartels.
16
Alan Beattie and Frances Williams, US blamed as trade talks end in acrimony, FIN.
TIMES, July 25, 2006, at 1.

that 1

14

15

6
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a question of why competition policy was dropped in WTO DDA negotiation which
would be the important chance to adopt binding international law as to cartels.
Extending application of cartel regulations in industrialized countries, current
extraterritorial application notwithstanding conflict with the comity principle, does and
will not satisfy the necessity to regulate international cartels in developing countries as
the application undermines cooperation between the North and the South, and does not
provide compensation to consumers in the South. Although international organizations
achieved soft international laws and cooperation regimes of competition law practices
mostly among industrialized countries, efforts to reach binding international cartel
regulations have failed.
The reason why efforts have failed is presumably because developing countries,
consisting of a majority of most international organizations, did not have the intent to
focus on the efficiency-oriented cartel regulation scheme and competition law but
focused rather on their economic development. The group of developing countries has
endured insufficient financial resource and immature skills and experiences for
effective competition policy, let alone the public consensus of damages of the cartels.

In order to enjoy rich fmancial resources and to operate sophisticated institutions, the
group of developing countries placed their utmost concern toward economic
development rather than creating a competition regime.
After reviewing different positions on cartels of the South, this thesis suggests
that building effective cartel regulations in the South should be the important ground to
construct a binding international cartel regulation. With effective domestic cartel
enforcement, the multilateral negotiations will have firm basis to obtain an international

7

cartel regulation. By assisting their enforcements, international community can
approach with non-treaty agreement an international cartel law. Extending current

Thl
follow:

bilateral or regional agreement can connect the soft law to a binding plurilateral
agreement which need to reflect development concern of the South. The plurilateral
agreement can have two strategies: narrow focus on hard core cartel in the short term,
and cartel regulation under competition regime in the long term.
Since the characteristics of cartels consisting of private companies (private cartels)
are different from those of sovereign states (intergovernmental agreement for
commodity), the thesis distinguishes private cartel regulations from intergovernmental
agreement for commodity and reviews the development of international commodity law.
Such distinction is justified by the fact that developing countries have derived the major
impetus for economic development from their major commodities. Thesis suggests a
strategy of differentiated products with high quality standards to balance market
mechanisms with economic development in the South.
The consensus building in the South as to cartel regulations will be achieved
through effective enforcements of the cartel regulations supported by international
cooperation and assistance from the North. The increased public awareness can reach
international cartel regulations as to private cartels while intergovernmental agreements
for commodity are left under the different rule.

5. Structure of the Thesis

Cl
intern:

8

The thesis consists of a total of six chapters to answer the research question as the
following picture describes.
Structure of this Thesis
[ b/'~1~: <sp>

Ch. 1

Defming a Cartel and its Effect

Ch. 2

Legal Status and Historical Background of Cartels in International Law

A. Private Cartels : Restrictive
Business Practices (RBP)

Ch. 3

B. Int'l Commodity Agreements

Conciliation of Conflicts of Opinion between North- South Conflict

Ch. 4 The Regulation of Cartels in
Developing Countries

Ch. 5 The Need of the Development of International Law on Cartels
Int'l Cartel Agreemem:Narrow App.
Int'l Competition Law: Broad App.

Market-related Policies,
Structural Policy, and
Models for Sustainable
Development

Ch. 6 General Conclusion

... - Chapter 1 examines the defmition of a cartel, discussion the effects of a cartel, and
international agreement for commodity distinctive from private cartel, and introduces

9

aspects of international cartels and major exemplary cases from the comparative
analysis.

agreemc

Chapter 2 researches the legal status of international cartels in international law by

looking

investigating such international organizations under the doubt of being a cartel. The

ofbilatc

chapter goes into development of domestic cartel law and of international agreement of

analyze

commodity. Under the private cartel regulation, trials for achieving multilateral

stratero

agreements by international organizations and the possibility of extending current

internal

bilateral and regional trade agreements including competition law are to be examined.

agreem

Chapter 3 analyzes North-South conflicts as hurdles to achieve international cartel

price-ri

regulations. After examining the failure of recent WTO DDA negotiation to adopt

reflecti

cartel law under competition policy, the necessity of cartel regulations in the

model·

developing countries is to be asserted with persuasive reasons. The positions of

The

competition policy in developing countries in comparison to advanced countries are to

assessr

be investigated. The international cartel law reflecting the perspective of international

intema

development law is to be considered. The roadmap toward binding cartel law will be

relatio1

proposed.
Chapter 4 starts with a comparative analysis of cartel law in both advanced and
developing countries with promising competition law practices. After researching
different types of cartel laws in both the North and South, the thesis focuses on
consensus building for active cartel regulations in the South. Concrete suggestions shall
be followed to make efficient institutions with sound foundations in developing
countries. Cooperative measures with developed competition authorities shall be
suggested as the effective ways to build capacities in developing countries.

10

Chapter 5 concentrates on suggesting strategies for achieving binding multilateral
agreements and advanced models of international agreements for commodities. After
looking over current international cartel regulations, the chapter examines the limitation
ofbilateral agreements as leading measures of international cartel law. It further
analyzes the hurdles in binding multilateral agreements. The chapter also proposes a
strategy for binding multilateral agreements for cartels, and discusses the possibility of
international economic crime. Moreover, reform measures for international commodity
agreements will be addressed in light of past failures. Market-related policies, such as
price-risk-management, structural policy for economic development, two models
reflecting the cause of sustainable development, and eco-label system as a cooperative
model between private and public sectors, will be suggested.
The chapter 6 concludes all the discussed arguments and summarizes overall
assessments and interim conclusions. Finally, this chapter adds its future prospect that
international competition Jaw and international commodity agreements will have some
relationship in the area of international economic law.

11

Ch. 1. Defining Cartels and Their Effects

I. Introduction

Although a cartel sounds like a recent problem due to the semantics of its language,
the phenomenon that it covers dates back to the ancient times when our forefathers
earned money by trade and competed so as to have more profits. Competition-restraint
measures by suppliers have been maintained with the development of trade throughout
human-being's history.
However, modem legislations toward promoting competition based on judicial and
economic reasons were not seriously enforced until the 1980s even in industrialized
countries. Specifically, up until the 1990s or even the 2000s, there is hardly any
anticipation to establish an international organization dealing with competition law
Issues.
This chapter initiates its exposition through searching the meaning of the term
'cartel' within the context of modem development of its regulatory regimes, either
international or domestic. It explores the coverage of cartels by categorizing them.
Studying the damages and benefits of the cartels with their effects on the economy,
politics, and society helps reduce conflicting views between the countries with strong
cartel regulations and those with hesitancy or less skills to investigate the cartels.
Examining the possibility of benevolent cartels is an opportunity to investigate
arguments of developing countries that do not want to adopt cartel regulations related
to international trade negotiations.

1

to cc
II. Definition

intet

1. Origin of the Cartel and the Current Meaning
A 'cartel' is thought to come from the Latin charta, meaning a writing, a paper, or a
letter. Before the word was used for a trade jargon, it was used for representing a

com

military agreement between belligerent nations, e.g. the exchange of prisoners. 1 As
markets grew expanded and competition became severe among entrepreneurs dealing

acc1

with the same products, the word arguably changed its usage to the trade term of an

entr

agreement for the exchange of sales information, including price or other conditions. 2

PUIJ

Currently, a cartel is defined as ' an arrangement among supposedly independent
corporations or national monopolies in the same industrial or resource development

con:

field organized to control distribution, set prices, reduce competition and sometimes

hare

share technical expertise' ,3 or 'a combination of producers or sellers that join together

are

1

George W, Stocking & Myron W. Watkins, CARTELS OR COMPETITION?, 3 and footnote
1 (Twentieth Century Fund, 1948); John Eatwell, Murray Milgate, & Peter Newman,
THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, Vol. 1, 372 (Stockton Press Ltd,
1998).
2
Chan-Moo Huh, KOREA'S MONOPOLY RESTRAINT AND FAIR TRADE ACT [MRFTA]
AND CARTEL REGULATION (iJ-fiJ 71 ~~ ~ 7} 2 ~Tf~lJ, 15-17 (Bi-Bong 2002)
3
Refer to http://dictionary.law.com. Dictionary in the other academic areas includes the
public cartel in the similar way to the Law Dictionary. The Britannica Encyclopedia
also includes state-monopoly or inter-state cartel, e.g. OPEC. THE NEW
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, Vol. 2 Micropaedia 908 (15th ed. Encyclopaedia
Britannica Inc. 2007). With focus on the element of 'agreement', DICTIONARY OF
BusiNESS TERMS, 89 (Barron's, 4th ed. 2007) explains that a cartel is a group of
independent suppliers, which agree to restrict trade to their mutual benefit. On the other
hand, Douglas Greenwald, ed., THE MCGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
136-8 (2nd ed. R.R.Donnelley & Sons Co., 1994) states, with focus on 'anti-competitive
acts' rather than the agreement, that a cartel is a group of producers who coordinate
price and output decisions to increase combined and individual output. If all producers
of a good combine, the cartel may seek to imitate the behavior of a monopoly supplier,
however, commonly, a fringe of small producers will operate outside the cartel.

2

pub
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to control a product's production or price' or 'an association of firms with common
interests, seeking to prevent extreme or unfair competition, allocate market or share
knowledge' .4 All of the definitions have at least two common elements, i) the gathering
of companies and ii) the purpose of controlling transaction term(s) related to
competition.
Compared to its origin, the cartel concept have evolved, under the influence of
accumulated economics, to include a type of association consisting of competing
entrepreneurs which controls sales or productions or shares knowledge with the
purpose ofpreventing competition. National competition laws and international law
have developed regulations of cartel activities which cause severe harm to markets and
consumers. Particularly, the laws designated several types of cartel activities, so called
hard core cartels, illegitimate. The cruiels are made up of only ptivate compru1ies which
are supposed to compete each other. Meanwhile, international law has separated interstate cartels from the coverage of international competition law and thereby placed the
public catiel or intemational commodity agreement under international commodity law.
With the increasing number of cartel cases, the concept of a cartel has distinguished
itself from the other concepts ofbusiness combinations. After reviewing similar
concepts and cartel regulations, this research will propose a definition of a cartel
distinguished from other concepts.

2. Similar Concepts: Trust, Joint Venture, Syndicate, and Konzem

4

Bryan A. Gamer, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (2nd pocketed. 2003).
3

Competition law in the United States, starting with enacting the Sherman Act in
1890, originally pointed out a trust as the major object of its application since section 1
of the Sherman Act adopted the language, 'every contract.. in the form of trust or

pers

otherwise'. However, a trust is a legal concept different from a cartel. A trust creates

rest!

binding legal rights that are enforceable in equity for the beneficial enjoyment of a

whi·

property, the legal title of which a trust settler (settler) transfers to another person

cast

(trustee) for the third party (beneficiary)'s benefit. 5 While a cartel is formed among

COli

competitors, a trust is created between a settler and a trustee and generates no

carr

relationship among competitors. The common law legal tool was used so as to create a

se il

strong business combination aiming at restraining competition in the U.S. markets in
the late 19th century. Competing companies in the same market, for the purpose of

COl']

getting rid of competition, transferred their stocks to the third company, which would

dev

decide the level of price or production or allocate geographical markets and distribute

afte

its profits to the settler companies, usually in proportion of the value of the stocks. The

salt

third company controlled the national market with its trustee position while the
competing companies, which entrusted their stocks to trustee, took positions of both the

6

BJ

7A.J

settlers and the beneficiaries. Such trust represented one oflegal measures which
restricted competition, and sec. 1 of the Sherman Act explicitly included the trust as
one of its targets. Since the competition law in the U.S. is originally designed to prevent
anti-competitive business practices, represented by the trust, it has been called an 'anti-
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trust law' even though the 'anti-trust' law covers other aspects of trade restraint such as

9L
sup

monopolies, price-discrimination, or anti-competitive mergers.

cor.
car
65~

5

Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and
Bid-rigging, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 693, 710.

4

ore
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A joint venture is different from a cartel in terms ofthe level ofbusiness and legal
integration and competitive effect. A joint venture is one business undertaking by plural
6

persons engaged in a single project. It has a common purpose but not the one for
restricting competition. The U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished a joint venture
which set a price from a hard core cartel which fixes a price. 7 As a joint venture in most
cases generates pro-competitive effect in markets through cooperation, the procompetitive effect should be considered for a decision of substantially reducing
competition. Meanwhile, a hard core cartel with price-fixing has been treated under per
se illegal.

8

Meanwhile, a syndicate is defined as 'a joint venture among individuals and/or
corporations to accomplish a particular business objective, e.g. the purchase,
development and sale of a tract of real property, followed by division of the profits,
after the completion of which it will dissolve' .9 Usually, a syndicate means a common
sales company established through the common investment by companies in an

6

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 376.
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 356 (1982); Texaco Inc. v.
Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 3; 126 S.Ct. 1276, 1277 (2006). In the Maricopa case, the Court
held that the Medical Society was a foundation which did not sell different products but
fixed price for medical services, and that it is not analogous to partnership or joint
venture. In the Texaco case, the Supreme Court held that it is not per se illegal under
Sherman Act § 1 for lawful, economically integrated joint venture to set prices at which
it sells its products.
8
See Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514,518,2
L.Ed.2d 545 (1958).
9
Law dictionary, available at http://dictionary.law.com. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 4, at 687. The BLD defines the syndicate as a group organized for a
common purpose, especially an association formed to promote a common interest and
carry out a particular business transaction. See also DICTIONARY OF BUSINESS TERMS,
655 (Barron's, 4th ed. 2007). It defines the syndicate similarly as a group of individuals
or companies who have formed a joint venture to undertake a project that the
individuals would be unable or unwilling to pursue alone.
7

5

industry. 10 The syndicate is distinguished from the cartel where independent companies

tber

do not establish a common sales company or an association to carry out a transaction

state

but agree to control reciprocal business activities for restraining competition. In the

coml

U.S., tight joint ventures including syndicates fall under the merger regulation under
Sec. 7 of the Clayton Act and the Celler-Kefauver Amendment.

11

On the other hand, there were Kozems or Concerns during World War II m

COIIll

This
pron

Germany and Japan. The Kozems were financial combinations of companies that are
legally independent. They differ from the cartel which requires no financial

com:

combination or financial dependence but requires the agreement to restrain competition

the

with legal and financial independence.

com

1

colh
3. Cartel Definitions from Individual Countries
butt
testi

(1) The United States (U.S.)
The U.S. anti-trust law practice has paid little attention to the definition of cartel but
developed a per se illegal rule, which determines several types of typical cartel

prod

practices as illegal without an analysis of their economic impact on competition. 12 As

secti
com

10

Huh, supra note 2, 21.
U.S. v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168; 84 S.Ct. 1710, 1715 (1964). The
Penn-Olin Chemical Co. case applied sec. 7 of the Clayton Act, a merger regulation, to
the formation by two corporations of a joint venture for production of sodium chlorate
and dissolved the joint venture which may substantially reduce competition in a market.
12
The Supreme Court explained activities violating section 1 under per se illegal rule as
'agreement or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inguirv as to the precise harm which they have
caused or the business excuse for their use.' 356 U.S. 1, 5, 78 S.Ct. 514, 518,2 L.Ed.2d
545 (1958).
11
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the main legal foundation to regulate a cartel, Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not
state a definition of a cartel but states a broad prohibition that 'every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.'
This provision has been used to prevent cartel activities. The U.S. Supreme Court has
pronounced the cartel aspects as per se illegal under Section 1 of the Act, such as
agreements for price-fixing, output restrictions, and market allocations among
competitors without using the 'cartel' term. The per se illegal rule is distinguished from
the rule of reason standard, which determines the anti-competitiveness of the other
competition-restraining activities including vertical restraint or other horizontal
collusions, e.g. concerted refusal to deal 13 •
The U.S. Supreme Court did not define the concept of a cartel with its own term,
but defined the concept of a cartel, in the U.S. v. National Lead Co. et al, through the
testimony of two people 14 in front of a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate. They stated "a
cartel is, with a protean form, a combination of producers for the purpose of regulating
production and, frequently, prices, and an association by agreement of companies or
sections of companies having common interests so as to prevent extreme or unfair
competition." 15 Regarding the 'common interests', one of the testators added that the

13

Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296 (1985). The case applied rule of reason standard regarding a cooperative
activity involving exclusion as a type of concerted refusal to deal.
14
Sir Mond was the organizer of the Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) which
consolidated competitors in the U.K. As the other testator, Sir Pole was the chairman of
the Associated Electrical Industries (AEI), a British company which produced and sold
light bulbs.
15
United States v. National Lead Co. et.al., 332 U.S. 319, 340; 67 S.Ct. 1634, 1644; 91
L.Ed. 2077, 2096 (1947). The case is as regards the market division agreement of major
7

common interests covers from preventing extreme or unfair competition or allocating

Sup1

markets to interchanging R&D knowledge, exchanging patent rights, standardizing
products, and so on. The cited statement, however, does not address well the anti-

reas1

competitive effect of a cartel but rather implies its positive effects. It is confirmed by a

rule.

testimony of the testators that competition is not eliminated but regulated. However, a

illeg

cartel does not just regulate competition but restrict it, thereby causing a huge
inefficiency to the overall economy. 16 The unilateral testimony of the two testifiers

com

come from two testators' background that they were respectively an organizer and a

ben<

chairman of companies involved in international cartels regarding chemical industry

the:

and light bulb manufacturing. 17 The cited statements did not point out the negative

Wh:

effects of a cartel.

out}:

Rather, it is beneficial to look at the categorized types of cartel activities through

Act

U.S. cartel-hostile practices in order to have clear understanding of a cartel. The
1 oJ

titanium product manufacturers in the world by providing licenses to each other. It cites
Monograph No.1, Subcommittee on War Mobilization ofthe Committee on Military
Affairs, U.S. Senate, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, p.l. Quoted also in U.S. v. National
Lead Co., 63 F.Supp. 513, 523, note 5.
16
Refer to Ch.1.III.2.
17
The ICI had been involved in 800 competition-restraining agreements with Du Pont,
its American rival company. The 800 agreements ended in 1948 before U.S. antitrust
suit regarding its anti-competitiveness produced its result. ICI Pic - Company Profile,
Information, Business Description, History, Background Information on Imperial
Chemical Industries Pic, available at
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/ 19/Imperial-Chemical-lndustriesPlc.html (visited on Feb. 24, '08).
Meanwhile, the AEI had been a member of the Phoebus cartel consisting of seven
competing light bulb companies. The cartel controlled the manufacture and sale of light
bulbs for almost 20 years (in 1920s and 30s). It started to be weakened when a
Swedish-Danish-Norwegian union of companies launched an independent
manufacturing center and sold lamps at a much lower price than Phoebus in spite of
economic and legal threats by Phoebus. Phoebus Cartel, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phoebus_cartel (visited on Feb. 24, '08)
8
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Supreme Court has pronounced the price-fixing, output-restraining, market-allocation
cartel as illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act without inquiring into the
reasonableness of the cartel since the middle of the 20th century under the per se illegal
rule. 18 The judicial categorizing of several restrictive business practices into a per se
illegal rule has been made under considerable experiences with the RBPs. 19 The
judicial body, experiencing a lot of cases with broad business areas, faced an implicit
conclusion that typical cru1el activities cause severe harm outweighing small
benevolent effect and that the judiciary does not need to consider economic impact of
the activities. The courts have rarely played roles to justify the typical cartel agreements.
Whatever form the agreement or business practice takes, collusive price-rising or
output-restriction among competitors has been deemed to violate sec. 1 of the Sherman
Act in the U.S. antitrust practices. 20
In short, the U.S. Judicial body did not devote effort to define a cartel although sec.
1 of the Sherman Act has broad language to cover diverse RBPs. However, judicial
decisions have distinguished some aspects of a cartel e.g. price-fixing, outputrestriction, market-allocation, from the other RBPs by treating them as illegal without
looking into its reasonableness. It is because the significru1t hanns of the hard core
cartel activities and they have paid little attention to further economic analyses for
arguable pro-competitive effects.
18

U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co. 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700 (1927); U.S. v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,60 S.Ct. 811,84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940); Chicago
Professional Sports LP & WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. National Basketball
Association, 961 F.2d 667,674 (Ct ofApp. 7th Cir. 1992).
19
Broadcast Music, Inc. et al. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. et al., 441 U.S.
10, 99 S.Ct. 1551 (1979).
20
ELEANOR Fox, LAWRENCE SULLIVAN, AND RUDOLPH PERITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, 78 (2nd ed. West Pub., 2004).

9

(2) United Kingdom (U.K.)

und·

The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) defines a cartel, using the simple terms, as an
agreement, usually secret, verbal and often informal, between businesses not to
compete with each other. 21 Section 2(1) of the 1998 Competition Act, by adopting the

regt

same language as Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty, prohibits agreements between

beh

undertakings, which, among other things, have as their object or effect the prevention,

cus1

restriction, or distortion of competition within the U.K. Moreover, Sec. 2(2), parallel to

the

paragraphs of Art. 81(1) ofthe EC Treaty, enumerated typical activities of a cartel such
as agreement to fix prices or other trading conditions (price-fixing), limit production,

con

markets, technical development or investment (output limitation), share markets or

sim

sources of supply (market-allocation), apply discriminatory conditions to other trading

are

parties(discrimination), and make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance of

dis1

irrelevant obligations by the other parties. A cartel enables business people to enjoy

imi

higher prices with less effort to offer competitive products or services, which leaves

atta

little choice for consumers. 22 As a result, it causes huge damage to consumers and

pos

creates inefficiency in the whole economy.

qut
wh

(3) Germany's Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt)

im]

Art. 1 of the Act against the Restraint of Competition (ARC) as the regulation of
cartels states, "agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of

23 (

Co
21

OFT, What is cartel,
http://www.oft.gov.uk/advice_and_resources/resource_base/cartels/what-cartel (visited
on Feb. 24, '08).
22
OFT, Cartels and the Competition Act 1998: a guide for purchasers, 3 (2005), at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oftlbusiness_leaflets/ca98_mini_guides/oft435.pdf
(visited on the same day)
10

241

htt]
25 (
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'

undertakings and concerted practices, which have as their object or effect the
23

an

prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, shall be prohibited."

The

to

amendment of the ARC for improving compatibility to the European competition

he

regime was made recently which will lead to the identification of five hard core cartel

en

behaviors such as price-fixing, market sharing, production or sales quotas, allocation of

n,

customers, and bid-rigging. 24 The hard core cartels are not criminalized but fined under

to

the Administrative Offences Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure.

:h

There are some exemptions from the cartel regulation under ARC although the hard

1,

core cartels do not meet the criteria of the exemption. The exemption includes the very

•r

similar language as Art. 81 para.3 of the EC Treaty. 25 Under Sec.2(1), such agreements

g

are exempted from application of ARC as contributes to i) improving the production or

f

distribution of goods, or ii) promoting technical or economic progress ii) without

'f

imposing on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives and iv) without affording such undertakings the
possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question. Additionally, the agreements for the rationalization of economic activities
when competition on the market is not substantially impaired and when the agreement
improve the competitiveness of small or middle-sized enterprises are exempted.26

23

Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschraenkungen [GWB][Act against Restricting
Competition], at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de
24
Bundeskartellamt, A Report to ICN Anti-cartel Enforcement, at
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de
25
Compare Sec.2(1) of ARC to Art. 81.para.3 of the EC Treaty. Refer to Ch.1.4(1) in
this thesis. Although it adopts the almost same language, sec. 2(2) states that Art.81 (3)
of the Treaty is applicable.
26
Sec. 3(1)
11

(4) Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC)

busi

A report to the Asian Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) by the JFTC states that

less,

a cartel is a horizontal agreement between competitors to avoid competition. 27
Concretely, a cartel means express or tacit conventions, promises, or agreements among

incl'

firms to fix the price or limit the volume of production and sales, or select trading

sub]

partners. Similar to definition of a hard core cartel in the ICN and OECD, they are

busi

classified in terms by the object of restriction into four categories: price cartels, volume

esta

cartels, market allocation cartels, and bid riggings.

28

bar<

(5) The Monopoly Restraint Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) of South Korea

disc

Art. 19 sec. 1 ofthe MRFTA defines 'improper concerted acts' as certain behaviors

proJ

which unfairly restrain competition with the other entrepreneurs by agreement, contract,
resolution through another method. Not every competition-restraining behavior falls
into the category. Art. 19 has enumerated eight kinds ofimproper concerted acts: i)
price-managing, ii) condition-setting for transactions of goods or services, iii)
restricting production or delivery or transaction, iv) limiting the territory of trade or

as':

customers, v) restricting the establishment of facilities or necessary equipments, vi)

bet\

restricting the specifications of goods or services, vii) co-managing the main parts of a

corr

bet\
27

JFTC, Capacity Building to Combat Cartels in Japan, 1 (2002), at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpt705/APECTrainingProgram2002/Japanl.pdf(visited on Feb.
25, '08)
28
Japan Fair Trade Commission, What Practices are Subject to Control by the
Antimonopoly Act ? (Section 3-1, "How Does this Apply to Cartels?), available from
http://www2.jftc.go.jp/e-page/aboutjftc/role/q-3.htm.
12

29
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business or establishing a joint-company, and viii) any practice that substantially
lessens competition in a particular business area. 29
7

J

:>

The Art. 19 adopted so broad a coverage of anti-cartel regulation as the subpara. 7
includes the concept of the syndicate under the improper concerted acts, and the
subpara. 8 has a general provision without concrete description of the restrictive
business practices (RBPs). The subpara. 2 (condition-setting),S (restriction of
establishment of facilities), and 6 (restriction of goods specification) do not fall on the
hard core cartel of major international organizations, but can fall on a cartel as they
may restrain competition in markets. Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) enjoys
discretion to authorize certain collusive behaviors which generate more efficiencyprogress than competition-restraint.

4. Cartels in International Law
(1)

The EC Treaty

Under the glossary of terms used in the EU Competition Policy, a cartel is defined
as 'an arrangement between competing firms designed to limit or eliminate competition
between them, with the objective of increasing prices and profits of the participating
companies and without producing any objective countervailing benefits.' 30
For the statute language, Art. 81 (1) of the Treaty of Rome prohibits all agreements
between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted

29

English version of Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) of KOREA is
available at http://ftc.go.kr/engl
30
European Commission, Glossary of Terms used in EU Competition Policy, 8
(Brussels 2002), available at
http://europa.eu. inticomm/competition/publications/glossary_en. pdf
13

practices which may affect trade between Member States, and which have as the object

Th

or effect of such agreements the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition

ente:

within the common market. Particularly, Art. 81 ( 1) considers the following five

whe:

categories of cartels as anti-competitive: (a) price-fixing, (b) output limitation, (c)

1imi

market allocation, (d) discriminatory treatment, and (e) making the conclusion of

info1

contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of irrelevant supplemental

effe<

obligation. 31 However, a cartel is considered as legitimate when such agreement,

cour

decision or concerted practice contributes to improving the production or distribution of

and

goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair

arrru

share of the resulting benefit, and which does neither (a) impose on the undertakings

enfo

the concerted restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these

SUPI

objectives, nor (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition

asso

in respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 32 Cartels with net efficiency
balance are treated as legitimate and valid. 33

(g).

c
(2)

bern

UN Set and Model Law

The Resolution of the General Assembly of United Nations (UN) to adopt the Set of

as tJ

Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive

intet

Business Practices in 1980 (the UN Set)

and the Model Law that the UNCTAD

prod

drafted for adopting international competition law confine the definition into the

refu1

agreements to unduly restrain competition among rivals.

Whi(

31

For in-detail statute languages, refer to 1998 Competition Act Sec.2(2) in the U.K.,
this chapter, II.3 .(2)
32
Art. 8 1 para. 3.
33

ld.

34

Tl

for a

14

The UN Set, using 'restrictive business practices' instead of cartel, states that
enterprises, except when dealing with each other in the context of an economic entity
wherein they are under a common control, should refrain from the such practices as
limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition through formal,
informal, written or unwritten agreements or arrangements with possible adverse
effects on international trade and economic development particularly of developing
countries. The concrete acts are (a) agreements fixing prices, including as to exports
and imports, (b) collusive tendering (bid-tigging), (c) market or customer allocation
arrangements, (d) allocation by quota as to sales and production, (e) collective action to
enforce arrangements, e.g. by concerted refusals to deal, (f) concerted refusal of
supplies to potential importers, (g) collective denial of access to an arrangement, or
association, which is crucial to competition. Besides the coverage of the hard core
cartel of OECD, the UN Set includes three types of concerted act illustrating from (e) to
(g).

Chapter 3 of the Model Law 34 prohibits restrictive agreements or arrangements
between rival or potentially rival firms. The restrictive agreements are, almost the same
as the UN Set, (a) agreements fixing prices or other terms of sale, including in
international trade, (b) collusive tendering, (c) market allocation, (d) restraints on
production or sale, including by quota, (e) concerted refusals to purchase, (f) concerted
refusal to supply, (g) collective denial of access to an arrangement, or association
which is crucial to competition. The Model Law almost follows the UN Set's seven
categories although para. 1 of the Model Law added 'other terms of sale' thereby
34

The Model Law is formally named as The Substantive Possible Elements for articles
for a Competition Law.
15

extending its coverage. The illustrated seven examples of RBPs are cartel activities as

outpu1

the agreement among rivals to control reciprocal business activities so as to restrain

suppli

competition.

does r

The UN Set excludes, from the coverage of its cartel regulation, an economic entity

reasor

in which the enterprises are under the common control including one through common

effici~

ownership or otherwise not able to act independently of each other. Commentaries in

count:J

Chapter III of the Model Law confirms the exclusion of one economic entity from the

exelm

cartel regulation by noting that a prevailing number of jurisdictions have ruled that

transp

firms under common ownership or control are not rival or potentially rival firms.

neces~

Although the establishment of a common business entity to control independent
competitors' behaviors may restrain competition and violate competition law,

(4

constructing the common business entity is not under the cartel provision of the Model

In

Law. Establishing a common entity among competitors may be an issue of merger

Tl

regulation in Sec.l & II of Ch.VI of the Model Law. When it brings about the

Devel

possibility of lessening competition substantially, it will be prevented or undone under

frame

para. 3 Sec. III of the merger regulation.
Decla

(3)

Hard

Core

Cartel

of Organization for

Economic

Cooperation

and

legal
did nc

Development (OECD)
The recommendation that the OECD adopted in 1998 defines a hard core cartel

Genet

with four types of cartel activities. Under the OECD Recommendation, a 'hard core
cartel' is an anti competitive agreement, concerted practice, or arrangement by
35

competitors to (a) fix prices, (b) make rigged bids (collusive tenders), (c) establish

16

OE

Core
subse
36 I. A

output restrictions or quotas, or (d) share or divide markets by allocating customers,
suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce. 35 The hard core cartel category, however,
does not include agreements, concerted practices or arrangements that (i) are
reasonably related to the lawful realization of cost-reducing or output-enhancing
efficiencies, (ii) are excluded directly or indirectly from the coverage of a Member
country's own laws, or (iii) are authorized in accordance with those laws. All
exclusions and authorizations of what would otherwise be hard core cartels should be
transparent and should be reviewed periodically to assess whether they are both
necessary and no broader than necessary to achieve their overriding policy objectives. 36

(4) The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP)
The WTO issued a Ministerial Declaration in Doha in Nov. 2001, the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA), which launched multilateral negotiations toward legal
frameworks regarding agriculture, services, and trade-related issues including a
competition policy which had been discussed since the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration in 1996. WGTCP which worked for building a multilateral competition
legal framework, however, faced a deadlock when the Cancun Ministerial Conference
did not reach any consensus on modalities in this area in 2003. The following WTO
General Council in 2004 confirmed its failure by deciding that the issue of competition
policy would not form a part of the DDA. Therefore, no work towards negotiations on
35

OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard
Core Cartels, 921 st Sess. C/M(98)7/PROV (Mar. 25, 1998). See Art. I Sec.A. para. 2.
subsec. a).
36
1. A. 2. b). ofthe Recommendation.
17

competition policy will take place within the WTO during the DDA. 37 To make things

OECI

worse, the whole DDA collapsed after the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference in 2005

sugge

mostly due to the North-South conflict in agriculture negotiations.

betwe

The Doha Declaration did not explain the definition of a cartel but mentioned that

forma

further works in the WGTCP would focus on the clarification of provisions on hardcore

(priva

cartels. 38 By concentrating on hard core cartels, it is implied that the WTO Group tried

each

to limit the topic of multilateral negotiations to the hard core cartel similar to the OECD

mono

Recommendation.

placir

(5) International Competition Network (ICN)

acros:

The ICN was formed by an original proposal from major advanced competition

bid r:

authorities, the US's DOJ and the International Competition Policy Advisory

Recm

Committee

(ICP AC),

for

consensus-building on

procedural

and

substantive

convergence in antitrust enforcement, along with support from competition

(6)

professionals, and formerly mentioned international organizations, e.g. WTO, OECD,

In

and UNCTAD. 39 Its main constituents consist of senior government competition

activi

officers in both developed and developing countries while the ICN also includes the

cartel

participation of private experts. The ICN Working Group on Cartels issued a report in

nati01

2005 for the 4th Annual Conference of the ICN, which researched extensively on the

broad

definition of a cartel. The report agreed with the definition of a hard core cartel in the

the o1

37

WTO, Competition Policy: History, available at http://www.wto.org.
Paragraph 25, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, available at http://www.wto.org.
39
For background of establishing ICN, see Harry First, Evolving toward What? The
Development ofInternational Antitrust, in THE FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUSTFROM COMPARATIVE TO COMMON COMPETITION LAW, 33-38 (JosefDrexl ed. Kluwer
Law Int'l, 2003).
38
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OECD Recommendation without substantial suggestions for improvement.

It

)5

suggested the following three common elements of a cartel: i) an agreement, ii)
between competitors, and iii) to restrict competition. The 'agreement' need not be

at

fonnal or written, 41 therefore it includes secret conspiracies. The 'competitors' refer to

re

(private) companies at the same level of distribution channels in direct competition with

:d

each other to sell goods or provide services, thereby excluding states or national

D

monopolies. 'To restrict competition' means to target at open competition,42 whereby
placing its focus on the intent or purpose of the agreement.
Further, it categorizes the following four types of conduct commonly identified
across jurisdictions: 1) price fixing, 2) output restrictions, 3) market allocation, and 4)

n

bid rigging. All four types have the same areas as the OECD Hard Core Cartel

'I

Recommendation covers.

(6) Analysis

1

International law regulating a cartel approaches the consensus that hard core cartel
activities with several categories are to be addressed rather than a clear-cut definition of
cartel itself. The attitude to de1ive common denominators from various forms of
national cartel laws is not profitable compared to its effmt. Some countries adopt a
broad provision which applies to vertical restraint as well as horizontal restraint while
the other countries treat the former clearly different from the latter. The national cartel

40

ICN Working Group on Cartels, Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective
Institutions, and Effective Penalties, 11-12, at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
41
See id. 10.
42
See id., 9-10.
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laws include exemptions from an anti-cartel provision. The exemptions cover from the

to co

one with outweighing competitive effects to the one on the basis of domestic political

narr<

reason. The standard of analyzing the restraint on competition of a cartel is diverse
from the per se rule through quick rule of reason to full rule of reason. Therefore,

prop

defining cartel in international competition law appears inefficient as it demand much
work to harmonize different national laws with less benefit or promise of reaching a
consensus. The approach to a hard core cartel with several categories has proved
effective to reach a consensus among diverse interests in individual countries as over
all international cartel laws adopt.

5. Assessment
( 1) Proposal for a Cartel Definition in the International Law Context

vent

It is not easy to reach the international agreement in light of complicated interests

not 1

from diverse economic situations, legal systems, and cultural backgrounds. The diverse

man

aspects of cartel activities make the reaching of the agreement more difficult. 43 Rather

verti

than adopting the definition covering a broad aspect of cartels, defining a cartel needs

reas·

to consider its purpose. This thesis pursues the agenda of international cartel regulation,

vett

in light of which, the definition of a cartel should start with a narrowed category, in

Hov

other words, that of a hard core cartel. Since a binding international cartel regulation as
the ultimate goal of this thesis is much difficult to obtain accession from countries due

44"
the~

43

Barry Rodger & Angus Macculloch, The Chapter I Prohibition: Prohibiting Cartels,
or Permitting Verticals? Or Both?, in THE UK COMPETITION AcT, at 172-3 (Rodger &
Macculloch eds. Hart Pub., 2000).
20
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to concern about restricted sovereignty, this thesis will confine its discussion into the
narrow definition of a cartel.

In light of the distinction of the cartel with the syndicate and the trust, this research
proposes the following elements of the cartel definition under the narrow focus,
i) as a subject, more than two independent entrepreneurs or undertakings
competing in the same level ofbusiness,
ii) as to conduct, agree to restrain or do restrain reciprocal business activities, e.g.
fix price, allocate market, or limit production, and rig a bid,
iii) as regards to purpose, to prevent competition thereby to secure extra profit.
(2) Subject: Private Companies Reciprocally Competing
Regarding the element ( 1), a tight combination of competitors, known as a joint
venture, has been treated akin to mergers which shall be under merger regulations and
not under cartel regulations. An industrial combination in the vertical level from
manufactures to distribution to sales invokes the matters of merger, monopoly, and/or
vertical restraint rather than a cartel. Particularly, the U.S. practices with persuasive
reasoning have developed separate rules and regulations on mergers, monopolies, and
vertical restraint from cartel regulation, which focuses on hard core cartels (HCC). 44
However, the combination-operating or forming agreement needs to be screened by

44

While the section 2 of the Sherman Act applies to (attempt) monopoly, section 7 of
the Clayton Act, along with merger guidelines and procedural rules applies to merger.
The Supreme Court has distinguished a vertical restraint from a cartel. NYNEX Corp. v.
Discon, Inc. 525 U.S. 128, 136 (1998); Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronic
Corp. 485 U.S. 717, 730; 108 S.Ct. 1515, 1523 (1988).
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cartel regulation whether it includes competition-restraining activities, particularly
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HCC activities. 45
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The issue is whether the 'independent entrepreneurs' as member of a cartel include

assm

either a country or state-managing company. A country with public interests acts

law,

differently from the private company pursuing a profit-interest. A state which receives

thed

financial resources from public revenue functions as a market-moderator by taking loss

may

or reducing profit, dissimilar from private companies operating on a maximization

econ

principle of profits or market share. Since the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
Sherman Act does not apply to a state but persons under Sec. 746 in Parker v. Brown,47
the U.S. courts have developed state-action doctrine allowing immunity to state

rectp

legislations involving the market. Besides such exemption from domestic law, the

ares,

activities of a state in the international level are protected under the sovereignty

restri

immunity which does not allow other countries to intervene in its domestic affairs. The
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Model Law ofthe UNCTAD confirms the principle as one of its many examples. 48 In

divet

addition, inter-state cooperative activities in commodity trade have been acknowledged
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45

Consent decree of General Motors/Toyotajoint venture case, 103 FTC 374 (1984),
includes such orders refraining them from exchanging pivotal non-public information
e.g. price, marketing plans.
46
Sec. 7 confines the definition of a 'person' under the Sherman Act to corporations
and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of the U.S. or any state or any
foreign country. The same language of the provision is adopted by sec. 1 (a) of the
Clayton Act. The state monopolies or inter-state associations can be exempted from the
U.S. competition law.
47
317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). At the page of 351, it states that there is no suggestion of a
purpose to restrain 'state action' in the Act's legislative history and that the sponsor of
the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only business combinations.
48
See Ch.II. Sec.II. para.( c). It stipulates that the Model Law does not apply to the
sovereign acts of the state itself, or those oflocal governments, or to acts of enterprises
or natural persons which are compelled or supervised by the State or by the local
governments or branches of government acting within their delegated power. Ch.II, sec.
II. para. (c). See UNCTAD, MODEL LAW ON COMPETITION, 3 (2007).
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as legitimate and have been promoted under international commodity laws. The
international commodity agreements (ICAs) and intergovernmental producers'
associations (IPAs), 49 which are distinguished from a private cartel under competition
law, have developed unique regulations under international commodity law. In light of
the development of international law and political consideration, the ICAs and IP As
may not be under the same rule as the cartel of private companies only due to the
economical perspective that countries restrain competition in the international trade. 50
(3) Conduct and Purpose
In terms of conduct, a cartel shall have agreement for restricting or do restrict
reciprocal competitive activities in the market among participating companies which
are supposed to compete for the purpose of enjoying extra profits. The purpose of
restricting competition may be presumed by the contents of the agreement and the
impact of cartelistic activities on markets subsequent to the agreement. However,
diverse types of business activities may fall under the category of (b) an illegal cartel in
the following picture when their anti-competitive effect outweighs pro-competitive
effect. For example, concerted refusals to supply to or deal with a competitor fall on the
illegal cartel when the cooperative parties enjoy market power or exclusive access
which is essential to effective competition, 5 1 and when the concerted refusals occur

49

The ICA is an international agreement that restrains competition in international trade
of a product or raw material with both consuming and producing countries as members
while the IPA is one with producing countries only. Refer to Ch.l.IV.(l).
50
Association of states producing natural resources or setting technical standards will
be discussed in IV of Ch.l.
51
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986). Application of the
per se illegal in boycott cases is confined to the case where firms with market power
boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a
competitor. Group boycott has been under per se illegal since the U.S. Supreme Court
23

horizontally. The decision regarding anti-competitiveness of concerted refusal depends
important factors. including i) the motive of the denial, ii) the degree to which access to

as t<
regt

the standard is critical to effective competition, and ii) the effect on competition from

restl

excluding the tival. 52 Vertical restraint, which belong (a) vertical restraint of
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competition law in the picture, occurs between companies which do not compete each

stan

other, so it needs different economic analysis from a cartel regulation to determine its

corr

anti-competitiveness. 53 Price-fixing, production-limitation, market-allocation, and bid-

corr

rigging, as major four HCC activities. fall under the category of (c) because they in

con·

most cases cause much more severe harm than benefit.
As one of the more ambiguous areas, there exists a standard-setting activity which
causes both pro-competitive effect, e.g. efficiency-enhancement from integration of

EU
acti

standards. and anti-competitive effect. e.g. resttiction of competition, in a relevant
market. The activity may constitute an illegal cartel when it suppresses more than
promotes competition. 54 Concretely. it violates cartel regulation when the standard
works as an agreement among competitors to tix prices or to exclude another
competitor, 55 and when the anti-competitiveness effect should outweigh the efficiencyenhancing effect of integration from standard-setting. 56 Even a pool license agreement
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decision, IGor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 359 U.S. 207, 79 S.Ct. 705 (1959).
52
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, HANDBOOK ON THE ANTITRUST ASPECT OF STANDARD
SETTING, 65 (2004). .
53
Non-price vertical restraints are rarely opposed by competition authorities. UNCTAD,
supra note 48, at 26.
54
National Society of Profession Engineering (NSPE) v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 691
(1978).
55
See National Macaroni Manufacturers Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965);
.
Radtant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. 364 U.S. 656, 659-660 (1961).
56
In the U.S., courts which had held the activities derived from standard-setting illegal
under per se rule, have relaxed the strict approach. The Standards Development
24
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as to new technology, where competing patents are pooled. 57 might invoke cartel

; to

regulation when anti-competitive effects, e.g. exclusion of non-member competitors or
restriction of competition in the area not related to the technology, outweigh procompetitive benefits, e.g. promotion of R&D.

h

58

Decisions regarding membership of

standard-setting organizations (SSOs) can violate cartel re!:,rulations when anti9

competitive effect prevails over legitimate interests. 5 Neelie Kroes. the EU
l-

competition commissioner, warned more strictly that if voting in the standard-setting
context is influenced less by technical merits but rather by side agreements,
inducements, package deals, reciprocal agreement, the result of voting may fall foul of
EU competition rules. 60 Overall analysis of economic impact and social etfect of
activities related to SSOs needs complicated studies. 61

J,

Organization Advancement Act of 2004, Pub.L.No.1 08-23 7, confirmed the shift. ABA
Sec. of Antitrust Law, supra note 52, 31-32 & 34-35.
57
ABA, supra note 52, 73. However, so called blocking patents, in which one party
could not practice under its patent without infringing the other party's patents, or
complementary patents, which cover different aspects of the same technology, are less
likely to be anti-competitive.
58
U.S. DOJ Antitrust Division, Business Review Letter as to DVD Standards (June 10
1999).
59
The legitimate interests are proper functioning of the organizations and overall
efficiency in related markets. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,296 (1985). The decision of a buying
cooperative to expel a member would be under the rule of reason unless the cooperative
has market power or exclusive access to an element essential to competition. On the
other hand, in Pretz v. Holstein FriesianAss'n of America, 698 F.Supp 1531, 1539
(D.Kan. 1988), the court declined to apply the per se rule to the decision of a cattle
registry association to exclude a member even when the association had very
substantial market power and membership in the association was essential to effective
competition.
60
Nikki Talt, Kroes warns on open technology standards, FT, at 2 (Jun.11, 2008). She
made the statement at an OpenForum Europe seminar in Brussels.
61
ABA, supra note 52,44-46, & 47-79. In evaluating the selection and enforcement of
standards, courts consider whether the standard creates or enhance the exercise of
market power by the SSO or its members and whether the standard has an
25

Compared to the major four categories of(c) HCC in the picture, the other category
of cartels under (b) needs in-detailed analysis in related markets for the decision of proor anti-competitiveness. It is because many cooperative arrangements, designed to
increase economic efficiency, can enhance competition in related markets.

62

Although a

rule of thumb tells that price-increase and output-reduction actions are mainly
evidences of restraining competition, there may be hidden pro-competitive effects, e.g.
long term effects, or outweighing national interests. Each country can place different
weights on the national interests or the hidden effect in light of its unique situation,
which works as hurdles to reaching international consensus. The definition of a cartel in
this thesis, with the purpose of achieving international cartel law, needs to be confined
to the cartel category that clearly causes huge net consumers' loss and market
inefficiencies. The narrow definition can conveniently facilitate the achievement of
intemationallaw on cartels.

com
inst;
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anti competitive purpose or effect. The composition of a SSO may be an evidence of the
anti-competitive motive. In addition, the non-discriminatory and consistent application
ofthe standards maybe another evidence ofit. Some types of distortion ofthe
standard-setting process show the anti-competitive effect or purpose.
62
As to the concerted refusal to deal or boycott issue, refer to Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 441 U.S. at 20; 99 S.Ct. at 1562 & Northwest
Whole Sale Stationeries, v. PSP Co., 105 S. Ct. at 2620. The Supreme Court
acknowledges the necessity of careful defining of per se illegal group boycott, by
quoting Sullivan, LAW OF ANTITRUST, 229-230 (1977), "there is more confusion about
the scope and operation of the per se rule against group boycotts than in reference to
any other aspect of the per se doctrine."
26
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Picture : The Coverage of Cartel
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Public Cartel

Private Cartel
Competition Law (a)
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Commodity Law
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Intergovernmental
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(4) The Coverage of the Cartel for International Cartel Law
With the three elements of the cartel, the cartel can be defined as an agreement or a
collective action under the agreement to restrain business activities of more than two
independent and reciprocally competing entrepreneurs or undertakings so as to restrain
competition. The definition matches the (b) plus (c) area in the following picture. The
instances of tight business combinations, such as joint venture, do fall on (a) as they are
regulated under merger or monopolization regulations within the competition law
regime. While the formation of an economic entity with legal personality belongs to
merger or monopolization, the formation of a loose combination of companies as an
association of competitors to restrict competition falls under the category of a cartel. A
vertical restraint can be under the (a) area as it belongs to a different category of
regulation.
The IP As have states or state-monopolies as their members. They are beyond the
coverage of competition law but under the commodity law area. However, some usages
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of a cartel, particularly what is reported on the internet, e.g. dictionary.law.com and

ofle

Wikipedia63 , include an inter-state cartel under the definition of a cartel with the focus

by tl

on the economic impact of IP As similar to a private cartel. It neglects the development

Corr

of commodity law. Commodity laws regulating international commodity transaction (d)

hav(

have been developed with the unique characteristics of a commodity.

64

ICAs, although

intet

having consuming countries and producing countries as members, have played almost

cate.

the same roles in the markets as the IPAs. With the only difference being membership,

narr·

the !CAs and the IPAs are treated the same way in this thesis. The discussions as to

ton

inter-state cartels apply to both.
Particularly, for the purpose of achieving an international cartel regulation, the
definition of a cartel should have explicit several categories of behaviors with net anticompetitive effects so that they may reduce ambiguity on the effect of the behaviors on
competition and reach international consensus for regulation conveniently. The HCC

eco1

under (c) falls on a representative example. The definition is similar to the OECD HCC

the

recommendation, but narrower than the UN Set, which includes other concerted

adv

behaviors such as refusal to deal with a certain partner(s) matching the (b) area. It is

wot

noteworthy that the U.S. antitrust law, which has played as the leading competition law
in the world, narrowed the (b) area to such a way that its cartel regulation may
concentrate on (c) hard core cartel activities. The anti-competitive activities under the
(b) have been regulated under the title of horizontal collusive behaviors distinguished
from cartel regulation. 65 The reason for such a division comes from a different standard
situ
63
64
65

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cartel (visited on Feb. 27th, '08)
Refer to ch. l.IV. and ch. 2. IV for IPAs and ICAs.
Eleanor Fox, Lawrence Sullivan, & Rudolph Peritz, CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S.
28
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oflegitimacy. While a cartel is investigated and prosecuted under a per se illegal rule
by the DOJ, other categories are treated under the rule of reason by the Federal Trade
Commission. Recent international laws on cartels, particularly from OECD and WTO,
have focused on (c) HCC and individual countries have trie-d to comply with the
international laws. Therefore, for the international law perspective, rather than a broad
category of cartels with net pro-competitive impact under (b)+(c) or (a)+(b)+(c), the
narrow definition of a cartel with four categories ofHHC under (c) is more beneficial
to reach further international agreement.

II. Discussions: Advantage and Disadvantage of Cartels

There are still opinions arguing that some cartels with beneficial effects on the
economy should be exempted under the regulations or allowed temporarily. In addition,
the public does not know in-detail the damages that cartels cause. After considering the
advantages and the disadvantages that cartels arguably have, the alleged exemptions are
worthy examining.

1. Advantages of Cartels

(1) Restraining Destructive Competition
The need of using cartels is clearly demonstrated by the 'brown field economy'
situation where an over-invested facility or capital does not reap as much profit as

ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT, 368 (2nd edition, 2004).
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investors expected but rather goes to chronic deficit due to less demand and decreasing
prices. It happens when many competitors participate in the market, who invested a lot
of money as a fixed cost, but when the slackened demand can not raise price. At the
moment, an individual entrepreneur in the competitive market can not help but lower
the prices so as to reap profit by increasing sales volume. However, with the other
competitors trying to compensate their costs by reducing prices and increasing sales,
the entrepreneur ends up with setting prices much below the average cost. This is the
situation called 'destructive competition' .66
The damage through destructive competition may be quite a large amount of money
considering the total investment of the overall number of entrepreneurs in the market.
The damage can exacerbate the level of efficiency in society, which competition law
tries to protect. The situation needs to be improved with the cooperation among the
competitors. A depression cartel is to be facilitated for a temporary period necessary to
rescue an industry seriously hurt by an economic depression.
The governments in advanced as well as developing countries have approved this
type of cartel in severe economic depressions. Quite a few governments used to operate
compulsory cartels under such political pressure as the struggle for existence might
wipe out the weak industry. Even the U.S. Supreme Court, in the Appalachian Coals
Incorporation case, during the Great Depression, acknowledged the coal output
limitation cartel without violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. 67 The Roosevelt

66

Joseph L. Bower and Eric A. Rhenman, Benevolent Cartels, 63 Harvard Business
Review 4, 124 -132 (1985).
67
Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
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Administration used public cartels in several industries.

EU member countries have

1t

looked for 'cartels' more than once to solve a destructive competition situation.

69

Japan

approves depression cartels for one year or less through a specific government agency.
Furthermore, Sec. 25 of the Presidential Decree of Korea's Monopoly Restraint Fair
Trade Act (MRFTA) has an exceptional approval provision for a cartel aiming to
overcome the depression with strict conditions.

70

The Model Law ofthe UNCTAD is

interpreted to allow a cartel in this context since it allows cartels to be authorized by
member states when the cartel members demonstrate a 'net public benefit'.

71

:y
(2) Securing Large Scale Investment Capital
Joint sponsorship for a project, which costs too much for individual entrepreneurs
to take but which is substantially beneficial to all the participants in the markets is
argued to be another area where cartels can play roles. A research joint venture is a
popular phenomenon which academic researchers have analyzed as beneficial. 72 Unless
the sharing of information limits the incentive for R&D investment or leads horizontal

e
68

J. Eatwell, et al. ed., supra note 1, 373. The National Industrial Recovery Act
permitted industries to formulate 'codes affair competition', which was ruled
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1935. However, the U.S. continued to
maintain cartels in coal mining, oil production, interstate transportation, and agriculture.
69
Bower & Rhenman, supra note 66.
7
Korea's Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has authority to approve collective
behaviors of entrepreneurs when (1) it is clearly expected that demand for a product or
a service would continue to decrease and supply would far exceed demand for
substantial period, (2) price of the product or service is below average cost for
substantial period, (3) substantial number of companies in the industry face possibility
of discontinuing their business due to depression, and (4) rationalization of the
company can not be a method of overcoming (1) through (3) situation. Huh, supra note
2, 290.
71
Model Law, article 3, paragraph 2.
72
William Baumol, When is inter-firm coordination beneficial? The case of innovation,
19 International Journal oflndustrial Organization 727, 729-31(2001)

°
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competitors to engage in monopolistic behaviors, a technology consortium or a
technology-exchange agreement produce net consumer welfare benefit.

73

Such

cooperation helps innovation efforts of small companies. In Germany and the
Scandinavian countries, industrial associations have long helped small companies

an

protect their interests by sharing expenses and promoting technological innovations

ca

from larger competitors. 74 Para. 30 & 31 ofChapter IV of Schedule 13 in the U.K. 1998
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Competition Act allow joint arrangement between competitors regarding the efficient

we

development and production of petroleum resources. 75 Moreover, Sec. 24-3 of the
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Presidential Decree ofKorea's MRFTA approves a cartel for research and technology

Be

development, as an exception to the prohibition of collusive behaviors with restricted
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conditions. 76
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Developing countries, where companies do not have sufficient financial systems to
invest much in research and development (R&D), have more necessity of collecting

st
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money for R&D investment than advanced countries. For example, the Colombian
legislation, the Lithuanian law, Ukrainian law, and the Hungarian legislation exempt
R&D cartels or the agreement that improve investment or technical or economic
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!d. at 732.
Bower and Rhenman, supra note 66, 126.
75
Rodger & Macculloch, supra note 43, 195.
76
KFTC approves the cartel when ( 1) the R&D is necessary for increasing industrial
competition power and the effect of the R&D on the market is significant, (2)
investment for the R&D cost too much to be provided by one company, (3) the cartel is
necessary for distributing risk of uncertain result of the R&D, and (4) the effect of
R&D outweighs that of restraining competition. Sec 24-3 of presidential decree of
MRFTA.
77
UNCTAD, supra note 53, 32-3.
32
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(3) Voluntary Regulation by Industry or Professional Associations
When the public requests its government to regulate an industry, autonomous
regulation by the industry members before an anticipated government control can be
another usage of a cartel. U.S. chemical industries recognized complex problems
caused by the toxicity of their products in 1974. Facing public scrutiny of the industry
along with the extreme cost oftesting the products as well as a scarcely trained
workforce, the industry constituted the Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology to
develop the technical strength to win the respect of the government and businesses.

78

Besides health or environmental concerns, voluntary regulation has been used in ethical
norms of professional organizations to offer honest and good-quality services by
suppressing excessive competition within the professions. Sometimes the ethical
standard includes price-fixing79 or its variations such as a ban on competitive bidding80
or a maximum medical fee agreement for insurance payment81 or a boycott to raise

78

Bower & Rhenman, supra note 66.
Goldfarb et. ux. v. Virginia State Baret al. 423 U.S. 886, 96 S.Ct. 162 (1975). The
Supreme Court held, minimum-fee schedule for lawyers published by the Fairfax
County Bar Association and enforced by Virginia State Bar is price-fixing and per se
illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
80
National Society of Professional Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari for the district court to decide the factual basis of
justification and affirmed the trial courts' decision that the ethical rules of the Society
violated section 1 of the SA which prohibited members' competitive bidding before an
engineer was selected for a specific project by a prospective client.
81
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). The Court held,
the maximum fee schedule is per se illegal price-fixing because (i) strict application of
rule of reason standard cost significant money, (ii) judges do not have much expertise
understanding in the industry and its market structure, (iii) a decision of a specific case
with different background gives almost no certainty or standard for legitimacy of
customs. Per se rule saves courts from the dilemma, and the Court has endured nullity
of some customs that would prove to be reasonable if total review is to be done so as to
secure procedural economy and conviction of the industry.
79
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fees 82 or a ban on professional advertisements about price & quality.

83

However, the

U.S. Supreme Court held per se illegal for all the former cases except the ban on

evah
com1

professional advertisement about price and quality. Meanwhile, the U.K. Competition
Act allows professional rules, designated and reviewed by the Secretary of State, to be

basis

excluded from Chapter I prohibition, cartel regulation. 84 Self-regulating bodies

econ

operating under other laws are also excluded from the Chapter I prohibition. 85

pred:

(4) Reducing Price Fluctuation

regw

Cartels are argued to prevent price fluctuations due to its independence from cost
and its agreement on fixed prices. The International Coffee Organization (I CoO),
arguably functioning as one of the international commodity agreements (ICAs), 86 has
set the market share of major global markets and has collected price information for
more than forty years. The International Tin Agreement (ITA) played a role similar to a
cartel by placing a ceiling and a floor price and export quotas. 87 The ICoO and IT A are

free

parti
82

FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). The Court
held, the boycott for raising fee for trial lawyers' representing criminal defendants in
Washington D.C. was also price-fixing cartel and illegal per se.
83
California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). The Court held, the
association's ban on professional advertising about price and quality requires looking
into the circumstances, details and logic of a restraint rather than a quick look analysis
for rule of reason.
84
Schedule 4 exempts designated professional rules. Rodger & Macculloch, supra note
43, at 192-3.
85
See Schedule 2 of the 1998 Act. Refer to id. at 193.
86
The ICoO membership consists of 45 coffee importing countries as well as 32
exporting ones. Under the strict meaning, a cartel is arrangement among producers. The
ICoO is not the cartel under the definition. However, it functions to restrain excessive
competition in global coffee market and to maintain stable production and price of
coffee through allocating market. Refer to !CoO, Rules on Statistics Indicator Price, at
13, Annex I, EB3776/01 Rev.l(2001), available at
http://dev.ico.org/documents/eb3776r1e.pdf (last visited on Oct. 23, '07)
87
Eric J. McFadden, The Collapse ofTin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity
Agreement, 80 A.J .I.L. 811, 815 (1986). Id. at 817. The predecessor of ITA was the Int'
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evaluated high in a point that they achieved price stability during its effective era
compared to its demising era.

88

Stable commodity price enables exporting countries,

particularly commodity-dependent developing countries (CDDC) to have financial

e

basis for purchasing food for the producers of the raw material and further promoting
economic development. Meanwhile, importing countries can enjoy the benefit of
predictability from stable price trends, if the price maintains to a reasonable level,
regardless of external circumstances such as weather.

89

2. Disadvantages that Cartels Cause

(1) Inefficiency in Production
a
!

Efficiency with low cost and high production quantity can be achieved through a
free market mechanism as a result of an individualized rational decision of market
participants. However, cartels replace market participants' free exercise of business
decisions with a cartel agreement, thereby restricting the free market mechanism or
competition. Restraint of the free market mechanism inevitably produces inefficiency
of production resources, thereby leading to comparatively a 'high price' and 'low

Tin Committee which had functioned as a producers' cartel with its membership limited
to producers from '20s to 40s. The ITA is an outgrowth of the Int' Tin Study Group of
1948-1956, which produced a draft oftin agreement for ITA including consumer states
as well as producers in the era of postwar cooperation.
88
Mark S. LeClair, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY MARKET AND THE ROLES OF CARTELS,
59 to 61 and table 3.2 (M.E. Sharpe Inc. 2000). Price variation during ICA functioning
period (1976 to 1986) was from 0.161 to 0.198 while it during non-functioning period
(1989 to 1996) increased up to 0.303. See McFadden, supra note 87, at 819. From the
initial Int' Tin Control Scheme in 1931 until the 1985 collapse, the ITA confined price
fluctuations to a much narrower range than those in unregulated periods.
89
Ch.I. Art.1 (2) of International Coffee Agreement 2001, available at
http://dev.ico.org/documents/agreeme.pdf (last visited on Oct. 23, 2007)
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production' because cartels prevent destruction of relatively inefficient high-cost
enterprises. 90 The reduced pressure to reduce cost through innovation, although difficult
to measure, generates harm to productive efficiency.

91

The inefficient production with

high prices directly results in detriments to the consumers.

92

As to price, the wide margins between costs and high prices caused by cartels were
illustrated in the 1930s in the U.S., so called the Great Depression era. In the rubber
industry, the international rubber regulation committee was able to maintain prices,
yielding a gross profit margin from 50 to 100 per cent above costs of productions
around its critical shortage period ofthe 1930s. The copper cartel maintained the price
to almost the same level for twenty years while technological improvements of copper
production reduced the cost to half during the 1920s and 30s. In addition, methanol
price trends in the U.S. from 1926 to 1941, when cartelization ofterritorial allocation
had been progressed in the methanol market by Union Carbide and Carbon, indicated
that the synthetic methanol price decreased by only 59% while output increased by
more than 740%. The Union Carbide and Carbon, the biggest producer of domestic
synthetic methanol, did not make much of an effort to reduce the price in loose

90

In the nitrogen cartel agreement of 1930, high cost enterprises were actually given
larger relative quotas than low cost enterprises. Corwin D. Edwards, ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS, 40 (Arno Press, a New York Times
Company 1976)
91
OECD, Report on the Nature and Impact ofHard Core Cartels and Sanctions against
Cartels under National Competition Laws, 6 (2002).
92
Edwards, supra note 90, 41. It illustrates aluminum manufacturers' cartel involving
the Aluminum Corporation of America [Alcoa]. The cartel caused damage to efficiency
in the market by price-increase and output reduction.
36

competition with only output-decreasing wood methanol without other competitors of
. meth ano l . 93
synthetic
On the other hand, the limitation of output by a cartel does not necessarily lead to
low level of production or high profit. The copper cartel after WWI tried to liquidate
the surplus stock, ending up with double the excess stock by the end of 1920. Moreover,
after General Electric (GE)'s geographical-market allocation cartel with Krupp Steel
Works of Germany in the world tungsten carbide market from 1928 up to 1936, GE's
annual sales of the same material with an 800 % price increase was outnumbered by
Krupp's monthly sales due to GE's output and demand reduction from the price skyrocketing. Furthermore, when the Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC)
succeeded in raising oil price per barrel from US$ 2.80 in 1972 to $36.68 in 1979, the
consumers put effort into substitution and conservation initiatives. The high oil price
provoked new producers, e.g. China, to enter the market and non-OPEC producers, e.g.
Mexico, to expand their production while the high price caused covet cheating within
the organization. The extreme increase of the oil prices turned out to cause severe
holdback of sales of OPEC members. 94 All the responses can lead to substantial
lessening of pricing power of the OPEC in the long run.
(2) Unfair Treatment: Price-Discrimination
As a cartel agreement has characteristics of exclusiveness against free market
mechanisms, it can easily create discriminatory pricing depending on the territory or
cartel-affiliation. In a cartel agreement involving the Dow Chemical Company and
93

Stockings & Watkins, supra note 1, 116-122, 124-125 and 130.
ld. at 129 to 134. LeClair, supra note 88, 14-15 and 67-71 (M.E. Sharpe Inc. 2000).
OPEC's share in the world oil market continued to decline from 55.4% in 1973 to
28.5% in 1985. The average price per barrel dropped to US$ 14.23 in 1986.
94
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Alcoa in the magnesium market, Dow provided Alcoa with a discount, averaging 30 to
40 % lower than those quoted to Dow's other domestic customers from 1927 to 1931.
Although the price differential between Alcoa and other domestic customers decreased
to an average of 28 % from 1931 to spring of 1942 when an antitrust decree broke up
the cartel, the price-discrimination was maintained during the time. After the
dissolution of the cartel, Alcoa purchased its metal from Dow under price regulations at
an average of 5% below the regular price. 95
(3) Inflexibility of Price with Entry Barriers
Cartel prices are not flexible because it does not reflect changing business
conditions through the market system. Rather, in most cases, a cartel agreement aims to
raise prices and hold it as high as possible without paying much attention to supply and
demand in the markets. 96 Some cartels, with their forecasts, fix and adhere to prices
high enough to assure substantial profits to their members, including less efficient
companies, even with the minimum output in recession. On the other hand, most cartels
advance prices under a prosperous condition up to the point that the reduced quantity of
sales may limit profit. 97
However, although the high-fixed price with maximized profits attract new
competitors in the market, new comers do not easily participate in the market because
various entry barriers established by cartels create hurdles. The cartels need to bloc
entry of new competitors into the industry to enjoy long-term control over price. The
major barriers are illustrated as exclusively concerted behaviors, , a line of
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Stocking & Watkins, supra note 1, 13 8 to 141.
Mcfadden, supra note 87, 823-24.
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Id. at 136. Edward, supra note 90, 40.
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discriminatory distribution, which may be in a collaborated manner among cartel
members, unfriendly or even opposed against new comers,

:d

98

technology armed with

pooled patents, and a heavy level of fixed capital.
(4) Malfunction of Market Economy Mechanism
Even though it might sound economically sensible in exceptional circumstances to

at

raise prices to improve profits in a distressed industry, the principle applies to limitedly
rare cases. 99 Even though the exceptional cases have positive effects on the economy, it
is important not to make the exception a main principle to justify the economic harms
that most cartels bring about. Noticeably, even in the exceptional cases, cartels might

to

do harm by aggravating the evil circulation of under-investments, under-employment,

d

and decreasing demand power for other products with less incentive to invest. 100
Rather, imperfect competition, a concept currently popular among modern
economists, makes an issue out of the weakness of competition, not the severity of it.

ls

They argue that the gentlemanly restraint and mutual deference among competitors

Jf

rather than competition prevailed in many industries. 101
Moreover, even though cartel proponents argue that cartels help to restore balanced
markets in some fields where overproduction progresses, a temporary restriction of
oversupply to take away the current surplus may bring about an expansion of extracapacity through non-members or members' additional and surreptitious investments.
The sustained high price sooner or later leads to even more oversupply. On the other
hand, the increased price suppresses demand in conflict with a cartel's original goal of
98

Stockings & Watkins, supra note 1, 136-138. LeClair, supra note 88, 59 to 60.
Stockings & Watkins, supra note 1, 104-1 06.
100
/d. at 216-240.
101
/d. at 108.
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securing future consumption. It promotes consumers' substituting efforts with other
complementary goods. 102 In the long run, it leads to reducing cartel power. Therefore,
cartels can not resolve the initial overproduction problem due to oversupply or reduced
demand. 103
(5) Consumers' Damage
Cartels cause large damages to consumers through fixed prices. Total harm to
consumers consists of consumers' loss and consumers' damages. Consumers who
would pay the price determined by market mechanism of price-competition will face
higher prices in the market where suppliers collude to set price or quantity. Economists
agreed that, unless consumers have market power to decrease the price, consumers'
collective decisions to purchase less of the product at the cartel-determined higher price
means an overall loss of consumers' welfare. As the loss is not easy to calculate, the
following concept is used as the basis of calculating consumers' damage. 104
The consumers' damage (CD) is the sum of expenditure that individual consumers
pay additionally beyond the normal price, which amount to unlawful gains of cartel
members.

105

In most price-fixing cases, the sum is not easy to quantify since it would

require comparing the actual price in the manipulated market to the normal price in a
hypothetical competitive market. Moreover, as competition law usually does not
require its calculation, it is hard to find out the exact amount of CD. For the research
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McFadden, supra note 87, 825 & 830.
Stocking & Watkins, supra note 1,108-109 and footnote 10: LeClair, supra note 88,
13-14 and 58-61.
104
Consumers' damage (CD) is used for persuading consumers and policy makers to
implement strict policy against cartels, to redress to consumers and to measure
appropriate sanctions. OECD, supra note 91, 6.
lOS Jd.
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purpose of demonstrating an estimate CD, it is calculated as 'consumed quantity [Qcl'
multiplied by the gap between the high fixed price [Pr] and the normal price [Pn] that
consumers will pay if there is no price-fixing agreement in the market. The consumers,

in other words, are cheated by price-fixing and deprived of the consumer benefit
quantified below.

The amount of CD varies case by case, but usually is large enough to cover the
whole scope of a market in light of cartel members' market power. If the suppliers who
agreed with the higher price do not have power to affect the market price, consumers
can purchase the same product from other suppliers with no higher price, then, the
cartel would be ineffective. Individual suppliers are not willing to participate in an
agreement when they estimate that a cartel has insufficient market power to affect the
market condition. Therefore, once a cartel is formed and has been operated, CD is quite
large in light of the scope of the market and the cartel members' power on the market.
OECD's survey states that the affected global commerce of just sixteen large cartel
cases out of one hundred nineteen cases, revealed from 1996 to 2000, exceeded US$ 55
billion. Considering the insufficient data of cartels' damages, the difficulties of learning
about cartel agreements, and under-enforcement in each country, the magnitude of the
harm from the cartels will be tens to hundreds billion dollars annually. 106 In the U.S., an
international vitamin cartel case reached a US$ 2.4 billion-amount settlement with
direct U.S. purchasers in the class action suit, which is estimated as a little more than
the total harm that the cartel actually caused. On the other hand, KFTC indicates that
106

OECD, Policy Brief Hard Core Cartels -Harm and Effective Sanctions, May 2002,
available at http://www.oecd.org/ (visited on Jul. 10, 2008).
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while a price-fixing and bid-rigging case among major three school-uniform producers
in Korea turned out to cause around US $ 50 million of annual damage for two-and-a-

halfyears, 107 the international electronic-graphite cartel case caused around US$ 37
million of annual damage for five years in Korea's market.

108

In light of the fact that

the global market scope is around twenty five times larger than Korea's, the annual
damage by an international cartel may reach US$ 0.93 to 1.23 billion. It is noteworthy
that, when KFTC and the judicial body of Korea estimated total damages of pricefixing cases, they used the concept of CD, estimated by the total sales of conspirators
multiplied by a gap between the fixed price and average price of normal bids. 109
(5) Loss of Faith in Social Integrity and Honesty
Besides economic harm, a cartel has a negative influence on social justice. 110 When
such an agreement as usually secret among competitors brings huge profits to
themselves, enterprisers tend to be more concerned about their competitors rather than
about their consumers' interests. Social respect toward successful enterprisers and faith

107

Korea's Won 50 billion (the exchange rate is calculated as KW 1,000 equal to US $1
in this thesis for its convenience). The school-uniform price-fixing had maintained from
the end of 1998 until2001 for two-and-a-half year, thereby causing 2.5 million students
$ 125 million, or$ 50 per purchaser. KFTC, press release: KW 11.5 billion (US $ 11.5
million) surcharge & criminal reference to four corporations and seven individuals
involved in price-fixing & interference in consumers' bid (including bid-rigging)
among school-uniform producers and distributors [ .Jil. .J!t ~1 ~ %-%~ ~1 ~ ~ 7}~ ~~
~ if%-To~ l=lJ"iiJl ~all t11 iiJl ~ 115~ ~ ll}~ ~ lf-11}, ~ ~ 47TI ~ A}~ ;A} 7~ ~
~ -"} .Jl ~], 4. para.1 (May 2001 ), available at http://www.kftc.go.kr (visited on Jul.1 0,
2008)
108
The damage calculated by KFTC is KW 183.7 billion for the 5 years which amount
to around US $ 184 million.
109
KFTC, supra note 107. See also Ye-Rang Hwang, Seoul District Court Decided that
price-fixing damages, US$ 58, should be compensated to individual purchaser [ .Jii.J!t~
~W 51il-8~ ~~~ l:l~ %"8"}2} ], The Hankyoreh, Jun.20, 2005, available at
http://www.hani.co.kr (visited on Jan. 29, 2007)
110
OECD, supra note 91, 6.
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in their honesty will be reduced when the public, usually consumers, realizes their

a-

cartelistic behaviors, which has the effect oftransferring the welfare of consumers to
enterprisers. The sneer attitude toward businessmen might result in the loss of faith in
the integrity and honesty ofthe whole society.

y

3. Assessment

Although a cartel is effective to prevent the waste of precious resources and the
collective destruction of a local economy in a temporary case, it demonstrates that the
results of diverse cartels is not good for efficiency but can interfere with a free market
n

mechanism. High or rigidly-maintained prices independent from cost or market
conditions support producers, especially inefficient suppliers, at the expense of both
consumers and new competitors facing entry barriers caused by cartel members. Some
examples even indicate the demise of cartels due to oversupply by either non-members
or members who cheat by ignoring any restraint of a cartel in response to the high price.

In short, the artificial restraint to price or output through a cartel causes conflict with
free market mechanism and subsequent inefficiency. The restraint can not maintain its
effect in the long run.
However, there are still dubious areas where cartels arguably have some positive
effects outweighing their negative effects under certain extreme circumstances during a
temporary period. Precedent research have already indicated, notably, in light of the
long-term effects, even in the arguably justified cases, that price manipulation
eventually turned back to or aggravated the initial problematic situation. As proponents
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of cartels try to exaggerate very limited advantages of cartels, it is beneficial to
investigate exceptional situations with such limited advantages and to find out whether
a cartel is justifiable in the context.
( 1) Crisis Cartel
First, in destructive competition situations, competitors tend to collude and fix
prices or sometimes output levels so that the price level may be maintained. Otherwise,
they would compete with each other by lowering prices, thereby ending up with the
survival of companies with large financial resources enough to endure price
competition regardless of their merit in quality. This result is in conflict with the ideals
that competition laws pursue. Although free market mechanisms should allow free
entry to and exit from the markets, in the special economic situations, such as severe
depression, destructive practices lead to competition not based on merit, quality or price,
but on financial ability to sustain businesses.
Fostering competition needs to be encouraged to maintain 'merit-based
competition' in a market under an extreme situation. Small- or mid-sized firms with
less financial resources but with high quality products should be able to survive the
situation. Therefore, lenient approaches against cartels in severe depression may be
adopted on the conditions that participants do not have power to control the whole
market, and the agreement aims at eliminating destructive practices under a voluntary
basis, and not restraining competition. In the Great Depression Era, the U.S. Supreme
Court approved Appalachia Coals Inc., established by 137 bituminous coal producers,
as an exclusive agent for the sale of all the coal that they produce. 111 In the Sugar

111

Appalachian Coals, Inc. et al. v. United States, 288 U.S.344, 53 S.Ct. 471 (1933).
44

Institute case, 112 the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the Institute which used

unfair methods of competition was worth not to be dissolved in a depression situation
involving destructive practices as well as overcapacity although the methods should be
enjoined. The case implied that the Institute was useful, in spite of its anti competitive
practices, and should continue competition in the economic situation. The case further
implied that a voluntary agreement among the competitors in the industry could be
exempted in light of economic circumstances.

113

(2) Inter-State Cartel or State-Operating Cartel
Second, competition that cartel regulations aim at is supposed to be among private
entities, either individuals or enterprises, not a public entity e.g. state. Regarding interstate or state-operating commodity cartels, the cartel regulation which applies to usual
:,

private cartels does not apply in light of unique characteristics of commodities and
sovereignty principle. Price fluctuation in commodities, more often than not, is related
to poverty, or at least economic development of developing countries. Reduction of
poverty, and economic development have been acknowledged as duties of the states in
international law with more weight than competition in markets. In addition, excessive
exploitation of natural resources from competition intervene with conservation of the
natural resources under the states' permanent rights over natural resource and
environment protection. The sovereignty of states does not want international
regulations over activities of inter-state association or the state itself. Developing
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Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), aff'ing 15 F.Supp. 817.
Rudolph J.R. Peritz, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW,
136-9 (Rev. ed. Oxford Univ. Press, 1996)
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countries with newly adopted competition laws exclude agricultural commodity and
.
114
natura1 resources fr om thetr coverages.
Although existent cartel regulations exempt public cartels from their application,
such commodity cartels should not totally disregard the competition perspective.
Historical inability of cartels to control price or production of natural resources in the
long term proves that cartels do not provide as many advantages as their original intent
except in some cases. 115 Cartels usually ended up with generating high price, thereby
pushing consumers to alternative source or reducing demand. 116 In the inter-state
commodity cartel, a voluntary guideline without sanction on non-complier need to be
acknowledged for output and maximum price fluctuation in the light of special
circumstances of producing countries.
On the other hand, as to arrangements or associations of private companies or
individuals regarding natural resources, output restriction or price maintenance can be
the object of cartel regulations under competition law. Unless a state drives a public

114

Jamil Anderlini, Foreign investors fear China law to curb monopolies, FIN. TIMES, at
5 (Aug. 31, 2007). In keeping with the government's commitment to improving the
livelihood of more than 800 million rural citizens, China's ftrst anti-monopoly law does
not cover the agricultural sector, allowing farms to form cooperatives, such as cartel,
that can market their products. The government protects many state-own monopolies by
separate regulations in areas including petrochemicals, coal, and power.
11
LeClair, supra note 88, 81-83. The exceptions are bauxite and petroleum.
116
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) which specified a price range through export
quotas for reducing price and supply fluctuations but ended up with high price lost
price control by exporters supplying the excess production over the limit to nonmember
countries with cheap price. !d. at 58-61. International Cocoa Agreement failed to either
stabilize or raise prices due to oversupply of non-participants and entry of new
producers. See id. at 63-67. Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is
thought to lose its significant price control back in 70s due to conservation efforts of
industrialized countries. shift to alternative energy sources such as natural gas and coal
and the increased number of non-member countries with expanding their output as well
as new producers. /d. at 67-71.
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cartel policy with an appropriate legislation, private entities are not under such a duty
unlike the states. Private entities can not justify the result that consumers are cheated by
the increased price, or the reduced production of a cartel.
(3) Cartels for Research and Development
Third, as to joint research, companies with insufficient financial sources to invest
1t

into research or technological innovations in an industry, e.g. small or mi-sized
companies, sometimes need to get together under an arrangement. Benefits from the
investment will go directly to consumers if the joint research succeeds in creating a
high-quality product with a relatively low price. On the other hand, participants have
the high chance of competition-restricting activities, e.g. price-fixing or the suppression
of innovation-outlays, increasing because the participants spending a lot of time and
money have the same interest in the research. 117
In light of the conflicting points, a cartel authority may have power to regulate the
anti-competitive behaviors of their research in a case where anti-competitive effect
outweighs efficiency. Concretely, in exchange of approval, the authority may request

t

that the participating companies should not, during or after their collective research
period, conspire or implement an agreement which restrain competition in a market.
However, in light of the characteristics of technology consortia in practice, the

I

possibility of the perversion is low. The negotiation of the arrangements is strictly
bilateral rather than multi-lateral convenient for a cartel conspiracy. 118 In addition, the
incentives built in a technology consortium lead to the increase of R&D investment. In
other words, as a firm only with sufficient technology information may participate in
117

Baumol, supra note 72, 732.

118 ld.
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the exchange agreement, the firm needs further R&D investment to maintain the
.

consortiUm.

119

(5) Cartels by Professional Organizations
As to the voluntary restraints by a professional organization, there are some
necessities for ethical rules of professional services. However, the agreement regarding
service fees among member entrepreneurs should not be allowed. Even though the
service-fee restraint may lead to competition with more focus on high quality of service
by prohibiting fee-decreasing competition, the restriction can not satisfy consumers'
desires to have a wide range of services. Although autonomous service quality control
is an appropriate policy for professional organizations, price-fixing is never a good
method for quality control but is the very measure to restrict a free competition
mechanism. Although professional practices have a public-service characteristic, the
service is offered to consumers in exchange for money, which falls on commerce.
Moreover, the activities of professionals have played an important part in commercial
transactions. As a result, their anticompetitive practices impose a restraint on commerce.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court in Goldfarb et. AI. v. Virginia State Baret. a/. case
(1975) held that the fee prescribed by a minimum fee schedule issued from the State
Bar and County Bar Association fell on price-fixing against Sec.l of the Sherman
Act, 120 the Supreme Court has affirmed a violation of Sec.l in most cases involving
professional organizations' restriction of price competition. 121 Recently, the Omnibus
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/d. at732-3.
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Lewis H. Goldfarb et. al. v. Virginia State Baret al. 421 U.S. 773, 95 S.Ct. 2004
(1975).
121
Price-fixing or its variation restraining price-competition is per se illegal. Goldfarb
et. al. v. Virginia State Baret al. 421 U.S. 733 (1975), National Society of Professional
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cartel Repeal Act in South Korea adopted the strict application of cartel regulations
against a fee-settlement by nine professional organizations including lawyers, certified
public accountants, patent 1awyers, customs o ffi cers, etc.

tg

IV.

122

Intergovernmental Agreement for a Commodity Distinctive
from a Private Cartel

1. International Commodity Agreement (ICA)
(1) The Meaning
International Commodity Agreement (ICA) is an agreement between governments
of both producing and consuming countries to regulate the terms of international trade
in a specific commodity 123 •124 It is a type of treaty in international law, which provides
regulatory measures for the stabilization of prices and supply. It establishes an
international organization with an international personality. 125

e.
Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 493
U.S. 411 (1990). In a exceptional case, the Supreme Court requires in-detailed
examination under the rule of reason standard for California Dental Association's ban
on price advertising. California Dental Association v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999)
122
Korea's Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act: Regulating Undue Concerted Activities
Exempt from the Application of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act
(hereinafter OCRA), Law No. 5815 (February 5, 1999).
123
A commodity in the I CAs means a primary commodity, any product of farm, forest,
or fishery or any mineral in its natural form or which has undergone such processing as
is customarily required to prepare it for marketing in substantial volume in international
trade. See Art. 56 para. 1. of the Havana Charter.
124
Christopher Gilbert, International Commodity Agreements, 2 (Jan. 14, 2005),
available at http://grade.unitn.it/people/gilbert/file/Attachment_10.pdf (visited on Ju1.1 0,
2008)
125 Kab'
rr-ur-Rahman Kahn, THE LAW & THE ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, at 9 (Martinus NijhoffPub., 1982).
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(2) Relationship with the Intergovernmental Producers' Association (IP A)
The ICA is different from the intergovernmental producers' association (IPA). The
IPA includes only producing countries while the ICA needs to admit consuming
countries as well as producing countries with an open membership. The ICA is seen as
more effective than the IP A in terms of screening the deviation from cooperative
measures, e.g. export or production quota, as it requires producing countries to report
regular statistics of production and export and consuming countries to limit imports. 126
The ICA has a similar economic impact on international commodity trade to the
IP A. The moderation of price fluctuation of the ICA in a commodity market prevents
excessive price changes through market interventions by countries with substantial
market power. Free price-setting mechanism of a market is under the control of the
agreement. The concrete ways of operation of the ICA include almost the same
measures as the IP A. The current demise ofiCAs implies that the ICA is not favored by
particularly consuming countries. Benefits to consuming countries such as stable prices
and participation in commodity policies were considered small while costs to them, e.g.
helping DCs under non-transparent artificial market control, were evaluated large. 127
This analysis explains recent resurgences of the IP A. 128 Although the ICA has a bipartisan membership structure, it has revealed characteristics close to IPA in economic
functions in markets. The following characteristics of commodity production apply to
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Gilbert, supra note 124, at 14.
!d. at 13-14.
128
Recently a proposal for the organization of natural gas producing countries, led by
Russia, was seriously discussed among major exporting countries. Meanwhile, OPEC
demonstrated an increasing influence on global crude oil market. Refer to 2(3).
127
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both JGA as well as !CAs. In this thesis, ICA is going to be discussed with IGA as there
:be

are not big differences between ICA and IGA in terms of its economic impact.

as

2. Unique Characteristics of Commodity Production
(1) Economic Perspectives

1

1) Significant Importance to Domestic Economies of Commodity Dependent

126

Developing Countries (CDDCs)
The inter-state commodity cartels have been acknowledged and supported financially

s

by the international community to sustain economic development of developing
countries, or the South, and to provide stable and reliable financial resources for the
food supplies. 129 In less diversified economies, commodity exports occupy substantial
parts of their national income and constitute valuable financial sources to provide foods

by

and other necessities to the public. Particularly, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs),

:es

which belong to the CDDCs 130 by Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), have their

.g.

economic foundations on commodity production. A group of the DCs with specialties
in exporting certain demand-increasing commodities do not belong to the CDDCs as
129

c

Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) ), a UN special agency for financing and
supporting commodity trade, was established for supporting commodity development
projects, one of which include commodity market risk management or pricemanagement for reliability of supply. See CFC, Current Trends & the New
Development Role of Commodities, 7-8 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.commonfund.org/downloadlactualiteit/CT06jelle.pdf (visited on Jul.1 0, 2008) & Figure 3,
section ofthe Decision I of the Governing Council of the Common Fund at its Seventh
Meeting in Dec. 1995, Decision I (VII/1995). See id., at 24, para. 8 ofU.N. General
Assembly (GA) Resolution A/57/236 (Dec. 2002).
130
According to CFC, the CDDCs are defined as the developing countries for which
50% or more of all merchandise exports are made up of non-oil commodities. Oil is
omitted for the following reasonable grounds; i) most oil exporter meet a qualitatively
different challenge from CDDCs and ii) the unique high value of oil can distort export
composition. CFC, supra note 129, at 10.
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they have land-abundant infrastructures and capitals and enjoy a large market share in
international trade, most of which have outgrown the level of economic development
and simple economic structure of CDDCs. 131 On the other hand, the CDDCs are the
other group of the DCs where the export of a commodity facing falling or stagnant
demand occupies a significant portion of national income. The commodity export from
the CDDCs has stagnant market shares due to poor infrastructure or high-risk
investments or low-sized farms. A large part of population in the CDDCs consists of
small producers working on a few commodities under less diversified economic
structure. The price changes in their major production affect more severely their
domestic economies and the poor population than other countries and classes.
2) Instability of Price in relation to Inelasticity of Production
In spite of the close relationship between commodity production and poverty, the
actual terms of trade indicated high volatility of the commodity prices. The
deteriorating prices of most commodities during the past and recent price surges in food
commodities and oil have revealed a wide range of economic impacts on the global
market. The fluctuation and the deterioration of the prices not only led to lower profits
from the international trade of the commodities but also exacerbated the poverty level
in the countries that focused on the commodity export.
The sensitivity of the commodity price and its severe impact on the economy is
exacerbated by inflexible adjustability of the commodity production to price change.
Commodities' outputs respond slowly to increased prices, but once expanded, they are
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For example, Argentina, Brazil, Thailand, Malaysia and recently Vietnam belong to
such Commodity Developers group. !d. at 8.
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extremely difficult to contract. 132 In addition, a commodity production requires large
fixed costs compared to small variable costs for production. As a result, the production
tends to be either much larger or smaller than economic equilibrium. As a solution to
the insensitivity to market price shifts, a buffer stock, however, requires huge capital to
operate in the price-moderating way,

133

which as one major reason led to collapse of

the Tin Agreement in 1985.
Meanwhile, agricultural or meat products need a relatively long time from several
months to even a decade, to grow up and be processed enough to become commercial
products in the market. 134 The storability of agricultural products are limited due to
natural decades and consequential cost increase. 135

(2) Political and Legal Perspectives: State-involvement
In most cases, states themselves are producers of commodities, particularly natural
resources including minerals, or the states are involved in agricultural commodity
production with in governmental policies, e.g. subsidies or export quota. The
sovereignty issue and public interest from such state-involvements and subsequent
rights and obligations is distinguished from the individual entrepreneurs working on the
private interest without any public duty or privilege in intemationallaw. 136 A state with
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See Scherer F.M., COMPETITION POLICIES FORAN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY, 54
(Brookings Inst. 1994).
133
Edward Quill, The Failure ofInternational Commodity Agreements: Forms,
Functions, and Implications, 22 Denv. J. Int'l L.& Pol'y 530 (1994).
134
ld. at 530. Production cycles limit the ability of an international commodity
agreement to control supply. For instance, coffee plants require ten years to reach full
maturity.
135
ld. at 529-30.
136
Refer to II. 8. of this Chapter.
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sovereignty has their unique privileges or duties as a major subject under international
law while a private company does not. A government in itself has the right to exploit
natural resources as national properties under internationallaw. 137 Even in some cases
private companies participate in such productions, as recently growing phenomena, a
type of national license or authorization and subsequent government restrictions are
needed. The governmental restrictions have the characteristic of sovereign acts, which
are protected under international law unless there is a norm of jus co gens, or customary
international law, or an international treaty to which the state accedes. It is not easy
work to persuade a multitude of governments to reach an international agreement for
restraining their sovereign powers, which provide a lot of economic benefits to their
revenues. For example, governments have provided subsidies to their agricultural
producers by supporting their productions while maintaining low prices. Currently,
multilateral negotiations for curtailing governmental subsidies under the WTO Doha
Round did not create an international agreement due to internal political conflicts.
Placing international competition in commodity trades, by cutting subsidies, let the
government face risks to deal with strong protests from many laborers who depend on
incomes proportionate to the price of their productions.
State interests in intergovernmental cooperation lead states to gather together to
manage total production or price level of the commodity and to establish international
organizations or associations for the purpose of controlling a respective commodity
137

The right is acknowledged in UN GA Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, art. 31, 33 and 34 of Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, Declaration & Program of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO, and UN
Conference on New & Renewable Sources of Energy. The economic development of
the resource-producing countries has been protected as the principle of UN Charter.
Refer to Ch. 3. NIEO.
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ional

trade. For instance, developing countries that have significant importance in national

loit

commodities launched the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC) which has supported

ases

works of individual international commodity bodies. 138 The number of international

a

commodity bodies (I CBs) under the patronage of CFC amount to twenty five. 139 A

l,

e

recent proposal for the organization of natural gas producing countries as a new IP A,

ich

led by Russia, was seriously discussed among major exporting countries. 140 Since the

1ary

works of such organizations include the management or the setting ofthe prices or
production quantities of commodities, they have similar characteristics to a private

r

cartel.

(3) Different Legal Principles from Private Cartels
The ICA is an international organization with legal personality. It is different from a
conventional cartel with nothing but an agreement to restrict competition. The ICA is
shielded under the sovereign immunity principle. Additionally, the point that its
members are sovereign states enables the ICA to be protected from responsibility

138

CFC provided financial support, around total US$ 3.5 million, to price risk
managements of cocoa, coffee, cotton and pilot cotton in six cases in 2001. See id. at 16,
17, 20, & 21.
139
International Commodity Bodies (ICBs) are intergovernmental organizations which
concentrate on specific commodities through consultations between consumers and
producers, and analyses of market developments. Annex IV provides 25 ICBs. See id. 7
& 30-31.
140
Andrew England, Gas exporters launch pricing study, FIN. TIMES, AprillO, 2007, at
2. Russia, Algeria, and Qatar, responsible of 60% of the world gas exports, reached the
decision to operate a committee to study gas pricing policy of the Gas Exporting
Countries Forum (GECF). See also Russia, Qatar eye OPEC-style natural gas cartel:
Reserves rich countries seek ways to influence global market, Associated Press (Feb 12,
2007), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17116262/
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•
through the act of state doctrine in international law. The cooperative behaviors of
independent sovereign states do not change their characteristics by gathering together.
International law, moreover, has developed different rules under international
commodity law from cartel rules under competition law. Development, right to food,
and environmental protection under sustainable development are concerns that the
international commodity law needs to address in distinction with competition law. Art.
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 ( 1994 GATT) exempts from
its general obligations the governmental measures pursuant to the intergovernmental
commodity agreement, which is open to participation by both exporting and importing
states, and are designed to assure the availability of supplies adequate to meet demand
at stable prices. 141
In addition, the UNCTAD's eleventh session (UNCTAD XI) in 2004 adopted the Sao
Paulo Consensus. Para. 74 of the Consensus stipulates that a concerted focus should be
directed toward CDDCs, and that efforts by the countries to strengthen the
competitiveness of their commodity sectors should be supported by the provision of
enhanced market access on a secure and predictable basis and the strengthening of
capacity and institutions in both the public and private sectors. 142 The provision placed
a legal foundation for an international commodity-managing organization. The
subsequent sentence that existing compensatory financing schemes should be reviewed
141

Sub-para. (h). Ad Art. XX subpara. (h) extends the exception to any commodity
agreement which conforms to the principles approved by the Economic and Social
Council in its resolution 30 (IV) of28 March 1947. However, the exception, although it
opened a large loophole, made little practical effects because such agreements were
hard to make. Only wheat and sugar agreements had been made effective. George
Bronz, An International Trade Organization: The Second Attempt, 69 Harvard L. Rev.
440, 466-67 (1956).
142
CFC, supra note 129, 27.
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and combined with modem risk management and risk-sharing instruments
her.

143

approves

CFC's assistance to ICAs' activities e.g. quota or buffer system. Moreover, the
International Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries,

td,

and Donor Countries and International Financial and Development Institutions on
Transit Transport Cooperation in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in 2003 (2003 Almaty

Art.

Conference) urged, for commodity issues, concerted efforts by the landlocked and

)m

transit developing countries along with development partners, international

1

organizations, and other relevant regional and sub-regional organizations. 144

ng

n.d

3. Necessity of Different Regulations in International Commodity Markets
As rapid-increases of the oil price and food price threaten global economies,

;ao

particularly fuel-importing countries, and less developed countries which need financial

be

resources to purchase food, there are arguments that the currently operating
international commodity agreements shall be regulated similarly with private cartel
regulations. 145 However, such distinctions ofprimary commodities as mentioned above
necessitate independent regulation under the international commodity law. The

d

following arguments support the independence of commodity law with in-detailed
reasonings.

d

(1) Limitations of the Competitive Market Approach

t
143

144

see z"d.

para. 42 of 2003 Almaty Conference.
Raphael Minder & Joe Leahy, Asia battles with surging food costs, FIN TIMES, at 9
(Jan. 10, 2008); U.N. General Assembly, Report ofthe Secretary-General, International
trade and development, para. 4 N62/266 ( 62nd sess.) (Aug.l6, 2007).
145
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First, the adoption of competition in commodity market can threaten overall
economies and economic development ofCDDCs. Commodity price competition may
suppress stable maintenance of export revenues in most DCs which depend on
commodity production for a large part of their economic export. Some countries will
prohibit exports of their major commodities at low prices. A research by CFC analyzes
the distribution of wealth among agricultural-commodity-producing countries through
the price-increase of agricultural commodities, thereby distinguishing Commodity
Developers 146 from the CDDCs. The research states that the beneticiaries of the
increasing demand are Commodity Developers with an economy of scope rather than
the CDDCs and that only six commodities out of sixteen agricultural commodities
show strong unit price increases. 147
Second. as commodity price surges throw out the hunger issue,

148

commodity price

collapse exacerbate many people's lives in CDDCs where productions and exports of
small-farm-produced low-quality commodities occupy a substantial part of national
income. The CFC's researches pointed out price-decreases in many traditional
agricultural products which the CDDCs depends on while prices surge in some
agricultural products. In the CDDCs, the increase of foreign exchange revenues through
export growth is unlikely to come true under current situations. Robert Zoellick, the

146

A few developing countries, so-called emerging markets, fall on the Commodity
Developers (CDs). They are leading exporters of higher value commodities for which
demand is expanding. See CFC, supra note 129, 8.
147
!d., 7. The unit price of commodities from CDDCs had been lower during 2003-5
than the average world unit price for 12 out of 16 commodities. The reason of such low
p,rices is inferred due to lower quality products. See also id. at 10.
48
FAO Newsroom, Crop Prospects mixed for low-income food-deficit countries in
2007: 28 countries face food shortages, available at
http://www. fao.org/newsroom/ en/news/200711 000628/inde.html
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World Bank president, confirmed such difficulties of the CDDCs and states, "along
may

with high food and energy price, global economic turbulence starting from credit
crunch in the U.S. and western Europe poses difficulties to a group of poor countries,

viii

mostly in Africa, thereby undermining their recently-built fundamentals for growth and

lyzes

worsening hunger and malnutrition in the poorest sector."

ugh

1

149

Third, the rising price addresses the global concern for development of the countries
under negative impacts. Countries where the economic structure largely depends on
low-quality demand-stagnant commodities need international assistance for profitable

.an

agricultural productions and policy guides, which have been provided by international
organizations e.g. the Food and Agricultural Organization (F AO) and the CFC, and
industrialized countries, e.g. United States Agency for International Development

ce
of

(USAID).
Fourth, environmental issues matter when exploitation of natural resources goes
competitive. Natural resources shall not be traded without any fetter of environmental
protection because excessive exploitation of the natural resources limits the usability of
future generations. Under natural resource managements, an increasing number of

ugh

legislations are reflecting the necessities of agricultural cooperatives and tradable
fishing quotas.

(2) Balance oflnterests: Bipartisan Membership within the ICA

w

149

Krishna Guha and James Politi, Zoellick calls for fight against hunger to be global

Priority, FIN TIMES, 5 (Jan. 24, 2008).
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To effectively work continuously, an ICA should pursue the policy objectives that a

°

majority ofthe constituents desire. 15 Finding an objective for an organization is
important so that the organization may work continuously in a market. Since an ICA is
an organization operating in the global market, it needs to obtain correct objectives,
which come from resolving conflicting interests among members. Therefore, the ICA
needs a political process. If an organization targets an objective, not desired by a
powerful faction ofthe organization, it may lead to its malfunction or destruction. 151
The conflicting interests within an ICA come from bipartisan membership with
different perspectives. First, the conflicting interests within ICAs are the heterogeneous
interests of producers and consumers. The producers have more power in most ICAs
than consumers as the focus of the organizations is toward production management
including a quota. It is noted that some ICAs collapsed due to the difficulty of
reconciling two opposite positions between producers and consumers. Second, its
members can be divided into two groups, large and mid-sized economies and small
economies. The Commodity Developers (CDs) belong to the former group while the
Commodity Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs) belong to the latter group. As
the CDDCs, compared to the CDs, lack an economy of scope, information or
techniques for high productivity and high quality, products from the CDDCs tend to be
low-quality commodities. Since an ICA needs active participation from large producers,
mostly CDs, its objective cannot avoid reflecting the large producers' interests or a
150

Quill, supra note 133, 532.
!d. at 531-2. Quill illustrates the collapse of the Int' Tin Agreement( ITA). The ITA
was under a severe dispute between consumers from the North, including the U.S. as
the biggest consumer, and producers from the South by changing its objective from
moderating price-fluctuation & developing efficient production method to a
remunerative return to producers. See id. at 515-518.
151
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reconciliation between large consumers and producers, thereby overlooking the
interests of small-scale producers, particularly from the CDDCs.

\.is

The proper objective for ICAs is negotiation among different groups and distribution
of their interests. Consumers' concerns about food price increases can be negotiated

A

with producers, particularly, in terms of reducing hunger and malnutrition. Particularly,
for food commodity agreements, moderation of severe price fluctuation through
production management on the basis of output level forecast or increase of productivity
of good quality food may be a good objective. However, small-size consuming

JUS

countries or producing countries will still face difficulties in effectively representing
their interests on the negotiation table as their contribution to the agreement is less than
large economies. The special interests in small economies, particularly CDDCs, e.g.
poverty, food shortage, need to be addressed with supplemental law or policy.

(3) Necessity of Supplemental Measures
1) Special and Differential Treatment of International Trade Law
International commodity agreements, prevalent in the 1970s, grew less effective in
the 1980s and 1990s when market liberalization policy dominated international
commodity trades. Under this liberalization approach, the less competitive low-quality

:rs,

products from the CDDCs faced a reduction of exports under harsh competition,
thereby threatening the lives of small-sized producers in the CDDCs. Meanwhile,
advanced countries reduced their assistance in ICAs as trade liberalization dominated
commodity trades.

61

One way to solve the problem ofless competitive products in less developing
countries 152 is for them to learn from trades with advanced countries to produce and
develop for themselves. 153 The trade principle of reciprocity, however, as currently
illustrated, impedes promotion of international trade between DC groups and advanced
countries. Peter Mandelson, the EU Commissioner for Trade, recently stated that the
EU could not offer access to the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group
unilaterally but on a reciprocal basis under WTO rules. 154 The special treatment of
products from the ACP countries in the EU under the Cotonou Agreement (the former
Lome Convention) is no longer permitted under the WTO regime. The ACP states
cannot help but concede reciprocal trade preferences to the EU in order to have access
to the biggest market in the world. 155
The most-favored-nation (MFN) principle under the WTO regime invokes concerns
with less developing countries(less DCs). The less DCs have to offer reciprocal
concessions to regionally integrated markets, to which preferential treatment with any
trading partner in the future shall be applied equally under the principle, so that the
integrated markets may sell their products under the preferential conditions. Out of the

152

The less developing countries(less DCs) are distinguished from the least developed
countries(LDCs) designated by the UN. Less DCs are mostly middle-income and lowincome developing countries including LDCs. The major petroleum-exporting
countries, major exporters of manufacturers and high-income developing countries are
excluded from the less DCs. The less DCs are made up of the ACP group. Refer to
Ch.3.III.l. for the category of countries.
153
Bartram Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14
N.Ill.U.L.Rev. 347, 369-70 (1994). He cites the statement ofthe former Secretary of
State, George Shultz, in Rio de Janeiro at a conference sponsored by Brazilian business
rs;oups.
54
Mandelson, Brussels cannot offer ACP unilateral trade access, FT (Dec. 12, 2007).
155
Andres Bounds & Laura Dixon, EU to dilute trade deals to avert crisis, FT (Nov. 19,
2007). The literature on preferences highlight
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concern, Namibia and South Africa refused to sign new trade agreements with the EU
because they are required to allow future preferential treatments under the MFN

. .1

pnnc1p e.

156

Growing regional market integrations in advanced countries can work against the less
ocs as they place more opportunities with products from their member states than the
ones from the less DCs. 157 Economic cooperation within the DCs, in response to
economic blocs of industrialized countries, has brought less benefits than the
cooperation with the blocs because the low level of economic structure in many DCs

.
1 econom1c
. deve1opment effiectlve
. 1y. 158
could not support rec1proca
The strict application of current international trade law principles, between the less
DCs or CDDCs and the advanced regionally integrated markets, neglects the unequal
bargaining positions of each group of countries. Supplemental measures for promoting
trades between LDCs or CDDCs and advanced countries are in need and thereby
necessitate the development of international commodity laws independent from
international competition law.
Although the GATT system offered non-discriminatory quantitative restrictions to
further economic reconstruction with strict conditions, which require the prior approval
of the contracting parties, the quantitative restrictions have not been used widely to the
benefits of CDDCs. Only the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) under GATT

156

Bounds, Two African nations refuse to join EU trade deal, FT (Dec.4, 2007).
Quill, supra note 133, 536: Brown, supra note 154, 396. Brown classifies DCs into
Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) and the least developed Fourth World of Asia
and Africa, which falls on the LDCs in this thesis. He foresees that, while NICs may
join with Japan under a Asian trading bloc, the Fourth World states will be more
isolated than ever.
158
Brown, supra note 154.
157
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has at least been used in favor ofless-skillful products from DCs

159

as the GSP

provides permission to have duty-free treatment or non-reciprocal tariff preferences.
The point that the GSP operates on a permissive standard rather than on a mandatory
one weakens its effectiveness. The CFC has already recognized such practical
limitations of currently valid preferential treatments to DC groups.

160

2) Policy Assistance for Economic Development
Economic development, important for the growth ofDCs, does not automatically
grow through the trading of commodities which are abundant in DCs. For example,
countries where a lot of crude oil exists have achieved less economic growth than
expected with profit through their oil -trading and have rarely reached the level of
advanced market economy. Economic development requires high-skilled labor forces,
diversified economic structures, efficient market systems. transparent financial systems,
and competitive manufacturing industries. Neither a competitive international market
nor the OPEC has provided effective economic development to oil-exporting countries.

(4) Concern about Environmental Protection
Commodity production can generate environmental problems. Although economic
development through producing commodities requires exploiting natural resources and
transforming environments at the cost of future generation's usage, economic
development pays more attention to cost reduction than environmental protection. Such

159

Brown, supra note 154, at 362. UNCTAD have been less than satisfied with the
scope of the GSP as well as with its ultimate benefit because not all DCs are covered
and each advanced country provides too different and complicated schemes to evaluate
the closeness to its original goal.
16
CFC, supra note 129, 11.
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market system is difficult to consider environmental issues as an economic analysis of
production's effect on the environment remains in the primitive level. For instance, the
issue of water shortage is deeply related to the increase in the agricultural production
for biofuel, or ethanol which requires a large water supply. The fishery industry can
cause derivative killings of marine mammals as the WTO Tuna-Dolphin case illustrates.
A competitive-market-based approach to such environmental issues, however, is short
of considerations for future generation. Transfonnation of an environment takes a very
long time to be restored to their original state and, in quite a few cases, they can not be
restored at all. The future generation. which does not have a chance to participate in the
decision to interfere or alter environment, has to inherit the un-desired results and
endure the heavy burden of restoration.
International responses sometimes bring about some conflicts with national
sovereignty of, particularly, the developing countries which are heavily focused on
economic development. The lack of sufficient green technologies and limited economic
resources in the developing countries results in another market barrier of' green
protectionism' 161 under the pretext of environment protection. On the other hand, so
called 'eco-imperialism' has something to do with the more direct type of sovereignty
intervention. The argument matters when the jurisdiction of a state as to domestic
environmental law extends to the territory of another state. For example, the 1972
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Brown, supra note 154, 382. See also Alan Beattie, Green Barricade, FT 7 (Jan.
24, '08). The border tax for carbon emission might play the useful role of bargaining
strategy in trade negotiation table while the imposition of actual direct tax on imports
from under-regulated countries is difficult to be implemented fully due to complexities
of global manufacturing system and local regulations in the light ofWTO rule.
65
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Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) 162 in the U.S. brought a dispute of fishery
trade with Mexico in the Tuna-Dolphin case under the GATT.

163

The MMPA and

supplemental regulations placed strict limits on the number of dolphins which can be
killed by persons and vessels subject to U.S. jurisdictions, 164 provided penalties
including forfeiture of cargoes 165 , and banned importation of commercial fish, which
cause incidental kills or serious injuries of ocean mammals in excess of the U.S.
standard. 166 Even the MMPA prohibited the importation ofyellowfin tuna from the
East-tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) unless the Secretary of Commerce found that the
harvesting country had a program regulating the taking of mammals comparable to the
U.S. 167 Mexico argued that the extraterritorial application of the MMPA falls onecoimperialism. Indonesia in this case argued that the MMP A exploited sympathy for
marine mammals to protect the U.S. tuna producers, thereby falling on green
protectionism. The GATT panel held that unilateral national legislation e.g. the MMP A,
threatened to undermine the multilateral trading framework of the GATT, and was
inconsistent with Art. Xl.1. 168 Although the penal decision explicitly declared that basic
trade rules are not neglected in the environmental issue of international trade,
162

Marine Mammal Protection Act of1972 (MMPA), Pub.L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(Oct. 21, 1972). Sec.l01(a)(2) stated that the incidental kill or serious injury ofmarine
mammals permitted in the course of commercial fishing be reduced to insignificant
levels approaching a zero rate.
163
In the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean where dolphins and tuna are known to swim
very closely together and dolphins are encircled with purse-seine nets to catch the tuna
underneath, when the nets are withdrawn, dolphins are ensnared in them and/or trapped
below the surface where they suffocate.
164
§ 102(a)(1) ofthe MMPA.
165
§ 106(a).
166
§ 102(a)(2)(B).
167
§ 10l(a)(2)(B).
168
GATT Dispute Panel Report, US-Restriction on Imports ofTuna, DS21/R, 5.18
(Aug. 16, 1991).
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subsequent environmental critics against the decision implied that the environmental
protection issue is an area which multi-dimensional approaches under researches are
better to address rather than international trade law. As commodity production is deeply
involved with environmental protection, specific regulations for its production and
trade are in need. ICAs can be places to discuss the issue of preventing environmental
destruction when development-oriented approach is moderated by reflecting the
economic evaluation of environmental effect of commodity production. The
proclamation of a 'sustainable development' agenda by the international community,
which will be discussed inCh. 5, addresses the necessity for specific regulations.

4. Focus ofthe International Cartel Law: Private International Cartel
International cartels mostly operating with state-involvement include complicated
\,

interests. The member countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), currently the most powerful IP A, have argued for sovereign powers to manage
the natural resources which have been acknowledged by such international law as the
United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, Art. 31, 33 and 34 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, the Declaration & Program of Action on the Establishment of New International
Economic Order (NIEO), and the UN Conference on New & Renewable Sources of
Energy. Independent right to economic development of the OPEC countries has been
protected as a principle of the UN Charter. In light of such rights to natural resources,
the OPEC member countries will object to any international regulation over OPEC.
Even the non-member countries hesitate to accept international regulation regarding
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•
inter-state cartels with the fear that their sovereign power to produce other natural
resources may be intervened by the regulation. This thesis, which tries to make a
possible international regulation against cartels, places major focus on cartels
consisting of private corporations by distinguishing them from IP As. Countries, free
from fear of restriction to their sovereign powers, succeeded in reaching a consensus in
regulating cartels of private companies, such as the 1980 UN Set or the 1998 OECD
Hard Core Cartel Recommendation. To make binding international law on cartels, it is
convenient to root firm international consensus through active practices in the area.
Private cartels are to be discussed with priority. As IP As and ICAs have more weight
on economic development and poverty rescue than competition consideration, they
need to be regulated under separate laws, and not in the same coverage as private
cartels.

V. International Cartels and Their Representatives

1. Domestic Cartels vs. International Cartels
It is a cartel working across borders rather than the one within a domestic market

that quite a few international cartel regulations target. Some cartel conspiracies taking
place in one country may affect another country, which belongs to the latter category,
the cross-border cartel. The cross-border cartel is defined as an international cartel in
this thesis. On the other hand, a cartel conspiracy taking place and affecting one
country is defined as a domestic cartel. While the thesis does not neglect the
importance of regulating domestic cartels as a basis of consensus-building for
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international regulation, this thesis plans to devote itself to regulating international
cartels with which majority of international agreements deal.

2. Emergence of International Cartels
1

The phenomena of international cartels took place in the late 19 h century in Europe
where economic trade across national territories had been most in progress in the world.
The German-Swiss dyestuffs cartel established in 1880s was one of original
international cartels. 169 It set predatory price against competing, usually small,
producers from other countries so as to secure dominance over Western European
markets. According to a research, no less than forty international cartels, either public
or private, worked in Europe in 1897.

170

From the occurrence ofWWI to the Great Depression, international cartels in the
prewar stage were dismantled. When European states tried to recover the broken
economy under new frameworks of treaty of Versailles and World Economic
Conference in Geneva, one of the objectives of the Conference was to restore economic
integration and protect stable equilibrium between production and consumption through
international industrial agreements including public and private cartels.

171

However,

the Conference reached only a statement requiring close attention to such industrial
agreements due to conflicting opinions. The interwar cartels were re-established in line

169

John M. Connor, Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare & Antitrust
~Worcement, 1 (Purdue Univ. Jun.l8, 2003).
Andreas Resch, Phases of Competition Policy in Europe, Inst. of European Studies
Paper 050401, 3 (2005), at http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/050401/ (visited on Jul.l 0,
2008)
171
.
See zd. at 6.
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I
with agreements on a national level as states did not prohibit cartels.

172

Particularly, an

international steel cartel led by France and Germany's steel industries controlled the
entire steel production of members under a quota system with penalty payments for
excess production. Starting from the international steel cartel, followed by the
European Rail Manufacturers' Association(ERMA) in steel industries, international
cartels came out in markets of magnesite, carbide, glue, explosives, electric bulbs,
bottles, aluminum and copper. During the Depression, however, most international
cartels dissolved.
Although the efforts to achieve market control through international industrial
agreements failed, most states did not forsake measures of national intervention,
including a public cartel, 173 in disintegrated economies of the Depression era. As quite
a few nations adopted favorable or at least accepting legislative attitudes toward cartels,
international cartels had prospered supported by the tolerating legislative approaches.
International cartels in tin, aluminum, nitrogen, dyestuff, and enamel goods were
established with support of national governments through international treaties. The
cartels enjoyed their heyday during the 1930s, and affected 40 to 50 % of world trade
with monopolistic pricing.
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Meanwhile, the U.S. took strict investigations against

cartels, thereby causing American companies to be hesitant to participate in
international cartels. 175 However, as international cartels covered the American market
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Connor, supra note 170; Resch, supra note 171, 4.
However, the public cartels were treated by different rules from private cartels under
international law. The inter-governmental producers' associations(IPAs) in a clearer
term belongs to the public cartel.
174
Resch, supra note 171, 14.
175
Connor, supra note 170.
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as well as the European market, the affected commerce in the U.S. during the times
. "ficant rat es. 176
amounted to stgru

3. Aspects of International Cartels
Although international private cartels appeared in the late 19th century and grew
popular in the interwar era,

177

the ones uncovered since 1995 are different from the

previous ones in terms of scale, multicultural pluralism, refined operational technique,
and longevity. 178 Currently discovered international cartels cover markets in more no
less than two continents, and diverse participants from not only European countries but
also Asian countries. They lasted for more than six years on average while they worked
secretly.
Generally, an international cartel tends to be formed among a few companies

;,

competing with a homogeneous product in a high concentrated market where high
barriers to market entry block new competitors 179 or an industry trade association
exists. 180 Low buyer concentration prevents purchasers from counter-veiling against the
market power of the sellers in the cartelized market. According to a study, the organic
chemical industry had the highest percentage of 283 cartels discovered since 1990, a

176

Stocking et al, CARTELS IN ACTION, 4-5. The tentative results of their research
revealed that 87% by value of mineral products sold in the U.S. in 1939, 60% of
awcultural products, and 42% of manufactured products were cartelized.
17
Connor, supra note 170, at 48. Hundreds of international cartels operated in the
~terwar period, affecting nearly 50% of international merchandise trade.
78
See id. at 1. The forty international cartels were only the ones involved by Germany.
Great Britain was involved in 22 of them.
179
Id. at 6-8 •
180
OECD, supra note 91, at 7.
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majority ofwhich are chemicals for food or animal-feed ingredients.

181

The organic

chemical market is an area where several conditions for an international cartel are met.
The number of international cartels uncovered and investigated is not large, but
they generate enormous damage to not only commerce and consumers' welfare but also
to social integrity and industrial efficiency.

182

In terms of commerce, the size of the

affected sales is, although not direct, proportionate to the market scope and duration of
the investigated international carte1. 183 Compared to domestic cartels, the former
research of 283 international cartels demonstrated that global cartels had the highest
median sales, $ 2.64 billion while median sales affected by thirty seven domestic
cartels, active in one nation of Western Europe, is$ 1.5 billion larger than domestic
cartels in North America. 184 While the average duration of cartels with foreign
members was 6.4 years, global cartels last much longer than localized ones. 185 In terms
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Connor, supra note 170, at 10-11. See John Connor & Gustav Helmers, Statistics on
Modern Private international Cartels: 1990-2005, The American Antitrust Institute
(AAI) Working Paper No. 07-01, at 8 (2007). Connor & Helmer revealed 22% oftotal
international cartels came out in the area. See also Connor, supra note 170. at 4 & 11.
Although Connor defines an 'international cartel' as the cartel of which members
include foreign nationality or foreign-based headquarter, he mentions that more than
50% of the international cartel affects more than two continental market.
182
Refer to supra II. 2. Disadvantage of Cartels.
183
Connor & Helmer, supra note 182, at 12-13. Cartels working in global and West
European area occupies 76% (respectively 37.5) of 40 biggest cartels. The U.S. cartels
have 20%. While none was active only in Asia, two cartels were in South America and
Oceania respectively.
184
See id. at 3-4. 'International cartel' means a cartel consisting of a member with
foreign nationality or foreign headquarter while 'global' means that effect of the cartel
covers more than one continent. Connor & Helmers mentioned that 40 North American
cartels' median affected sales including those operating in both U.S. and Canada were$
0.9 billion (900 million). !d. at 14-15. On the other hand, Connor's prior research of 55
international cartels indicated, at 11, that the international cartels affected at least 211
billion, thereby causing$ 3.65 billion per cartel in table 5. ld. at 5.
185
Id. at 13. Global cartels lasts for the longest year (6.0 median years), followed by
EU-wide cartels (5.5), single nation in EU (3 .5). See id. at 11.
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of overcharge, while median overcharges are from 24 to 29 % depending on the
geographical area, global cartels have the highest rate at 29%.
matches other research studies.

187

186

This result nearly

With calculation of Consumers' Damage [CD] under

this thesis, 188 median CD ofthe global cartel is around US$ 770 million($ 2.64 billion

* 29% = $ 765.6 million). 189
The global cartels invoked severe sanctions through major competition agencies,
particularly U.S.DOJ. The level of enforcement in developing countries is less
developed than that in major industrialized countries with strict attitudes. The OECD
report, a survey of eighteen non-members' anti-cartel enforcements, demonstrates that
only four states imposed fines on price-fixing or bid-rigging. Since the report includes
domestic cartels, enforcements against, particularly, international cartels, from the
developing world would be much trivial in light of the fact that an investigation against
an international cartel faces many hurdles.

190

The following is the analysis of

representative international cartel cases investigated by several competition authorities.

2. Graphite Electrodes Cartel
186

Id. at 21.
Id. See Connor, supra note 170, at 11. Average overcharge in 32 cases with accurate
information was around 30% of sales. Similarly, the average overcharge of98
international cartels with incomplete data, was 28% of affected sales. Meanwhile,
median overcharges for cartels, both domestic and international, are between 15 and
20% since a domestic cartel places less overcharge than an international one. See also
OECD Global Forum on Competition, How Enforcement against Private Anticompetitive Conduct Has Contributed to Economic Development, 4
CCNM/GF/COMP(2003 )7.
188
See Ch.1.II.2.( 5)
89
~ 90 Multiplying affected sales by overcharge rate is CD of a global cartel(s).
See OECD, supra note 188, 7 & Annex C at 27-28. China (6,500), Estonia (639),
Latvia (0. 7% of annual turnover), and Peru (1 ,800 per each respondent & 900)
specified the amount of imposed fines (EUR). For in-detail hurdles, refer to III. 3. (3).
187
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•
(1) Summary of Fact
The UCAR International Inc. (UCAR U.S.) with several subsidiary companies is one
of the largest manufactures of graphite electrodes 191 in the world with each subsidiary
incorporated under the law of its principal place of business. SGL Carbon
Aktiengessellschaft (SGL AG) with many subsidiaries, a corporation of Germany, is
also one of the world leaders in manufacturing and trading graphite electrodes. The
other significant participants in the manufacture, and trade of graphite electrodes are
Showa Denlm, Tokai, Nippon Carbon Co., SEC Co. (Japan), VAW Carbon Gmbh
(Germany), and the Carbide Graphite Group (USA). The global market for supplying
graphite electrodes is concentrated in light of the facts that around fifty areas produced
approximately one million tons in the global estimate, and that the UCAR, SGL, and
the other companies supplied 80% of the global need. 192
Representatives of SGL, UCAR, and other significant manufactures met and reached
an agreement to restrict production capacity, to allocate the sales volume with exports
to the graphite electrodes market in each participant's country, to divide the global
market, to provide neither rebate nor discount, and to fix prices in the global and
regional markets in May, 1992. Since that time until June 1997, meetings among the
representatives of the manufacturers continued to convene to discuss in-detail issues
and monitoring the enforcement. During the cartel-operating period, the prices of

191

Graphite electrodes are ceramic-moulded columns of graphite used in the production
of steel in electric arc furnaces through conducting electric current into a furnace
accompanied with high temperature.
192
The total production is based on 1998 statistics. The market share data comes from
the in-house report of SGL in Nov. 1996. KFTC, 11 ~ [Decision], 1. Y. .(2)(7})(2002~
~ 0250) (Apr.4, 2002).
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graphite electrodes increased 48.9% in South Korea
ne
V

in the U.S. 195 and around 100 %in Canada.

193

,

50% in the EU

194

,

50 to 60%

196

(2) Penalty
The cartel was uncovered and prosecuted in the U.S. The investigation was much
facilitated by information submitted under its leniency program. The U.S. Department
of Justice (DOJ) imposed a fine in the total amount of US $ 290.8 million on seven
corporate defendants during the indictment procedure under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The defendants plead guilty and consented to pay the fines, which a court
approved. The DOJ indicted former employees of UCAR International, and the
president ofSGL Carbon, and most ofthem plead guilty and agreed with the individual
fines and jail time. 197 The judicial body approved the guilty pleas.
The EU Competition Commission treated the cartel as a serious infringement of the
EC competition rules, and imposed a total of US$ 275.8 million (euro 195.7) 198 fines
under Art. 81 ofthe EC-Treaty and Art. 53 ofthe EEA-Agreement.
Canada's Court of Justice agreed with imposing a total of US$ 24.95 (Canadian
Dollar[CD]$24.95) million on the defendants who pleaded guilty. 199 Two former
193

See id., 2.7}.(3).
Europa, Press Release: Commission Fines Eight Companies in Graphite Electrode
Cartel (July 18, 2001), available at http://europa.eu/rapid (visited on Apr.1, 2008).
195
OECD, Hard Core Cartels, 35-6 (2003).
196
Canada Competition Bureau (CB), New Release: Mitsubishi Fined $1,000,000 for
Aiding and Abetting Graphite Electrode Cartel (May 12, 2005), available at
h~://www.competition bureau.gc.ca (visited on Sep. 25, 2007)
197
Followings are in-detail sentences: former president with US$ 1.25 million and 17
month jail, former employee with $ 1 million and 9 month jail, and president of SGL
Carbon with $10 million. KFTC, supra note 193, I.q.<Table 3>.
198
Total fine of European Court of Justice was Euro 195.7. Europa, Press release:
Competition: Commission welcomes judgments of the Court of Justice in SG L Carbon
and Showa Denim Cases (Graphite Electrodes cartel) MEM0/06/258 (Jun. 29, 2006).
Exchange rate of US$ 1.00 equals to Euro 0.7095 as ofSep. 24, 2007.
194
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executives ofUCAR International were fined after guilty pleas.

200

The penalties were

based on a violation of Sec.46 ( 1) of the Competition Act of Canada.

201

Private actions

in damages were also filed, one ofwhich ended up with a payment of CD$ 29 million
to Canadian steel companies.
The Japan Fair Trade Commission did not impose a fine but issued warnings to four
companies that were suspected of violating the Antimonopoly Act of Japan. Meanwhile,
the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) imposed a total of around US $ 9.57 million
on six defendants in 2002. 202 The cartelistic activities fall on the violation ofMRFTA
Art. 19 Sec. 1 para. 1 which prohibits competitors from collusively fixing, maintaining,
and changing a price.
Table : The Graphite Electrodes Cartel Investigation of Countries
Scope of Market

Total Corporate Fines

Individual Fines and

(US$ million: from May ' 92 to ' 97)

(US$ million)

Jails

(ratio to the world market)
U.S.

(US$ million/ months)

290.8

(48.4%)

12.25 I
17 & 9 each

EU

275.8

199

(45.9%)

NIA

KFTC, supra note 193, Table 3; Industry Canada, News Release: Nippon Carbon
Pleads Guilty to Participating in International Graphite Electrodes Cartel (Dec. 8,
2005), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca (last visited on Sep. 25, 2007); Canada CB,
supra note 197. Exchange rate of currency of US$ 1.00 as of Sep. 24, 2007 is CD$
1.0002, which is almost the same value.
200
Two individuals were with no jail sentence but fine of a total CD$ 0.12 million.
Canada CB, supra.
201
The Attorney General of Canada, Statement of Allegations by the Attorney General
of Canada, para. 23 (2005).
202
KR W 8,812 million equals to US$ 9,567,861 dollar at currency exchange rate
(US$ 1=KRW 921) as of Sep. 24, 2007.
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'Canada

s. Korea

440 (high power) (3.9 %)
450 (ultra high power) ( 4 %).lUJ

n

24.95 ( 4.2%)

N/A

9.58 ( 1.6%)

NIA

601.13

(3) Assessment

rile,
on

An analysis of the results reveals that the U.S. has strict enforcement records whileS.

Korea, although its commerce under the influence of the cartel is similar to that of
Canada, has a more lenient anti-cartel penalty record than Canada. Korea's under-

g,

enforcement against the international cartel is affirmed by the fact that the level of
penalty in the graphite electrodes cartel is still the highest among international cartel
enforcements inS. Korea during its quarter-century competition law history.
S. Korea, however, hit the international graphite electrodes cartel with a much
stronger penalty than any other developing country under the influence of the cartel. It
was the global market which the international cartel targeted at through allocating the
market and sales volume, restricting production capacities, fixing price, and preventing
each member from giving a rebate or discount. The vast majority of the markets in the
world did not even know or at least attempt to punish the international cartel after a few
advanced countries revealed the conspiracy. Korea, as one of the developing countries,
did not notice the cartelistic activities until the competition law enforcement in the
advanced countries was announced in public. KFTC could enjoy unprecedented

203

In order to have correct comparison, the work period of the cartel is confined from
May, '92 to '97. KFTC-issued data from '92 to '98 was US$ 553 million, but import
in '98 was excluded. The cartel-caused harm from '92 to '98 is estimated to be around
US$ 139 million, around 25% of the total import. KFTC, supra note 193, 3.
77

extraterritorial application of MRFTA thanks to wisely-planned investigation,
consensus within the organization, and leadership ofKFTC chief.

204

S. Korea, one of the countries with a relatively short competition law history, found
difficulty in dealing with procedural obstacles of an international cartel investigation. It
is through international law that international cooperation for reducing the obstacles
can be secured. In order to achieve an international law, participation of advanced
competition authorities in the creation of a legal frame for international cooperation is
very important.

3. International Vitamin Cartel

(1) Summary of Fact
Bulk vitamins are used for manufacturing animal feeds, medicine, foods, and
cosmetics. In 1989, four major companies dominating the world's bulk vitamin market
agreed to allocate the market among themselves, and follow the price increase
announced by a cartel member. The producers, through regular meetings, developed a
cartel conspiracy and made an in-detail plan. The meetings progressed with four levels
-the top level, heads of marketing, global product marketing level, and regional product
marketing level- joined by the remaining seven companies. The arrangement continued
until 1998 when the members noticed the US DOJ investigations starting a year in
advance against themselves. The participants tried to maintain allocated market share

204

See id. at 5.
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by exchanging sales information and managing the quantity of their sales. In two years,
the increased price during the cartel period dropped below the 1989level.

205

(2) Penalty
The U.S. DOJ prosecuted eleven companies under the violation of Sec.1 of the
Sherman Act and imposed an US$ 910.5 million fine with a guilty plea. The judiciary
body approved it. Subsequently, the private action from direct purchasers of the vitamin
in the U.S. was settled with US$ 2.4 billion.2°

6

The EU Competition Commission imposed US$ 1,205.4 (Euro 855.2) million on
eight companies on the basis that they violated Art. 81 of the EU treaty and Art. 53 of
the EEA agreement.
Meanwhile, the DOJ of Canada indicted twelve companies for their collusion under

Art. 45 ofthe Competition Act of Canada. All the companies pleaded guilty and
accepted around US$ 96.8 (CD$ 96.8) million in fines.
The Australian Competition Committee prosecuted three companies for price-fixing
and market-allocation of animal-feeding vitamins. All the defendants plead guilty and
received a fine of US$ 22.5 (AU$ 26) million. For cases of other developed countries,
Japan issued a warning without a penalty while Switzerland rendered a consent order
without a fine.2° 7

205

For example, import price of vitamin E in South Korea increased up by 46% from
1989 until1998, but dropped by 52% to below the original price in 1989. KFTC, Press
Release: KFTC imposing surcharges on international vitamin cartel [.!2...5:.7.}.li: fJ- :Aa
~ l:llE\-lil ~~l7}.S~oJl JI}~~lf-32}], at 8 (2003).
206
The private action of foreign direct purchasers was, however, dismissed on the lack
of jurisdiction because Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA)
could not give rise to a claim from foreign injury. F.Hoffinan-La Roche LTC et al. v.
¥o~pagran S.A. et al., 124 S.Ct. 2359 (2004).
OECD, supra note 196, 35.
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(3) Developing Countries' Enforcement

The KFTC, after hearing of the advanced countries competition law enforcements,
launched an investigation against the cartel with the presumption that the cartel affecteu
the market inS. Korea in 2002. With data shared by the advanced competition
enforcers, the KFTC revealed the effect ofthe cartel on Korea's market and imposed a
total of US$ 3.73 (KRW 3,433) million in fines against six companies under Art. 19.1.
para. 1 ofthe MRFTA. The following table compares the ratio ofvitamin sales and
monetary penalties against the cartel.
Public Penalty (US$ million)

.....

Private Action

Total

3,310.5 ( 71%) ,

u.s.

910.5

(41%)

2,400

EU

1,205.4

(54%)

N/A

Canada

96.8

( 4%)

0.58

97.38( 2.1%)

Australia

22.5

( 1%)

N/A

22.5 ( 0.5%)

(26%)

Japan

N/A

N/A

0.0

Swiss

N/A

N/A

0.0

S. Korea

3.7

N/A

3.7 ( 0.08%)

Total

( 0.2%)

2238.9:./.UI!

4,639.48

~i

II
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OECD revealed that annual world-wide turnover of the vitamin products during the
conspiracy period was US$ 3.3 billion. Agreements on some of the products, not all,
lasted as long as ten years. In considering the fact that not all products were under the
conspiracy, total affected commerce is less than$ 33 billion. If conservatively
presumed, 50%, 16.5 million, is affected, total fine, around 2.24 billion, is 13.6% of
the affected commerce. Since the median cartel mark-up in 14 cases ranged from 15 to
20%, the conservative presumption, 13.6%, indicated that total public penalty is a little
less than harm. See id., n.l3.
80

The under-enforcement of a monetary penalty against cartels in South Korea is

ts,

demonstrated by the comparison of the ratio of the scope between Korea's market and

:ted

the global market. The ratio of the vitamin market in Korea to the global market and
that of the members' profits inS. Korea to the profits in the global market are around

a

t.S%?09 Meanwhile, the ratios of penalties between S.Korea and the other advanced

1.

countries are 0.2% in criminal (including administrative) fines and 0.08% in both
private and public actions. Provided the damages of the cartel accrue in proportion to
the ratio of market scope or profits, the penalty ratio will be much below the ratio of
harms. It means that penalty regimes, both public and private, are less active in South
Korea than advanced countries.
The other developing countries did not even launch an investigation or punish the
cartel participants even though the cartel had a negative impact on their countries. 210
Procedural hurdles, which the developing countries might experience in investigating
foreign companies with no branches in the countries as well as their immature

209

See Brief for Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empargran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004) (No. 03724), 2003 U.S. BRIEFS 724, 9-11. Compare it to KFTC Decision, ~12003- 098:§..
[case number 2003-098] (2003 ~~ 0396), 2003\! 4~ 29~ [April29, 2003], Korean
version at h ://www.ftc. o.kr. The Brief and the Decision illustrate the followin .
All defendants' total profits Their sales of cartelized
for ten years of the cartel
vitamins (A, E, D3 and AD
o eration
3) in 1998
US $ 18,000 million
1,687 million
The World
South Korea
185 million
26.5 million
Ration
1.5 %
1.5 %
When the numbers on the second line are divided by those on the first line, the ratio is
around 1.5% which reveals the scope of Korea's market to the global market.
210
Lithuania launched an investigation which is not resolved. The Brazilian
investigation is in a standstill under the hardship of gathering information. Although the
conspiracies affected many regional markets in the world, the penalties were issued
mostly from developed countries. OECD, supra note 207, at 37-8.

81

0

I

capacities, contributed to the barren results? 11 International cooperation to support
competition law enforcement in the developing countries, as well as their own efforts to
entrench in a competition culture, is necessary to balance the level of anti-cartellaw
enforcement with the cartel-causing damages.

VI. Conclusion

A cartel is an agreement or a collective action to restrain reciprocal business

activities among plural independent entrepreneurs competing in the same level of a
business industry to prevent competition thereby securing extra profit. Domestic
competition laws have adopted this definition under their cartel regulations. However,
the coverage of this definition is less appropriate in achieving effective international
cartel regulation because some cartels in the definition cause more pro-competitive
effects than ant-competitive ones and individual nations have developed different rules
on cartels with hybrid effects. In order to achieve international law on cartels, the
international community needs to focus on hard core cartel (HHC) activities with
several types of categories, narrower than the definition, because most countries agree
with the necessity of regulating such cartels and because international agreements have
been developed with a narrow focus. Recent activities of regulating cartels in the
OECD and ICN have concentrated on cartels under the narrow HHC definition.

211

/d. at 34-5.
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cartels function to control competition in the markets, which brings inefficiencies to

forts to

whole industries, harm to consumers, a loss of consumers' surpluses, and undermines

aw

both the faith in social integrity and sincere entrepreneurship.
On.the other hand, cartels can save the waste of financial and personal resources
through harsh competition. Severe competition in an economic depression era could not
save the related industry or economy in light of past experiences of even advanced
market economies. According to economic analyses, mass unemployment and
bankruptcies of companies during an extreme financial crisis came from an ineffective
financial system, which did not produce sufficient funds, rather than from productive
inefficiencies which a competition law aims at eliminating through cartel regulations.
Particularly, in economic depressions, emerging or developing economies under an
immature financial system have resorted to industrial policies, instead of newly adopted
or young competition policies. In an extremely severe economic depression period, it is

les

unexpected for young economies to apply cartel regulations to the same level under
normal situations. In order to gather wide participation from emerging markets or
developing countries, the international cartel regulation needs to exempt so called crisis

:e

cartels. Even the industrialized countries with an advanced competition law system

ve

have approved this type of cartel in their histories.
In addition, although collecting money for investments is necessary in developing
market economies, the developing countries usually face insufficient funds for
investment. There is a greater chance to raise enough money for innovation and
investment when so called investment cartels are exempted with strict screening
procedures.

83

Moreover, commodity cartels need to be exempted so that they may reduce extreme
price fluctuations. The Intergovernmental producers association (IP A) needs to be
under international commodity laws different from the law for typical private cartels.
The ICAs under bipartisan membership of consuming countries as well as producing
countries work similar to the IP A under a unilateral membership of producing countries
Except membership and its derivative rules, placing both IPAs and ICAs under the
same regulation does not interfere with the development of international commodity
law. The IP As and ICAs share a common concern between them that certain
developing countries, particularly CDDCs, have heavily relied on commodities
production in exchange of which small-sized producers may manage to earn money for
food. International law has developed independent commodity laws for the IPAs and
ICAs ..
International private cartels, which have prevailed since the 1990s, generate bigger
average damages, US$ 2.64 billion per cartel, than average damages of domestic ones,
$ 1.5 billion per cartel. The international cartels are formed in a highly concentrated
market with a few companies with a homogenous product where entry barriers exist.
The graphite electrodes cartel and the vitamin cartel are main examples of international
private cartels. In a comparison of anti-cartel enforcements in the industrialized
countries under the table 1, South Korea as well as other developing countries
demonstrated much lower level of public and private enforcements against two cartels.
Such under-enforcements are due to less experience, insufficient support and
procedural hurdles. The international support for cartel regulation enforcement needs to
be promoted.
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To utilize international support for cartel regulations, international cartel law should
focus on private cartels with priority since there have been growing research studies on

Is.

the cartels sufficient enough to reach a consensus among the countries .
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.tries
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Ch. 2. Legal Status and Historical Background of Cartels
in International Law

I. Opening International Law Era: Infant Stage

The international community's effort to institutionalize free trade and to liberalize
cross-border commerce since the end ofWWII has resulted, during the last decade of
twentieth century, in the establislunent of the European Union in 1993, the Word Trade
Organization in 1995 as a result of the Uruguay Round, and the Doha Declaration
proclaiming that approximately twenty items, including the competition policy, should
be negotiated in a multilateral agreement besides goods and services. Such
achievements are contrasted with the failure to ratify the Havana Charter for an
International Trade Organization (ITO) after World War II, an attempt to launch a
comprehensive set of rules and procedures, including detailed rules covering restrictive
business practices or competition law. The failure was due to the domestic opposition
of the U.S. protectionist group to the exceptions to free market principles that were
established in order to facilitate the negotiation of diverse economic levels. 1 However,
the commercial policy sections of the Charter were implemented in 1948 as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which played an important role in promoting
free trade legislations and policies in the world especially by the launching of several

I

Robert E. Baldwin, Failure of the WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun: Reasons
and Remedies, 3, available at
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Conferences/CGP/May2004Papers/Baldwin.pdf

1

free trade rounds, such as the Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round, and the Uruguay
Round. 2
The on-going trend towards establishing free trade trend challenged competition
laws and policies in individual countries with an attempt to promote the level of
domestic competition up to the global business standard. The establishment of the EU
which integrated its members markets in 1993 was soon followed by the Maastricht
Treaty on EU of 1993, a treaty establishing the EU with article 81 as its cartel
regulation. Since the Treaty did not make substantial changes to the competition
provisions of the EC Treaty in 1957, the competition provisions originally date back to
the EC Treaty with article 85 as its cartel regulation. Besides the EU's competition law,
the WTO, established as a result of the Uruguay Round, adopted competition policy as
one of the multi-negotiation subjects in the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996.
The Doha Declaration urged further negotiation to take place regarding competition
policy although the Doha Agenda has been at a standstill since 2003. Furthermore,
there are bilateral agreements and multilateral agreements to contribute to international
competition law. Among industrialized countries, bilateral agreements for cooperating
enforcement of competition law include methods to alleviate conflicts that arise from

2

See id. at 4-7 for the in-detail achievements of the Rounds.

The title of the Round
The Kennedy Round

The period
1964- 67

The Tokyo Round
The Uruguay Round

1973-79
1986-92

Major Issue(s)
Special-rule based tariff reduction,
Development, and non-tariff barriers
Negotiation on non-tariff barriers
Binding Non-tariff rules, launching
WTO, binding trade dispute settlement
_l)rocedure.

2

divergence of competition laws and different national interests. Multilateral agreements
are currently in progress to achieve binding regulations.

This chapter treats the issue ofthe legal status of international cartels in relation to
three cases, where it will be investigated whether the cases fall within the realm of
cartel. This chapter will also deal with the development of domestic cartel regulations
and the necessity of international legal measures in response to the emergence of
international cartels, as well as shifting its focus toward the development of
international commodity law. Finally, this chapter will return to the issues of
competition law, examining past efforts to achieve multilateral cartel regulations by
international organizations. The discussion will soon be followed by the development
of cartel regulation in bilateral or regional agreement.

II. Legal Status of International Cartel in International Law

1. Necessity of Examining Legal Status

It is important, in the process of regulating an international cartel, to characterize it in
terms of international law. According to the configuration of legal status, the
international cartel can have different legal treatments in terms of rights and duties
under international law.
Some international organizations have been suspected as international cartel. The
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has managed to limit crude oil
output in its member countries, thereby affecting oil price in the global crude oil market.

3

Its impact is expected to increase. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
has had to endure accusations that it had restrained competition in the
telecommunication industry by allocating radio frequency spectrum (RFS) and settling
account rate in international call. The International Air Transportation Association
(IATA) has been charged as a cartel, regulating prices, allocating schedules and routes
in order to promote its members' profits. All the cases involve international
organizations respectively consisting of states (OPEC), private companies (lATA) and
both(ITU). The decision of the legal status issue affects the further discussion of the
three cases.

2. Legal Status of International Cartel
(1) Elements of International Organization
International organizations are formed and governed by its constituent international
agreement, its charter, and laws pertaining to such an agreement, laws of international
organization. 3 International organizations, for the most part, have international legal
personalities. A legal personality requires three elements, duties which incur legal
responsibility, rights which allow the claiming of benefits through related laws, and the
capacity to enter into a legal relationship with other legal persons. 4 As the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) stated at Reparation for injury suffered in the service of the UN
case, the rights and duties of an organization must depend on its purposes and functions

3

The American Law Institute (ALI), Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, Part II, Ch.2, Introductory Note (1987).
4
CHRISTIAN N. 0KEKE, THE EXPANSION OF NEW SUBJECTS OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THEIR TREATY-MAKING CAPACITY, 19 (Universitaire
Pers Rotterdam, 1973)

4

(ITU)

as specified or implied in its constituent document as well as practices in light of the
5

needs of its community. Otherwise, members (consisting mostly of states that agreed
;ettling

to become members with expectation that the organization's activities would remain

on

activ~ in constitutional

routes

collaborate. 6 Although the power to enter into a relationship with other international

provisions in spite of its sovereign limitation) would refuse to

persons has been considered necessary to international organizations, it needs to be
.) and

examined whether a particular treaty or agreement is relevant to the purposes and

he

competence of such international organizations, 7 which indicates the limitation of
capacity of international organizations compared to states.
(2) The IGCs, IP As and I CAs as International Organizations
The inter-governmental companies (IGCs) and inter-governmental producers'
associations (IPAs), generally established by treaties, however, stipulate, in their

onal

treaties, that they shall be under municipal law rather than international law including

nal

international arbitration or generally accepted principles oflaw. Judge Lauterpach's
opinion at the report on the Law of Treaties is noteworthy in deciding whether such
associations fall on international organizations. In a case when parties selected one of

the

the municipal laws as governing law but the constituent agreement met the requirement
of a treaty, he stated that the applicable municipal law is transformed into conventional

r

f

international law and subsequent transactions are still under principles of international

: A~visory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J ., 174 (Apr. 11 ). at 178-179.
It 1s called 'implied powers doctrine.' See Rama-Montaldo, 44 Brit. Y.B.I.L. at 123(1970).
Art. 6 of the UN Convention on Treaties Concluded between States and International
Organizations or between tow or more international organizations. See Fitzmaurice,
The Law and Procedure of the International Court ofJustice, 30 Brit. Y.B.I.L. 2 (1953).

J24

5

law and rules interpreting treaties. 8 The intergovernmental companies, IP As, and
intergovernmental commodity agreements (ICAs) which have had similar roles with the
exception of membership construction, in distinction to a private cartel, can have rights
and take duties under international law. They can make international agreements under
their constituent agreements. As a result, such companies or agreements fall on
international organization as they fulfill the requirement, and thereby fall under the
international organization law.
(3) An International Cartel as an International Organization?
On the other hand, a cartel defined by i) an agreement among private companies to
restrict competition itself or ii) a loose association of private companies established by
such agreement, is rarely qualified for an international organization in most cases. The
association-typed cartel may be qualified for a limited legal personality, but the
agreement-typed cartel without establishing an independent entity does not have a legal
personality at all although its members of private competing companies are
acknowledged to have limited legal capacity to do transactions in internationallaw. 9 In
light of the three elements of legal personality, an independent duty, the possibility of
claim to enjoy benefit of right or law, and an independent capacity to do legal and valid

8

Lauterpacht, Report on the Law ofTreaties, UN (AC/4/163); Okeke, supra note 4,
219.
9
See Okeke, supra note 4, 215. Okeke states, "though they(private corporations and
non-governmental organizations) can not be said to enjoy international personality as
ascribed to international governmental organizations, nonetheless, they conduct
activities on the international plane with often significant political importance and with
little or no governmental control. Their status is different from that of public
international organizations." He acknowledges international legal personality of private
companies although the personality is more confined than intergovernmental
organizations.
6

affairs related to its purpose,

10

the agreement-typed cartel does not meet any of three

elements. On the contrary, an association established under a cartel agreement can
fulfill all the elements.
First, the agreement-typed cartel does not take any responsibility itself. Rather, the
participating companies will abide by a legal obligation such as restriction of
competitive business practices. It reflects the same principle in contract law that a
contract between individuals does not incur liability on the contract itself but on the
individuals. On the other hand, the association-typed cartel can incur a duty pursuant to
the objective of constituent agreement.
Regarding a claim conferred on the cartel, some associations may have legitimate
claims under their constituent agreements or an organization-related law when the
associations are acknowledged as legitimate and valid under standard of cartel
regulations. However, the agreement-typed cartel without establishing any entity does
not have any claim for itself.
The element of a legal capacity to do something valid and legitimate independently
from members invokes a sensitive issue of validity and legitimacy of cartel. A cartel
operating as an association of private competing companies may have an independent
legal capacity if it meets the standard of legitimacy under cartel regulation and other
provisions of competition law. In addition, the association-typed cartel should pass tests
of validity including restraint of competition so that the cartel may be acknowledged to
have a legal capacity. On the other hand, the agreement-typed cartel does not have any

10

Okeke, supra note 4, 19.

7

legal capacity as an agreement itself does not remain active independently in public
relations from its members which act for their own interests.
In short, the association-typed cartels can fall under the realm of international
organizations when they are acknowledged as legitimate and valid. However, the
agreement-typed cartels do not satisfy any of the elements of international organization
regardless of the result of legitimacy and validity tests.
(4) International Cartel as International Agreement
The agreement-typed international cartels may be categorized as international
agreements among private companies with limited legal personality. The international
agreements are not treaties because a treaty covers the agreements between subjects of
international law, which are governed by international law. Although the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969 is limited to treaties between states only, a
treaty may be extended to cover the international between a state and an international
organization which constituted a subject ofinternationallaw. 11 In light ofthe U.S.
Constitution Art. 6 that a treaty has the same power as legislation of Congress and need
to go through constitutional procedures, a treaty may not be extended to cover the
international agreement among private companies. Private companies which conspire to
restrict competition do not enjoy limited legal personality under international law as the

11

ALI, Restatement (3rd) of Foreign Relations Law, Sec. 303 comment (a) (1987)
explains the authority of the U.S president to make a treaty on the premise that any
treaty to which the U.S. is subject needs the participation of the U.S. president. See
LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 455 (4th ed.
Westgroup, 2001 ), which states that an international agreement between international
organizations may be treated as a treaty when they are qualified as subjects of
international law.
8

blic

activities are not treated as legitimate. As a result, the cartel agreement among
competing private companies does not fulfill the requirement.
Moreover, the agreements must be governed by international law regardless of the
intents of parties. However, the cartel agreement fall under the realm of domestic

zation

competition laws which currently extend their coverage beyond national territories. The
jurisdiction of domestic competition law has been acknowledged through laws of
advanced countries without respect to intents of participating companies. As a result,
the international cartel agreement is a kind of international agreement, not a treaty,

•nal

among competing private companies because the companies usually represent diverse

s of

nationalities. The cartel agreement has been treated as illegal and void in countries with
advanced competition law practices.

·,a
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3. Some Intergovernmental Organizations under Suspicion of Cartels
Practices of some international organizations are arguably condemned as cartel

~ed

activities which restrict competition in markets in relation to their works. Organizations
that represent countries which produce commodities such as non-renewable natural

:to

resource as well as organizations which set international standards fall under this

he

category.
International organizations consisting of commodity-producing sovereign countries
are often the objects of blame since their activities have a similar effect on the market
as do those of international cartels. Non-member countries argue that these
organizations set high prices amidst low production levels, thereby causing a transfer of
Wealth from consuming countries to producing countries. Among other organizations,

9

the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been suspected to be
in charge of a competition-restricting cartel for decades. The impact of the OPEC

with

thirteen members 12 on the global oil market, which has been already at a considerable
level, is expected to increase in the near future as the accelerated levels of consumption
in emerging countries much outweighs the lagging supply due to the delay of
production projects in new provinces and the limited production in mature areas of nonOPEC member states.

13

In addition, international standard-setting organizations, particularly the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), regulate the development of technology
by settling a single global standard. Non-member countries argue that the standardsetting of the ITU has created an entry barrier to newly developing technologies and
that it supports the maintaining of the market power of existent member states in the
global telecommunication market, thereby falling under the category of a cartel activity.
(1) Organization ofthe Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
1) Decisions ofU.S. Courts
The judicial branch of the U.S. has had a chance to decide whether the activities of
the OPEC had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act as cartel activities. A labor union,
as the plaintiff, filed the suit by arguing that it had endured the injury of paying higher
price for gasoline at the gas stations because of the anti competitive actions of OPEC
and its member countries. The suit for damages and injunctive relief against the OPEC

12

Ed Crooks and Javier Bias, Angola joins cartel: OPEC expansion increases US
dependence, FIN. TIMES, January 3, 2007, at 4.
13
Javier Bias, World will face oil crunch 'in five years', FIN. TIMES, July 10, 2007, at 1.
10

• be

and its thirteen member states 14 was decided by the U.S. District Court of Central

~ith

Division of California and Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

ble

dismissed the suit against the OPEC on the basis that OPEC could not legally be served

•tion

either under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) or under the

15

The District Court

International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). 16 With regards to the suits against
non.

the other thirteen nations, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for damages,
designating them as the indirect purchasers under the Illinois Brick rule. 17
For the remaining injunctive relief against the thirteen countries, after allowing the

ogy

plaintiffs as indirect purchasers to maintain the suit, 18 the District Court held that the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the action against the member states could not be allowed
when the sovereign immunity 19 applies to the alleged cartel activities of the countries

fity.

n,
r

14

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (lAM) alleged that
price setting activities of OPEC and its members violated section 1 of the Sherman Act,
and brought injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. section 26, section 16 of the Clayton Act,
and a default judgment against OPEC along with 13 foreign nations in an action for
damages under 15 U.S.C. 15, section 4 ofthe Clayton Act in December 1978.
IS International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (lAM) v. OPEC, 477
F.Supp.553; 1979 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 9713;1979-2 Trade Cas.(CCH) P62, 868 (U.S.Dis.Ct,
C.D. CA, 1979), ajf'd by 649 F.2d 1354, 1981-1 Trade Cases P 64;143 (C.A.9th Cir.
1981).
16
FSIA applies only to foreign sovereignties, not international organization, and lOlA
applies only to those international organizations with the U.S. as the member, which is
not a case of OPEC. The plaintiff admitted the hurdle for legal service to OPEC. See
477 F.Supp.560.
17
In the damage action, the court disallowed indirect purchasers from bringing damage
action under Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S.Ct. at 2068, and the suit from falling on
exceptions. /d. at 560-63.
18
The District Court cites Mid-West Paper Products Company v. Continental Group,
Inc. 596 F.2d 573, 591-2 (3d Cir. 1979). See id. at 564. The test for standing under
Section 16 of the Clayton Act (injunctive relief) has been framed under a proximate
cause standard that is less constrained than that under section 4 (the treble damage
~fion) and which might in fact be no more rigorous than the general rule of standing.
The sovereign immunity, under which domestic courts must refrain from jurisdiction
over a foreign state, is an international law doctrine recognized since the Schooner
11

-

under 28 U.S.C. sec 1330(a) & 1605 (a)(2). 20 The District Court dismissed the case by
stating that the activities of alleged price-fixing or output reduction did not fall under
the commercial activity exception to the sovereign immunity, thereby resulting in the
lack of jurisdiction on the basis of the sovereign immunity principle. Lastly, the District
Court cited the lack of causation between the alleged act and the damage, even with the
assumption of the jurisdiction.21
As to the 'commercial activity' exception of the sovereign immunity under the
provision, especially, the District Court further analyzed the pricing mechanism of the
members ofthe OPEC. The pricing involved the so called 'government take' through
levying a tax on foreign oil-extracting companies or charging a royalty for the extracted
oils, which the District Court characterized as governmental rather than commercial in
nature under sec. 1603(d) ofFSIA. 22 With the basis of an expert's testimony, the

Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812) and evolved by the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity adopted in U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act in 1976. ld. at 565.
20
District courts only have jurisdiction to hear actions against foreign states when the
foreign state is not entitled to sovereign immunity either under sections 28 U.S.C.
1605-1607 or under any applicable international agreement according to section
1330(a) of this title. The question of sovereign immunity is the main question for
determining jurisdiction issue. 477 F.Supp. 553, 564; 1979 U.S. Dist.LEXIS 9713, 23.
Moreover, 28 U.S.C. sec 1605 (a)(2), by adopting the restrictive sovereign immunity
theory, provides that a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case, in which the action is based ...... upon
an act outside the territory of the U.S. in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the U.S.
21
It further opined that even if the activities were not sovereign but commercial, the
evidence did not support the granting of an injunction due to lack of proving the causal
connection between the injury and the anticompetitive conduct. 477 F.Supp.553, 553;
1979 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 9713, 9713.
22
Section 1603(d) defines 'commercial activity' as either a regular course of
commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose.
12
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District Court pointed to control of supply as a major mechanism of crude oil pricing

llllder

which, instead of the alleged price-fixing, actually allowed the management ofprice.

in the

With the foundation of various resolutions from the UN General Assembly,

District

Charter ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS),

tith the

the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO Declaration) in

25

24

23

the

and the Declaration on

I97426, along with the U.S. Congress sole power to make rules pertaining to the
development of resources under Art. IV, Sec. 3, Cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the
•ftbe

District Court stated that the control over natural resources of a nation stems from the

ugh

nation's sovereignty? 7 Activities such as the 'government take' and production control

racted

were not considered to be commercial activities, but as sovereign activity by

alin

establishing the terms and conditions for removing a prime natural resource from its
territory. The reasoning on the part of the thirteen member states was due to the
recognition by the judicial branch of the international law principle that the right to

ythe
rities

control the production of natural resources belongs to the sovereign power, which must
be exercised in the interest of both its national development and its people.

he
Moreover, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, due to the act
~3.

ity
rts
pon

e

of state doctrine, a federal court did not have jurisdiction to judge the legality of the

23

Dr.Morris A. Adelman, prof. of economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

was appointed as one of experts in the field of World Petroleum Economics by the
Court. !d. at 566.

24

:al

Resolution 1803, GA. Res. 1803, section 1(1), 17 U.N.GAOR, 2d Comm. 327,
U.N.Doc. NC 215 R 850 (1962); Resolution 3171, G.A.Res. 3171,28 U.N.GAOR 30
(Vol.l) at 52, U.N.Doc. N9030 (1973); Resolution 2158, GA.Res. 2158, sec 1(1), 21
U.N.GAOR, Supp.(No.l6) 29, U.N.Doc. N6316(1966).
25
Ch. II, Art. 2(1), U.N. Doc. NRES/3281 (XXIX) (1974).
UG A.Res. 3201 (S-VI), sec 4(e), U.N.GAOR, 6ili Spec.Sess., Supp.(No.l) 3, U.N.Doc.
A/9559.
27
477 F.Supp.553, 565-67.
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sovereign acts of the foreign states. The act of state doctrine, similar to the political
question doctrine, reveals the passive nature of the U.S. judicial branch within a
structure based on the separation of power, because further examination into the acts of
foreign states may intervene with the executive body and the legislative bodies'
international diplomacy. 28 Since the Ninth Cir. Court agreed with the significant
sovereign nature of OPEC's competition-restriction, it applied the action of state
doctrine to the acts of OPEC, thereby leaving no decision on the merit of the case, a
decision distinct from that of the lower court. Finally, the Ninth Cir. Court stated, under
the proposition that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a
particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render
decisions regarding it, but that there is no international consensus condemning cartels,
royalties, and production agreements although conspiracies in restriction of free trade
are explicitly illegal under the U.S. law. Rather, it added that the international
community, including the U.S., has supported the principle of supreme state
sovereignty over natural resources. 29
2) Collective Acts ofNations Producing the Natural Resource
Although the control over natural resources has been declared as a permanent
sovereign act, it appears difficult to maintain its sovereign immunity when efforts to
control are made collectively with other countries producing the most important energy
resource, crude oil, and when the collective acts affect the global market in a significant
way. 30 The sovereign nature of production control is diluted by its strong commercial

28

See lAM v. OPEC, supra note 16, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-59.
See id, at 1361.
30
The IMF Research Department, The Impact ofHigher Oil Prices on the Global

29

14

nature when the countries exporting petroleum work together to curb the global
petroleum market. As collective price-fixing or output restriction or market allocation
among private multinational companies competing in a global market is proclaimed
against international law under the Declaration of the U.N., the collective setting of
target price range or output range among major petroleum-exporting countries with a
significant portion in the global petroleum market can not avoid influencing both crude
oil market and global market mechanism. The relative price increase of crude oil as
major energy input has influence on the whole price level in national economies of oilimporting countries regardless of developing or industrial. 31

Economy, 8-12, Ch.III (Dec. 8, 2000), at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft!oil/2000/#annex
It argues five major changes from higher oil prices, i) transfer of income from oil
consumers to oil producers, ii) a rise in the cost of production of goods and services in
the economy, iii) impact on the price level and on inflation, iv) direct and indirect
impact on financial markets, and v) incentives for energy suppliers to increase
production and investment, and for oil consumers to economize.
See id, 11. Although the impact is larger for industrial countries than for developing
countries due to the fact that net oil exporters belong to developing countries, the
impact on individual countries which import oil f developing countries is often large.
See also Ed Crooks and Javier Bias, supra note 23, at 4. OPEC supplies more than
54% of the oil imports of industrial countries in 2007 when Angola joins the
organization.
31
The IMF Research Dept., supra note 30, at 11 and 18. Even thirty of the forty
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries are among the most seriously affected by higher oil
prices. See also, Hyundai Research Institute, 3~} .2. ~:11:.3. ~ .2. ~ 7} [Does the third
oil price shock comes?], 2-3 (Aug. 9th, 2004), available at
http://www.hri.co.kr/uploadlbbs_ file/publication/BSR20040809_ 2_1.PDF
Economy of South Korea totally depending on import of oil was under two oil price
hikes.
_{%)
1971- 73
1974 -76
1977-79
1980-82
Oil Price (US$ per barrel)
2.5
11.0
14.1
31.2
Economic Growth
8.6
8.4
8.7
3.9
Inflation
9.1
14.8
22.2
38.9
The
Trade
Balance
-10.8
- 18.8
-40.2
- 27.7
'Data: Korea Central Bank and the National Statistical Office.
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3) All People's Right to Use the Natural Resource
The unhealthy rent-seeking that so called the People's Fund proposae 2 tried to
reduce is stepped up by the collective practice. The argument that a right to pennanent
sovereignty over natural resources (PSNR) is vested in the entire population of a
country33 needs to reflect the interest of the whole population who uses the natural
resources, including the people of the country. Art. 1 section (2) ofthe both Human
Rights Covenants 34 states all people's free disposal of natural wealth without prejudice
to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based on the
principle of mutual benefit and international law. Art. 25 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC) states, nothing in the present
Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of 'all people' to enjoy and
utilize fully and freely their natural resources. In the provisions, free disposal of all
people over their natural resource should not get rid of any duty under international
economic cooperation with basis on the principle of mutual benefit. 'All people' cover
not only the population of the country with natural resource but also that of the other
countries using the natural resource because international economic cooperation under

32

The proposal targeted to reduce collusive acts within the governments managing
natural resources through movement of public assets including natural resources from
governments to citizens. See Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples'
Ownership ofNatural Resources in International Law, 38 Geo. Wash. Int. L. Rev. 6875 (2006). Nobel Economics Laureate Vernon Smith proposed a new geopoliticaleconomic paradigm on the principle that public assets belong directly to the public.
33
See id., 38-67.
34
They are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI), at 52, U.N.Doc. N6316 (Dec.l9, 1966), and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), at 49, U.N.Doc.
N6316 (Dec.l9, 1966).
16

mutual benefit and international law can be interpreted as reflecting the interest of the
consumer class utilizing the natural resource.
4) Price Increase in the Global Market
The decision ofthe Central District Court of California, moreover, adduced major
reasons of gasoline price increase during 1973-74 and 1978-79 in failures of several
federal administrative policies.
ce

35

Although the OPEC was not a cause of oil shortage

and gasoline lines during in the U.S., the oil price increase during the period was a
global phenomenon36 and affected Gross Domestic Production (GDP) of oil importing

nt

countries. 37 Moreover, the reasons for the gasoline price increase in the other countries
did not altogether come from the failures of their government policies.

nd

5) No Penalty
It is noteworthy that there is no penalty against a member country which does not

comply with production quota of OPEC. OPEC and its member country have adjusted
r

its production quota according to shifting price and supply of oil market. 38 The cartel
has maintained despite the lack of the penalty against cheating the output quota because
Saudi Arabia, as the most oil producer, has kept its production quota and placed weight
35

The decision enumerate such federal regulations as i) Federal Energy Administration
regulations preventing refiners from recovering costs of the additional capacity thereby
leading to a shortage of refinery capacity, ii) federal allocation regulations establishing
a series of priorities for different users and set-aside requirements for government
supply of gasoline, and iii) two federal regulations of the Environmental Protection
Agency leading to shortages in crude oil at domestic refineries. See 477 F.Supp. 553,
573-74.
36
The IMP Research Department, supra note 30, figure AI: Oil Market (1972-2000) in

Annex.
37

For impacts on world GDP, see id., figure A2: Macroeconomic Aggregates (19702000) in Annex. For those on OECD countries' GDP, see id., tableA1: Impact of
Nominal Oil Price Hikes in Annex.
38
Dr. Adnan Shihab-Eldin, OPEC on Oil Supplies and Prices, WASH. PosT, June 18,
2004, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A48713-2004Jun17.html
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on the quota ofOPEC assigned for its own interest.

39

The absence ofthe penalty makes

OPEC distinguished from the other typical cartels of private companies operating With
penalty threat to cheating.
6) Assessment
In conclusion, a public international cartel with sovereign state as members, OPEc
should be treated differently as private international cartels with private entities as
members. However, OPEC has operated as the lP A which moderates production of oil
under the common production plan in the global market. The IP A can impose severe
economic harms on consumers. For

example~

although failures of domestic energy

policies exacerbated its price surge. the sudden price rise of crude oil in 1973 and 1979
illustrates the power of OPEC to control the world oil market with restriction of
quantity of production in the context of shifting political circumstances in the Middle
East. 40 In case the OPEC works against the principle of mutual benetit under
international economic cooperation, its production manipulation can be beyond the
protection of Art. 1 sec. 2 ofthe ICCPR and ICESC.
It is very hard to condemn their plan of production managements as violation of
competition law. First, it has no penalty regime against a member which does not
comply with the scheme. As a voluntary guideline, the production-control of OPEC
lacks of a characteristic of a condemned cartel which screen member's free activity.
Moreover, crude oil, as the most important non-renewable resource of energy currently
in the world, needs to be preserved as balanced against fluctuated market demand. The
39

Benjamin Zycher, OPEC, Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, at
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/OPEC.html
40
MARKS. LECLAIR, INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF
CARTELS, 67-71 (M.E.Sharpe, Inc., 2000)
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stable management of the limited resource is in need. Volatile price and subsequent

h

impacts on the global economy does not generate benefits to both the advanced and
developing countries. In tenns of less diversified economic structures of its expmting
countries, their rights over it to promote their economic development have been

C

acknowledged as permanent sovereignty of producing countries under international law.
However, in case OPEC member countries directly breach obligation for
international economic cooperation on the basis of mutual benetit, e.g. signiticant
infringement on consumers' interests, their rights ofPSNR should be limited in the way
that international economic cooperation can be secured. As an IP A has more limited
availability for reflecting opinions of consuming countries than an ICA. its collective
enjoyment ofPSNR should be under more restraints. Particularly, price-tixing or
production limitation regardless of oil price surge, as well as the adoption of penalty for
maintaining collective production plan, has high possibility that it is beyond the
coverage ofPSNR.

(2) The International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
It is questioned whether the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) of

standard-setting organization restricts competition as a cartel. In order to discuss the
question, first, the structure of the organization is to be addressed because the
association made up of countries only is difficult to invoke the violation of international
competition law due to the state immunity doctrine. In considering the merit, the
characteristic of standard setting of the organization with regard to competition is to be
followed. Concretely, account rate-setting practices of the organization invoke the

19
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doubt of price-fixing. On the other hand, radio frequency spectrum (RFS) allocation is
argued to restrain competition by allocating markets among competitors or to establish
monopoly within the allotted range.
1) Purpose and Structure ofOrganization
The ITU is the UN Specialized Agency responsible for the regulation,
standardization, and development of world-wide telecommunication. For researching
both purpose and structure of the ITU, it is important to note the International
Telecommunication Convention (lTC) as constitution of the ITU which establishes its
structure and set forth its purposes. The lTC is divided into two parts: 1) Basic
Provisions and 2) General Regulations. 41
In the light of the Basic Provisions and the General Regulations, the purposes ofthe
ITU are (i) the promotion of efficiency and (ii) that of equitable usage in technology
and network which does not violate competition law. The Basic Provisions have
efficiency-oriented purposes implying equity concern, such as the maintenance of an
efficient world-wide telecommunication network, and the constant upgrading of the
techniques and procedures in the network. To achieve the purposes, the General
Regulations enumerate eight kinds of activities of the Union. 42 Among them, related to
equity promotion are using radio telecommunication among countries in harmonized
ways, and assisting in development oftelecommunication technology in developing

41

GEORGE A. CODDING, JR. ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
IN A CHANGING WORLD, 205 {Attech House, 1982).
42
!d. at 206. See also ITU. International Telecommunication Convention. Art. 4 (Nov. 6,
1982). at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1984/35.html (last visit on
June 19th, 2007).
20

ts

countries (DCs). Offering telecommunication service at the least rate in the light of

;b

public interest contributes to both efficiency and equity.
While cartels have characteristics of raising price and reducing production, the ITU
bas its purpose to foster collaboration so as to offer service at such a rate as low as
possible within a range consistent with efficiency.

43

The cause of collaboration among

44

members is not to seek rent but to use telecommunication services in a harmonious
way between public interest and private profits. To make a long story short, the ITU
promotes downward price competition while price-cartels usually try to abolish it.
While conferences, whether plenipotentiary or administrative conference, takes
prerogative for decision makings, International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR)
1e

and the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT) are in
charge of studying innovations in telecommunication and making standards. The two
committees are composed of specialists from government and industry. 45
The CCITT under the auspice of the ITU was attacked as a virtual telephone cartel
of Postal Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) due to its recommendations. Until recently, it
is said that the CCITT rules for international commerce in telecommunications services
had been treated almost absolute. The recommendations concerning
telecommunications services used to function fairly smoothly for relatively slow

43

44

s,

Art. 4. 2 (e) ofthe lTC.

Rent-seeking is defined as incorporating "efforts, both legal and illegal, to acquire
access to or control over opportunities for earning rents. Particularly, with reference to
countries largely depending on oil revenue from the export of the commodity, it states,
rent seeking refers to widespread behavior, in both the public and private sectors, aimed
at capturing oil money through unproductive means. Terry Lynn Karl, Oil-Led
Development: Social, Political, and Economic Consequences, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
?FENERGY 661 (Cutler J. Cleverland ed. Elsevier, 2004).
5
See Coddings et al, supra note 40, at 59 & 84 .
21

changing technology, homogeneous and vertically integrated services, and the same
basic range of services under more or less the same regulatory conditions.

46

Since the

telecommunication technology recently changes fast and new services grow diversified

'
the effects of the recommendation are not currently so absolute as in the past in the
light of differentiated services and differently corresponding regulations in each
country. 47

2)

Members of the ITU

(A) Member Countries under the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Countries, when they do sovereign acts, do not provoke cartel violations because
their acts are immune under the doctrine of sovereign immunity established as
intemational customary law unless they concern real property or the disposition of the
property of a deceased person.48 According to U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) of 1976, adopting the 'restrictive form' ofthe sovereign immunity doctrine,
states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts when they are involved in
commercial activities, and their commercial property may be levied upon for the
satisfaction of judgments against them in connection with their 'commercial
activities' .49 The 'commercial activity' is defined as either a regular course of

46

JONATHAN DAVID ARONSON AND PETER F. COWHEY, WHEN COUNTRIES TALK:
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, 45-48 (Ballinger, 1988)
47
JAMES G. SAVAGE, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
REGULATION, 25-27 (Westview Press, 1989).
48
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,3 Led. 287 (1812).
Damrosch et. al. cite, as a commercial exception, Letter of Acting Legal Adviser, Jack
B. Tate, To Depru1ment of Justice. May 19, 195::?., 26 Dep't State Bull. 984 ( 195::?.). See
Drunrosch. et. al. supra note 1 L 1204- 1206.
49
28 u.s.c. § 1602.
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commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The FSIA states, the
commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of
the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose.

50

Critics might argue that the organization's standard setting is, in its nature, a
commercial activity not immune from the sovereign immunity doctrine. The standard
setting of such sector as CCITT or CCIR by its nature, however, is not a commercial
conduct but a placing of a regulatory framework in order to foster commercial activity
and competition. Efficient telecommunication needs normal standard to ensure
compatibility of technology. Unlike the production of goods, the standard-setting to
make the trade of goods effective does not belong to the regular course of commercial
conduct in international trade but to a regulatory function such as that of the works of
administrative bodies of related countries. Concretely, the allocation ofthe Radio
Frequency Spectrum (RFSi 1 has the characteristic of regulatory activities in the
telecommunication industry between sovereign powers. Rate-setting, however, might
arguably have something to do with a commercial conduct, which is to be discussed indetail subsequently.

In sum, the ITU or its sectors have limited jurisdictional basis for any cartel
investigation because the member states are immune from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts under the sovereign immunity doctrine. The standard setting does not fall under
the commercial activity exception.

:o 28 u.s.c. § 1603(d).

I'

1

The RFS means an electromagnetic wave of frequencies propagated in space used to
transmit information. Refer to infra (5).
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(B) Sector Members: Private Entities
The ITU has private entities as its constituents besides sovereign states. As

cc:rrr

or CCIR, a sector of the ITU, includes the private entities under its association. Besides
189 member states, 650 sector members and 94 associates

52

comprise the ITU as of

2003. Since the ITU is organized into three sectors as development (ITU-D), radiocommunications (ITU-R), standardization (ITU-T), an interested entity or organization,
either private or public, may join any sector of the ITU as a sector member provided
they meet certain qualifications.
Concretely, a sector membership may be endowed on the following entities:
A) Recognized Operating Agencies (ROA) 53 , scientific or industrial organizationss.t,
and financial or development institutions, which should be approved by the
Administration of the Member State concerned,

52

Any interested entity or organization may join an ITU sector as an Associate and be
entitled to take part in the work of a selected single Study Group or Working Group
thereof. Associates may have access to documentation required for their work and may
serve as rapporteur or editor.
53
The ROA is the operating agency which operates a public correspondence or
broadcasting service and upon which the obligations provided for in article 6 of the ITU
Constitution are imposed by the Member State in whose territory the head office of the
agency is situated, or by the Member State which has authorized this operating agency
to establish and operate a telecommunication service on its territory. Any individual
company, corporation, or governmental agency which operates a telecommunication
installation intended for an international telecommunication service or capable of
causing harmful interference with such a service falls on the ROA. The ROA covers
multinational telecommunication corporation dealing with international
telecommunication service and governmental regulatory authorities in international
telecommunication.
54
The scientific or industrial organization in the category 1 is private organization other
than a governmental establishment or agency, which is engaged in the study of
telecommunication problems or in the design or manufacture of equipment intended for
telecommunication services.
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B) Other entities dealing with telecommunication matters

55

,

which should be

approved by the Administration of the Member State concerned, and
C) Regional and other international telecommunication, standardization, financial
.

.

or development orgaruzatlons.

56

As the category B) allows private entities to become sector members. the possibility
of cartel activity among private entities exists. Particularly, the chance is more
prevalent in the Standardization (ITU-T) sector. The sector members do various
activities 57 , among which standard-setting is noteworthy in terms of relationship with
competition.

(C) Standard-setting of the ITU as Restraint to Competition?
To discuss whether ITU standardization restricts competition, several factors are to
be the basis for analysis, such as efficiency, entry barrier to new competitors with
monopoly argument, and the consumers' benefit. Suspicion regarding cartel's sanction,
review of activities of International Consultative Commitees (CCis), and restriction of
public availability are to be studied.
55

This category includes private entities in telecommunication-related industries as
sector members. Many telecommunication companies, e.g. Alcatel-Lucent France,
Sony Corp. and Nokia Corp., are actively working as sector members.
56
ITU, ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) Membership, available
at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/membership/_page. print
51
Jean-Yves Besnier, Membership Benefits- ITU-D Overview, Seminar on
Standardization and ICT Development for the Information Society, 6-8 (October, 2003),
available at http://www.itu.int. Sector members are involved in paying its annual
contribution, influencing the evolution of global telecommunications networks,
increasing the awareness of business priorities among the representatives of global
telecommunication, promoting network contact, participating in sector members' works,
holding positions within study or working groups, and having access to invaluable
information such as access to ITU working documents, or free or discounted ITU
publications.
25
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As to efficiency, the ITU's global standardization of both telecommunications
equipments and the means of delivering telecommunications services ensure the
continuity of technology and service, cuts manufacture costs, and provides
telecommunication authorities with international compatible equipments as the ITU has
its objectives in promoting the global development oftelecommunication technology
and in assisting in the ever-advancing integration of communication media. 58 All these
benefits increase the efficiency of the telecommunication service by saving time and
money which would be spent in adapting equipments to multi-standards. 59
Regarding entry barrier, global standard under the ITU might arguably interrupt the
free placing of diverse standards by late enterprises in the telecommunication industry.
However, ITU recommendations for standardization without binding power can not
restrict member countries which stick to their own standards. The standardization,
rather, has contributed to promoting the ability of countries or competitive private
companies with technological advantage to obtain their access to export markets with
the global standard. 60
In addition, the technology developed by a single large firm, often with the global
use in mind, might arguably lead to a global monopoly. However, there are such
procedural barriers to the alleged global monopoly conspiracy because the approval of
International Consultative Committees (CCis) as specialized committees, and the
consensual approval from members at the ITU Plenary Assembly are necessary. Rather,

58

ITU, CCITT Document, AP VII-No. 110 ( 1980).
The experts comprising International Consultative Committee (CCI) delegations
under ITU universally recognizes the desirability of the standardized
telecommunication. See SAVAGE, supra note 4 7, 25-7.
60 ld.

59
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the advanced technology is used to generate multi-standards instead of a monopoly in
an industry where global standardization threatens the political or economic strengths
•

of a nation.

61

From the perspective of consumers' \Velfare, the global standard protects the users
from facing incompatibility in the world where diverse standards from different
countries interfere with consumers' usages ofthe same standard. The ITU-T
recommendation generates a unique multilateral forum which allows competing
interests to harmonize in an atmosphere of constructive debates, providing a framework
for companies to mediate their differences for the benefit of consumers. 62
Opponents ofthe ITU argued that the longstanding lTD-supported system, on the
contrary to such short-life span of most cartels as in an economic theory, was due to
legal sanction which helped monitor and enforce the competition-restricting activities
ofthe ITU as a carte1. 63 The argument does not consider the non-binding characteristics
ofthe recommendations of the ITU or its sector, as well as the lack oflegal sanction
against non-compliant entities. The main reason why the ITU survives and functions
for more than 13 0 years comes from the necessity for the countries facing new
technologies to have international standards for promoting co-operation and increasing
the efficiency of the technologies. The standards are committed to achieving equitable

61

See id. at 184. Six incompatible cellular car telephone systems of EU in 1987, for
example, maintained their different standards because the cellular car telephones were
distributed by monopolies which employ 'buy domestic' policies. National
administrators who seek to protect their interests barred creation of a single standard of
the cellular car telephones in the Western European market where the international
~dard would have promoted consumers' welfare much more.
ITU, supra note.
63
ARONSON AND COWHEY, supra note 46, at 218-120.
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access in the technological development and fostering global competition on equipment
pertaining to compatibility.
Although the ITU achieved many successes in the late 191h century,

64

it is

noteworthy to examine the CCis under the ITU since they have issued
recommendations influential to global standardization through continuous studies. The
CCIR issues the recommendations for all wireless services of radio communication,
while CCITT 65 does the same for wired telephone services. Although a global
commitment to standardization for improved telecommunication might arguably
conflict with recognition of a country's sovereign right to exercise control over its
technology standards, 66 the standardization effort of CCis can cause no, if any, serious
conflict with a state's sovereignty since they issue non-binding recommendations.
Although the CCis' recommendations have no sanction against non-compliers, they are
respected as the global codes of conduct and technical criteria set by the CCIR are vital
to international communication and as global telephone linkage is possible through

64

The major achievements are the establishing of both European telegraphy network
through the standardization of Morse code, along with the setting of an acceptable rate
structure and periodic meetings, and International Bureau ofTelegraphAdministration,
as the first global permanent bureau of telegraph, publishing rate tables, statistics, and
journals besides the gathering of the information in the 19th century.
65
!d. at 46. the International Consultative Committee on Telegraphs (CCIT) and CCIF
later merged into CCITT.
66
Efforts to strengthen the CCI recommendations by giving them power of
international law might be seen as one way of promoting international standardization,
which is a mistaken perception. As most CCI decisions have great effect on domestic
telecoms services and equipment procurement, it would be unacceptable to even the
most diminutive ITU member to relinquish national standard-setting discretion to the
international CCI level if the international process was anything stronger than
recommendatory. Legally binding standards can only be set domestically by national
standard-setting agencies. See id. at 168.
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specific recommendations of the CCITT. The voluntary nature of the recommendation
bears little resemblance to the characteristic of cartel.
Efficient telecommunication of global standardization by means of delivery,
moreover, is one of the main objectives to which CCis, particularly CCIR & CCITT,
have made a commitment. Art.4(b) of the 1982 Nairobi ITU Convention points to
promoting the development of technological facilities and their most efficient operation
with a view to improving the efficiency and public availableness of telecommunication
services. Specifically, the International Consultative Committee on Long-distance
Telephones (CCIF) and the CCITT have played important roles in issuing
recommendations as to the standardization of telephone and telegraph equipment and
inter-state circuits and system.

67

For example, in 1939, the overall standardization of

the EU telephone networks by the CCIF allowed any EU subscriber to communicate to
any other subscriber with a generally highly satisfactory condition of audibility without
having to wait for a connection. Inspired by the success, its proponents empowered the
CCIF's plan for a single standard global network in which national and international
systems would be technically indistinguishable, enabling the CCIF to aid and advice
newly independent and developing countries in studies related to establishing and
maintaining domestic national networks. The role of the CCis to make international
network feasible have not changed since the time, and the enormous growth in
telecommunication technology afterwards has enhanced the importance of the CCis. 68
Regarding priority between efficiency and universality, it is argued that most CCI
recommendations promote technical efficiency over universality of access to new
67

68

ld. at 31.
ld., at48.
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technology or affordability, which contributes to the LDC perception of being caught in
the wrong end of an increasing technology gap.

69

However, the argument is not related

to violation of competition law because the competition law perspective focuses on
fostering technical efficiency rather than on universal access. Moreover, the argument
acknowledged that given the CCI's recommendatory roles, it must be at the cutting
edge of new technological developments. 70 The availability ofthe access to market or
RFS is ensured by an extension of membership in the Plenipotentiary Conference and
the growing influence of the New World Information Order.
Global standardization has contributed to fostering competition. Through its
standardization efforts for more than 130 years, the ITU has helped the
telecommunication industry grow to become the world's third-largest business sector
with an annual value of over USD one trillion. 71 The international standards, in addition,
provide manufactures with a solid basis for competition in the global market without
the hindrance of technical barriers. The convergence among Internet Protocol (IP),
public switched telephone network (PSTN), digital subscriber line (DSL), cable
television (CATV), wireless local area network (WLAN) and mobile technologies is a
task which would have been impossible without the development of the global standard.
4) Rate-setting: Price-fixing ?
There are strong arguments that rate-setting on the part of the ITU might restrict
competition in reducing the rate.72 Major targets of complaints are (i) the accounting
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SAVAGE, supra note 47, at 181.

70
71

ld.

ITU, Overview-Standardization Sector, available at http://www.itu.int/ (last visit on
June 20th, 2007).
72
ARONSON AND COWHEY, supra note 46, 218-220.
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rate 73 system that resembles that of a cartel with both an arcane sharing of the revenue
from international calls which secretly distributes the spoils of telecommunication
4

business among major members/ (ii) a method that penalizes companies that cut their
prices, and (iii) restrictions on private circuits which were designed to keep non-cartel
members out of the market and enshrined on the CCITT's recommendations

75

•

Concretely, the complaint about the accounting rate system is supported by price
for phone call set by the CCITT at three times as high as the cost.

76

The inculpation

against the current accounting rate system which does not closely reflect actual cost is
exacerbated by the fact that countries with a monopoly approach, developing countries,
have shared revenues of those with liberalized approach, the industrialized countries.
As the latter have to pay half of its revenue for international calls terminated in the
fonner, the international call price can not be decreased in spite of price competition in
industrialized countries. The research of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in the U.S. confirmed that the U.S. balance of payment deficit for international
telephone traffic grew from US$ 40 million in 1970 to US$ 2 billion in 1988, and
73

The 'accounting rate' is the internal price agreed between public telecommunication
operators (PTOs) for carrying international traffic between two points. Usually one half
of the accounting rate, so called settlement rate, is used to determine the price charged
to the originating PTO by the terminating PTO. ITU, Trade in Telecommunications: A
Glossary ofTechnical Terms, available at
http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press/WTPF98/Glossarytechnterms.html (visited on Apr.
15 2008)
74
Dixon, Reconnecting Charges with Costs, FIN. TIMES (April, 3, 1990).
5
~6 Id. It mentioned D-series of its Blue Book as well as the CCITT recommendation.
Hugo Dixon, Phone club days are numbered: Change is on the line for global cartel,
FIN. TIMES (May 15th, 1990). "There is little pretense that payments for international
calls begin to reflect the underlying costs of the infrastructures used," Mr. Jonathan
Solomon, cable and wireless' director for corporate business development and a former
senior civil servant at the UK's Dep. of Trade and Industry, argued. Artificially high
accounting rates for international calls deter companies from cutting their international

prices.
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insisted that accounting rates substantially above the cost of network go into excess
profits by international carriers because the profits are to subsidize domestic and local
services in their country. 77
From the opposite point of view, developing countries rather complained about the
problem of equal division of the accounting revenue to compensate for the higher unitcost for their telecommunication facilities. The complaint proposed a resolution
attached to new regulations that countries should agree to a split of the accounting rate
other than a half and half in the light of the lTD's further research on real costs.
Considering the rate-setting structure as well as the complaints, the current ITU
activity or structure does not resemble the typical characteristic of cartel for the
following reasons.
First, carriers of international call in an originating country and a tenninating
country are placed in the opposite position with reciprocally conflicting interests under
accounting settlement arrangement of bilateral relationship. It is in distinction with a
cartel agreement of multilateral arrangement where competitors are in the same
position with competing interests. A carrier in a destination country can be remunerated
by a flat-rate price per circuit on the basis of the traffic units carried, or through a
procedure whereby accounting revenue is shared between terminal operators. 78 The
carrier which experienced the BOP surplus would maintain such a current situation so
that credit from incoming calls outweighs the debit of outgoing calls. On the other hand,

Peter A. Stem, The International Telecommunications Settlement Process: What s
needed? Destroy and replace it or adjust it?, IIC Telecommunications Forum
(Washington), 3-4 (25-26, Oct. 1990), available at http://www.itu.int/
78
The CCITT Recommendation D. 150 & D. 155.
77
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its partner in BOP deficit would mitigate the deficit by negotiating for the reduction of
the accounting rate and by assisting the carrier to have more frequent outgoing calls.

79

The developing countries' proposal regarding the revenue division reflecting real
1e

costs can be repudiated in the following way. Although, in theory, it is possible to split

t-

the accounting rate in other ways besides 50/50, there is extreme difficulty in obtaining
reliable data supporting splits in different ratios due to the absence of sophisticated

e

accounting and administrative infrastructure among countries. Therefore, a universal
agreement on the calculations and accounting procedure with equal division such as

50150 is more practical unless a new infrastructure of accounting and administration in
telephone industry is available.
Second, the price-fixing conspiracy of accounting rate standard is seriously doubted
with several persuasive bases. Among other things, the setting rate is the maximum
rather than the minimum as the ITU-T Recommendation D.600 R, 80 clause 2.4.1
indicates. It verifies that the purpose of setting rates is to decrease rate under a certain
level. 81
j

As to the second point, it matters whether the accounting system has any penalties
against non-complier to maintain an alleged cartel regime. The standard is
recommendatory rather than binding. As a result, non-compliance does not cause any
punishment. The agreement in summer 1998 through the accounting rate reform in the
79

!d. 5-7.
ITU-T Recommendation D.600 R, Charging and Accounting in International
Telecommunication Services: Determination of Accounting Rate Shares and Collection
Charges in Telephone Relations between Countries in Africa (1994).
81
With the maximum rate level, recommendatory remuneration standards on the basis
of a flat-rate price for a transit country and a destination country are stated in clause
2.4.2.1., and 2.4.2.2. ofD.601 R has very similar recommendations regarding
accounting rate and collection charges.
80
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context ofiTU-T Study Group 3 provides a departure from the global limit on the totaJ
accounting rate. Works of the World Telecommunication Policy Forum and its Focus
Group related to the ITU-T Study Group provide flexible means of establishing target
rates in a way tailored to the specific situations of individual countries. 82 Moreover,
ITU-T Recommendations for regional application83 specifically mention that, for the
accounting rate shares for each country, illustrated standard rates are recommended. 84
For collection charges, the recommendations allow diversified collection regimes by
asking each country to settle its unique charge by establishing different charges for
each method or a single collection charge weighted in light of the volume of each type
of traffic. 85
At last, it matters whether the restriction on private circuits to keep non-cartel
members out of the market falls as an entry barrier to new competitors. The World
Administrative Telegraph and Telephone Conference (WA TTC) in 1988 limited the
application of the restriction, faced by contestants who argued that the existent
international organization was out-dated. Its limitation resulted in the removal of the
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ITU, Accounting Rate Reform: the Current Debate, opening remarks prepared for Dr.
Henry Chasia (Sep. 29th, 1998), available at http://www.itu.int/ITUD/ict/papers/accrates/_page. printrl
83
ITU-T Recommendation D.301 R (Recommendations for Regional Application),
Standards Rates Applicable in the International Telecommunication Services:
Determination of Accounting Rate Shares and Collection Charges in Telex Relations
between Countries in Europe and the Mediterranean Basin (1995).
84
See also id., clause 2.3 .1.1) fn b). It adds that recommended accounting rates may not
be appropriate to some small capacity submarine cables, in which cases the rates should
be fixed by agreements among the parties concerned. This implies the flexibility of
recommended rates.
85
Refer to Clause 3.3.2 ofD.600 R. The collection charge is the price charged by the
PTO which originates a call to a customer. See ITU, supra note 73.
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potential regulatory barrier in the entry into new competitive enhanced services
including basic international services and international transport means.
Actual price shifts in real markets do not align with the cartel argument. Accounting
rates have successfully been reduced in compliance with the expectation ofiTU-T
recommendations. 86 Prices of international commercial services provided by
international carriers such as Teleglobe have been reduced by as much as 35% over the
last few years and have been accompanied by a continuing trend of reduction in
accounting rates through the negotiating mechanism which is afforded by the current
arrangements. Although the global accounting rate decline was only 4 % per year from
1992 to 1996, it reached up to a decline of 12% between 96 and 98, reaching 20% per
year after 1998 while actual costs have been declining at a faster rate.

In the majority of the ITU's 189 member states, which do not adopt the competition
policy in international telecommunication service, such ITU recommendations can act
as rules restricting extraordinarily high price. Price-setting regulations can be necessary
in light of the public characteristics of telecommunication since pricing in the
telecommunication industry can be viewed from a public-service perspective. It is
argued that pricing policy in telecommunication must consider at least eight basic
r.

goals: i) universal service, ii) static efficiency, iii) equity for different kinds of users
and services, iv) financial self-sufficiency, v) prevention of uneconomic entry, vi)
consistency with expected technological change, vii) administrative simplicity, and viii)
historical continuity. The policy goals indicate that the interests of the public, e.g.
universal service, administrative simplicity, and continuity, should be taken into
86

D.140 of Study Group 3 on accounting rates principles for the international telephone
Service.
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account besides economic or private interests. The utilization charges are established at
a level which generates the revenue required to meet the operation, maintenance, and
advertisement of the system as well as the amortization of and compensation for the Use
of capital.
In the member states with effective competition, which account for more than three.
quarters of total traffic, telecommunication service is becoming more and more
considered as a tradable commodity. With the advent of competition for transit trafficB1

'

carriers began in the late 1970s to offer Transit Remuneration Plans whereby the transit
facilities were offered to terminal operators at competitive rates. The fierce competition
among carriers to attract the transit traffic is not a characteristic of a cartel any more
than their behaviors in negotiating accounting rates are. The pressure to liberalize the
global telecommunication service market continued to be furthered when the Uruguay
Round adopted a new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) with a
provision that prices should reflect costs.
In short, the ITU or lTU-T has no high price fixing arrangement, a key
characteristic of a cartel. In light of the accounting rate system of the ITU without any
binding provisions for international carriers to enter into agreements to set prices and
without penalties against violators, the actual price trend, the public interests, and the
pressures to liberalize from the industrialized countries, it is evident that the existent
international organization and its practices contain no formal traits of collusion. An
argument with the pro-competition stance of the ITU opines that the ITU Constitution
and the Convention and Administrative Regulations acknowledge the sovereignty of
87

'Transit traffic' means telecommunications traffic that an originating carrier delivers
to a transiting carrier or carriers for delivery to a terminating carrier.
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each nation to regulate its telecommunications depending on their interests. The treaties
are the result of difficult compromises made between the liberalization request from the

le

industrialized countries and the championing of the sovereign principle from
developing countries. The present international settlement procedure contains an inner

:-

commercially-driven dynamism towards cost reduction in all the instances where traffic
imbalances occur. 88 Domestic communication agencies have contributed their efforts to
reduce price to a certain level for a decade.

89

5) Radio-Frequency Spectrum (RFS) Distribution: Market-Allocation?
Radio Frequency Spectrum (RFS) is an electromagnetic wave of frequencies
propagated in space used to transmit information through signals. 90 A frequency is not
an entity but the number of cycles that an electronic carrier wave diffuses in a second.
With a designated frequency spectrum range, the electronic wave carries sound or
picture from broadcaster to recipient. If incorrectly exerted or operated, various uses of
radio waves can interfere reciprocally and nullify their benefit since allocation of the
RFS proceeds independently in individual countries. The ITU holds World RadioCommunication Conferences (WRC) every two years to debate the allocation of
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Stern, supra note 77.
Sarah Laitner and Andrew Parker, EU to cap price of mobile calls, 3 FIN. TIMES {Th.
May 24, 2007). EU decided to impose price caps on international telephone call charges
despite fierce opposition from operators. See also Stem, supra note 77, 5. The FCC in
the U.S. issued a notice of proposed rule to bring int' accounting rates closer to the cost
of providing international telecommunication services and to reduce US prices by as
much as fifty percent. OFTEL in BK made inquiry after the two FT articles about the
BT's international rates, not included in the basket of prices subject to the UK price cap
fonnula.
90
Refer to Recommendation lTU-R V.662-3 (2000) and V.575-3 ( 1990).
89
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spectrum so that the technology used in an individual country works effectively Without
any technical problems. 91
Arguments that the allocation of RFS falls on market allocation or monopoly come
from a misunderstanding of the RFS. The RFS allocation is inevitable for countries that
use telecommunication technology without reciprocal interference. The RFS is a
limited resource with a characteristic ofinelasticity. 92 It vests exclusive rights to
assigned entities to send the RFS within the designated spectra. In order to avoid
conflicts with the other electronic waves, each broadcaster requires the range of RFS
designated for its exclusive use. A global consensus is effective in solving technical
problems such as harmful interference among countries and the impossibility of global
roaming. 93 The ITU-R ensures the rational, equitable, efficient and economic use of the
RFS by all radio-communication services, including those using the geostationary
satellite orbit, and carries out studies without limit of frequency ranges. 94 As
technology needs a certain rage of RFS for global roaming, the WRC has led the
discussion for allocating the RFS to the technique for roaming. 95
Moreover, the global standard for the RFS allocation has changed toward
promoting competition in the light of equity concern. The equitable access to RFS is
requested by developing countries. With several international agreements, radio
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Chun-Hung Lin, International Telecommunication Regime and Its Influence on
Taiwan's Telecommunication Regulations, 245, SJD thesis (Golden Gate Univ. School
of Law)
92
Inelasticity means the characteristic of goods or service which can not be produced
so sufficiently to match the increasing demand.
93
Lin, supra note 91, at. 252.
94
cs Art. 12.1.1.
95
E-mail from Dr. Seung-Joon Park, Researcher at LG Electronics (June 27, 2007 5:56
PM) (on file with author)
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frequencies and the geo-stationary satellite orbit that have been already regarded as
IUnited resources become affordable so that countries may have equitable access to
each other. 96 The concrete ways of the allocation indicate interests in both equitable
access as well as efficiency. They are categorized as posteriori and priori. The
following is a comparison between the two ways of allocation:

posteriori

(unplanned bands)

priori

Protecting vested rights

Concerning equity

Flexibility

Rigidity

Case by case approach (first-come and

Principled approach

(planned bands)

first -served)
Often used in domestic level

In international level

Through the posteriori allocation standard, rights to use a specific radio channel in a
geographical area are vested on a first-come, first-serve basis. The posteriori standard
was a success of the International Radio Conferences (IRCs) held in order to assign the
existing RFS and to avoid interference with existent stations in the early 20th century.
However, the rate tables negotiated at the Conferences were not accepted by the U.S.
and Canada where private companies set telegraph rates and the government only
supervised them with non-specific guidelines. After World War II ended, which
destroyed many parts of international telecommunication systems but made the radio
technology central, the priori spectrum, or the planned system for registration of

96

ITU CV. Art. 44.
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frequency list was adopted as an international standard in the 1947 Atlantic City
Convention97 to distribute the usable radio frequencies among the members with a basi
on sound engineering principles.

98

The new standard reflected equitable access, fairness,

and technical efficiency of operation, and was applauded by developing countries with
the belief that the priori planning would achieve just distribution and technical
feasibility for new RFS, such as orbit allotment.
The attitudes of the European Commission (EC) and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) are compatible with the opinion that RFS allocation does not restrict competition.
The EC issued a directive asking member states to open telecommunication services
and equipment markets to competition by withdrawing an exclusive right to supply
telecommunication service under Art. 82 & 86 of the Treaty ofRome. 99 Several
member states with the Postal Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) monopolies contended
the directive and caused a legal dispute. The holding of the ECJ was that only in
opening telecommunications services and terminal equipment market, but not in RFS
distribution, free market principles should be enforced. 100
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SAVAGE, supra note 47, 28-44. CODDINGS ET AL., supra note 40, 11-26.
A full a priori allocation plan was scheduled to take effect on Sep. 1, 1939, but, due
to the outbreak ofWWII, the plan failed in being effective. SAVAGE, supra note 47, 37.
99
Commission Directive 90/338/EEC of28 June 1990 had its foundation on former Art.
86 and 90 of the Treaty.
100
ECJ, Judgment of 17 Nov. 1992, Case C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90, ECR 105833, para. 36 (1992). Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom ofBelgiwn, and Italian Republic
intervened by French Republic were in position of applicant for requesting annulment
of the Directive. Regarding withdrawing 'special right' in the terminal equipment
directive, the court held that the directive to the extent of the 'special right' must be
annulled due to the lack of specific information about the type of special rights. The
directive applied to telecommunication services except telex, mobile radio telephony,
paging and satellite services, as well as telephone equipment.
98
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The monopoly argument was made by countries or enterprises which did not have
favorable frequency bands because most areas had been occupied by advanced
countries. The ITU, however, counter-argues by pointing out the equity-concerned
'Table of Frequency Allocations (TF A)', which states that an individual country in the
designated geographical areas had an equitable access to a frequency band. The TF A
was included in the Radio Regulations (RRs) so as to avoid interference between
certain stations. 101 Thus, the equity-based approach to solve technical problems in the
light of the distinction ofRFS with competitive equipment market is so persuasive as to
outweigh the monopoly argument.
The RFS of the ITU does not constitute a market-allocation cartel, either. From a
technical viewpoint, the ITU, with the RRs covering wider spectra and more radio
services, needed an effective coordination among countries to make their radio
communication effective without interference. The international coordination through
RFS allocation is indispensable to radio broadcasting. When the coordination is fairly
managed with concern for equity, it enhances consumers' benefit rather than restricts it.
Moreover, individual countries do not face any penalties, unlike cartels, although
they do not abide by the international agreement. 102 They are totally free to distribute
RFS allocation in ways different from the allocation of the ITU or the WRC. The
international standard is only for avoiding technical problems and making
telecommunication effective in the global level.
6) Conclusion: the ITU is not a cartel
101

Vacancy Notice, No. 17-1998 ITU, 253(13 Aug. 1998). The stations are the
following: aircraft, control towers, car telephones, ships at both sea and coast stations,
radio stations, spacecraft and earth-based stations
102
Email from Dr. Seung-Joon Park, supra note 95.
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The ITU does not violate competition laws with either accounting rate setting or its
RFS allocation. The rate-setting is on a voluntary basis with the maximum rate standard
The actual market price trend for international phone call indicates a downward trend in
terms of the telephone service fee. There is an international pressure to liberalize
service trade under the GATS. It also is noted that rate setting should reflect public
interests such as equitable access, universal service and static efficiency. The concern
for public interests provides the justification for a recommendatory accounting rate
setting.
The RFS allocation is inevitable in order to have effective cross-border radiobroadcasting without interference in different radio spectra. Judicial bodies in advanced
countries, on the other hand, hold that establishing monopolies in the
telecommunication industry violates competition law. However, the decision does not
apply to the RFS allocation because the act of allocation is not within an industry where
private companies compete to sell products. The RFS allocation in the ITU is not a
restriction of competition but a management practice to ensure its fair distribution and
effective use. The standards ofthe TFA and the RR have reflected the consideration for
equity among developing countries.

(3) The International Air Transport Association (lATA)
1) Origin and Legal Status
The less-developed international commercial aviation industry, where carriers were
satisfied with uncoordinated and informal negotiation, prior to World War II, had
grown sufficiently enough for many nations to convene at the Chicago Civil Aviation
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Conference (CCAC), and thereby establish the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). However, the ICAO, although an intergovernmental organization,

was not empowered to engage in economic regulation due to conflicts of interests
mainly between the U.S. and the U.K governments.
With a need to cooperate in economic matters of the international civil aviation

industry, thirty one scheduled airlines, private companies which participated in CCAC

as observers, organized the lATA in Havana, Cuba in April, 1945. The nongovernmental organization was given a corporate charter by an Act of the Canadian
Parliament in December.

103

Subsequently, in January of 1946, the U.K, under the threat

of price-cutting by the U.S. airlines, engaged the U.S. in disagreement with regards to
economic regulation at CCAC, only to reach a compromise in Burmuda, through which
the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) allowed antitrust law immunity to airlines
participating at lATA rate-setting conferences by the late 1970s while the U.K. allowed
U.S. airlines to fly trans-Atlantic routes. 104
2) Structure and Works
lATA works to coordinate the diverse differences in airlines, currencies, policies, and
laws regarding international air transportation so as to create a global air transport
system which connect users, airlines, and governments. Important achievements of the
lATA include: lobbying for lower taxes, monitoring fuel prices, compiling information
from members, providing data-processing equipment and programs, studying airmail
conveyance rates of various governments, operating a clearing house for controlling
103

Hannigan, Unfriendly Skies: The Decline of the World Aviation Cartel, 25-1 the
Pacific Sociological Rev. 112-3 (Jan. 1982).
104
R.D.Peterson, The CAB :s- Struggle to Establish Price and Route Rivalry in World Air
Transport, 49-1 American Journal ofEconomics and Sociology, 65-66 & 71 (Jan. 1990).
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interline accounts among carriers, and disseminating public relations materials to
. . groups and the generaI publ.tc. 105
governments, ctvtc
The IATA operated a two-tier mechanism of the organization itself and the
conferences which discussed and agreed on such issues as rights to carry traffic on
routes, prices to be charged, and standards for various services. Among other things,
Traffic Conferences and Tariff Coordination discussed, respectively, the international
coordination of international fares, fare-related conditions, and procedures along with
governments, as well as fares and commissions on sales among members only. 106 The
agreements from such conferences were issued as recommendations subsequently
delivered to individual governments by company representatives or as bilateral
agreements dispatched to reciprocal national congresses for ratification.
While the Traffic Conferences, with open membership including governments,
mostly focused on coordinating international fares and on establishing their conditions
and procedures, the organization treated a wide range of aviation policies from indetailed techniques, e.g. communication procedures, to coordination of services, e.g. a
centralized ticket clearing house. The highest authority of organization itself was on the
annual general meeting consisting of representatives of the members. The
administrative functions including policy direction and execution were up to the lATA
secretariat, an executive committee headed by the director general and aided by five
standing committees in the technical, legal, financial, and medical areas of traffic
advisory. 107 The administrative body has sought to achieve multilateral forward
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ld. at 69.
ld. at 69-70.
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Hannigan, supra note 103, 114.
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.....,.,ents among the national governments of its members for cohesiveness and

agr~~

ation in ITAT policy enforcement.
cooPer
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Since 1980, in response to the condemnation of cartel led by the U.S., the
organization has been transformed to the Trade Association for the coordination of
matters other than rate and the Tariff Coordination for rate-setting. The main intent of
such restructuring is considered to be that of protecting the IA TA operation from
accusations of cartel-like behaviors.

109

3) Membership
In its launching era, fifty seven international air carriers from thirty one countries,
mostly leading airlines in Europe and North America, belonged to the lATA. Currently,
two hundred forty members from one hundred twenty six countries are members of the
IATA. 110 As IATA is voluntary, non-exclusive, democratic, and a non-political
organization, any airline can be a member of it if it has been able to provide scheduled

air service under license by a government with qualified membership in ICA0. 111 The
participation in Traffic Conferences was not required. Observers from governments,

108

Two successful models, EU agreement for opening aviation industry among EU
member states and APEC agreement for creating a single aviation market, are likely to
be affected by such efforts.
109
Peterson, supra note 104, at 73 & 77. lATA confirms such analysis at its website by
the following statement: in the late 70s when the US Government, which had first given
lATA Traffic Conferences immunity from national anti-trust law in 1946, began its own
review of air transport regulation, and the international dimension of the US review
resulted in a "Show Cause Order" in 1979 by which lATA was called upon at the
hearing ofU.S. Congress to show cause why anti-trust immunity should not be
removed from its Tariff Coordination activities. Eventually, lATA restructured its
organization as such two-tier system. The present position is that all Tariff Coordination
activities continue to be protected. lATA, History-a Two Tier lATA: part 4, available at
http://www.iata.orglabout/history (visited on Mar. 2, '08)
no lATA, History-Introduction: part 1, available at http://www.iata.orglabout/history.
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Peterson, supra note 104, at 68.
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although not members, were allowed to attend lATA conferences.

112

The Tariff

Coordination has more than one hundred members including the largest airlines in the
world.
4) Cartel Debate

There have been disputes as to whether the lATA is a cartel in need of competition
law regulation in relation to most of authorities, a reconsideration of the formerly
provided antitrust or competition law exemptions to IAT A conferences. As
backgrounds for such disputes, the current aviation industry has met increasing market
competition compared to the initial stage of the IATA. The national authorities which
pursued an airline industry deregulation policy in major countries, particularly the
U.S. 113 and the EU, 114 blamed conferences of the IATA for restricting competition.
Particularly, the points of disputes are whether tariff coordination falls under the
category of a price-fixing cartel and whether slot allocation and airport scheduling

112

/d. at 74.
The Air Cargo Deregulation At of 1977, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Order
to Show Cause on lATA Conference Agreement (June 9, 1978), and the International
Air Transportation Competition Act {IATCA) of 1979 are major four official policies
for deregulating airlines in the U.S. For in-detail U.S. Air Transport Policy shift, refer
to Peterson, id. at 70 to 75.
114
European Competition granted Art. 81 (3) exemptions, cartel provision exemptions
to certain lATA conferences with Council Regulation 3876/87 and 1617/93 which
applies to June 2005. However, the coverage ofblock exemptions has been narrowed
only two consultations, consultations on passenger tariffs on intra-Community
scheduled air services, and slot allocation and airport scheduling in terms of intraCommunity airport services. See EU Competition Commission (CC), Director General
(DG) Competition Consultation Paper: concerning the revision and possible
prorogation of Commission Regulation 1617/93 on the application of Art. 81(3) to
certain categories of agreements and concerted practices concerning consultations on
passenger tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at air ports (DG CCP), 45.
113
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restricts new competitors' entry into the market as the result of a collective refusal to

the

negotiate.
First, opponents against the lATA's fare-setting, e.g. the U.S. Civil Aeronautic
Board(CAB}, argue that the coordination of air fares in traffic conferences and the

Q

issued recommendations has restricted an otherwise competitive process of reducing
airfares. 115 Discussions at IATA meetings were allegedly aimed more at harmonizing
and adjusting airfares than sharing price information, thereby obtaining a uniform price.

:et
1

1n response to the criticism, the DG of the lATA argue that its pricing agreements
were merely recommendations to governments, not binding orders to airlines, and
further, that the participation in Traffic Conferences is not mandatory to any carrier
while observers from governments are allowed to attend. Such characteristics of the
international air carriage market as a perishable commodity which can not be stocked,
as well as indispensable frequent contacts with diverse domestic laws and policies,
make the air transport industry a market which necessitates careful coordination among
airlines and governments. 116 The lATA, rather, requested an intergovernmental
approach to deal with price-coordination and interlining. The direct negotiation of

r

national governments as an alternative to that among individual airlines was not a
popular one, as it was not welcomed by the major dominant powers in international
civil aviation. 117 It looks as if the airlines with strong market power do not want to
dispose of their bilateral negotiations with national governments as to market entry or
international fare or rate.

~::Peterson, supra note 104, 73-74; Hannigan, supra note 103, 123.
I 11

Peterson, id. 74-75.
H .
anmgan, supra note 103, 133.
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The IAT A further argues that such improvement of production or distribution or
promotion of economic progress results from increased market access, access to
coordinated implementation, access to market knowledge, efficiency through one-fune
multilateral meetings, through tariff information dissemination, and through
development of standards, equality from the unanimity rule, and worldwide antitrust
immunity.

118

Moreover, it adds consumer benefits attributable to the IATA interlining

system 119 •
Second, airport scheduling and slot allocation may treat arguably in an unfair way
new carriers or carriers who request more slots and thereby bloc their access to the
market. Entry has been denied for many years to new supplemental carriers while
remaining open to scheduled carriers in similar circumstances. 120
On the other hand, it is argued that the possibility of unfair discrimination or
blocking entry by collective boycott is eliminated. IATA Worldwide Scheduling
Guidelines provides that all air carriers can participate in the discussions and
negotiations for allocating slots and that the allocation at congested airports is made on
a non-discriminatory and transparent basis. It added that the entry to congested airports
will remain possible for the purpose of securing competition. 121
5) Assessment
(A) Tariff Coordination Conference under the Category of Price-fixing Cartel
118

EU CC, supra note114, 16.
The 'interlining service' provides passengers with convenient options with their
purchased tickets, e.g. changing airlines for the return portion of a round trip ticket, or
taking the other airline to destination with a single ticket issued from the airline taken
on leave, baggage transfer without repetitive checks, and the establishment of throughfare. See id. at 17.
120
/d. at 116.
121
EU CC, supra note 114, 10.
119
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The conferences for tariff coordination as themselves have a high probability of
falling under the category of a price-fixing cartel. Since they offer pivotal information
regarding passenger fare and cargo rate which can restrict competition in the air
trafiSport industry, the conferences at the very least promote price-fixing activities and
lead to the forming of hardcore cartels among competing airlines, which need to be
strictly regulated.
Of the two categories that comprise cartel acts, 122 the lATA falls under the category
of the association-typed cartel consisting of competing private companies. The lATA is
the association which consists of majority of the competitors in a horizontal market
because the majority of competing airlines which cover the world air transport industry
are their members.
The activities of the lATA at least provide a forum, e.g. the Traffic Conference, to
restrict competition in a market. The Traffic Conferences allow the settlement of
international passenger fare or cargo rate and the dissemination of fare or rate
information although it issue non-binding recommendations rather than binding
resolutions. Even non-binding recommendations has revealed anticompetitive impact
on the markets by preventing fare-reducing competition. 123 For example, IATA's
Special North Atlantic Tariff Conference(SNATC) in the first half of 1990 agreed to
increase fares between the U.S. and most European countries, thereby raising fares
from 4 to 15% depending on areas. 124 In contrast to the lATA argument that services
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Refer to Ch.1.II.1.
•
U.S. DOJ, Comments of the DOJ before the U.S. Department ofTransportatzon, Doc.
46928, at 9 (Aug. 7, 1990). U.S.DOJ, Reply Comments ofthe DOJ, at 7 (May 14,
1992).
124
US DOJ, supra note 123, 11-12 (1992). Each 1 %of fare increase from !TAT fare
123
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would be disrupted, 125 in markets where carriers are non-lATA members, services and
fares have been improved and lowered.

126

In light of such circwnstances, the settlement

or dissemination of such price-related matters has the effect of restricting competition.
In terms of 'purpose' of the agreement, this element is presumed by circwnstantia}
evidences including the result of a sustained high level of fares/rates. According to the
CAP reports, the main purpose of tariff coordination is to agree on price among direct
competitors to the maximum extent. 127 While fuel costs increased throughout the
enforcement of the deregulation policy, 128 the international passenger fares which
increased under exemption regulation decreased after deregulating U.S. airline. 129 In
addition, due to the agreed mileage rules 130, overall costs reflecting such uncertainty
will possibly be increased, which may produce competition-restricting effects in
relation to the increased fare. 131 The analyses indicate that tariff coordination on the
part of the lATA is for raising fares, thereby restricting competition, which the

coordination activity costs U.S. conswners nearly$ 60 million annually in the North
Atlantic market alone. !d. at 16.
125
Peterson, supra note 104, 74. He cites CAB Final Order Terminating Proceeding 815-27.
126
US DOJ, supra note 123, 10 (1990) It cites DOT's study of the U.S. airline industry,
a study of Morrison and Minston (1989), and that ofOECD.
127
U.S. DOJ, supra note 123, at 6-10 (1990); U.S.DOJ supra note 123, at 7 (1992)
128
The rates of increase are respectively 42% from '77 to '79 and 82% from '79 to '81.
Peterson, supra note 104, 77, which cites Statistical Abstract of the United States,
selected issues, 1975 to 1984-5, 88 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce,
Government Printing Office)
129
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See id. 77; Statistical Abstract, supra note 129.
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The agreed mileage rule, inherent institution to the lATA interlining system,
provides passengers with flexibility to change routes and to add or delete intermediate
stopping points.
131
EU CC, supra note 114, 9.
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European Commission approved in reviewing an application of exemption to passenger
tariff conference as to intra-Community routes under Art. 81 (3 ).

132

The European

Commission decided to withdraw all exemption to lATA tariff consultations for intracommunity interlining starting from January 1, 2007 for interlining between EU and
the U.S.A. and Australia from July 1, 2007, and between EU and the other countries
from November 1, 2007. 133 The evidences indicate the goal of raising fares of lATA's
tariff coordination.

An efficient interlining service which is evaluated as a benevolent institution to
customers and argued as an important public benefit justifying lATA's tariff
coordination, can occur without the horizontal price-fixing. Although the lATA argues
that the lATA interlineable fare has been customarily used as a benchmark fare by
airline corporate agreements, 134 and that the Multilateral Interline Tariff Agreement
(MITA) and the multilateral prorate system as main pillars sustaining lATA Interlining
System have the effect of settling the lATA's interlineable fare to the same level
without imposing any legal obligation, the sophisticated mechanism for facilitating
interlining has not revealed the indispensable dependence of the interlining system on
lATA's multilateral tariff coordination. Large U.S. domestic carriers, e.g. US Air, and
Alaska Air, international carriers wishing to offer interline service to internal points in
the U.S. found no difficulty in interlining with the majority of U.S. carriers which were

132

Id. at 22-23.
Art. 4 of Commission Regulation No. 1456/2006 of28 Sept. 2006.
134
lATA, DG-Competition Consultation on Regulation 1617/93: lATA Observations on
Third-Party Comments, 5 (Dec. 22, 2004). It is because signatory airlines that issued
the ticket and received payment need to conform to the settled fare so as to compensate
the airline which actually carried passengers at the pro-rate agreed in the lATA
passenger tariff conferences.
133
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not a member of lATA tariff coordination conferences.

135

Without anti-competitive

tariff coordination, benefits of the interlining system can be provided through fare
publications, bilateral prorate agreements, the developed computerized fare quote
system which enables airlines to search for complex fare changes, and an efficient
clearing house mechanism for partners to exchange compensation. In addition, the
MITA has been under oversight of the IATA Passenger and Cargo Services
Conferences and a joint IATAIAir Transport Association group, different from the
Tariff Coordination Conference. The custom of settling the interlineable fare does not
justify tariff-coordinating activities. 136
The coordination requirement of the specific characteristics of the air transport
industry, e.g. exposure to diverse national laws and currencies, may well be negotiated
in the IAT A. However, the settlement of fare, rate or its floor level has a very high
possibility of meeting the standard of competition restriction as price-fixing HCC in
spite of its recommendatory nature. Although it is acknowledged that there is a unique
necessity in the industry to lead to an inter-government or multilateral agreement
among governments, the fare/rate settlement among competitors restricts competition
as the fair/rate is the pivotal point of competition which can attract consumers. The
proposal of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) to withdraw the antitrust
exemption as to lATA tariff-coordinating conferences for flights from the U.S. to
Europe and flights from the U.S. to Australia were aimed at enhancing competition and
thereby providing lower international passenger fares. 137 Such proposal of the
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US DOJ, supra note 114, 21-22 ( 1992).
EU CC, supra note 114, 8-9.
137
DOT, DOT Proposes Revoking lATA :s- Antitrust Exemption for Transatlantic and
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withdrawal by U.S. DOT demonstrates that the lATA conferences have restricted farereducing competition although there may be a benefit from interlining fare-coordination.
The EU Commission and Australia's competition authority have already withdrawn the
exemption from cartel regulation.
(B) Slot Allocation and Airport Scheduling

As to slot allocation and airport scheduling, the measures are considered as necessary
to the arrangement of congested airports because the coordination has such advantages

as improving efficient utilization of scare airport capacity, facilitating air-traffic control,
and helping to maximize the benefits of air transport service to airport users. So as to
avoid the restriction of competition, the allocation and the scheduling require (i) an
open entry into negotiation and (ii) non-discriminatory and transparent consultation. 138

In light of the standards reflecting competition law, the use of 'historical precedence' of
the lATA 139 matters which entitles an airline with a series of slots allocated for regular
scheduled services, which operated no less than 80% of the slots, to have priority over
other airlines in the next equivalent period.
Competition in air transport services can be lessened through the historical
precedence. The intent of the use ofthe historical precedence is analyzed to secure
foreseeable scheduling for existent large airlines in the same period and encouragement

U.S.-Australia Fare and Rate Coordination, available at
h!tJ>://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot7506.htm (visited on Mar. 4, '08)
138
The European Commission acknowledged the standards in a preamble of official
regulation. See EC, Official Journal ofthe European Union, 1.272/4 (Oct.3, 2006),
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air__portal/competition/doc/ec_ 2006_1459_en. pdf (visited
on Mar. 4, '08). On the other hand, lATA states that activities of agencies in charge of
scheduling and allocation should be neutral, transparent and non-discriminatory. lATA,
[f~rldwide Scheduling Guidelines, 7, 11 & 12 (15th Ed. 2007).
lATA, supra note 138,22.
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for them to use as more airport slots as possible. In terms of the convenience for airport
users, the historical precedence can provide familiarity to users. The possibility of
abusing the institution, e.g. intentional interference with competing airlines operations
through exchange of slots, is screened by coordinator, and coordination committee or
slot performance committee. 140 However, the historical precedence can impede a new
airline competing with the existent airlines from using the slots or having schedule in
the similar times. More efficient usage of slots can be made with preference to airlines
willing to pay more airport fee with longer effective operation period rather than
airlines which maintain the a large portion of slots. While the unilateral focus of the
historic precedence on large airlines with market power may lead to inefficiency from
monopoly, competition among airlines can improve services and decrease fare. In EU,
the protection for the IA T A Guidelines by the bloc exemption of Art. 81 (3) expired on
January 1, 2007. 141 The non-renewal of the application of the bloc-exemption implies a
strict attitude of eliminating the possibility of competition-restricting activities of slotallocation and airport scheduling.
As an alternative institution, the slot auction system, which U.S. DOJ suggested for
O'Hare(Chicago) or LaGardia(New York) airport, is a market-based model for
preventing the restriction of competition through slot allocation in air service
markets.

142

However, the auction system may shrink airlines' investment plan because
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See id. at 29.
Art. 4 ofthe Regulation No. 1456/2006.
142
U.S. DOJ, Comments of the DOJ: Before the Federal Aviation Administration
Department ofTransportation(DOT), Notice of Alternative Policy Options for
Managing Capacity at Laguardia Airport and Proposed Extension of Lottery Allocation,
Doc. No. FAA-2001-9854, at 14-15 (2002); DOJ, Comments ofthe DOJ: Congestion
and Delay Reduction at Chicago O'Hare lnt' Airport, Doc No. FAA-2005-20704, at 19
141
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it significantly reduces the foreseeability of schedule and usable slots. The over-tenyear spectrum license system which the U.S. Federal Communications Commission has

used at auctions reduces the uncertainty of the auction. 143 The preference for an airline
with effective longer operation can be provided through a kind ofloyalty program,
loyalty discount or special slot allocation.
The EU Council Regulations have illustrated concrete measures to increase
competition in slot-allocation in an open, non-discriminatory and transparent way. Art.
2 para. 1 states (a) openness to all new carriers with interest, (b) establishment of nondiscriminatory rule of priority, (c) 50 % share allocation of available slots to new
enterers in EU airports, significant share in third country airports, (d) and (e) securing
of open access to the rule of priority, slot information, and allocation criteria, and (f)
reason for refusal of slot request. 144 The historic precedence does not allow sufficient
openness to all new carriers or the rule of priority. 50% share allocation of remaining
slots as a pool to new entrants under the Guidelines will occupy only a tiny portion of
the whole slot allocation. The new entrant status can be endowed on an airline holding
fewer than only five slots at an airport on the day of request. A modified slot allocation
rule with administrative procedure of the U.S. FAA at LaGuardia airport has provided
only a limited portion of slots to a pool for small community service, and the impact on
new carriers was small. 145 Similarly, the pool of slots for new entrants under the IATA
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(2005).
143
U.S DOJ, supra note 142, at 13 (2005).
144
EC, supra note 138, at 32. It stated that Council Regulation 95/93 as modified by
Regulation 793/2004 of the European Parliament brought the Community system to the
p,ractices in scheduling guidelines.
45
A withdrawal of 3% or less every year or every two years from the air carrier
existent slot category would provide a pool for new entrants, which means at most 2
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historic precedence will not solve the problems of inadequate access to new carriers

'

monopoly inefficiency, and efficiency use of congested airport.

c

In short, although the other aspects of slot allocation under lATA Scheduling
Guidelines do not express the high possibility of restriction of competition, the historic
precedence rule has discriminatory characteristics in favor of existent airlines with
large portions of slots.

III. Historical Development of National Cartel Laws and the Necessity

a

p

of International Law

1. Development of Domestic Legal Measures
(1) Cartel Regulations in Ancient and Medieval Times
In the ancient times, especially when international trade was prospering, there were
regulations against illegal price-fixing and collective boycotts for profits. In the ancient
India, in several centuries B.C., there was a law that regulated profits earned through
boycotts. In the latter part of the Roman Empire era, it is recorded that there were laws
regulating increasing price or imposing monopoly prices on grain. Diocletian's Edict on
Maximum Prices in 301 A.D. and the Constitution of Zeno in 483 A.D. imposed fines
or even physical punishment on illegal attempts to raise the price of food or commodity.
In addition, the Tang Dynasty in the ancient China issued a prohibition on price-fixing
in Art. 33 of the Tang Code in 737 A.D. 146

slots, e.g. one landing and one departure, would become available in any given hour.
US DOJ, supra note 142, Notice, at 13 (2002).
146
MAR1YR D. TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: A NEW DIMENSION FOR
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In the Medieval times, however, there were no records regarding regulation against
cartels. Guilds, as a basic unit of commerce, had operated under the merchants'
association with power to restrict competition in commerce in the early stage. A craft
guild, under manufacturers' association with exclusive power to manufacture and sell
the goods, replaced the merchants' association. Both the guilds enjoyed its monopoly
powers, in wholesale and retail areas, acquired from local governments.
As the industrial revolution led to mass production and the demand for labor
attracted the population into the cities in the 18th century, guilds gradually lost their
powers. Although the guilds afterwards disappeared, individual enterprises began to
collaborate with competitors by reducing production or maintaining price when they
faced an economic panic which led to falling prices and decreasing demand on the part
of the public. Individual nations developed unique legal treatments regarding collusive
activities among competitors. Such legal developments reflected economic, political,
and legal backgrounds in each country.
(2) Cartel Regulation in Modern Times
1) The U.S.: The Sherman Act & Effect Doctrine
The U.S. was the only country that had a serious push to promote competition in
the market starting from the late 19th century, when it faced a serious economic issue.
While major companies colluded to create a trust to raise profits by fixing prices and
allocating market and large companies grew through continuous mergers, small and
middle size companies were threatened by growing conglomerates and consumers
complained about the high prices that were fixed by the major cartel members in the

THE WTO? 74 and fn 8 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006).
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industry. The unique position ofthe U.S. with strict competition policy continued Up to
the end ofthe World War II when European countries adopted effective competition
law as a method to economic recovery. Since 1890 when the U.S. Congress adopted the
Sherman Act, U.S. courts have developed a literal interpretation of it, as regards to Sec
1 of the Act covering cartels, rather than following the rule of reason in common law.
Through subsequent case laws, the Supreme Court adopted a per se illegal approach by
stating that unrestricted competition, which is good for commerce, ensures the setting
of reasonable prices.
Extending the subject-matter jurisdiction over national border is the other aspect of
cartel regulation related to international law. The initial extraterritorial application of
the U.S. competition law to a foreign cartel, came out in 1945 with the U.S. confidence
of having the most developed competition law scheme in the US. v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa), where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the

Sherman Act does not cover agreements abroad unless it intended to affect imports or
exports and its performance is actually shown to have had some effect upon them. 147
The Alcoa doctrine faced harsh criticism from other nations, especially Great Britain,
which, by adopting a blocking statute, ch. 11 of the British Protection ofTrading
Interests Act ( 1980), prevented documents in the UK from being produced for foreign
litigation and allowed a British firm to recover penal damages paid pursuant to a
foreign judgment. In response to the retaliatory legislations, some cases adopted
approach ofbalancing foreign interests with national interests and held that courts
147

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444-445 (CA2 1945) (L.
Hand, J.). The Aloca doctrine was accepted by Matsushita case. Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582, n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1354, n. 6,
89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)
58
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should refrain from exercising jurisdiction ifthe interests of foreign nations and foreign
nationals in the non-enforcement of U.S. law outbalance the U.S.' interest in

the

enforcement. 148 In the context ofthe balancing principle, the other court refused to

ec.

apply it due to incommensurability between American interests in antitrust enforcement
and British interests against it.

149

In the midst of conflicting opinions, the

extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws achieved, as a result of the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FT AlA) of 1982, the legislative basis of expanding

their subject-matter jurisdiction to anticompetitive conduct of foreign companies that
f

occurs in a foreign country in so far as the conduct has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic commerce, and such effect give rise a
claim under the provision of Sec. 1 to 7 of the Sherman Act.

° Finally, the U.S.

15

Supreme Court resolved existent conflicting opinions, in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California (1993), by holding that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was

148

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (C.A.
Cal. 1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3rd
Cir. 1979); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. 671 F.2d 876, 884-5 (5th Cir.
1982); Montreal Trading Ltd. V. Amex, Inc. 661 F.3d 864, 869-70 (lOth Cir. 1982). In
the Timberlane case, the 91h Cir. suggested a balance approach in determining
extraterritorial effect of antitrust laws, which illustrated elements to be weighed such as
i) degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, ii) nationality or allegiance of parties
and iii) locations or principal places of business of corporations, iv) extent to which
enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, v) relative
significance of effects on United States as compared with those elsewhere, vi) extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, vii) the
foreseeability of such effect, and viii) the relative importance to violations charged of
conduct within United States as compared with conduct abroad.
149
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-49
(D.C.Cir. 1984); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980).
ISO
15 U.S.C. Sec. 6a; Sec. 6a(l)(A)&(B), and (2) ofthe Sherman Act; Sec. 402 ofthe
FTAIA of 1982.
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meant to produce (and did, in fact) some substantial effect on the U.S.

151

The folloWing

'implementation approach' in the judicial branch of the EU had similar results to that or
the developed 'effect doctrine' in the U.S.
2) European Countries: U .K, France, and Germany
(A) U.K.

The British Kingdom with strong industrial competitiveness from the mediaeval era
did not have to focus on cartels due to its common law traditions that any restraint of
freedom of commerce had been considered as illegal in public, 152 and that its strong
free trade policy encouraged the tendency of companies' merger. However, as the
English courts recognized justification, when reasonably limited in time and space, of
the trade restraint, the earlier tradition grew weakened. In Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711),
the English court enforced a provision not to compete for five years in the immediate
locality by using 'reasonable' standard. It held that trade restraints may be justified as
'reasonable' if ancillary to some principal transaction and iflimited in time and
space. 153 The attitude of common law was imported in the U.S.
However, in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordernfelt Guns and Ammunition Co. (1894),
although the court acknowledged the traditional anti-restraint rule, it loosened its strict
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509 U.S. 764, 796; 113 S.Ct. 2891,2909 (1993).
The English courts held unenforceable a promise not to compete which was
ancillary to a lawful transaction. The reason for such prohibition was not that they
might limit competition but from the fear that skilled workmen deprived of his trade
due to the restriction to their freedom of commerce would become a burden upon the
public. In those times, when trade was controlled by the guilds and towns, the promise
not to compete in the locality meant by far severer restriction on practicing one's trade
than the current meaning of competition-restraint, thereby reaching his inability to
practice anywhere. Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Analysis: problems, text, and cases, 45 (3rd
ed., 1981).
153
See id. 1. P.Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711).
152
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policY by expanding the 'reasonable' standard and holding that the restraints may be
justified if the restriction is reasonable (a) in reference to the interests of the parties
concerned, (b) in reference to the interests of public, and (c) so framed and so guarded
as to afford adequate protection to the parties without injuring the public.

154

Moreover,

the 'reasonableness' standard was decided mostly on the basis of the related parties'
interests because the courts accepted prima-facie presumption in favor of public interest
unless evidences of negative economic conditions outweigh those of positive conditions.
The Court of Appeals, in 1889, dismissed an action against an agreement among shipowners of the low fee fixing to dispel competitors and the discontinuance of rebate on
the condition that shippers would use the competitors' ships. The holding of the
majority drew a delimitation of illegality of an agreement for combining competitors to
drive from the market outsiders away by stating that the agreement could not secure
aids of courts, e.g. relief or action on its basis, but that, unless they injured rival
business through fraud, intimidation, or molestation, the entering into the agreement is
not indictable or actionable. 155 As an economic analysis was in a less-developed stage
to reflect a predatory pricing or a monopoly attempt, Queen's Bench Division pointed
out that the agreement-causing damage to competitors' rights to trade which were
conditioned by competition was so strictly limited that it could not form an unlawful
act.
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The holding implied that moral culpability against the agreement is weak, which

was in contrast to a dissenting opinion that the agreement is one intended to interfere
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Areeda, supra note 152, 45-46. [1894] A.C. 535, 565.
Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. et al, 23 Q.B.D. 598, 626-27 (1889).
See also F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FORAN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY,
26-27 (Brookings Institution 1994).
156
Mogul Steam Co. case, at 613-615 & 624-625.
155
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with the free trade of non-party and a wrongful act against both an individual and
public welfare if carried out.

157

A shift of the loosening policies toward the stringent one took place after the World
War II when a whitepaper was published warning that the attainment of postwar full
employment objectives might be jeopardized by the price-fixing practices of cartels and
monopolies. 158 Pursuant to the whitepaper, 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act
(RTP A) prohibited restraints of trade among suppliers of goods with specified
exceptions, required registration of trade-restricting agreements with the Office ofFair
Trading(OFT), and created a Restrictive Practices Court (RPC) to adjudicate contested
cases. The RPC decisions caused formal restrictive agreements to be abandoned. 159
(B) France
Some countries in the European Communities which adopted anti-cartel provisions
have shown no effective cartel regulations until the post-war era when economic
recovery was in progress and when the legal foundation of economic development
including competition law was set after the end of the WWII. In France, Art. 409 ofthe
Napoleonic Penal Code, which prohibited collective action to raise or lower prices
artificially for the purpose of acquiring profit, had not been actively applied by the end
of the WWII. The strict requirement of the criminal statute to prove artificiality or
abnormality of the desired price along with the war-time tolerance of cartels led to
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See id. at 606. Lord Esher mentioned that an illegal act against the public welfare
seems to have the necessary elements of a crime (at 606) and that the agreement was an
indictable conspiracy done with malice to obstruct plaintiffs (at 608-610).
158
Ken George, UK Competition Policy: Issues and Institutions, in COMPETITION
POLICY IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND INSTITUTIONS, 105
(Comanor et al. eds., NY Harwood Academic 1990).
159
See Scherer, supra note 155, 32.
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orcement. 160 As a result, cartel formation was allowed in practice due to such
toos e enfi
. ftiective law. 161 The earliest cartel dates back to the Marseille Cartel in soda industry,

tne
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8. Subsequently from 1840s, it was followed by cartels from raw materials, e.g. iron,

coal, sugar, and petroleum, to artificial products e.g. chemicals, glass, porcelain, and
textiles. 162 Although a number of cartels came out, their control over market
competition is analyzed as very limited as foreign competition beyond the coverage of
such cartels challenged national markets. Meanwhile, internationalization of cartels
grew under the facilitation of nation-level agreements, e.g. the federation of
Luxemburg-Lorraine crude iron works in 1879.
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The international cartels were mostly

dissolved during the great depression starting in the late 1920s.
(C) Germany
On the other hand, Germany neither regulated cartels as the U.S. nor had such strong

freedom-oriented public opinion as France nor common law tradition as U.K. When
cartels regulated raw material supply according to economic ups and downs in the late
19th century, the German Empire Court, the highest court of Germany, even held, in
1897 in a case involving wood-pulp manufacturers, that a cartel agreement falls on
freedom of association accorded workers and businesses and is binding unless a cartel
led to an actual monopoly or extreme exploitation of consumers. 164 In 1908,
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32-33 (1964).
Id; Andreas Resch, Phases of Competition Policy in Europe, Working Paper AY0504,
2(Institute of European Studies: UC Berkeley, Apr. 2005), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.orglcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=ies (visited on
Mar. 17, 2008)
162
Resch, supra note 161, 3.
163
ld. at 3-4.
164
Scherer, supra note 155, 24.
161

CORWIN D. EDWARDS, CARTELIZATION IN WESTERN EUROPE,
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representing public opinions,

165

the Court pronounced that the members of a

construction cartel adhere to their agreement by focusing on such a benefit of the cartel
as the mitigating of the damage of unrestrained competition from dishonest
underbidding. As to offense to public moral by secret bid agreement, it stated that
agreements whose purpose is to mitigate the damage and maintain appropriate prices
offends public morals so little that they deserve approval, and that a public official,
actually mislead by such secret understandings, has only his own negligent
comprehension ofhow business is done to blame.

166

Through the formal approval of

cartel from the court, cartels grew popular in diverse industries. 167 Internationalization
of cartels developed to such a level that forty international cartels involving Germany
existed in 18 97. 168
German government took advantage of cartels so as to secure materials for warfare
during the World War I. Under the suffering of political turmoil and postwar
hyperinflation, 169 Germany's legislative body enacted the German Cartel Ordinance of
1923 that adopted abuse principle, in other words, made illegitimate only abuse of
165

Scherer, supra note 155, 24-25. Although it is not sure whether judicial decisions
reflected scholarly opinions, the leading contemporary economist in cartel, Robert
Liefmann considered unrestricted competition as inherently unstable and the
advantages of cartelization compelling thereby stating that State only needs to hinder
the unfavorable effects as much as possible. Gustav Schmoller, the most eminent
German economist, shared the same judgment in 1905.
166
See id.
167
Scherer, id. at 23; Huh, Chan-Moo, Korea's Monopoly Restraint and Fair Trade Act
and Cartel Regulation [:g- Aj 7-1 ~ ~ 31} .S £..1l it All], at 28 (Bi-Bong, 2002)
Year
1875
1887
1896
1905
1911
~--------~---------+----~~--~--~~--~--~~--~---Number of
8
70
250
395
600
Cartels
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Resch, supra note 161, 3.
There were Hitler's coup in Bavaria, crisis in Saxony, and the conflict in the Ruhr
area. !d. at 5.
169
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restraint of trade among collaborating competitors under the national supervision of a

a ..3-~n1strative agency that could request the correction of abuses before a new

new~

cartel Court. However the Ordinance was sparingly enforced. 170 Subsequently, when
Nazis g~vernment's trial to solve high-price and inflation by de-structuring cartels

·s

failed, the government made such compulsory cartels as Marktvergand (market groups)
and supervised food business groups through which the government intervened in
economy for securing war-time capacities.

3. Necessity of International Legal Measures
(1) Rationales for International Agreement as regards Cartels

I

Why have countries strived to achieve bilateral and multilateral agreements in
competition policy, particularly cartel regulations, although there are suspicions
regarding such efforts?

f

First, without international agreements for controlling cartelistic behaviors, each
country will have a narrow perspective on maximizing its national interests regardless
of the harm that consumers and competitors in other countries will have to endure. The
case of the free trade dilemma applies in competition law and anti-cartel regulations. A
country may have benefit through allowing by lenient application or legalization, or by
stimulating cartel activities among domestic firms which affect mostly foreign
countries, but the restrictive business practice produces a negative effect on the global
economy, such as high-price low-quality goods, entry barrier for new enterprises, and a
i I

I;
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Scherer, supra note 155, 26; Fritz Voigt, German Experience with Cartels and Their
Control during the Pre-War and Post-war Periods, in COMPETITION, CARTELS AND
THEIR REGULATION, 170-74 (John Perry Miller ed., North-Holland Pub. Co., 1962).
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disincentive to invest in innovative technology. Widespread export cartel exemptions
are the examples. In order to promote total economic welfare through fair competition
on the global level, a binding agreement on the serious enforcement of competition law
as well as cooperation in its enforcement is necessary.
Second, the agreement can let member countries overcome hurdles in the
investigation and enforcement of international cartels. Its major advantages are that
competition authorities can collect evidence located in other member countries, share
confidential information, and make foreign-based companies comply with judgments
under the agreement. Domestic competition laws may be difficult to effectively enforce
against overseas cartels, such as obstacles in investigating the conducts overseas of
foreign companies in relation to collecting substantial evidences located outside
domestic territories, particularly confidential documents, those pertaining to the
delivery of documents to foreign participators, and those pertaining to collecting of
surcharges from foreign perpetrators. Insufficient cooperation from the other
competition authorities may be added in case bilateral agreements lack or do not cover
sufficient substances for cooperation.171
Diverse kinds of international law can reduce the obstacles substantially. A
bilateral agreement as to the cooperation of competition law enforcements is the most
important basic cooperative measure to substantially reduce such investigatory
difficulties as collecting evidences, delivering documents, enforcing surcharges, and
sharing confidential information during the procedure. The competition authorities
171

KFTC, KFTC's experience in dealing with international cartels, APEC Training
Program, 8-9 (Mar., 2004), available at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgramMarch20041KE.experience.Jand.
pdf (visited on Aug.14, 2008).
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from developing countries(DCs) where international cartel members do not have an
affiliate need international cooperation to secure evidence against international cartel
members. A multilateral agreement or a treaty may address these issues when many
countries make bilateral agreements and widely use them. The multilateral agreements,
such as the current OECD-level recommendation, will contribute to the building of
competition capacities in countries with insufficient experiences and immature skills
regarding cartel enforcement.
A governmental authority of a country involved with a cartel participant may object
to penalties imposed on the participating company because the economic damage to the
company caused by the penalties may negatively affects the country's economy and
industrial competitiveness. The wide-spread of competition cultures, the establishing of
the effective cooperation among the competition authorities, and the understanding of
the risks and damages of the cartel under international law can reduce the

C')

~
c:

intergovernmental conflicts.

z:

I

Third, the international agreement is a legal foundation for DCs which lack the

'~

resources and experience in anti-cartel law enforcement to improve their capabilities.
Developed countries can assist the promotion of anti-cartel enforcement in the DCs
with their skills, experiences, and the sharing of information. Currently, UNCT AD,

:e
r::
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i.
!
I

OECD and ICN are the main institutions devoted to assisting DCs in the enforcement
of cartel regulations and competition law. The developed countries need to be aware
that building a competition culture in emerging markets help multinational corporations
from the markets to abide by competition laws in advanced countries with their
already-built awareness. As regional markets grow integrated and consumers are
I

II
67
l1

i

treated as a whole regardless of territories, widening competition norms in the less
developed areas can prevent the enterprises in the South from unintentionally violating
competition laws in the advanced markets. In addition, potential cartel members in the
North will face the utmost deterrence when DCs, where they do not have any branches
t

are ready to enforce their anti-cartel regulation seriously.
Fourth, it can reduce jurisdictional conflict of extraterritorial application of
domestic competition laws and disputes over defining relevant markets in the light of
the global impact beyond national territories. When a cartel with cross-border effect is
prohibited in a country but allowed in the other country, the strict application of the
former country's anti-cartel law as to the cross-border cartel may intervene in the other
country's jurisdiction. On the other hand, a weak jurisdictional basis to extraterritorial
applications to overseas conduct might lead to a reluctance to investigate or apply
competition laws to overseas cartels. Stipulations in advance as to extraterritoriality
with clear guidelines of negative and positive comity principles can reduce such
possible conflicts regarding the sovereign principle. Currently, the issue has been dealt
with bilateral agreements. In the near future when a consensus as to the extraterritorial
application of cartel regulations is reached, a multilateral agreement or a treaty is able
to be enforced regarding to this issue.
In addition, although defining a relevant market is an important process in
competition law including cartel regulations, and the market scope is widened to
regional or global level through regional free trade agreement or WTO negotiation; in
reality, competition law enforcers frequently examined it within national borders. The
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international agreement is expected to contribute to defining sophisticated relevant
markets in the light of the global market beyond national territories.
Fifth, the fact that the harms imposed on the DCs' economy by the international
cartels is quite substantial should be duly noted. The Working Group on Competition
Policy (WGCP), established by WTO, addressed the importance of regulating cartels in
ocs. In the light of necessity of developing certain economic sectors and industries in
ocs, UNCTAD IV conference in 1976 provided special treatment to DCs, which
eventually led to the UN Set in 1980. Since then, a variety ofharmful activities on the

0.

part of international cartels have been researched in the global scope, resulting in a
consensus for international cooperation against cartel activities. By the consensus, the
1998 OECD Recommendation against Hard Core Cartel, a non-binding
recommendation, has been reached. So, as to reduce the damages from international
cartels, with more reports from sophisticated researches and recommendations, binding
international laws are to address the international cartels-to promote international
cooperation through international laws that would contributes to eliminating cartels,
thereby bringing positive effects to advanced countries and DCs.
(2) EU : Competition Chapter under 1957 Treaty of Rome & Implementation
Approach
The Treat establishing the European Community (the 1957 EC Treaty) as a single
market includes a chapter of rules on competition under Title VI (ex. Title V) and
I j
!

promotes a high degree of competitiveness through a system ensuring that competition
i

in the internal market is not distorted under Article 2 and 3. Concretely, Article 81 (1)

I
I

I

I.

(ex. 85 (1)), as regarding cartels, prohibits all agreements between undertakings,

!

!'
I•
I•
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decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States, which have as their main object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market unless they satisfy
the justifying conditions of para. 3 of the same article. 172 Article 81 (1) enumerates five
particular activities: (a) price-fixing, (b) production control, (c) market sharing, (d)
application of discriminatory condition, and (e) placing the conclusion of contracts
subject to acceptance of unrelated supplementary obligations. The Competition
Directorate publishes annual report on competition policy, although major politicians
currently try to remove the competition policy from the EC Treaty. 173 An adamant
attitude against price-fixing and market-sharing cartels is reflected in the representative
competition policy of the Community. 174 Pursuant to Art. 83 (ex. Art. 87), the Council
of the EC adopted Council Regulation in 1961 175 as an initial implementing measure of
Art. 81 and Art. 82, which was replaced by Council Regulation in 2002. 176
Regarding extraterritorial application of its competition law, the European Court of
Justice held that an infringement of Art. 81 (ex. 85) consists of conduct characterized
172

Any agreement or decision or concerted practice which contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not (a)
impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment ofthese objectives, and (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question
according to Article 81 (3).
173
Sarkozy Scraps Competition Clause From New Treaty, SMDIREUTER (Jun. 22,
2007), at http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/europe/0, 1518,490136,00.html (visited on
Feb. 12, '08)
174
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy,~ 2 (1999). XXVIth Report on Competition
Policy (1996) states generally, as Commission's policy, promoting the competitiveness
of European industry as a whole by strict enforcement of the competition rules, art. 81,
82 and 86, applicable to Member States and those applicable to undertakings. ~ 8.
175
Council Regulation No. 17 of 6 Feb. 1962.
176
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 Dec. 2002.
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by twO elements, i) the formation of the agreement, decision or concerted practice and
In,

ii) the implementation thereof, and that if the applicability of prohibitions under
competition law were made to depend on the place where the agreement, decision or

e

practice was formed, the result would obviously be to give undertakings an easy means

of evading those prohibitions. 177 As a result, the ECJ placed focus on the place of the
implementation of a formed agreement.

178

In terms of import trade, the

'implementation approach' of the ECJ has a high possibility of producing the same
result as the 'effect doctrine' of the U.S., because cartel abroad can not have a
substantial effect on a domestic market without implementation of its conspiracy within
the market.

179

IV.Development of International Commodity Agreements (ICAs)
Separate from Cartel Regime

1. Initial Treatments
(1) The National Interest Period (1921 to 1933 World Monetary and Economic
Conference)

In this period, governments had relied heavily on national regulations for their
national interests. The representative regulatory measures were export levies under the
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Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio et. al. v. Commission ofthe European Communities, cases 89,
104,116-117, 125-129/85 [1988] ECR 5193, ~ 16 (EU). This case is called as Wood
pulp case.
178 !d.
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JOHN FLYNN, HARRY FIRST, AND DARREN BUSH, ANTITRUST STATUTES, TREATIES,
REGULATIONS, GUIDELINES, AND POLICIES 2005-2006, 172 fn 52 (Foundation Press,
2005).
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Rubber Restriction Scheme and a buffer stock and a quota system as export quantity
control under the Tin Scheme 1931.

180

Whatever forms the control measures took, the

measures were justified on a strong public interest basis. The profits from primary
commodities, which are state owned, constituted a large portion of governmental
revenues. 181 In countries where the mining industry has created the majority of its
wealth, stable and fair remunerations for mining were considered necessary to prevent
social and economic crises. The opposition against national control was not against the
scheme itselfbut against the rigidity of its operation. The U.S., however, as major
importers of rubber and tin, changed its attitude from acquiescence to governmental
control to the condemnation of it, by deeming it as an attempt to set up private
monopolies. 182 Aware of such criticism, the British government invited representatives
of consuming countries to voice their interests at a committee; which controlled the
global scheme, so as to protect their interests from excessive price increase. The
protection of the consumers became the principle of organization, which distinguished
its commodity organization from that of a private cartel. As wide participation was
necessary for the operation of the organization, consideration was given to low-end
producers by setting a two-tier negotiation process in control. After the first negotiation
amongst high-end producers took place regarding international obligations and rights,
the second negotiation among low-end producers decided on imposing less or even no
obligations. 183
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KABIR-UR-RAHMAN KAHN, THE LAW & THE ORGANISATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMODITY AGREEMENTS, 53-54 (M. NijhoffPub. 1982).
181
See Kahn, supra note 180, at 52.
182
See id. at 54.
183
ld. at 55.
72

(2) The League ofNation Period (1933 to 1948)
The concern about national interests in the Anglo-Dutch phase was shifted to that of
the global economy in this period in the context of economic depression. The League of
Nations developed international economic law principle based on article 23 (3) stating
that Members will make provisions to secure and maintain the freedom of
communication and transit, as.well as the equitable treatment for the commerce of all
Members. With acknowledgement on the importance of economic policies to
international security, promotion of international cooperation was accepted widely as a
general principle. At the World Economic Conference in 1927, there were advocates of
farmers interests who had encouraged farmers to organize themselves in order to deal
with the saturated market through an agreement among governments. The final
resolution of the World Monetary and Economic Conference (WMEC) of 1933
reflected such a necessity, by including the statement that, in the exceptional conditions
of the present world crisis, concerted action is required for the purpose of increasing the
purchasing power of the producers of primary commodities to a reasonable level, and
that plans should be adopted for the co-ordination of the production and marketing of
certain commodities. 184 The possible conflict that would arise from preferential
treatment for countries producing certain commodities was reconciled as organs of the
League, e.g. Economic Committee, acknowledged that cereal surpluses were a global
economic issue to be dealt seriously with priority and that such preferences would be a
temporary and limited exception. The WMEC actively supported the formation of
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Id. at 57. He also cites the statement of the President, J. Ramsay MacDonald of the
World Monetary and Economic Conference 193 3 who stated that international
cooperation is our best way to national recovery.
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commodity agreements by enunciating certain principles as to the organization of the
commodity agreements, declaring its favor of the agreements complying with the
principles, and inviting the participating countries to negotiate agreements. The
principles included: the participation of producing countries and assent of the majority
of producers as well as their states, fairness to both producers and consumers for
securing a fair price level, and the cooperation of consuming interests of importing
countries.

185

The 'consuming interests' were considered to be on equal footing to those

of governments of importing countries. The commodity agreements during and after the
WMEC adopted these principles. The International Sugar Agreement of 193 7, in its
preamble, mentioned the League principles of the orderly relationship between supply
and demand of sugar in the world market and of fair and equitable treatment of
consumers as well as producers. 186 However, the representatives of consumers worked
in an advisory function as the International Rubber Regulation Committee under the
International Rubber Agreement 1934 and the International Tin Agreement 1937
illustrated. An accurate reflection of consuming interests in the settling of price levels
was not possible. The International Tea Committee confirmed the concern of importing
countries and mentioned, with a focus on consuming countries' assurance for the
reasonable operation of governmental regulation schemes as to raw materials, that such
a scheme should have adequate provisions for the effective representation of consumers
and be subject to governmental supervision so that the controlling body can take
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Sec. (d) ofthe WMEC resolution. C.435.M.220 (1933). See id. at 61 to 62.
!d. at 61.
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immediate action in the event of an unreasonable rise of prices or other effects
prejudicial to the consumers.

187

2. Distinctive Legal Treatment from Conventional Cartel
(1) International Law
1) Chapter VI of the Havana Charter and its Survival
(A) The Principles and Rules governing ICA
Although the Havana Charter in 1948 with a design of a complex legal framework of
international law in the post World War II era-failed to be in effect, Chapter VI dealing
with ICAs came into existence. The particular chapter was intended to address the
difficulties unique in primary commodity trade such as the tendency toward persistent
disequilibrium between production and consumption, the accumulation of stocks, and
pronounced fluctuations in prices. The special difficulties may cause adverse effects on
the interests ofboth producers and consumers accompanied by widespread
repercussions jeopardizing the general policy of economic expansions. As a result, such
special difficulties request special treatment of international trade in such commodities
through inter-governmental agreements. 188 The general principles governing ICAs are:
open participation, equitable treatment between participating countries and nonparticipating countries, and the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle to overall nonparticipants, bipartisan participation from both consuming countries and producing
countries, and the full publicity of the statements of consideration and objective of the

187
188

ld. at 66; ILO, IGCA, 137-139.
Art. 55 ofthe Ch. VI. Of Havana Charter.
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proposing member, and the nature and the development of the corrective measures or
the ICA. 189
Particularly, the commodity control agreement regarding price regulation or
quantitative control of production, export, or import needs to be subject to additional
principles which includes the parity of vote between importing and exporting countries,
the offer of increasing opportunities for satisfying national consumption and world
market requirements, and internal economic adjustment program to ensure as much
progress as practicable. 190 The control agreement may be entered into only in the
circumstance (i) when a burdensome surplus of a primary commodity has or is
expected to develop, which would cause serious hardship to producers, particularly
small producers who account for a substantial portion of the total output, and the
surplus could not be corrected by normal market forces, or (ii) when widespread
unemployment or unemployment in relation to a primary commodity due to the unique
difficulties of commodities has or is expected to develop which could not be corrected
by normal market forces in time to prevent widespread and undue hardship to
workers. 191
(B) Art. XX (h) of GATT and 1947 Resolution of Economic and Social Council
The survival of the Chapter was due to the supports from both the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
as well as subsequent state practices. The ECOSOC resolution 30 (IV) of Mar. 28 1947
recommended that Members of the United Nations (UN) adopt the principles in

Art. 60. ~ 1.
Art. 63 (b), (c) and (d) ofCh. VI.
191
Art. 62 (a) and (b) ofCh. VI.

189
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Chapter VI as a general guide in intergovernmental consultation or action with respect

to commodity problems. Pursuant to ECOSOC's request for the UN Secretary General
to launch an interim coordinating committee for international commodity agreements
(ICCICA), the committee started to work to stay informed of and to facilitate

tes,

intergovernmental consultation as to commodity surplus problems. The GATT accepted
measures in pursuance of obligations under the ICA as an exception to GATT trade law
principles under Art. XX (h). The exception applies to the one which conforms to the
principles approved by ECOSOC in the resolution in 1947 as well as the one which
conforms to criteria submitted to the contracting parties and not disapproved by

them. 192 The state practices, reports and findings of ICCICA, and subsequent ICAs, e.g.
1954 International Sugar Agreement and International Tine Agreement, maintain the
validity of the Chapter VI.

193

(C) Assessment
Although Ch. VI of the Charter contributed to the organization of ICA and built

I.
regulations of supplies separately from private cartel regulations in competition law, it
did not address the positive points of the ICAs toward economic development and
special treatment to LDCs. 194 The resolutions, negotiations, and recommendations of

UN conferences, mentioned later, extended the limited functions of the international
ICAlaw.

2) UN Conferences
192
193

Art. XX (h) and ad. Art. :XX(h) of GATT 1947.
Khan, supra note 180, 67. The principles of parity of votes have been applied almost

consistently.
194
Id. at 73.
I
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(A) Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
UNCTAD, since its first conference, has contributed to supporting the work ofthe
international commodity bodies for promoting cooperation between producers and
consumers, which, however, have functioned similar to cartels. The New International
Economic Order (NIEO) principle proposed by UNCT AD and passed by UN General
Assembly as Resolution 3201 & 3202 195 has operated as the legal foundation for
operating such inter-state commodity agreements.
Recently, the Sao Paulo Consensus adopted at UNCTAD XI in June 2004 confirmed
its mission to continue to help to build effective partnerships among relevant
stakeholders, aiming for viable solutions and sustainable approaches to commodity
problems. The Sao Paulo conference established an independent international task force
on commodities which is to review the contribution ofiCAs. Recently, UNCTAD
adopted a new agreement on olive oil and table olives in the context of increasing
demand from advanced countries with an interest in health benefits, by transferring
advanced cultivation technologies to DCs. 196
(B) Environment and Development (UNCED)
The so called 'Stockholm Declaration' adopted by the United Nations Conference
on the Human Environment stated that natural resources of the earth must be
safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations through careful planning

195

Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO),
GARes. 3201, (1 May 1974); Programme of Action on the Establishment of a NIEO,
GA Res. 3202, (1 May 1974)
196
Ostensson, Press Release: New Agreement On Olive Oil And Table Olives Record
rise in demand for this commodity, UNCTAD/PRESS/PR/2005/015
29/04/05, available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates
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or management as appropriate.

197

Similarly as to non-renewable natural resources,

sustainable development through managing the exploitation of non-renewable natural
resources requires careful concerns to the danger of their future exhaustion and
equitable sharing of their benefits by all of mankind.

198

A commodity price-

management by an ICA or an IP A has its legal foundation concretely in principle 10,
stating that, for the DCs, the stability of prices and adequate earnings from primary
commodities and raw materials are essential to environmental management since
economic factors as well as ecological processes must be taken into account. 199
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) adopted the RIO

I

I

Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992 which stipulated that while
states have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources under their own
environmental and developmental policies, the right to development must be fulfilled
so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations?

00

In the case of non-renewable natural resources, exploitative competition

in producing the resources under the sovereign right might cause exhaustion at a
premature stage, thereby conflicting with interests of future generations. Management

in producing exhaustible commodity is required because states should reduce and
eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption to achieve sustainable
development and a higher quality oflife for all people. 201

p . . 1
nnctp e 2.
Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, Principle 5, UN Doc. A/COF.48/14 (June 16, 1972).
199 p .
. 1
nnctp e 10.
200p . . 1
nnctp e 2 and 3.
201 p . . 1
nnctp e 8.
197

198
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Moreover, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development and a
Plan of Implementation for the further implementation of Agenda 21 (2002
Johannesburg Declaration) under the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) requested the international community to address the instability of commodity
prices and declining terms of trade and suggested international assistance for
sustainable resource management. 202

3)UN
(A) Resolutions of General Assembly
Although the Havana Charter included provisions pertaining to inter-governmental
commodity agreements (ICAs) under Ch.VI, separately from the competition
provisions ofCh.V, the provisions along with the whole Charter did not come into
effect. The United Nations adopted a series of General Assembly Resolutions, 203
clearly approving of permanent sovereignty over natural resources (NR) since 1950s,
some ofwhich foundered the so called New International Economic Order(NIE0)?04
Under the NIEO principle, subsequent resolutions recognized the relationship between
the economic development ofNR-producing DCs and the permanent sovereignty

Item IX, The Plan of Implementation, Means of Implementation,~ 8.
UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution 523(VI) of 12 Jan. 1952, 626(VII) of21
Dec. 1952, 1314(XIII) of 12 Dec. 1958, 1515(XV) of 15 Dec. 1960, 1803(XVII) of 14
Dec. 1962, 2158 (XXI) of25 Dec. 1966, 2386 (XXIII) of 19 Nov. 1968, 2625 (XXV)
of 24 Oct. 1970, 2692 (XXV) of 11 Dec. 1970, 3016 (XXVII) of 18 Dec. 1972, and
3171 (XXVIII) of 17 Dec. 1973, particularly ch.VIII of3202 (VI) of 1 May 1974, 4(e)
of3201 (VI) of 1 May 1974, & ch.II art.2(1) of3281(XXIX) of 12 Dec. 1974.
204
They are Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO), GA Res. 3201 (1974) and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a
NIEO, GA Res. 3202 (1974).

202
203
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principle over NRs;

205

the promotion of international co-operation for economic

development was considered to have its basis on respect on respect for the right to
sovereignty over national wealth and resources.

206

The ICAs have a firm justification under the NIEO. As a method to develop
economic cooperation among commodity-producing states, inter-state cartels are not
only allowed but also encouraged as a state's economic right,
duty which the other states should respect.

209

207

or even required

208

as a

Since such commodities include

agricultural products as well as natural resources, associations or long-term multilateral
agreements of primary commodity producers (IP As

210

)

have been approved with

concern on the sustained growth of world economy, particularly, the economic
development of developing countries.

211

For example, OPEC, as the model for inter-

governmental producers association (IP A) successfully operating during the era, has
been working under such concrete legal provisions as 4.(t) of Declaration of the
Establishment of a NIEO, Ch.VII.l.(a) ofProgramme of Action on the Establishment
of a NIEO, and Ch. II Art. 5 & Art. 28 of Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States (CERDS).

One of them is preamble ~ 6 of 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 Dec. 1973.
Ch.I.6. of 1803 (XVII) of 14 Dec. 1962, 7 of 3171 (XXVIII) of 17 Dec. 1973, &
Ch.I.1.(b) of 3202 (VI) of 1 May 1974.
207
See supra note 204, Ch.I.l.(b) ofRes.3202, 3.(a)(iii),(viii),(xi), and 4(f) of Res. 3202,
and para.4(t) of Res. 3201.
208
See supra note 206, Res.3171.
209
Ch.II. Art.5 & art.28 of Res. 3281.
210
An Intergovernmental Producers' Association (IPA) works in the similar way to an
ICA. Under the large category of a cartel, it belongs to a public cartel subject to
international commodity law rather than competition law. Refer to Ch.l.II.8.
211
Ch.II. Art.5, 6 & 14 ofRes. 3281.
205

206
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Concretely, the stable pricing of the commodity trade is considered as essential to
maintain the global economy's continuous growth. Excessive competition in producing
commodity is regarded as a threat to global economic development, including the
economic development of DCs, particularly, the survival of LDCs, where commodity
trade occupies a considerable portion of the gross domestic product (GDP). 212 When
decreasing commodity price threatens LDCs' capability to procure foods, states need to
cooperate to sustain the decreasing price with non-reciprocal and special treatments_213
The necessity to provide food, recognized as the individual's urgent right to food, is to
be met with adequate priority in countries' development strategies and expenditure_214
The duty of states to end the waste of natural resources, including food product, and the
request for their collective actions for mutual economic cooperation among the DCs
resulted in the approval of production or price management since the trade of natural
resources is directly related to economic development, an urgent mission of the
developing world, particularly the LDCs? 15
Notably, the interests of consuming countries are not to be disregarded but to be
balanced to achieve the equitable development of the world economy. 216 The surging of
basic food or cereal price has the potential of generating more social tension as a major

212 Among one hundred forty one DCs with data, sixty eight depended on non-fuel
commodities for more than 50% of their export earnings in 1990-92. The number ofthe
countries, so called Commodity Dependent Developing Countries (CDDCs) had fallen
to sixty two by 1998-2000. Sophia Twarog, New Insights on Opportunities and
Problems in World Commodities Trade, UNCTAD/DITC (2004), at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page_ _957.aspx (last visited on Oct. 24, '07)
213 4.(j) (m), and (n), art.9, 14, 18 & 19 of Res. 3201.
214 UN GARes. On the Right to Food, GARes. 56/155, UNGAOR, 561h Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 348, UN Doc.A/RES/56/155 (Feb. 15, 2002). See para. 1,2,4, and 6.
215 4. (q)(r) and (s) of Res. 3201.
216 Ch.II. Art. 6 ofCERDS, GARes. 3281 (1974).
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political issue in industrialized countries as well as DCs, more so than the energy price
surge, e.g. oil shock, does in transitional economies.

217

Although the LDCs' interests in

primary commodity are urgent, the NIEO's emphasis on developing countries' interests
was to balance the interests of both producers and consumers for the sustained
economic growth of the global economy. Stressing regional and international
cooperation to deal with the global food security issue, the UN GA Resolution on Right
to Food urged each country to adopt a strategy consistent with the resources and
capacities, which gives priority in their development strategies and expenditures to the
realization of the right to food. 218 The Declaration on World Food Security adopted by
heads of state and government at 2002 World Food Summit confirms the importance of
the efficient use of resources and sustainable management of natural resources in
responding to the challenge of globalization - particularly with respect to agriculture
and food security. The Declaration urges cooperation and solidarity to consolidate
FAO activities? 19

In order for the declarations ofUNCED to result in success, the necessity of
managing natural resources and all living species pursuant to sustainable development

in light of the future generation - should be noted by changing current unsustainable
patterns of production and consumption?20 UN GA members are aware of the

217

Guy Dinmore, Italians spurn pasta in price protest, FIN TIMES (Sep. 14, 2007). See
Javier Bias, Agriculture Commodities:Political Sensitivity over food price rises, FIN
TIMEs (Oct. 17, 2007). For instance, wheat price has hit an all-time high of more than
$9 a bushel.
218
UN GA Resolution on the Right to Food, GA Res. 561155, UN GAOR, 561h Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 348 (Feb. 15, 2002). Refer to 4 and 6.
219
~ 20, 21 and 26. Rome, 11-13, June, 2002, at
http://www.fao.orglworldfoodsummit/englishlindex.html (visited on Apr.1, 2008)
220
~ 6 & 22 of UN Millennium Declaration (MD) A/55/L.2.
I
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. our earth221 , and comma d'1ty management 1s
. Per:tnittec~
insufficiency ofth e resources m
in the interests of environmental protection.
By reflecting the principles which justify public cartels consisting ofiCAs and lPAs,
the resolutions have been treated separately from cartel regulations aiming at private
companies in international law. Noteworthy are the other causes that international law
pursues as to public cartels in distinction with private cartels such as development and
reduction of poverty in LDCs and the protection against the wasting of natural
resources. However, the recent surges in commodity prices demonstrate that a better
strategy in regulating commodity trade can be drafted on the basis of an association of
consuming and producing countries(ICA) rather than an association of producing states
only(IPA).
(B) Treaties under the UN
There are 46 multilateral treaties regulating commodity trade that has been registered
to the Secretary General of the UN, among which thirty treaties expired or were
replaced by subsequent treaties. In other words, quite a few commodity agreements
ended or broke down in the 1980s. The reasons were because their decision-making
mechanism did not harmonize the requests of exporting countries to limit their export
with the interests of consuming countries which did not want to cooperate to the export
control, and because its members failed to treat the market force flexibly under their
short-sighted concems.

222

In addition, the U.S., as a major trading country which has

maintained its domestic agricultural subsidies even during the DDA negotiation for

~ 21 of UN MD.
Eric J. MacFadden, The Collapse ofTin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity
Agreement, 80 A.J.I.L. 811, 824-827 (1986).
221

222
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correcting unfair trade practices, has, ironically, displaced a negative attitude toward

ICAs, particularly ICAs for agricultural commodity, on the basis of competition.
Except the International Tin Study Group, not yet active, all fifteen treaties registered
under the UN are effective. While two treaties, such as the International Coffee
Agreement and the International Cocoa Agreement, consist of producing and
consuming member states, the other eleven treaties, such as the Terms of Reference to

1:

International Copper Study Group, have producing countries only as their members.

rI
i
I

Although a public cartel, in strict meaning, covers the latter type, the functional aspects
ofthe former type of treaties have been very similar in restricting competition in the
global market. 223 In terms of a regulatory purpose, it will make little, if any, difference
between the treaties with hybrid membership and those with producing countries.

224

(2) The U.S. Law
Since a commodity agreement consists of states rather than private companies, an
antitrust review of state activities through the commodity agreement cause issues in the
courts, such as the act of state doctrine and the concept of sovereign immunity.
1) Act of State Doctrine
Since the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez that every
sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and
223

Mcfadden, supra note 222, 811 & 815. While producers, mostly developing
countries, argued that fair-level commodity price should work for transferring wealth
from the developed countries consisting of mostly consumers, consumers contended
that the goal of the organization should be to restrict short-term price fluctuations and
to secure an orderly supply of the commodity. Regardless of the internal dispute, the
commodity agreements operated on export control or buffer stock or price maintenance
to regulate market.
224
For the in-detail explanation, refer to Ch.1.11.8.
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that the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the govennnent of
another done within its own territory, the 'act of state doctrine' has been applied as a
valid judicial rule? 25 As a rule for judicial abstention, it does not allow the judicial
body to intervene in foreign affairs related to the executive body, even when the
validity of the act of a foreign government is an unavoidable issue in trial. Although the
act of state doctrine is originally a domestic rule made by the U.S. judicial body226 and
accepted by competition authorities227 , it is worthwhile to review it because the
limitation of the judicial body in foreign policy matters is widely acknowledged by
other countries?28 In the OPEC case with an alleged cartel conspiracy in violation of
the U.S. Sherman Act Section 1, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
declined to acknowledge states' responsibility in being involved in the cartel under the

225

The 3rd Restatement ofU.S. Foreign Relations Law confirms the effectiveness ofthe
rule by stating that, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles, courts in the United States will generally
refrain ... from sitting in judgment on ... acts of a governmental character done by a
foreign state within its own territory and applicable there.
226
Among other case, the original one is Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
The controversial one is Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct.
923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964). Along with Sabbatino case, Republic of Iraq v. First
National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027, 86 S.Ct.
648 (1966) was challenged by the Second Hickenlooper Amendment stating that no
court should decline to make a determination on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine in the situation. 22 U.S.C. sec 2370(e)(2). However, the coverage of the 2nd
Hickenlooper Amendment was interpreted as limited by further decisions thereby
developing act of state doctrine.
227
Department of Justice Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, 3.33 (1995).
228
See American Law Institute (ALI), Restatement(3rd) of Foreign Relations Law,
Section 443, Reporter's Note 12 (1987); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A. 764 F.2d 1101, 1114
fn 13 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1985). The 5th Cir Court of Appeals states that although the act of
state is not prescribed by international law, most other nations have shown a similar
solicitude for the felling of their fellow states. The Note indicates actual cases of
expropriation by foreign states, but in the light of its wide coverage, the competition
law area will be under the same treatment.
86

229

'act of state doctrine' .

In the U.S., however, the doctrine does not have a

constitutional founding so it can be modified by national legislations.

230

Moreover, commodity agreements, in particular, have been historically approved by
international law.

231

Furthermore, the commodity agreement itself is a treaty registered

under the UN as a major source of international law. In other words, the states operate
through the ICA on the legitimate basis of international law. Although the !CAs and

IPAs look to be in conflict with competition laws that regulate cartels, the cartel
regulations themselves derives their legitimacy from legislation on the same level as
treaties, not from the constitution. In short, the operation of the public cartels is a
legitimate act subject to international commodity law.
2) Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) from Sovereign Immunity Principle
Sovereign immunity of international law, originally providing absolute immunity
irrespective of the nature of state activities, has developed an exceptional area, mostly,
of states' commercial activities or the area of ius gestionis under the relative doctrine. It
is a result of the consideration of balancing the potential damage to private parties who
otherwise would lose their opportunity for judicial remedy with the self-restraint of the
judiciary body, often a result of the separation of power within a government. States,232
according to the converging opinions, enacted domestic legislations which approve the
restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity, such as the 1976 Foreign Sovereign

229

See OPEC, 649 F.2d 1358-59 & 1361-62: Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983).
23
Kathryn E. Vertigan, Foreign Antitrust Injunctions: Taking a Lesson from the Act of
State Doctrine, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 155, 175 (2007).
231
IV.l. and IV.2.(1) ofthis chapter, Ch.2, have concrete examples.
232
The U.K, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Africa. See U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/20(1982).

°
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Immunities Act (FSIA) of the U.S. Under the Section 1603(d) of the FSIA, the
exception of commercial activity is to be decided by reference to the 'nature' of the
course of conduct, or a particular transaction, the standard of which had been adopted
by the Italian Court of Cassation and the State Department of the U.S.

233

the nature standard of the FSIA was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Subsequently,
234

In terms of setting a range of production level of a primary commodity by a nation, it

has the characteristic of a sovereign decision for national development rather than of
private transaction. International law, reviewed in supra, approves a state's right to
produce natural resources as well as agricultural products.

235

In addition, inter-state

cooperation to produce food or natural resources encouraged by international law
allows an association of commodity producers to develop their national economies or a
long-term multilateral commodity agreement which takes into account the interests of
both producers and consumers?36 Particularly, in light ofinstances of environmental
management or economic development in developing countries, a measure, either
domestic or inter-state cooperative, for maintaining the stability of prices and adequate
earnings for primary commodities and raw materials is considered to be essential. 237

233

Govemo degli Stati Uniti diAmerica c. Soc. I.R.S.A., [1963] Foro !tal. 1405,47
Revista de Diritto Intemazionale 484 (May 13, 1963): Letter to Argentine Embassy
(Apr.19, 1962), concerning Mirabella v. Banco Industrial De La Republica Argentina,
38 Misc.2d 128, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1963).
234
Republic ofArgentia v. Weltover, Inc. 504 U.S. 607, 112 S.Ct. 2160 (1992)
235
Principle 21 of Stockholm Declaration of UN Conference on the Human
Development (Jun. 16, 1972): Principle 2 ofRio Declaration on Environment and
Development, UNCED (Jun. 13, 1992): Para. 4 (e) ofDeclaration on the Establishment
of a NIEO (NIEO Declaration) (May 1, 1974): para. 1 ofUN GA Resolution on PSNR
(Dec. 14, 1962).
236
Para. 4 (J),(m),(q),(r),(s) and (t) ofNIEO Declaration: Art. 3,5,6, and 28 of Charter
ofEconomic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) (Dec. 12, 1974).
237
Principle 10 & 13 of Stockholm Declaration: Art. 5 ofCERDS.
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Although the functioning of commodity agreement affects international commerce, a
commodity agreement itself has a perspective that the sovereign operation of states fall
under sovereign immunity rather than falling under the commercial exception.
By respecting the legitimacy of commodity agreements, all states have a duty to
respect the right by refraining from applying economic and political measures that
would limit it. 238 Sovereign immunity is a legal principle which shields states' right to
have commodity agreements on a domestic level from each coWltry's law. Under the
concept of sovereign immunity, commodity agreements are protected in domestic
''
' '

courts from penalties or remedies.

3. International Organizations for Securing Stable Commodity Trade
(1) Development Agenda of the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC)
The UNCT AD, under a strong movement toward the NIEO, negotiated the Act
establishing the CFC in 1970s, and reached its conclusion in 1980. The intent of
launching the CFC was to establish a large fund which could link the finances of
various commodity agreements which buy and sell a particular primary commodity in

an attempt to alleviate the short tenn price fluctuations. 239 However, in the '80s, a lot of
commodity agreements started to fall apart240 due to the failure of its management, e.g.
the famous collapse of the Tin Agreement, although they had succeeded for several
decades. In spite of the declining power of commodity agreements, the proposal from
DNCTAD to institutionalize intergovernmental financial organizations for supporting
238
239

Art. 5 ofCERDS.

Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
347,364 (1994).
240 s
ee z.d.
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stable commodity trade has worked and brought about the creation of the CFC in 1989.
It represented international efforts to moderate the more declining terms of trade for

commodity exports due to the falls of commodity agreements. 241 The CFC currently
have more than a hundred member states with several institutional members, e.g. the
EC, African Union (AU), the East African Community and the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 242
The main objective of the CFC is securing efficiency in commodity market and their
development, aiming at the socio-economic development of commodity producers.243
Concretely, the CFC has supported the diversification of commodity production and
trade and the improvement, thereby alleviating poverty in commodity-dependent
developing countries (CDDCs). The CFC took actions in order to alleviate the
constriction of supply in commodity production, such as vertical diversification into
producing valued-added products and exporting them, or horizontal diversification of
supplying niche markets. The technical assistances for raising productivity and human
resources for enhanced work are provided by its funds. Its five-year action plan, in light
of the experiences through previous plans, throws out development projects in the
commodity market. The CFC issues yearly reports as to on-going projects?44
(2) Right to Food & Food and Agricultural Organizations (F AO)

241

Brown, supra note 239.
Refer to http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/004N2655E.HTM. Statement of
RolfW. Boehnke, Managing Director, at the International Conference for Financing for
Development, Monterrey, Mexico (18th March, 2002), available at
http://www. un.org/ffdlstatements/cfcE.htm
243
Boehnke, supra note 242.
244
For instance, see CFC, 2007 Basic Fact, available at http://www.commonfund.org/downloadlcontent/CFC _ BF_English. pdf.
242
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Established in October of 1945, the FAO with more than one hundred ninety
roeJilbers has been working on reducing hunger due to insufficient food production or
unwise distribution. Its focus is on the food security issue rather than food trade. Its
argument to invoke the right to food as an international human right, although
originally acknowledged in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948,
not been effectively adopted by subsequent laws.

246

245

has

The growing threat of increase in

food prices needs to be dealt in the context ofhuman rights issues of impoverished
people. Its approach to food not as a product of trade but as the object of a basic human
right implies that the international private cartel law for promoting competition in a free
competitive market is not an appropriate law in regulating international agricultural
commodity trades.
Besides providing know-how, expertise, information to less developed countries
regarding agricultural production, fishery, and livestock, as a special agency on the
food issue, the FAO convenes regularly in order to reach a common understanding
between the industrialized and the less developed countries. As a result, it has sixteen
ICAs approved and effective under its Constitution, including the Constitution on the
International Rice Commission (1948) and Agreement for the Establishment of the
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (1993). Although recent criticisms e.g. its bias in favor
of the donor group of countries and inefficient usage of its budget,247 its strenuous

245

Art. 25 para. 1 states that everyone has the right to a standard ofliving adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food (infra omitted).
246
Alison Small, FAO insists on food as a human right, FAO press-release (2007},
available at http://www. fao .org/newsroom/enlnews/2007I1000680/index.html
247
Recently credibility ofFAO's works is undermined. FAO's research on genetic
production provoked strong dissent from the less developed countries. Meanwhile, its
large budget mostly from donations from the industrialized countries has been under
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invocation for securing food for food-insufficient countries -has raised the issue of
human right in the context ofthe food commodity trade. The FAO's works, at least,ca!J
for the insufficient access to food in poor areas to be relieved by assistances from the

a

international community.

V. International Organizations' Endeavors to Achieve Multilateral
Agreements regarding Cartels

Q

p

I
Through international organizations, the international community has succeeded in
certain multilateral approaches. There have been other efforts to reach an agreement not
adopted later. The major substantive rules that nations have agreed with are (i) the Set
of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control ofRestrictive
Business Practices (hereinafter the UN Set) that General Assembly of the UN has
adopted as resolution with non-binding recommendatory characteristics in 1980 after
the UNTAD initially recommended it to the UN, and (ii) a recommendation against
hard core cartels adopted in 1998 by the OECD, even though it does not have an
enforcement mechanism or a dispute resolution system.

1.

Failed Attempts of International Agreement as to Restrictive Business
Practices (RBPs)

(1) The Havana Charter

pressure to curtail due to inefficiency.
92

The initial trial for a multilateral agreement in competition policy was made with the

Jl

Havana Charter/

48

which failed to have sufficient ratification, resulting in its

abandonment by the International Trade Organization (ITO) that the Charter had
originally purported to establish. The Havana Charter, which acknowledged the UN
Charter in contrast to the WTO, adopted full employment and development as its
objectives/49 and allowed special assistance in the form of protective measures to
promote the development of a particular industry of agriculture as an indigenous
primary commodity industry.

250

It allowed, through ICAs, governmental measures to

!
'l

stabilize commodity price, e.g. price control, and the measures to preserve exhaustible
natural resources, e.g. quantity control in severe economic situations.

251

!t

It even

encourages conferences and studies among member states producing commodities,
implying that an OPEC-like arrangement of producing countries for primary products is
desirable. 252 All of the commodity agreements or related disputes shall be reviewed at a
regular interval or ultimately decided under the IT0?

53

I.

248

Havana Charter for an ITO, Mar. 24, 1948, art. 46, U.N.Doc. E/C.2/78, reprinted in
Dep't St., Pub.No.3206, Commercial Policy Series 114, 86-87 (1948), available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf (last visited on Sep. 20th, '07). The
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) convened the UN Conference on Trade and
Employment in Havana in 1948, and approved the Charter for an International Trade
Organization (Havana Charter).
249
Art. 1. particularly, para. 6.
250
Art. 13. para. 1., art. 14. para. 1, 2, &3, and art. 55.
251
Art. 57 (c) & (d), art. 61, para. 2, (a) quantity control agreement, & (b) regulation of
Price, art. 62, & art. 63.
~52
See art. 58, para. 3, & 59 para. 1. Art. 55-70 were adopted as art. XX, para. (h) of
GATT. See, for more details, George Bronz, An International Trade Organization: the
recond Attempt, Vol. 69 No.3 HARVARD L. REv. 465-467 (1956).
53
Art. 65-66.
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On the other hand, it adopted concrete rules under Chapter V regarding both the
substance and the enforcement of competition law including cartel regulations.2S4
Art.46 para. 3 enumerates cartel activities as restrictive business behaviors (RBPs): (a)
fixing prices, terms, or conditions, (b) dividing any territorial market or field of
business activity, excluding enterprises from the market or field, allocating customers

'
or fixing quotas of sales or purchase, (c) discrimination against a particular enterprise,
and (d) limiting production quotas. It further stipulates that consultation, investigation

'

studies to RBPs and member's obligations are necessary in taking every measure to
prevent the RBP.
A member state negatively affected by the RBP may seek an investigation
procedure or consultation regarding the member concerned. In the former procedure,
the ITO was supposed to be a judge to decide on the complaint from a member state
and to request the member concerned to take every possible remedial action.255 To start
an investigation by the ITO, members should agree that complaints need to be subject
to investigation under the articles whenever (i) such a complaint is presented to the ITO,
(ii) the practice falls on the enumerated RBP, and (iii) they possess the power to
effectively control trade among a number of countries. 256 A RBP in service trade is
dealt with in an appropriate intergovernmental organization with priority. 257
The Charter was drafted as one of the instruments to establish the post-war global
economic order with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 258 The U.S.

lid. at art. 46 to 53.
Art. 48.5.
256
Art. 46.2.
257
Art. 53. 3.
258
Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization ofAntitrust Enforcement, 77
254
255
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initially had supported the Charter, but refused to ratify it due to concern that the
Charter, particularly Chapter V in regard to competition, would place restrictions upon

the U.S. sovereignty, not to mention concerns regarding the presence of complex
domestic political pressures and foreign diplomacy.

259

Out ofthe entire set of rules concerning over-broad circumstances, only one chapter

was made effective, as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
competition provisions under Ch. V were not mentioned with the implication that the
GATT members would not consider the competition issues?60 Although it did not come
into existence, this attempt is considered to be at least a precious lesson for future
multilateral agreements on international competition policy.
(2) Draft Agreement of ECOSOC
Subsequently, another attempt to revive the competition rules of the Havana Charter

•·,
was made in 1953 in the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
constituted of six industrialized countries and four developing countries?61 The draft

BOSTON UNIV. L. REv. 343, 350 (1997).
The main reasons for failure to ratification are i) weakened political support e.g.
death of Keynes as originator and retirement from office of Cordell Hull, a main
political supporter, ii) opposition from the U.S. business community fearing that its
strong antitrust law would place them in disadvantage, and iii) distraction of national
interest by other diplomatic issues, the cold war, the Marshall Plan, and reciprocal trade
agreements. After the reelection of President Truman, he proposed the Charter to
Congress in 1950, but the legislators never bothered to vote on it. Susan George,
Alternative Finances: The World Trade Organisation We Could Have Had, 2 (Feb. 1,
2007), available at http://www/zmag.orglcontent (visited on Sept. 14, 2007); Paasman,
supra note , 30; Maria Chiara Malaguti, Restrictive Business Practices in International
Trade and the Role of the World Trade Organization, 615 in PAOLO MENGOZZI, lNT'L
TRADE LAW ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM, 615 (A.
~~uffre, 1999); Scherer, supra note 155, 38.
See Waller, supra note 258.
261
India, Mexico, Pakistan, and Uruguay belonged to the developing group. Scherer,
supra note 155, 39.
259
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agreement as to competition policy, similar to Ch. V of the Charter, enumerated
cartelistic activities as RBPs, along with the abuse of intellectual properties.262 It
allowed an international agency to investigate complaints, to provide non-binding
recommendation of remedial measures to the member state concerned, and to publish a
report of decisions, reasons and recommended measures?

63

The member could

undertake a corrective action if it considers it appropriate according to its legal
system. 264 It failed to be effective, however, due to bipolarized international politics
during the cold war265 and the U.S. passive stance? 66 The U.S. hesitated to adopt the
draft agreement because its business community strongly opposed the draft due to the
fear that the U.S. companies might be at a relative disadvantage because of strong
domestic antitrust policies? 67
(3) Recommendation for Consultations of GATT
Afterwards, the last trial to focus on competition issues in the middle of 20th centmy
came from the GATT. The group of experts appointed by the Executive Secretary of

262

Art. 1 para. 3 of the Draft articles of Agreement, Annex II of Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Restrictive Business Practices to the ECOSOC, U.N. ESCOR, 16th Sess.,
Supp. No.ll, U.N. Doc. E/2380 (1953)
263
Art. 3 para. 1,3,5.8, & 10.
264
Art. 5 para. 1 & 4.
265
Ironically, former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) which strongly
objected to the Havana Charter supported the necessity of a universal approach,
reviving the Charter, to problems of developing international economic relations. Bronz,
suf.ra note 252, 443 & n.l 0.
26
The draft required the accumulation of ratifications from nations accounting for
around 65% of world imports and exports. Scherer, supra note 155, 39.
267
Paasman, supra note 259, 30; Malaguti, supra note 259, 615; Scherer, supra note
155, 39-40. U.S. politics was under pressure to reject it from business community.
American enterprises understood that a law against restrictive business practice had
never been witnessed by a majority of 60 UN members, and worried that the onesignatory one-vote provision would stimulate vote-participating nations to instigate
harassing complaints against the U.S.
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the GATT gathered in Geneva in 1959 to discuss competition issues during the post-

war period. They noted that, on the contrary to the goal of the GATT, international
cartels harmed the growth of the global economy and economic development in
individual countries, and recommended further consultations of related states on
bilateral or multilateral basis and the convention of experts. 268 However, after
discussion among the experts, they could not come to a multilateral agreement to
control the RBP due to the difference of opinions with regard to insufficient practice
experiences and a lack of consensus regarding RBPs regulation among member
states.269 The majority's recommendation was to encourage direct consultations
between member countries and studies among experts so as to eliminate harmful effects
ofRBPs rather than through multilateral agreement. 270 The failed trials revealed
divergences of viewpoints regarding the RBPs, including cartels.

2.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD)

(1) The UN Set
The developing countries made efforts to come by political power through an
international organization. It was through the UNCTAD that DCs insisted in
implementing developmental agenda against the free-market approach from advanced
countries. They urged the advanced countries to grant preferential treatment on goods
from DCs. As regards competition law enforcement, the UNCTAD has focused on the

268

GATT, Restrictive Business Practices: Arrangements for Consultations, Report of
Experts, ch. I. para. 1, 4 &5, and para. 1 ofRecommendation, L/1015, BISD
9S/170(Jun. 2, 1960), at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/rbp2.pdf
269
See id., at ch. I. ~ 6. Malaguti, supra note 259, 616.
270
See id. at ch.II ~ 7 & 9.
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developmental dimension of the international competition agreement, thereby
promoting an international consensus of regulating RBPs, supporting developing
countries' efforts to establish and operate competition law, and assisting their young
competition authorities' practices with technical support, education and training. It has
held seminars with competition experts from countries that were experienced and
skilled in these matters, to share their knowledge and experiences?

71

The matrix of concrete rules regarding competition in UNCTAD was the UNCTAD
III Conference in 1972 which established an expert group on the competition policy
with instruction to formulate a set of multilateral rules and principles to control RBPs
and to outline a special consultation procedure. Finally, the expert group produced a
draft regarding international competition rules, so-called the UN Set. Subsequently, the
UNCTAD and the UN General Assembly passed the draft in 1980. 272
While the UN Set reflected the objective of protecting less developing
countries(less DCs)273 from the restrictive business practices (RBPs) of multinational
corporations, insufficient experiences and low interests of less DCs in competition law
impeded effective reflection of their objective into final provisions and its
implementation. Seemingly radical opinions from some less DC groups at that time
were assuaged to a more conventional aspect of competition la~ 74 because the North,

271

Statement by Germany 5th UNCT AD Conference on reviewing the UN Set, at
http://rO.unctad.org/enlsubsites/cpolicy/english/cpissues.htm
272
Resolution adopted by the UNCTAD 22 April, 1980, and Resolution 35/63 of 5
December 1980, UN GA 35th Sess.
273
The Group of77 was a representative of the less DCs. SUSAN SELL, POWER & IDEAS:
NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST, 146-147 (State
Univ. of New York Press, 1998).
274
TAYLOR, supra note 146, 130-131.
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with experience in competition law, brought their drafts to final provisions. 275 The
Code did not adopt an effective dispute resolution system or binding powers on the
contrarY to the requests ofless DCs.

276

The Set with status of non-binding

recommendation stated, "in the performance of its functions, neither the
Intergovernmental Group nor its subsidiary organs shall act like a tribunal or otherwise
pass judgment on the activities or conduct of individual governments or of individual

!D

enterprises in connection with a specific business transaction". 277 Meanwhile, the
consultation procedures in the UN Set278 have never been used. The lack of usage of
such consultation procedures was analyzed to be due to a reason that DCs were aimed
at controlling domestic activities of foreign MNEs rather than RBPs themselves. 279
Although the UN Set was less effective than expectation, it perpetuated its further
development. The Set requested a UN conference to be convened by the Secretary
General of the UN under the auspices of the UNCTAD for the purpose of reviewing all
the aspects of the Set, thereby keeping its attention to further steps of the states which

275

Sell, supra note 273, 141.
Taylor mentions that the fact that the Code was approved by the UN General
Assembly without dissent carries considerable authoritative weight. See TAYLOR, supra
note 146, at 131, fu 43. However, no subsequently established multilateral instrument
in existence since 1980, which Talyor acknowledged, limited impact of the UNCTAD
code with limited fame, at 132, and lack of international consensus exploded in 2003
Cancun Ministerial Conference indicates that the authoritative weight is trivial. See id.
at 131.
277
See Part VI. Section G. Article 4 of the UN Set.
278
If a country suspects that another country's enterprise is involved in RBPs, it can
place a formal complaint to the UNCTAD. In response to it, the accused country is to
submit a report with regard to the activities of the enterprise to the UNCTAD. See Sell,
srra note 273, 163.
27
See id. Sell cites Joel Davidow, The Seeking of a World Competition Code: Quixotic
Quest ?, in Competition in International Business Law and Policy On Restrictive
Practices, 393-394 (Oscar Schachter and Robert Hellawell ed. Columbia Univ. Press,
1980)
276

99

accept the Set to meet their commitment.

280

Every five year since the adoption of the

Set in 1980, according to the request, UN Conferences to Review All Aspects of the Set
have taken place regularly. 281 The 2000 UN conference recommended that all UN
nations should implement the provisions ofthe Code while UNCTAD should develop
similar versions adjusted to regional characteristics particularly for small developing
nations. The conference explicitly pointed out the importance of the development of
sophisticated legal instruments and analytical capabilities by less DCs and
acknowledged its role in assisting such less DCs' pursuit of competition policy in
relation to developmental issues? 82
Among all the substantive provisions, the UN Set has a provision with regard to
restriction on cartels. Under the provision, the Set prohibits enterprises from doing such
practices as (a) price-fixing agreements including as to exports and imports, (b)
collusive tendering, (c) market or customer allocation agreements, (d) allocation by
quota as to sales and production, and such diverse boycott activities as (e) concerted
refusals to deal, (f) concerted refusals of supplies to potential importers, and (g)
collective denial of access to an important arrangement or association, when they limit
access to markets or unduly restrict competition, having or likely to have adverse
effects on international trade, particularly the trades of developing countries, and on the
economic development of these countries. 283

280

See part IV, section G, article 2.
See part I. For reference, the UNCAD IX conference in 1996 made a resolution
which confirmed UNCTAD's mandate in the research and the cooperation on the RBPs.
282
See Taylor, supra note 146, 132.
283
See part IV, section D, paragraph 3.
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The UN Set adopted preferential or differential treatment to DCs, particularly the
teast developed countries(LDCs), by considering their needs to develop domestic
industries and other economic sectors and to encourage the economic development
tbfOugh international arrangements among DCs?

84

Moreover, the UN Set imposed,

under principles and rules for states, a duty of operational assistance to developing
countries on the part of the states with more expertise in controlling RBPs?

85

However,

the level of technical assistance under the UN Set F (6) did not satisfy the expectation
ofthe DCs group after its passage. The director ofUNCTAD's Manufacturers Division
stated, by rejecting the argument from the North that extensive technical assistance had
been provided, that while some bilateral activities existed, multilateral assistance would
unlikely go forward within the present institutional and financial environment, which
reflects dissatisfaction of the South. 286

(2) Model Law
When, pursuant to Sec. F(5) of the UN Set which requests elaboration of a law on
RBPs, the UNCTAD discussed the adoption of a model law, the major issue was
whether the purpose of the law may include development as well as competition as a
separate and independent criterion for determining a RBP. The Group of 77,
representing the less DCs, argued that Sec. E(2) of the UN Set included 'having or

284

Paasman, supra note 259, 30. See Part IV, sec. C (iii).
Part IV, sec. E ~ 8 & 9. e.g. sharing their experience, providing technical assistance,
and supplying publicly available information necessary for its effective control ofRBPs
to other countries, particularly DCs.
286
Sell, supra note 273, 164-5. The argument from the North was that technical
assistance was provided on a bilateral and multilateral basis outside the framework of
the UN Set in spite oflack of funds from UN Development Program (UNDP).
285
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being likely to have adverse effects on international trade or economic development' as

an additional element of the RBP besides the unduly restraining of competition. It
further argued that the goal ofthe model law may be to exert control over RBPs
negatively affecting trade and development of the particular country in question, not to
protect competition which is only one means to the goal? 87 On the other hand, the
Group B, representing the North, insisted that the model law should be consistent with
the principle of promoting competition and not adopt the effect on development as an
independent standard for actions against RBPs. 288 Regarding the incorporation of the
rule of reason standard into the model law, the South preferred an absolute prohibition
of practices enumerated in the UN Set while the North favoured a rule of reason
approach which leaves the decision whether individual cases violate competition law to
the evaluation of domestic competition authorities. 289
Despite the controversial disputes, UNCTAD published a model law on competition
under the name of' Draft commentaries to possible elements for articles of a Model
Law or Laws (hereinafter Model Law)' in light of the recent development of
competition law among states. Ch.II, subch.II of the Model Law confines the coverage
of the object of its application to enterprises and natural persons, thereby excluding
sovereign acts of the state, local governments or acts of enterprises or natural persons
within the delegated power compelled or supervised by the state or local governments.
Ch.III. Subch.I. of Model Law prohibits almost the same competition-restricting
agreements, as illustrated under the UN Set, between rival or potentially rival firms,

287

See id. at 167.
/d. at 166-7.
289
/d. at 168.
288
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as

regardless of formality, since the elements of the chapter have basis on Sec. D (3) of the

UN Set under a prohibition approach. 290 The commentaries on Ch. III states, the
agreements or arrangements under the chapter include any agreement whether it is
b

written or oral, formal or informal, or whether it has the intent to be legally binding. A
list ofRBPs from (a) to (g) inCh. III Subch. I are not exhaustive acts but exemplary
ones, thereby making the chapter a general clause that covers the other RBPs.
On the other hand, the Subch. II of Ch. III allows the authorization of a cartel or its

exemption/ 91 by stating that, properly notified in advance, and engaged in by firms
subject to effective competition, practices in the competition-restrictive agreements
may be authorized or exempted when competition officials conclude that the agreement
as a whole will produce 'net public benefit'. The policy that requires the agencies to
determine 'net public benefit' rather than 'no public harm' shifts to the firms their
burden of proofs to produce the net public benefit, thereby making the authorization
process quite strict.

292

Major exemplary reasons for the net public benefit are i)

promoting technical or economic progress, ii) reasonably organizing production or

i
t

~

i
i
.
.;

distribution, iii) overcoming crisis, iv) developing small or medium-sized entrepreneurs
that won't result in the substantial restriction of competition, v) relating to the
sovereign function of government, and vi) optimizing the export or import of products.
Enlarged efficiency and applicable defense in i) and ii) cartels may be proved in cartel
regulations ofboth developing and developed countries. Meanwhile, net public

290

UNCTAD, MODEL LAW ON COMPETITION: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY, at 22, ~ 21 (UN New York & Geneva, 2007).
291 Art. 3 ~ 2
292
UNCTAD, supra note 290, at 27, ~ 47.
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interests through restricting competition, e.g. iii) and iv), may be different, depending

on the level of the competition policy and economic development.
Export or import cartels are to be considered with special treatment for DCs,
particularly LDCs, to further their economic development, despite the negative effects
they may have upon consumers' interests in the advanced countries. Although some
countries exempt export cartels on such certain conditions as notification and
registration, Ch.III Subch.I.l. prohibits price-fixing agreement in international trade.29l
In contrast to a cartel with impact on a domestic market, an export cartel has been

acknowledged by national laws because the export cartel does not affect the domestic
market. In light of the fact that the export cartel has direct anti-competitive effects on a
foreign market, regular reviews of such exemption under limited standards needs to be
taken by exporting countries. State-governing cartels in international law are to be
discussed in a different area with commodity law. The authorization or exemption
provision is to be reasonable and inevitable in each country's context. 294 Otherwise,
cartels might prevail with colorable pretexts.
Although Ch.III Subch. II mentions competition officials or agencies as a determiner
with the discretion to allow exemptions, the determiner does not need to belong to the
administrative branch. As a result of attempting to reflect the diverse competition laws
of the member countries, the authority to approve exemption of cartel regulation is

293

Joint ventures under the U.S. Export Trading Company Act is not treated as export
cartel as they do not possess market power in domestic or foreign markets. UNCTAD,
surra note 290, 24 n.67.
29
Article 81 (3) of the Treaty of Rome of European Community, Germany, Japan,
Lithuania, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela, Colombia, Hungary, India, Slovakia, Turkey,
Austria, Algeria, Chile, Ukraine, Zambia, Tunisia, and Russian Federation. See id, 2733.
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·"ded by judges
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competitiOn.
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or with administrative officers in charge of trade or

296

j·

i

3. A Trial of a Plurilateral Agreement: Draft International Antitrust Code
(DIAC) Proposed by the Munich Group
While a multilateral agreement includes all of the members of international
organizations, a plurilateral agreement may consist of a few or many nations whether
inside or outside of an international organization. In case a plurilateral agreement is
'I,.,

established within a large international organization, members have the option to
become contracting parties. The plurilateral agreement of international competition law,
introduced by the Munich Group consisting of major competition scholars for further
consideration ofWTO, obligates contracting parties to respect its standards of
competition law as a part of their domestic competition legal systems, non-observance
of which, similar to WTO system, causes an international dispute between states as
violation ofinternationallaw. 297 The Munich Code was an ambitious attempt in its
broad scope of coverage, including all potential RBPs from horizontal and vertical
restraints to a regime for public undertakings and state authorizations, to remedies
covering administrative, criminal and private actions, and to a plan of an international
antitrust agency. The jurisdictional criterion of the Code is to deal with only crossborder cases thereby leaving domestic cases to domestic legislations. The agreement
295

The U.S. and EU.
Tunisia, Algeria, Norwey, Turkey, India and South Korea.
297
Refer to Art. 20 DIAC. Josef Drexl, Do We Need "Courage" for International
Antitrust Law? Choosing between Supranational and International Law Principles of
Enforcement, in THE FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST- FROM COMPARATIVE TO
COMMON COMPETITION LAW, 315-6 (ed. Drexl, Staempfli Pub., 2003).
296

105

'II

was not adopted by the WTO or any other international organization under the criticisnt
that nations would not accept overbroad regulations along with a wide limitation of its
sovereignty at the time when the convergence of competition law had not been
maturely discussed.
The trial, however, left valuable lessons for future international competition rules.
Among other things, the DIAC, at least, produced efforts from a private area to create
international competition rules in line with free trade law. Although rules over such
unfair practices, as anti-dumping, cover the phenomena similarly as competition law
does, and although their ultimate goal of free and efficient resource allocation is the
same, they caused conflicts in short-term objectives as well as in their measures to
achieve them. 298 The convergence of domestic competition policies and the reduction
of such measures which can be replaced with the enforcement of competition law, as
anti-dumping duty with respect to monopoly restraint or predatory pricing, can be a
solution to conflict between trade law and competition law. Moreover, a plurilateral
agreement as an alternative to a multilateral agreement can prove to be a method to
achieve cooperative relationships in international competition law since it offers the

298

The dumped price, arguably, is not unfair but due to high price in home market
where the exporter has a dominant position, which matches the area of competition law
rather than that of trade law. When the dumping case is treated with anti-dumping
provision of trade law, it often causes export cartels, price-fixing arrangements, as well
as voluntary export restraints. On the other hand, the art. 11 ( 1) of the Agreement on
Safeguards under exceptions allows unilateral measures to implement protectionist
policies, e.g. anti-dumping measures. The background of adopting the art. is that
competition policies permitting export cartels would damage trade policy, but the
unilateral methods without considering competition law application do not solve the
conflict with competition law. See Malaguti, supra note 259, 659-662.
106

option to accede, and countries with common interests could reap benefits from the
pturilateral agreement. Annex IV of the WTO Agreement indicates the example?
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Moreover, the DIAC brought light on the international procedural initiatives (IPI).
While the EU system requires the referral of national cases to ECJ under Art. 234, the
principle ofiPI allowed the International Antitrust Authority the right to ask national
authorities to initiate investigations and bring cases to national courts under national
law. 300 The reason behind the unique procedural initiative, juxtaposed to the
international dispute settlement, is that in considering such characteristics of
I

I

• I

competition law as reflecting the policy considerations and the economic reasoning of

it:! I
I

(I

!.

I

the respective country, jurisdiction of individual competition cases can match domestic
courts rather than the international dispute settlement body. 301

4. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
OECD, originally established to coordinate post-war financial assistance in Europe

in 1960 but now working as a global organization of inter-governmental discussions
and informal peer review system, has addressed competition law issues. An OECD

,·

I

report urged member states to utilize the information exchange and consultation
procedures for resolving disputes over multinational-enterprise(MNEs)-regulating
matters. The 1973 OECD recommendation proposed that members notify each other in

!
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Matsushita, supra note 259,251-252. Agreeing with Annex IV consisting ofthe
following four plurilateral trade agreements is optional to WTO accession: i) agreement
on trade in civil aircraft, ii) agreement on government procurement, iii) international
dairy agreement, and iv) international bovine meat agreement. They are referred to as
the TRAMS (Agreement on Trade-Related aspects of Anti-trust Measures).
300
Art. 19 Sec. 2 ofDIAC.
30!
Drexl, supra note 297, 316-7.
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any antitrust enforcement actions and exchange information between interested Parti
while the 1973 amendment adopted a voluntary conciliation procedure within the
OECD on disputes as to such law enforcements.302 The concerns about MNEs'

RBP

generated the 1976 OECD Guidelines for MNEs which includes regulations of
cartels. 303 Such attitudes are appreciated as support for a simpler code reflecting Parties
in similar economic situations than resolving the conflict between the South and the
North.304

The OECD have enacted competition policy outreach programme since planned
economies in East Europe and other communist countries shifted to market economies
in 1989. So as to work market economy and get integrated into the global economy, the
countries needed basic framework policies under rule oflaw, including competition
policy and sustainable development. 305 OECD' s outreach programme facilitated
assisting in the design and implementation of competition law and competition policy
through providing the experience and expertise of advanced competition regimes in
short-term events to other members and interested non-members. 306
Apart from the outreach programme allowing access to non-members, OECD's
main activities regarding competition issues came from the Competition Law and
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Sell, supra note 273, 74-75.
Under competition chapter,~ 3, states that enterprises should refrain from
participating in ... international or domestic cartels or restrictive agreements which
adversely affect or eliminate competition and which are not generally or specifically
accepted under applicable national or international legislation.
304
Id. at 75.
305
The conclusion of OECD Ministerial meeting in Ju1y 1999. Walter T. Winslow,
OECD Program for International Responses to Global Competition Issues, in
International and Comparative Competition Laws and Policies, at 236 (Yang-Ching
Chao et al eds. Kluwer Law Int'l, 2001).
306
Id. at 236-7.
303
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policy Committee (CLP), which has succeeded in achieving a convergence in
competition law enforcement over the last forty years without binding rules. The nonbinding rule principle encouraged members to accept international agreements
regarding competition law with less difficulty. The most beneficial instruments to
OECD members of the CLP are a series of recommendations regarding RBPs affecting
international trade

307
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Among other things, recently OECD revised the

Recommendation on Antitrust Cooperation in 1995

308

which, initially aimed at

reducing conflict among OECD members, emphasized and facilitated mutual assistance

I
!l1.

'
I

of competition law enforcement through the notification and exchange of information,
coordination of action, consultation, and conciliation.

309

Subsequent cooperation

agreements among OECD members resembled the Revised Recommendation. 310
Much recently, the OECD Council's Recommendation Concerning Effective
Action Against Hard Core Cartels adopted in 1998 {1998 OECD Recommendation)
began focusing on cartel regulations. The 1998 OECD Recommendation, even though
it exempts its application to the cartels evaluated as reasonable under cost/benefit
analyses or those excluded from the legislation of a member country or authorized
under domestic law, is important in that it urges member countries to provide effective
307

See Recommendations of the Council Concerning Co-operation between Member
Countries on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD
Doc.C{67)54/final (Oct. 5, 1967); C(86)44(Final), 21 May 1986, {1986) 25 ILM 1629;
C{95)130/Final, 28 July 1995. The OECD has revised the recommendations three times
since 1967, respectively in 1973, '86, and '95.
308
See Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between
Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD
Doc.C(95)130/final (July 27 & 28, 1995), available in 35 I.L.M. 1314
(1996)[hereinafter the Revised Recommendation]. Waller, supra note 258, 361-62.
309
Preamble ofthe Revised Recommendation.
310
Even the cooperation agreement among the competition authorities of the three
Baltic countries is modeled on the OECD Recommendation. See id. at 241-42.
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sanctions and enforcement measures with powers adequate to detect and remedy hard
core cartels311 and that it develops a concrete cooperation method on the basis of the
positive comity principle312 • In addition, it requires the exemption process to be
transparent and to be reviewed periodically so as to limit its coverage no broader than
necessary. 313 Moreover, it includes the definition of a hard core cartel. 314
Subsequently, the CLP of OECD published three comprehensive reports. The
reports are the result of demonstrating how member states' practices have complied
with the 1998 Recommendation by investigating its progress in jurisdiction of member
states and observers. The third report in 2005 indicated that efforts of member states
and observers to fight against cartels and to cooperate among competition authorities to
investigate international cartels were at a very high level.

315

The non-binding

recommendations and peer-review of members' reports have contributed to the
successful frame work for cooperation in enforcing competition law. 316
On the other hand, exchanging confidential business information has been less
successful in light of its importance in attacking international cartels, although there are
1998 Recommendation [C/M(98)7/PROV], ~ 1 of section A of Article I.
!d. See ~ 1 to 3 of section B of article I. The positive comity, on the request of the
other country, invokes the one country to apply its domestic competition law so as to
remove anticompetitive practices that occur in its jurisdiction and that adversely affect
the other party. This principle is a way to control anticompetitive activities that
adversely affect a party without resorting to an extraterritorial application of its
competition law that may result in a conflict of jurisdiction, which is useful for making
international agreement for cooperation of competition law enforcements. See Mitsuo
Matsushita, Globalizing the World Economy and Competition Law and Policy, in
COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, at 254 (Clifford A. John and
Mitsuo Matsushida eds. Kluwer Law International, 2002).
313
See art. I, sec. A. para. 2 subsec. b).
314
Id. See art. I. sec. A. para. 2 subsec. a).
315
OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998
Recommendation, 3 (2003).
316
Waller, supra note 258, at 362.

311

312

110

severai

achievements. Most OECD countries have banned the exchange of much

. ~: nnation that is not even confidential.

1010
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To challenge the restriction and raise the

level of awareness to the potential damage that cartels can inflict, the CLP issued a
report on approximate cost and economic harm resulting from activities of international
cartels. It argued the necessity of legal mechanisms for cooperation in international
cartel investigations, particularly the sharing of information among national offices.

318

OECD has provided the Global Forum on Competition annually to officials of
member states, the European Commission and some non-member states

319

since 2001.

The Forum supports member states and some non-members to build competition-lawoperating skills by leading a peer review on the competition law and policy of those
states. Although broader consensus against cartels and capacity-building measures
;

among members through the OECD extend the benefit to non-members,

320

in the light
t-

of the nature of the OECD as an organization of a total of thirty countries with an

I
I

'

advanced economy, accessibility to its activities has been limited to non-members with
the exception of those with big regional markets. 321 It needs to enhance inter-

:
i.
I

governmental cooperation in anti-cartel and competition law enforcement beyond the
I

i.

OECD scope.

I
J·
i
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317

See Winslow, supra note 305, at 243.
See id., at 244.
319
Such countries with big regional market as Brazil, China, Russia, Indonesia, and
South Africa.
320
See Winslow, supra note 305, at 246-7.
321
JOSEF DREXL ED., THE FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST- FROM COMPARATIVE
TO COMMON COMPETITION LAW (hereinafter, The Future of Transnational Antitrust),
321-322 (Staempfli Pub. Ltd, 2003); TAYLOR, supra note 146, 135. OECD website
offers information about member countries, available at
http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_338731 08 _33844430_1_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html
(last visited on Ju1.15, 2008).
318
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5. International Competition Network (ICN)
Countries gathered for facilitating robust competition law enforcement which
resulted in the International Competition Network (ICN). The ICN launched in 200}
has provided places for senior officers of competition law agencies in both developing
and developed countries to discuss convergence issues in their competition law
enforcements. Although the ICN has no authority to make decisions or to issue binding
rules, it has been operating as a global forum to announce non-binding
recommendations, harmonizing all the participating competition-enforcing officials.
Recently non-governmental advisers comprising of lawyers, scholars and international

~

organizations, have actively taken part in the ICN's work.

p

The Network has its aim at assisting developing countries in promoting competition
cultures based upon sound economic principles. Its membership started with fourteen

v

founding members, including both developing and developed countries, but extended to

(

ninety three competition authorities from eighty two countries within five years. 322 The
enlarged membership is thought to be a result of the developing countries' sympathy
with the activities of the ICN.
The ICN has its focus on several topics of competition laws, one of which is the
issue of cartel enforcement. The Cartel Working Group established in 2004 has worked
on anti-cartel enforcements. Annual meetings of enforcement officers have discussed

322

Initial founding Members countries are the following: U.S.A., EU, Canada, Mexico,
Australia, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, South Africa, United Kingdom,
United States, and Zambia. FTC, U.S. and Foreign Antitrust Officials Launch
International Competition Network , at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/200 1/1 0/icn.htm.
Statement of Germany, available at www.unctad.org
112
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OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998
Recommendation, 17 (2005).
324
Para. 23 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration.
325
The followings are the three projects: (i) the clarification of core principles including
transparency, (ii) non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and (iii) provisions on
hardcore cartels, modalities for voluntary cooperation, and support for progressive
reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through capacity
building.
326
WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, para.23 to 25 (14 Nov. 2001).
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(2) Rupture While Trying to Renegotiate
However, so called the Doha Agenda faced its deadlock by failure to reach a

trade

consensus in the successive ministerial conferences, such as the Cancun Conference,

that

the General Council in 2003, and the Hong Kong Conference in 2005. At the Caneun

that

Ministerial Conference, participants dropped competition policy issues in further

of 0

negotiation. After the Hong Kong Conference, the Doha Agenda went underground

dri'

without producing any positive result. In spite of the current standstill, there occur,

all<

from time to time, endeavors by politicians or trade representatives mostly from

W:

industrialized countries to revive the Doha Round.

327

(3) Limitation of Anti-cartel Rules within the WTO

sta

Since Art. III.2 of the Agreement establishing the WTO provides the forum for

pfi

negotiating matters dealt with in the Annexes to the Agreement including RBP, and Art.

en

IX of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) requires the

m

Council for Trade in Goods to consider adopting provisions on competition policy, the

N.

WTO has the legal foundation to carry out further multilateral negotiations on this

n

issue. 328 Confining the scope of prospective competition rules in relation to

c

international trade within the legal foundation of the WTO is necessary because the

D

international rules regulating cartels within the WTO may intervene in each member's

s

sovereignty over competition policies. The members eventually agreed to limit their

327

As of July 2007, India and Brazil do not reach an agreement to revive further
negotiation with the U.S. and EU mostly due to conflicts such as elimination or
reduction of agricultural subsidies in the industrial countries and tariff reduction on
products in emerging economies. See ICTSD, G-4 Talks in Potsdam Break Down, Doha
Round's Fate in the Balance Once Again, 11 Bridges Weekly 23 (Jun. 27, 2007),
available at http://www.ictsd.orglweekly/07-06-27/storyl.htm
328
Malaguti, supra note 259, 619 & 622.
114

sovereignty only to the extent that their domestic policies could jeopardize international
trade. 329 The coverage of the rules includes not only domestic practices or measures
that directly restrict imports or exports to those that foreclose the market, but also those
that indirectly affect international trade which are considered to circumvent obligations
of opening up a member state's market.

330

Hence, any foreclosure cartels that aim to

drive existing and potential competitors out of the market, as well as other marketallocating or any price-fixing cartels that have the same effect, can be prohibited by the

wro.
The above-mentioned coverage, however, may be remedied only when autonomous
state responsibility is proved, in other words, members have the duty under the specific
provision of the Marrakech Agreements to ensure that private undertakings will not
engage in certain RBPs. 331 An opinion places weight on the obligation to guarantee
market access under Art. XVI of the GATS as complementing major legal principles of
Marrakech Agreements by arguing that it may be construed as the basis for a duty, that
member states should prevent market barriers by means of either private or public anticompetitive restraints. 332 Although market foreclosure by private undertakings causes a
negative effect on both competition and trade, the article of the GATS does not have
sufficient foundation to restrain the sovereignty of a member engaging in trade in goods,
not services. Since rules on competition currently in the Marrakech Agreement do not
impose a direct and general duty on members to ensure that no RBP be undertaken
329
330

/d. at 624-5.

A vertical restraint with exclusive arrangement needs positive proof of foreclosing
market in contrast to merely making entry more costly but still economically feasible.
Id. at 625-6.
331
Id. 639.
332
'
/d. at 645-652.
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within their territories, positive acts of member states can be nullified and impaired
under Art. XXIII, para. I (b) of GATT. Damage caused by anticompetitive private
undertakings and omission by a member state does not assign such a duty to the
member state under the current WTO regime. The scope of the WTO needs to be
extended to regulate whole private entities' RBPs. 333

7. Assessment
The efforts to make competition law, including cartel regulation, as a part of
international law produced precious fruits represented in the UN Set, Model Law, the
1998 OECD Recommendation, and the Doha Agenda. There have been conflicting
interests, however, between proponents and contestants of international competition
law and cartel regulation, which contribute to the current collapse of the Doha Agenda
The proponents groups, mostly consisting of EU and its member countries, failed to
dissuade DCs from having the fear that international competition law might intervene
in their legislation and shackle business activities of relatively weak domestic
companies. Even the U.S. was hesitant to devote itselfto ensuring the success of the
negotiation, stating to the effect that the application of its competition law, with the
most experience and the longest history, may be limited by the international law and
that the benefit which the negotiation brings about could be obtained through bilateral
or trilateral agreements. 334

333

!d. at 641-3. Malaguti argues, adopting a international competition code or inserting
a duty to prohibit RBPs hindering market access would be solution. See id. at 643-5.
334
Seung Wha Chang, Interaction between Trade and Competition: Why a Multilateral
Approach for the United States? in WTO AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVE, 329-330
(Mitsuo Matsushida and DukgeunAhn eds., 2004)
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l
The decision to revive the multilateral framework looks to be up to the persuasive
powers of the leaders, who have interests in promoting a global economy toward free
trade and competition, to the benefit of developing countries. It is no wonder that the
leaders of the countries with large local market announced that the Doha Agenda
should be re-discussed when they meet.

335

Although the OECD urged resumption of

the Doha Round, there are still disagreements from DCs.

336

Since international law is created and is working through the consensus of the
global community, the majority of which DCs and LDCs occupy, it is important to
persuade DCs and LDCs to agree with international competition law by assisting in

I.

.~I

'

their adopting of competition law and as well as assisting in their practicing with the
skills, experiences, and theoretical foundations of developed competition law. Cartels
are more active in developing countries with less sophisticated competition regimes,

t

i.

~m

where the possibility of facing severe sanctions is very rare, than in countries with strict

:z

competition laws. As a result, the cartels impose much harm on those countries.

~
c:

However, cartel members who have some influence on politicians by the means of their

eg

C)

z

~

·.

capital are likely to lobby against competition law. The general public in DCs, who are
not fully aware of the damaging effect of cartels, might not have the sufficient power to

I

::.!

!

t:

i

I

I.

support competition law enforcement against cartels. Industry-promotion policies
which DCs usually focus on would try to make exemptions to cartel regulations such as
cartels under depression or export cartels. So as to overcome such hurdles in DCs,
sound foundations oflegal reasoning and economical theories for establishing
335

Bertrand Benoit and Ralph Atkins, G7 'committed' to Doha trade deal, FIN. TIMES
(February 11 2007 15:58), available at http://www.ft.com.
336
OECD tries to revive Doha talks, BBC NEWS (October 11 2006 17:39:15 GMT),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hilbusiness/6041930.stm.
117

r

i

m

~

competition cultures are indispensable. The international law of cartel regulation Will
require such sound theoretical support and development of practices, along with the
gaining of experience in DCs to further their progress.

VI.

Extending Bilateral or Regional Agreement

1. Advantages and Role ofBilateral Agreements
A bilateral agreement is the most popular form of international agreement on
competition policy, which is effectively enforced beside a regional agreement of the
Treaty of Rome establishing the EU. It is not only because it is easier for two parties to
reach an agreement than many parties and but also because it enables two parties to
discuss issues in which only the two parties have a special interest. Moreover, the
accumulation of successful bilateral agreements and international cooperation in
competition law can contribute as major building blocks to the creating of a multilateral
agreement. 33 7
It is noted that there is a distinction between the role of bilateral agreement and that
of multilateral agreement in competition policy. While the multilateral agreements
regulating RBPs were negotiated in terms of supplementing loopholes of international
trade law or suggesting universal anti-cartel and other competition codes, the bilateral
agreements in competition law addressed the issues of cooperation between
competition authorities, extraterritoriality, and conflicts of domestic competition laws.
337

Simon Evenett, Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, International Cartel
Enforcement: Lessons from 1990s, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
2680, 123 7-40 (200 1). They mentioned that confidential information sharing is major
hurdle.
118

In tight of the respective role, the bilateral agreements have operated as a supplement

rather than as an alternative to the multilateral agreements.

338

2. Treaties regarding Mutual Legal Assistance (MLATs) for Competition Policy
Bilateral agreements particularly regarding competition matters such as cartels,
had not occurred much until the 1990s when a large number of countries adopted
competition laws. Anti-cartel enforcements between competition authorities, except the
one between the U.S. and West Germany,

339

had been treated similarly as other

criminal law matters among countries which criminalized cartel activities. The U.S., the
foremost country in terms of seriously dealing with cartels as criminals, has enforced
thirty six treaties regarding mutual legal assistance (MLATs) on criminal matters, and

also signed fifteen treaties that are not yet ratified or in effect. 340 Although the MLA T

was a powerful method to support investigation as to cross-border cartels, most of them
were considered to be ineffective against cartels because the effective usage of the
MLAT necessitates the requisite level of enforcement capability as well as the political

will to penalize cartels along with anti-cartel penalty provisions. Successful examples
ofMLAT usages occurred between the authorities, which have already, under the
developed market system, accumulated considerable cartel practices in investigation
practices, and between advanced countries which criminalize cartels and the other anticompetitive activities which impose harm on consumers. The 1985 MLAT between the

338

Malaguti, supra note 259, 651-52.
West Germany does not criminalize a cartel activity.
34
Charles S. Stark, Improving Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation, in COMPETITION
POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM, 84 (Clifford Jones, and Mitsuo Matsushita
ed., 2002).
339
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U.S. and Canada in criminal matters
U.K. on criminal matters

342

,

341

and the 1995 MLAT between the U.S. and the

for examples, respectively state that the treaty should be an

effective tool in prosecuting modern criminals, including members of drug cartels343
and those who commit antitrust crimes in violation of consumer protection law344, and
that the definition of offence includes an offence in the category of consumer
protection.

345

Especially, the U.S.-Canada cooperation in anti-cartel enforcement under

the 1985 MLAT is evaluated as having been remarkably successful in the point that
coordinated searches between the U.S. and Canadian cartel investigatory institutions346
as well as the search by one party on behalf of the other party produced more increased
prosecutions of cross-border cartels and subsequent fines. 347

3. Bilateral Agreements regarding Enforcing Competition Law

341

Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Canada, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-14 (1988). The treaty came into
effect 5 years later in 1990.
342
Jan. 23, 1995, U.S.-U.K., S. Treaty Doc. No. 104-2 (1995)
343
Letters of Transmittal to the Senate of the United States in both treaties
344
See MLAT between U.S. and Canada, Annex. See also Waller, supra note 258, at
366 and n.131.
345
Annex (4) ofthe 1985 Treaty
346
In the thermal facsimile paper cartel case, the U.S. and Canada cooperated in their
first joint criminal antitrust investigation with a result of guilty pleas and substantial
fines for Japanese firms and their American subsidiaries. U.S. and Canadian
Prosecutors Attack Cartel Behavior by Fax Paper Distributors, 67 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 108 (July 21, 1994): Waller, supra note 258,368 n.141.
347
Stark, supra note 340, 84-85. For instance, Canadian prosecutions of international
cartels, first uncovered by the U.S. Antitrust Division, have lead to the imposition of
fines in Canada for violation of Canadian antitrust law of nearly US $ 100 million in
late 90s and 2000. See also Waller, supra note 258, n. 140. In the U.S. investigation into
price-fixing in the plastic dinnerware industry, the U.S. obtained the assistance of
Candadian authorities in executing search warrants and transmitting the evidence.
Plastic Dinnerware Price Fixing Probe Nets Indictment, Guilty Pleas Agreement, 66
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 661 (June 16, 1994).
120

As countries came to grips with the nature of interdependent economic

!

an

relationship in the globalization era, they grew aware of the necessity of cooperation,
particularly in enforcing competition law to deal with cross-border anticompetitive
behaviors of multinational corporations or foreign or domestic companies expanding
their business over national markets. Challenged by conflicts of competition law in

r

some cases, 348 competition authorities in industrialized countries have narrowed the
divergence of their competition laws through discussion and have adopted bilateral
agreements to cooperate in enforcing their competition laws. Since the U.S. had made
an antitrust accord 349 with Germany in 1976, it has resulted in eight bilateral
agreements regarding enforcement of competition laws. 350 Especially, the 1991
Agreement between the Government of the U.S.A. and the European Communities
regarding the Application ofTheir Competition Laws (hereinafter 1991 Agreement),
348

In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1154 (N.D.Ill. 1979), aff'd,
617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980). The controversy ofthe Uranium case delayed
bilateral efforts for formal agreement of cooperation until 1984 when Canda and the
U.S. entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding notification,
consultation, and cooperation with respect to the application of national antitrust laws
(Mar. 9, 1984), available at 23 I.L.M. 275 (1984). See Boeing's merger with
MacDonald Douglas. While the U.S. FTC approved the merger by stating that the
merger would not substantially lessen competition in any relevant market, European
Commission (EC) decided that the proposed merger would lead to a strengthening of
Boeing's dominant position in aircraft markets. FTC, Statement, 5 CCH Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) [Transfer Binder 1997-2001], para. 24,295 (1997); EC Decision, Case
N/M.877 O.J.L 336/16 (1997). See also Hartford Fire case, and GE/ Honeywell merger
case.
349
The formal title of the bilateral agreement in 1976 is Agreement Between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business
Practices. Its full text is available at
h!tiJ://www.ftc.gov/bc/intemational/docs/agree_germany.pdf
35
Competition Agreements of the U.S. with other countries are available at
http://www.ftc.gov/oia/agreements.shtm (last visited on Sept.l4, 2007). The countries
are Germany('76), Australia ('82), EC('91), Canada('95), Israel ('99), Brazil ('99),
Japan ('99), and Mexico ('00).
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which consists of eleven articles, became the model of subsequent bilateral agreCinents.
The concrete cooperative measures are, among other things, mutual notification in case
a party's enforcement may affect interests of the other party, the exchange of
infonnation on general policy or specific action, and assistance by one party in the
other's enforcement actions. The agreement does not have binding power but provides
reciprocal options to demur. Subsequently, the U.S. expanded the number of partners in
the agreement regarding cooperation of competition enforcement from just Canada in
1995,351 to Brazil, Australia, and Israel in 1999/ 52 and to Japan in 2000

353 354
.

Particularly, the 1998 Agreement between the Government of the U.S.A. and the
E.C. on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement of their
Competition Laws (1998 Positive Comity Agreement) supplemented Article V, the so
called positive comity, ofthe 1991 Agreement. 355 The languages ofthe 1998

351

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the U.S.A.
Regarding the Application ofTheir Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices
Laws, Aug. 15\ 1995, 35 I.L.M. 309 (1995). See Waller, supra note 258, 365-66. Waller
explains characteristics of the 1995 Agreement such as binding version of 1984 MOU,
inclusion of FTC and DOJ, mechanism for cooperation in both trans-border consumer
~rotection enforcement and competition matters. See the 1995 Agreement, Art. Ill& VII.
52
Agreement between the Gov. of the U.S.A. and the Gov. of the State oflsrael
Regarding the Application oftheir Competition Laws, Mar. 15th, 1999. Agreement
between the Gov. of the U.S.A. and the Gov. of Australia on Mutual Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance, Apr. 27, 1999. Agreement between the Gov. of the U.S.A. and
the Gov. of the Federal Republic of Brazil Regarding Cooperation between their
Competition Authorities in the Enforcement of Their Competition Laws, Oct. 26th,
1999. They have very similar structures consisting of 13 articles. Full text of both
agreements are available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/03/usisrael.pdf
353
Agreement between the Government of U.S.A. and the Gov. of Japan Concerning
Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities, October 7th, 1999, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/oialagreements.shtm
354
Stark, supra note 340, 89-91.
355
See preamble and Art. VI of the 1998 Agreement. The 1998 Agreement shall
supplement and be interpreted consistently with the 1991 Agreement, which remains
fully in force.
122

Agreement succeeded to the same agreement between Canada and the U.S.A. in
356
2004. The positive comity principle, distinguished from extraterritorial application of

domestic competition law, imposes the duty to investigate anti competitive business
practice on a party when the activities are occurring in whole or in substantial part in
the territory of the party and are adversely affecting the interests of the other party, and

when the activities are impermissible under the competition law of the former party. A
major purpose of the agreement is establishing cooperative procedures of the most
effective and efficient international competition-law enforcement and avoiding
allocating enforcement resources to dealing with anticompetitive activities that occur
principally in and are directed toward the other party's territory.

4. Cartel Regulations in Regional Trade Agreements
(1) The Adoption of Competition Issue in Free Trade Agreements
Most free trade agreements have a chapter or provisions regarding the competition.
Although they do not address, particularly, the cartel, one or some of them in fact apply
to cartel regulations. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement between

the Government of the United States, the Government of Canada, and the Government
of the United Mexico (NAFTA}, in general terms, includes the promotion of conditions
affair competition in the free trade area as one of the objectives of the Agreement
although it does not have specific regulations regarding cartels. The Free Trade

356

Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Gov. of the U.S.A. on the
Application of Positive Comity Principles to the Enforcement of Their Competition
Laws (Oct. 5, 2004), available at
http://www. ft:c.gov/os/2004/1 0/041 Ocomityagreeenglish.pdf (visited on Ju1.16, 2008)
The 2004 Agreement had exactly the same languages as the 1998 Agreement.
123

Agreement between the U.S.A. and South Korea adopted an article with regard to
competition law and anti-competitive business conduct. Although the FTA did not
address specifically the cartel regulation, it urges cooperation and coordination for
effective competition law enforcement between two authorities in charge of
competition law. 357 The cooperation requirement through the mutual assistance,
notification, consultation, and exchange of information will apply to cartel
investigations.
(2) Cooperation Agreement regarding Competition Law
Beside the free trade agreement, there are cooperation arrangements between
competition authorities. The cooperation agreements focus on the issue of competition
law enforcements. Although they do not mention 'a cartel' in their languages, the
provisions apply to cartel regulations in the same way as other regulatory areas within
the competition law. One of the arrangements is 'Cooperation Arrangement between
the Commissioner of Competition (Canada), the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission and the New Zealand Commerce Commission regarding the Application
of their Competition and Consumer Laws'. Important provisions related to cartel
enforcement are i) notification requirement when one's enforcement may affect the
other party's interests in the application of its competition law, e.g. when any restrictive
business practice that may be subject to penalties under the one party's competition law
was carried out in the other party's territory/ 58 and ii) cooperation through sharing

357

Art. 15.1 (7) ofCh. 16. The final draft ofFTA between the South Korea and the
U.S.A. The FTA is not ratified in the legislative body of either country as of March,
2008.
358
Cooperation Arrangement between The Commission of Competition (Canada), the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the New Zealand Commerce
124

information and coordinative efforts when parties enforce the laws to the same or
siinilar matters.

359

The sharing of the information in light of domestic interests in the

application of competition law, and the request of maintaining the confidentiality of
shared information

360

can work essentially for balancing cooperation in cartel

investigation with operation of leniency program. Periodical meeting among
competition officials

361

enables parties to discuss application of competition law and

strengthen cooperative investigation, particularly, against international cartels.

(3) Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

As a broad regional economic cooperation, APEC has acknowledged the importance
of developing competition principles and contributed to the promotion of overall
competition law and policy through issuing agenda, action plan, declaration and
principles. 362 APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform does
not mention a cartel specifically, but urges member economies to address anticompetitive behaviors by implementing competition policy for protecting the
competitive process.

363

Confidence and capacity building in DCs and effective

...
Commission regarding the Application of their Competition and Consumer Laws, II.l.b.
(Oct. 2000), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/pics/ct/euro-agree_e. pdf (visited on
Jul.18, 2008)
359
ld. III. I & 2.
360
Id. VI.2 & 3.
361
Id. V. d & e.
362
APEC, Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform, preamble; The
Auckland Challenge, APEC economic leaders' declaration, para. 6 (Sept 13, 1999);
Osaka Action Agenda(OAA), Implementation of the Bogor Declaration, 8. Objective
(1995).
363
APEC, supra note 362, Implementation 3). The Osaka Action Agenda, 8 Guidelines

b.
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cooperation on competition policy through APEC,

364

particularly as a concrete z n '

the establishment of a database on competition policy/ 65 facilitate the enforcement of
cartel regulations.
On the other hand, APEC allows members to have exemptions and exceptions of
competition law as long as they are no broader than necessary to achieve an objective
of APEC through competition policy.366 The sustainable development367 and the
peculiarity of food system368 are the areas where APEC has paid attention besides
competition. A cartel for environmental protection or primary commodity may be
permitted. APEC, particularly, acknowledges the importance of Small and Medium
Enterprises(SMEs) to economic activities within the region under Manila Action Plan
for APEC, thereby implying that the SMEs-related exceptions to cartel regulations, e.g.
crisis cartel and R&D cartel among SMEs, are acceptable.

5. Hurdles to Cooperation in Investigation and Enforcement
It is noted that although the U.S. and the EU have developed their cooperation in

competition law enforcement, member states are usually unwilling to share confidential
evidence, which they had obtained through their respective cartel investigation. The
lack of cooperation is analyzed to be due to the reluctance of the member states that
need to protect domestic business sectors and to secure the cooperation of the
investigated companies with fear that their confidential business information may

364

Principles, 6) to 10). The Agenda, 8. Collective Actions a (iv) and e.
The Agenda, 8.Collective Actions, a.(iii).
366
OAA, 8.CA.a.(iii)
367
Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA) para. 5 to 7 (Jul. 11-12, 1996).
368
The Auckland Challenge, para. 15 to 16.
365
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spread to authorities of other countries. Facing the problem, most member states in the

EU, institutionally, have acknowledged the support under their national laws and the
U.S. has enacted a legislation to facilitate anti-trust cooperative investigation and
enforcement in 1994. 369 Under the new legislation, the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA), the U.S. has tried to overcome the difficulty of
sharing confidential information.

370

Although the accumulated bilateral agreements will be the foundation for
international competition law, bilateral agreements are not direct contributors to
achieving international cartel regulation but act as complementary building blocks. The
bilateral agreements, still, have focused on cooperation of competition law enforcement
rather than harmonization of the competition law itself only with the exception of New
Zealand and Australia371 • In addition, bilateral agreements have their limitations in that
the participating countries were usually the most industrialized countries. Countries
with under-developed or developing economies with inexperienced competition

authorities are not yet participating in the bilateral agreements. MLATs on criminal
369

Stark, supra note 340, at 87. In 1994, the U.S. enacted the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA), 15 U.S.C. section 6201-6212 (1994), under
which through bilateral agreement confidential information can be shared, and antitrust
authorities can use their investigative powers on one another's behalf. See id. at 90:
Waller, supra note 258,371-72. Waller analyzes in-detail the IAEAAin terms of
antitrust mutual assistance agreement, and its legislative background with focus on
restriction of confidential information as to pre-merger notifications under Hart-ScottRodinoAct.
370
The U.S. has made an agreement with Australia under the IAEAA. See Agreement
between the Gov. of the U.S.A. and the Gov. ofAustralia on Mutual Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance, at http://www.usdoj .gov/atr/intemational/usaus7 .htm
371
New Zealand and Australia substantially harmonized their national competition laws,
replaced antidumping law with true competition provisions and amended domestic
competition laws to facilitate competition enforcement under a free trade area
agreement, Closer Economic Relations-Trade Agreement (Mar. 28, 1983), 22 I.L.M.
945. Waller, supra note 258, 355-56.
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matters may cover cartel regulation but, in the light of the current situation that
developing countries rarely employ criminal penalty against cartel members, they are
likely to produce few, if any, practical results. International organizations try to build
multilateral agreements by issuing recommendation or launching negotiation toward
multilateral agreements in the circumstance where the number of bilateral agreements
is increasing.

VII. Conclusion

International cartels are categorized into two types, an agreement among competing
companies to restrict competition and a loose association established by such
agreements consisting of competing companies. The association-type cartels can have
limited legal personality and a legal characteristic of international organization. On the
other hand, the agreement-type cartels have legal characteristic of international
agreements among private companies with limited legal personality. IGCs, IP As, and
ICAs under a very broad coverage of cartel including inter-state agreements may fall
under the category of an international organization.
Among international organizations under suspicion of international cartel, the OPEC,
as one of the long-existing IP As, is not a private international cartel. The characteristics
of the agreements among states with sovereignty, no-penalty against cheating, oil as
non-renewable natural resources, and the necessity of sustainable development are not
fit to a cartel under competition law but international commodity agreement under
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co:rornodity law as the different area of international law. However, it is subject to
international economic cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit.
The ITU as a standard-setting organization is not an international cartel which
violates competition law. Its practice of rate-setting without binding power or penalty
indicates downward price trend and reflects public interests e.g. equity, static efficiency,
and universality. The RFS allocation is an inevitable way to achieve effective crossborder radio-broad casting under the current technical level unless it severely limits
new competitive comers' accesses.
The IAT A consisting of private airlines, on the contrary, has the possibility of cartel
because it provides practices of passenger rate or air cargo fee-setting. The counterargument of non-binding recommendation is weak because the interlineable fare system
ofiATA has worked as a factor of settling fares to the same level. Current practices of
EU and US DOJ, which withdrew the immunity of competition law conferred on IA T A
and are investigating anti-competitiveness of such rate-coordination, underlines the
possibility. On the other hand, slot-allocation and airport scheduling are acknowledged
as necessary procedures for relieving congestion in airports, unless the practices of
'historical precedence' work as exclusive behaviors which impede new competitors'
participation.
Cartel regulatory regimes have developed in the late half of 20th century in
industrialized countries although there were laws prohibiting profiteering through hard
core cartel activities from the ancient to the medieval to the modem ages. However, the
occurrence of international cartels necessitated international law with respect to cartel
activities, thereby developing international agreements regarding competition law.
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In distinction with a cartel made up of private companies under competition law,
ICAs have been treated under commodity law. The separation is due to unique
characteristics of commodities. International organizations have issued declarations,
resolutions, and made treaties registered. The separate treatment of commodity laws
was accepted into domestic laws. As a result, the international commodity law has
pursued a different path from competition law.
Although international cartel law or competition law have experienced failures of
reaching concrete codes, cartel regulation of international competition law, currently,
has grown up with multilateral agreements as well as bilateral agreements. The 1947
Havana Charter with a chapter focusing on competition was not effective due to
insufficient ratification. Trials to revive the chapter faced their deadlocks coming from
conflicting opinions in UN ECOSOC in the 1950s. International organizations such as
the UNT AD and the OECD have devoted their efforts to secure multilateral agreements,
thereby achieving the 1980 UN Set and the 1998 OECD Recommendation. In addition
to these endeavors, the ICN has worked for promotion of competition law and practical
support for young competition authorities. The WTO included, although it dropped in
2003 Cancun due to severe objection from a less developing countries' group, the issue
of competition law under DDA which is currently in standstill. As a result, the
recognition of the importance of cartel regulation has widened to developing countries
and less-developed countries recently. The number of countries adopting competition
law, including cartel regulation, is over a hundred in 2008.
Bilateral agreements with characteristics of an international agreement regarding
cartel regulation have not been many until the 1990s when a large number of countries
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adopted competition laws. The bilateral agreements have advantages over multilateral
agreements in some points, e.g. the negotiation of specific interests between countries,
much less costs. MLATs occurred centering the countries with accumulated cases and
practices and treated competition law and cartels along with other criminal matters.
Following the MLATs, bilateral agreements addressing the issues of competition law,
e.g. 1991 Agreement between U.S.A. and the E.C. regarding the Application of their
Competition Laws, only came out from 1990s. However, the bilateral agreements have
weak points such as the unwillingness of member states to share confidential
information, limitation as foundation for international cartel law, and a confined scope
of participating countries, mostly industrialized countries.
Therefore, on the way toward binding international law, the multilateral agreement
has its unique role because promotion of bilateral agreements can not replace
harmonization through the multilateral agreement. In light of the former failures to
achieve multilateral agreements of competition law including cartel regulation, it needs
to place the priority in solving the dispute of opinions, particularly between less
developing countries and relatively industrialized countries, as regards international
cartel regulation as the Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference indicated in 2003. Since
the cartel regulation defends consumers' rights to have products through price
mechanism of merit-based competition in markets and punish anti-competitive business
activities curbing competition, it has much reciprocal benefit for developing countries
as well as industrial countries. By reducing fear of developing countries that
international cartel regulation interfere with their domestic economic policies, among
other things, industrial policy, international organizations' effort to have effective
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international cartel regulation can increase the probability of success. The next chapter
will discuss how to reduce conflicts between developing countries and industrial
countries.
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Ch. 3. Conciliation of Conflicts of Opinion between the North &
the South on International Law regulating Cartel

I.

Introduction

International law regarding cartel regulation has evolved with the support of the
developing countries in 1970s and 80s, while in 90s and the 2000s it developed under
I

the industrialized countries' auspice. The effort to achieve a binding international
agreement failed recently in 2003, due to developing countries(DCs)' opposition to the
inclusion of competition policy into the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). It appears
ironic that the United Nation (UN) Set regarding restrictive business practice(RBP)s of
transnational corporation was adopted by DCs but that the proposal of multilateral
agreement to adopt the competition policy was rejected by the same group twenty years
later. It should be noted that the languages of the UN Set and Doha Declaration are
similar in terms of cartel regulation. Therefore, it is worthwhile to research the reason
for dropping competition policy out from under the negotiation of DDAbecause the
regulation, once accepted by developing countries, was abandoned by the same group.
The two regulations originate from different perspectives. The major differences
between the two are the objectives of regulation and the ideological motive to introduce
the regulations. The former declaration was introduced to the UN General Assembly as
a result ofthe United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
resolution. It was for regulating restrictive business activities of multinational
corporations (MNCs), most of which have their headquarters in the industrialized
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countries. It was a part of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) with a
significant impact on the international community that supported UNCTAD's adoption
of the resolution and the UN Set. The UN Set, consisting of recommendations without
binding power, has requested to hold regular conferences for reviewing each country's
effort to comply.
On the other hand, the DDA was introduced by the World Trade Organization
(WTO). It was for achieving binding multilateral agreements with such a broad
coverage that it may include competition policy. The effort towards an international
free trade regime originated from the New Liberalism that has predominated the
international economy since the collapse of communist regimes in the 1990s.
The conflict between the two groups invokes the question whether cartel regulation
is necessary in international law. It is important that the benefits of international cartel
regulation to DCs and less DCs should outweigh the cost of the regulation. If so, the
group which currently disagrees with adopting international cartel regulation will be
more willing to accord approval to it. With persuasive researches added, its fear for the
regulation can also be reduced.
This chapter analyzes the recent failure of negotiating the DDA in Cancun by
dropping the competition policy out due to distinct positions of industrialized countries
and DCs. Subsequently, the theological backgrounds with which each group of
countries under the North-South dialogue hold their positions are to be researched indetail. In spite of the different placements in which each group is located, the necessity
of cartel regulation in international law is to be demonstrated in terms of benefit
derived to DCs.

2

II.

Failure of Further Negotiation on Competition Policy under
Doha Development Agenda (DDA) at WTO Ministerial
Conferences

1. Standstill ofDDA Negotiation
( 1) Collapse of theN egotiation at Cancun, 2003
A chair of the Ministerial Conference called an end to the Conference by dropping
the Singapore issues under multilateral negotiation for DDA. It was even before foreign
ministers at the site proceeded to a discussion of agriculture, the most controversial
issue. Although the reasons for the sudden end are arguably analyzed as a strong
objection to Singapore issues from developing countries' groups such as African
Caribbean Pacific group (ACP) 1, advanced countries' insincerity, 2 WTO decisionmaking procedures, 3 and a judgment by the chair to end the talks early, which was

1

The ACP grouping consists of over seventy countries that are beneficiaries of the
European Union's preferential market-access programs, originally provided by the
Lome Convention and later renewed by the Contonou agreement. White & Case LLP,
WTO Talks Collapse in Cancun: A Splash of Cold Water, or Dead in the Water?, Vol.
IX WTO REPORT: Special Report on the WTO Cancun Ministerial No.6, 3
(September 16, 2003).
2
EC's concession to drop two issues including competition policy was criticized for
being too late. See id.
3
The procedure is criticized from two conflicting perspectives. The one from advanced
countries argues that although the consensus-based system is democratic, it is exposed
to abuse from anti-trade or anti-liberalization groups and inefficient to produce any
substantial result with further negotiation. See Robert E. Baldwin, Failure of the WTO
Ministerial Conference at Cancun: Reason and Remedies, at 3 & 10 (Jul.IO, 2008),
available at
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/Conferences/CGP/May2004Papers/Baldwin.pdf;
White & Case LLP, supra note 1, at 9. The other one from developing countries insists
that WTO's untransparent and non-participatory decision-making process which
3

motivated by the unwillingness of developed countries to discuss agricultural refonns 4

'

the most serious reason looks to be the first one: the strong opposition from the
majority of DCs.
EC Trade Commissioner Lamy, on the last day of negotiation, agreed with the
chairman's position that the EC would be willing to remove investment and
competition from the agenda, too late in the light of the strong positions of DCs. 5 The
EC's concession invoked a gust of responses. After an-hour-long discussion among
ministers, Botswana, on behalf of the ACP, expressed the rejection for all four issues.
The ACP had held the strong position in requesting the cotton initiative and an end of
subsidies. 6 On the other hand, South Korea argued that it could not accept the dropping

invoked developing countries' rage led to the collapse of the negotiation, whereby
criticizing WTO 's bias in favor of minority of developed countries rather than majority
of developing countries. The informal drafting custom by chairmen, since 1996
Singapore Ministerial Conference, urged every member to adopt the last draft on the
last day of schedule, which accumulated anger from members with limited access to
decision. Martin Khor, An Analysis of the WTO s Fifth Ministerial Conference, Intergovernmental Group ofTwenty Four, 3-6 (Cancun, Sep. 10-14, 2003), available at,
http://www.g24.orglkhorgva.pdf(visited on Jul. 16, 2008).
4
The chairman's closing announcement was considered as surprise since quite a few
WTO members were absent at the meeting where the EC concession was presented.
Arguably, the motives of the chairman might have been driven by other factors, not
related to Singapore issues, such as developed countries efforts to thwart agricultural
reform. See Khor, supra note 3, at 1-5; White and Case LLP, supra note 1, 2-4.
5
Khor, supra note 3, at 2 & 9. However, Khor states, the Chairman proposed that the
two issues, investment and competition policy, would be dropped out from the agenda
but that for the other two issues, trade facilitation and procurement, negotiations could
begin. In response to the proposal, the EC Commissioner agreed to it, giving
impression that these would be removed from the WTO altogether, not just from Doha
mandate. Khor, id. at 2.
6
See White and Case LLP, supra note 1, at 2-3. The article states that the second draft
Ministerial Declaration reflected the U.S. proposal regarding the cotton initiative in
conflict with the initial pleading of four West African cotton producers, Burkina Faso,
Benin, Chad and Mali, for the consideration of a sectoral initiative to reduce and
eliminate cotton subsidies. ld. 5-6. Especially the text language inflames the African
countries, saying that international bodies direct existing programmes and resources

4

.,, 4

of anY issue. 7 The strong stand by the ACP group invoked a sudden halt to the
negotiation on any issue.
The G-21+, 8 a group of developing countries with a middle level of income or with

a big domestic market, were upset at the sudden closure of the negotiation by stating
that the group was a negotiating force that must be dealt with seriously, and that WTO
discussions should move forward in order to achieve agriculture reform. 9 Its member
countries blamed the ACP grouping in particular for the collapse. 10
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) Zoellick shifted the responsibility
indirectly to the African and Caribbean countries, by stating that the talk failed after the
countries walked out on the efforts to launch negotiations on trade facilitation as a
necessary modernization process in order to foster customs and other procedures. On
the other hand, the US reproached Brazil, the leader of the G-21 +, by arguing that the
demands of the group, which was unwilling to engage in constructive talks, were based
on an insincere attitude. 11

toward diversification of the economies where cotton accounts for the major share of
their GDP, because the African countries recognized the wording as suggestion of
stopping growing cotton. JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, at para. 27. They asked the ACP group of
support for the initiative, and the group requested to end all export subsidies in three
years, production subsidies in four years starting in 2005, and to remit payments of
maximum $300 million annually to African countries affected by subsidies. The
situation appeared to have spiraled out of control. See id. at 6.
7
Khor, supra note 3, at 2-3.
8
The G-21 +, led by Brazil, China, and India, also includes Argentina, Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador (later withdrew), Guatemala, Mexico,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. At the
start of the Cancun Ministerial, Egypt, Senegal and Turkey joined, Indonesia and
Nigeria joined toward the close of Ministerial. See id. at 3 fn 3.
9
The G-21 + group had taken a hard line on agriculture negotiation.
10
See id. at 3.
11
See id. at 4.
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(2) Assessment
The tension between the North and the South grew exacerbated through discussion
and negotiation. DCs' groups, ACP and G-21 +, focused on the 'development' cause of
DDA by addressing their demands. The developing countries, in addition, have
manifested their dissatisfactions with the current balance of trading concessions since
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. For instance, they resisted holding the
Ministerial Conference in Qatar that launched the Doha Agenda due to the lack of
significant progress on some implementation issues of the WTO agreement under the
Uruguay Round. They have also complained about the tardy process of agricultural
trade system reform and of removing quantitative restrictions on textile imports in the
developed countries. 12 The initiative for immediate reform of the cotton sector,
however, was difficult for the U.S. and other developed countries to accept because it is
closely related to agricultural reform as one of the most controversial domestic political
issues. 13
Besides the objection from the groups, diverse opinions within the developing
countries turned the whole negotiation into a standstill. While the G-21 + group held a
position to continue to negotiate on the Singapore issues with an interest in agricultural
subsidy reduction, the ACP group strongly objected to further discussion of all
Singapore issues. Some developing countries with high-level incomes insisted on
keeping the issues on the table. It was difficult to have a consensus-based decision
made because of diverse conflicting interests within the South.

12

Baldwin, supra note 3, 9-10.
U.S. General Accounting Office, Congressional Report Analyzes WTO Negotiations
Collapse at Cancun, 2-3 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov
13

6

Developed countries, on the other hand, not ready to adopt a unilateral liberalization
>n

approach alone, failed to persuade the developing countries to acknowledge that

of

adopting new trade-related rule issues such as competition and investment can provide
more gains in terms of development than cost.

14

It looked as if major developed

countries had underestimated the developing countries' complaints and had believed,
from their past experiences, that developing countries would not be brave enough to

thwart the on-going multilateral negotiation of the Doha Agenda and remain open to
criticism if the major trade powers formed a unified voice.

15

Although reforms of the existent procedure ofWTO decision-making are proposed
by both the North and the South groups, the problem consists in the mistrust in each
other because of the lack of an opportunity to understand reciprocal positions. The
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continual failure to revive the DDA among the group of advanced countries, like the
EU and the U.S., and the leaders of emerging economies with big local markets, such
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as India and Brazil, can not be explained but by the misunderstanding of reciprocal
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positions despite tenacious proposals to further DDA negotiation.
The argument for the chairman's biased closure in favor of the unwilling developed
countries does not provide persuasive supporting evidences. On the contrary, while
developed countries, e.g. the U.S. and the EU, put their efforts to revive the Doha
multilateral negotiation afterwards, the ACP group cheered the collapse. The
subsequent failures of WTO Ministerial Conferences indicate that the collapse was not

t4s
eel.d.
15

Less than a month before the meetings, the U.S. and the EU jointly presented a broad
framework for improving market access for agricultural products and joined with
Canada in presenting a proposal aimed at reaching an agreement on negotiating
modalities for non-agricutlural products. Baldwin, supra note 3, at 10.
7
'r·

from the personal fault of the Mexican chairman but from structural conflict of interests
among the groups of countries. Some observers agreed with this analysis and evaluated

sp

the decision of the chairman as wise and timely in advance of the situation worsening

nc

due to the hardened positions of the developing countries. 16 The grounds of the
argument regarding his biased judgment should be carefully examined in order to
eliminate possible prejudices of subsequent chairmen.

t1
2. The Competition Policy Issue under the GATT/WTO

p

(1) Insufficient Consensus in Competition Policy
Competition policy among the Singapore issues, although not the very topic so
controversial to lead to the failure of Cancun Conference, was the issue that some
developed countries 17 put aside for future negotiation rather than prioritizing.
Developing countries, which had diverse positions in the negotiation of the Singapore
issues, mostly agreed that the competition policy should be dropped out of the current
negotiation table. 18 The point that the second draft Ministerial Declaration at Cancun
relegated competition policy to further study reflects this reality. 19

16

White & Case LLP, supra note 1, at 2; Khor, supra note 3, at 5.
Canada's trade minister Pierre Pettigrew facilitated the discussions on the Singapore
issues at Cancun and proposed a compromise that would have allowed the two less
controversial issues to proceed, public procurement and trade facilitation, along with
eventual negotiations on investment, but not competition. On the other hand, the EU
and Japan had been the main supporters for negotiation on investment and competition
since at the Singapore Conference in 1996. However, the EU made concession to
remove the investment and competition at Cancun.
18
Malaysia, an opponent of all the issues, however, suggested to agree to trade
facilitation and competition, not in public procurement. On the other hand, South Korea,
traditional supporter of all the issues, kept on its position in spite of the EU's
concession. See id. at 2-3.
19
JOB(03)/150/Rev.2, at para. 15.
17
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The position of the majority of the DCs was on the opposite side when the countries
spearheaded the passage ofthe UN Set at the General Assembly in 1980. In the DDA
negotiation, which is supposed to include development concerns of the South, the
majority group of the DCs, or ACP 77, perceived the competition policy including
cartel regulation as a method to press the domestic markets' opening, restrict national
economic development policy, and curb cooperation among domestic companies. On
the other hand, the South in the UN Set considered cartel provisions as a shield to
prevent multinational or foreign corporations from the North from exploiting consumer
welfare through anti-competitive business behaviors.
The different views came from the difference of respective major objective and
negotiating attitudes of proposed multilateral agreements. Although the economic
development issue was one of the major goals set by both agreements, the DDA in
WTO was for promoting free trade by reducing or eliminating trade barriers while the
UN Set was intended for control over RBPs of MNCs. ACP 77 countries, which
approved the launching ofDDA negotiation under the commitment of the Uruguay
Round and international pressure, gradually lost trust in the benefits of the WTOleading trade liberalization approach to themselves, because their main trade interests in
cotton and agricultural product were not reflected in in-detailed negotiations. While the
North's concern for intervention into sovereignty was reflected in the UN Set with a
non-binding characteristic, the South's request for negotiation with a narrow range of
topics was rejected in the DDA under coercion of a wide range oftrade topics toward
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international binding rules. Rough or seemingly hesitant attitudes to such requests from
advanced countries, e.g. EU or U.S. generated much anger in the ACP 77 group. The

9

cause of development, particularly the necessity of DCs and LDCs' for enhanced
support in competition policy, proclaimed in the DDA, was suspected as an excuse for
opening domestic markets in almost all aspects of trade, covering services, agricultures
and trade-related laws. If cartel regulation in competition policy within DDA
negotiations had placed its basis on the UN Set and expressed a sincere attitude for
respecting the accumulated resources of competition policy of the UNCT AD, as the
Declaration states, 20 such a sudden deadlock could have been avoided. A minimum
consensus could have been reached as to the maxim principles e.g. restriction against
hard core cartels and international cooperation.

(2) Reflecting Fairness Principle within GATT
The regulation of so-called 'unfair trading practices' has constituted an integral part
ofGATT/WTO rules. 21 Article XX of the GATT, for promoting fair competition,
prevents products of free economic systems with a choice of employment options and
wages, from competing with the products of forced prison labor. Art. VI para. 1
addresses the prohibition of dumping22 which causes or threatens to cause material
injury to an established industry. Para. 2 permits governments to impose a limited
20

Para. 24 of Doha Ministerial Declaration states that the ministers shall work in
cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental organizations, including UNCTAD,
and, through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, to provide strengthened and
adequately resourced assistance to respond to the needs ofDCs and LDCs for
competition policy.
21
Baldwin, supra note 3, at 12.
22
Dumping means that the price of a product which is introduced into the commerce of
an importing country is less than (a) the comparable domestic price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product in the exporting country, or (b) in the absence of
such price, either (i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any
third country, or (ii) the cost of production plus a reasonable addition for selling cost
and profit. GATT (1947), Art. VI para. 1.

10

arnount of anti-dumping duties not greater than the margin of dumping. Para.3,

tr

sinrilarly, allows a limited amount of countervailing duties if a foreign exporting
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government provides subsidies to the production or export of a product in the country.
Moreover, developmental concerns under the GATT/WTO scheme imply that
formal reciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment ofDCs can produce unfair results.
The 1955 GATT amendment for substantial reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers
on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis announced that multilateral
negotiations should afford adequate opportunities to take into account 'the need of lessdeveloped countries for a more flexible use of tariff protection to assist their economic
development'. 23 According to an agreement among members in 1971 to temporarily
waive Article I, the non-discrimination principle permitted developed countries to
accord preferential tariff treatment to products from DCs. So-called the Enabling
Clause of 1979 extended the time and scope of the waiver to an indefinite level and by
covering non-tariff measures. Ministerial declarations in both the Uruguay and Doha
Rounds had urged the developed countries24 to grant special and differential treatment
to developing countries, especially the least developed countries (LDC). 25

23

Baldwin, supra note 3, at 12.
Although UN does not have any established convention for the designation of
'developed' and 'developing' countries or areas, UNCTAD considers 'developed' such
countries as Israel and Japan in Asia, Canada and the U.S. in northern America,
Australia and New Zealand in Oceania and most countries in Europe. Meanwhile, it
treats as a separate group South-East Europe including countries offormerYugoslavia
as well as Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), former U.S.S.R. All the other
countries fall on 'developing countries'. Countries are categorized under such
classification. Definition of Developed, Developing countries [code 491], available at
http://unstats.un.org (last visited on Sep. 14, 2007); UNCTAD, UNCTAD HANDBOOK
OF STATISTICS 2005, at 10 (UN, 2005)
25
Baldwin, supra note 3, 12-13. The LDCs are defined by low-income, human resource
weakness, and economic vulnerability. The low-income criterion is under $750 for
24

•
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The 'fairness' principle, on the other hand, has operated in favor of the developed
countries in pressing the negotiation agenda. Besides quite a few cases of dumping and
foreign governmental subsidies, there have been an increasing number of unfair trade
cases regarding lax or ineffective environmental and labor standards ofDCs. While
developed countries pressured developing countries to insert such rules into bilateral
and regional trade agreements, new rules under the WTO as to cartel and competition
policy have not been introduced. Competition law, although widely adopted by
developing countries, looks to be the area where wide international consensus for an
agreement does not occur.

(3) Understanding Developing Countries' Situations
The relatively low expertise and knowledge, along with a lower priority in
competition law on the part of the developing countries, caused the drop-out of the
competition policy from the DDA negotiation. With current institutions, human and
financial resources, and the level of experience, developing countries have the
difficulty in actively enforcing competition law and cartel regulations. They have kept
their focus on economic development. 26

inclusion and above $900 for graduation based on three-year average estimate of the
gross domestic product per capita. The human resource weakness criterion is indicated
by nutrition, health, education, and adult literacy. The last criterion is based on the
instability of agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services, the
economic importance of non-traditional activities, merchandise export concentration,
and the handicap of economic smallness (excluding large economies with more than 75
million people), and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters. 50
countries are categorized as LDCs by the UN. The list of LDCs is reviewed every three
years by the Economic and Social Council, available at
http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/factsheets/FS20.HTM (last visited on Sep. 14, 2007)
26
Refer to III of this chapter.
12

An important concern of developing countries in multilateral negotiation for
competition law is the disruptive domestic adjustment problem of a new competition
law, such as economic, political, and social implication, coming from the potential
negative domestic effect of the new rules.

27

Cartel regulation possibly affects the

eeonomic situation in the repression period, industrial cooperation in R&D,
management on non-renewable natural resources of developing countries, traditionally
accepted business activities, national industrial policy, and so on. Reaching a binding
international agreement as to cartel regulation with developing countries on the basis of
current non-binding recommendatory rules necessitates the understanding of their
arguments and concerns as well as the proposition of persuasive solutions. Researches
on the concept of the international development law and the NIEO are beneficial for the
further understanding of their positions.
Researches and investigations regarding cost and benefit of competition law
enforcement in DCs must be promoted so that the countries can make a commitment to
negotiation on the topic. Compared to mergers and acquisitions as well as market
dominant behaviors, cartels cause direct harms to consumers by raising prices and
reducing outputs. As the benefits of cartel regulation are clear, cartel regulation is an
area where consensus among the members can be achieved without a strong objection.
Further in-depth research will be beneficial in reaching a broad range of countries'
consensus- in appropriate penalties or remedies, some exceptional types of cases of
justifying cartels, and the costs and funding ofthe enforcement. 28

27

Baldwin, supra note 3, at 22 and 24.
Baldwin has the same opinion. See Baldwin, supra note 3, at 16. He requests
immediately to set up Working Groups to investigate on the matter and the adjustment
28
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III.

Necessity of Regulating Cartels in Developing Countries

1. Damages of Cartels in Developing Countries
Companies are exposed to the temptation of a collusive behavior, the formation of a
cartel, more in the developing countries under loose regulations. The representative
harmful effect of such a collusive behavior is.price-increasi~g, which transfers
~ fVt'C.L- -,~!{~ -

consumers' welfare into suppliers' surplus. The rate of the price-increase of
international cartels in the DCs is much higher than the average price-increase in
overall countries. Representative international cartel cases in the 90s, such as Citric
Acid and Graphite Electrodes, indicated that developing countries were overcharged for
their imports in a range from 20% to 45%.29 The level of overcharge in developing
countries overwhelms the median price increase between 14% and 20% in overall
countries. 30
The damages caused by the price-increase under a cartel reach a considerable
amount. Although it is not easy to measure the exact amount of damage that a cartel has
caused,

31

it is estimated that, conservatively, it exceeds many billions ofUS dollars

problems among various competition rules besides enforcement costs and possible
means of funding.
29
Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, Contemporary International Cartels and
Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, Vol.
71 ANTITRUST L. J. 801-818 (2003-04).
30
Estimated price effects in 14 cartel cases under the survey range from 3% to 65%.
See OECD, Report on the Nature and Impact ofHard Core Cartels and Sanctions
against Cartels under National Competition Laws, 9 (2002), available at
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/16/20/208183l.pdf
31
The reasons are following. First, most competition authorities, first, do not require
calculation of the damage as an element of prosecution, but focus on the unlawful gain
14

annually.

32

A research ofOECD demonstrated that, in 1997, total goods imported by

developing countries, worth more than US $ 81 billion, were from suppliers involved in
price fixing conspiracies in the 90s.

33

The other research (Levenstein & Suslow)

showed that US $ 51.1 billion were from industries in international cartel activities
during the same period.

34

The amount outnumbers official development assistance

(ODA) to all the developing countries,$ 39.4 billion, in 1997. 35 It should be noted that
the illegal cartels that are actually detected and prosecuted are nothing but the tip of a

. b erg. 36
large tee
The exploitation of consumers' welfare in DCs by cartel members has the actual
effect of taking away foreign assistance since the cartels transfer wealth from

accruing to cartel operators for sanctions because it is easy to figure out. Due to lack of
formal record or data, the work of quantifying the total damage is interesting academic
researchers. Second, the result of quantifying the total damage may not be correct
because it comes under assumption for a competitive price, a predicted price in the
affected market, so as to determine the unlawful margin. OECD, id, at 6-7.
32
!d. at 5 and at 9.
33
!d. See also UNCTAD, Can Developing Economies Benefit from WTO Negotiations
on Binding Disciplines/or Had Core Cartels?, 16 {UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2003/3)
(2003), available at http://www.unctad.org.
The UNCTAD report introduced a bid-rigging case on the United States Agency for
International Development (US AID) in Egypt, filed on Aug. 11, 2000, in the U.S.
District Court in Birmingham, Alabama. The defendant, American International
Contractors Inc. (AICI) pleaded guilty to participating in a conspiracy involving bidrigging from Jun. 1988 until at least Jan. 1995, and was required to pay US$ 4.2
million fine for the bid-rigging for wastewater treatment facilities construction
contracts funded by the USAID in Egypt. Philipp Holzmann AG, a construction
company based in Frankfurt, Germany, pleaded guilty to its participation in the cartel
and was ordered to pay$ 30 million fine. As a result of such bid-rigging, the
procurement market in Egypt became less competitive and the competitive lowest price
was unavailable.
34
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 29, 804.
35
See id., at 816. It cites World Development Indicators for 2001 ofWorld Bank. The
series used was 'official development assistance and official aid'.
36
Simon Evenett, Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow, International Cartel
Enforcement: Lessons from 1990s, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.
2680, 1237-40 (2001)
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consumers in DCs to the suppliers mostly working in industrialized countries. In a
conservative calculation, the former OECD research indicates that, in 1997, 20% Price
increase of the whole imports influenced by cartels (a minimum level) equals 41.1 %of
development assistance. Meanwhile, a 45 % price increase (a maximum level) equals
92.5%. 37 Meanwhile, the latter research (Levenstein & Suslow) indicates that damages
caused by the price increases of international cartels in DCs reaches from 25 % to
58.4% ofODA. 38 In short, the results mean that participants from industrialized in
discovered international cartels countries took away from at least 25.9% up to 92.5%
of foreign development assistance in 1997. 39
Moreover, international cartels provoke equity problems, particularly exacerbating
the poverty inherent in developing countries where a large number of the world

°

population lives. 4 Concretely, the international vitamin cartel regime caused price-

37

Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 29, at 813-818. Their calculation is based on the
conservative approach. First, it included only products with available narrow Standard
International Trade Classification (SITC) rather than those with broader SITC which
might contain goods with the cartelized product. The latter standard was used only
when the narrow level standard was not available. Second, it excluded service trade.
Third, it considers only international cartels, not domestic cartels which might affect
negatively developing countries. Fourth, it used only known cartel conspiracies.
38
See id. at 816-18. Even a narrower approach ofthe two researchers demonstrates that
the average annual amount of trade in the cartel-affected industries from 1990 to 1997
was$ 18.5 billion, and that wealth-transfer due to international cartels equals 9.4%
(minimum price-increase) or 21 % (maximum price-increase) of development
assistance.
39
!d., at 816. According to an average calculation, international cartels have kept taking
the amount from 9.4% to 21% of development assistance during the 8 years when the
average 10% price increase in overall countries is applied for the conservative approach.
40
In Asian Pacific region where many LDCs as well as a few developed countries are
located, 800 million live out of the 1.2 billion poor people of the world who live on less
than a dollar a day. Pradeep S. Mehta, Competition Policy in developing countries: An
Asia-Pacific perspective, Consumer Unity and Trust Society, Bulletin on Asian Pacific
Perspective 2002-2003, 79 (2003), at
http://www.unescap.orgldrpad/publicationlbulletin%202002/ch7.pdf (visited on Jul. 16,
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increase for nearly a decade for vitamins sold in developing countries. The estimated
damage to consumers in six developing countries, or India, Pakistan, Kenya, South

f

Africa, Tanzania and Zambia, are about $ 200 million.

41

The reduced production

would impede distribution of the vitamins to poor consumers living in rural areas.
A cartel hinders the world trade from growing in the pro-competitive way by
bolstering up market power, waste, and inefficiency in the countries which otherwise
would be competitive. 42 Since an anticompetitive business activity deprives the
consumers' welfare, it interrupts the maximizing of efficiency in a national market,
thereby aggravating static and dynamic inefficiency. In addition, the efforts of suppliers
to innovate quality of products and to reduce price lessen.43 Concerns about
maintaining collusive behaviors among competitors tend to establish market barriers
such as exclusive transactions to new enterprises or potential entrants, majority of
which come from developing countries. 44
Cartel members use anti-dumping action as a WTO-approved legal trade remedy to
screen the international cartel and to establish barriers to non-members. The abuse of
the trade remedy means that the international cartels have reduced the opportunities of

2008).
Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS), Pulling Up Our Socks: A Study of
Competition Regimes ofSeven Developing Countries ofAfrica and Asia: the 7-Up
Project (2003), available at http://cuts.org/pulling.pdf
42
Conclusion from the 1998 Recommendation ofthe OECD Council Concerning
Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels. OECD Global Forum on Competition
(GFC), How Enforcement against Private Anticompetitive Conduct Has Contributed to
Economic Development, CCNM/GF/COMP(2003)7, 4 (Oct.27, 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org.
43
OECD GFC, supra note 42, at 6. It states, the harm to productive and dynamic
efficiency is no less real than that to allocative efficiency if even more difficult to
measure.
44
UNCTAD, supra note 33, 16.
41
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developing countries' exports besides consumers' welfare. In addition, such an
advantage of exporters in developing countries as relatively low costs does not lead to a
greater market share because the cartel agreement has shut new members out of the
market to maintain pre-determined allocation terms.45 For instance, after an
international citric acid cartel was broken up in the U.S. in 1997, exports from China,
although falling at first, dramatically rebounded.

46

A cartel scheme causes stagnancy in

the market share during its operating time. An international lysine cartel of five
producers, operating between 1992 to 1995 with control over 97% of the global
capacity, fixed prices, allocated sales quotas, and monitored the volumes. The
production shares of two Korea's producers as cartel members, at a standstill during the
period, afterwards increased at the expense of other companies' market shares.
Potential competitors from developing countries have been blocked to entry through
price discrimination under market allocation agreement. China's new joint ventures
began operation in 1993 with a small market share, but, by 2000, its productive
capacity occupied 13 % ofthe global sale. 47

2. Benefits of Cartel Regulation to Developing Countries Group
( 1) Consumer
Consumers, as a result of successful enforcement of competition law, can enjoy lower
prices for the same or high-quality products since price-increases (the most common

45

See id. at 11.
The reason for the first drop is analyzed by Mathew Lerner who pointed the fact out
that the Chinese government has stopped giving export tax credits to Chinese citric
acid producers. Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 29, 822-824.
47
UNCTAD, supra note 33, at 13-14.

46
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effect of cartel) are to be removed and suppliers should compete to increase their profits.
oa

Most of the cartel investigation cases reveal price decreases after the breaking-up of
cartels.

48

The choice of products, decreased by a exclusive market barrier, will expand in width.
Since cartel members blocked new competitors from entering the market with

in

collaborative behaviors, consumers used to have limited access to new products with
better quality. 49 The product innovation and technological improvement, either at a
slow rate or at a stand-still, will be faster. 50 Marketing skills will be more consumerfriendly as competition increases.
(2) Government: the Reduction of Bid-Rigging

1e

Strong anti-cartel enforcement against governmental procurement contracts or public
bids can reduce governmental expense caused by bid-rigging. Bid rigging cases
uncovered by competition authorities demonstrate that the damage from bid-riggings
amounts to more than US$ hundreds of millions, which could even possibly increase
depending on the scope of the duration and the contract. Although many countries

48

r

For example, a report from Ukraine states that revisions of prices for electricity and
water supply, formerly set by another regulator, in 2 years have reduced consumers'
costs with a total amount more than US$ 200 million. OECD GFC, How Enforcement
against Private Antitcompetitive Conduct Has Contributed to Economic Development,
CCNM/GF/COMP(2004)4 Sess. IV, at 3 (Feb.3, 2004).
49
Although monopolist or a competitor restrained entry into a market, enforcement of
competition law opened the market, thereby generating much wider choices for
consumers. For Russian money transfer system case and Jamaica's communication
interface ofbank case, see id. at 4.
50
Lithuania's privatization of telecommunication could succeed with active
enforcement of competition law to prevent existent operator's anticompetitive
behaviors. Currently, network digitalization reaches 88% while ADSL services are
available 85% of the telecom operator's customers. Pakistan's two merger cases were
approved on the condition to introduce improved technology. !d. at 3-4. The similar
principle can apply to a cartel case.
19
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penalize bid rigging with criminal law, an immature practice and a low level of public
awareness in many DCs and LDCs have prevented a successful investigation into the
cartels. 51 When the push for cartel regulation grows more active and attracts more
public attention, bid rigging cases will be revealed through more investigative
experiences and financial support from their governments. Particularly, in developing
countries where transparency in terms of governmental contracts is insufficient, cartel
regulation can contribute to the reducing of bid rigging.
(3) Economic Development
Anti-cartel enforcements contribute to promoting competition and opening market
structure similar to other areas of competition policy. The break-down of a cartel
discontinues the extension of damages caused by the continued cartel. If the threat to
potential conspirators and the affected commerce are taken into account, a cartel
regulation may promote the related industries by more than the amount of calculated
damages. As similar to the case ofliberalization trade policy, although increasing
efficiency can not be measured in a quantifiable number, competitive culture brought
upon by the anti-cartel regulation will provide more benefit in the long-term to the
whole economy. 52 Producers will devote their efforts to producing high-quality
products with lower price so as to survive competition. With an open-market structure,

51

Bid rigging is widely prevalent in Nepal, especially in the construction and supply
sector. A conspiracy among manufacturers and suppliers of polythene pipes to the
Napal Drinking Water Corporation, and one among suppliers of rations to the Royal
Napalese Army and Nepal Police are reported. Due to prevalent bid rigging, even
municipalities in Nepal have refused to follow the guideline which requires the
awarding of a contract to the lowest bidder at the time of execution of the development
project. UNCTAD, Competition, Competitiveness, Development: Lessons from
Developing Countries, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/1, 64-65 (2004).
52
OECD GFC, supra note 48, 6.
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potential enterprises with innovative techniques will enter the market where meritbased competition prevails. The good products which win in domestic competition can
be exported to other countries, thereby strengthening the economic development of a
home country. Concrete data from a transitional economy, e.g. Ukraine, prove that
industries under the competition system can grow by far more than the industry at large,
for example, by six times in transportation. 53
There is a counter-opinion that non-cartel participants from developing countries
may have increased their prices in parallel to the cartel price. However, non-cartel
producers with a small portion of the market share can not charge the cartel price due to
inferior quality, insecure supply and contract terms, or different transportation costs.
The price increase of non-members in an graphite electronic cartel in South Korea was
only around 9 % during the cartel period compared to a 48.9 % increase of cartel
.

54

pnces.

On the other hand, cartel members collectively attack promising producers from DCs
with predatory pricing. During the cartel's activity, the price of graphite electrodes in
India was 68 % of the world price where the Indian Graphite Electrode Manufactures
Association was established and exports had increased. 55 Cartel members, moreover,
use another method of attacking non-members such as technical barriers or patent
53

In those industries in Ukraine where there is competition in at least half of activities
such as the food, forestry, and light industry sectors, growth is between 1.2 and 2 times
higher than in the industry at large. In the road transportation for passengers, opened for
competition in the last three years, growth of the transportation volume has been 6
times higher than in the railway transport sector, still under monopoly. See OECD GFC,
supra note 48, 5.
54
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 29, at 839-40; KFTC Decision [ if.Aa 71 ~ ~ ~ §1
{1 ~] 2002~~0250, table 2 and 10-11 (2002), available at
~ttp://ftc. go.kr/data/hwp/case/2002040 1_6330.hwp
Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 29, at 839-41.
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pooling. A cartel of graphite electrode producers from 1992 to 1997 collectively
restricted non-conspirator companies' access to their graphite electrode manufacturing
technology. 56 Profits from the exclusive behaviors that cartel members employ against
non-members usually outweigh profits from the paralleled price increase. Private
market barriers, including the exclusive behaviors, can be reduced or removed by active
anti-cartel enforcements.

IV.

Different Positions where Developing Countries Are Placed

1. Positions ofDeveloping Countries and Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
in Adopting and Enforcing Competition Law
(1) Economic Structures of Developing Markets
As regards to the level of competition in developing market economies, economists
have divided opinions. An economist argues that developing countries exhibit
segmented product markets, discretionary government regulations and considerable
corruption; hence, they are not very competitive.

57

On the other hand, the other

economist states, through various statistical proofs, that developing countries are

subject to no less, if not greater ;mpetitio~ advanced countries."

56

/d., at 833-34; KFTC Decision, supra note 54, 7.
JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, COMPETITION, INFORMATION, AND DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL
WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS, 237-257 (The World Bank,
1998). The position is followed by economists supporting structuralist theory solution
regarding the Asian financial crisis.
58
Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets: International
and Developmental Dimension, G-24 Discussion Paper No. 18, 4 (Sep. 2002), available
at http://www.unctad.org/enldocs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf. He provided another
supplementary statistics indicating that there is greater turnover as well as entry and
57

22

:I
I·

I

Regarding the economic structure o~elo~ing markets: it is noteworthy that lots
ofDCs have dualistic structure

ofmarket~~omi~~stic structure means that

a large modern sector consisting of a few big companies, occupying a big portion of
total output, co-exists with the other large traditional sector of small enterprises, which
contribute an almost equal portion of the economy's output. In developing countries,
compared to developed countries, the employment rate of the small-enterprise sector
would be larger than the output portion due to the bigger differences in capital intensity
of the two sectors in these countries. 59
While the true competition level in developing market economies is up to
economical discussion, from competition policy and ~ perspective, the level of

~'5

regulation and enforcement in DCs needs to differ depending on the characteristics of a
sector, either a small-scale sector with less than 10 employees but a higher employment
rate or the modern sector with a large output ratio. In terms of a cartel regulation,
concretely, if a cartel regulation indifferently applies to collusive anti-competitive
behaviors of both sectors, the penalty will cause a wide range of negative results to
employment and the development of national economy. When a commerce in the small
sectors faces external economic repression, the operation of their businesses, which
constitute the major foundation of national employment, needs to be protected, and,
under some conditions, to be exempted from a cartel regulation.

exit of firms in the small number of emerging markets for which such studies have been
carried out than for advanced countries. See id. at 4-6 and table 5. The position is
followed by Tibout who argues that the existing empirical literature does not support
the notion that LDC manufacturers are relatively stagnant and inefficient.
59
See id. at 3-4 and table 1 and 2.

23

!·

i·

Moreover, several structural weaknesses in developing countries need to be brought
under attention as opposed to advanced market economies. Small-sized markets with
less competition have limited access to essential inputs, more limited distribution
channels, and a higher dependency on imports and exports. In addition, immature
liberalization policies enable a greater proportion of local markets to be insulated from
national trade liberalization policies, and a greater incidence of administrative barriers
to imports. 60 Although a state or private monopoly is replaced by a number of private
enterprises, a former monopolist may make use of inherited advantages from knowing
restrictive market conditions, such as less developed financial markets, and make
difficult the survival of new entrants. 61

(2) Immature Social Infrastructure

1) Limited Financial Resources
Most developing countries have few resources to fund competition authorities at the
initial stage. The limited resources available for other governmental expenses
necessitate overwhelming financial benefits to justify further expenditure. Without
promised outcomes, developing countries' governments will hesitate to expend further
resources to competition authorities. With the limited financial resources, the nascent
competition authorities can not attract skilled experts and professional staffs.
2) Necessity to Attract Substantive Expertise

60

OECD Global Forum on Competition, How Enforcement Against Private AntiCompetitive Conduct Has Contributed to Economic Development, 5 (Oct. 27, 2003),
available at http://www.oecd.org/competition
61
Id. at 6.
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Developing countries experience the critical shortage of specialists with academic or
practical training in competition law or economics of competition policy since there has
been rare vocational demand. 62 Additional effort should be devoted to raising the level
of sanction. In light of the past experience of South Korea, as the sanctioning of
competition authorities grew powerful, officers in competition authorities became more
popular. 63 In addition, they can raise professional staffs with specialized tasks, such as a
cartel or M&A team. With the special task incentive, young public officers and
professionals will be attracted to the competition law practice. The problem, which
developing countries face at the nascent stage, can be overcome with further training of
staffs and participation in international technical assistances. International cooperation
among competition authorities can expose their officers to global practices and an
advanced level of enforcement skills.
3) Less Powerful Professional Associations and Consumer Groups

In developing economies, professional bodies such as bar associations, and consumer
groups did not, in most cases, make an effective forum for operating a new legal regime.
As social autonomy to develop consumers' movement is weak, consumers groups have
insufficient power to become strong supporters for cartel enforcements. Rather, they
would be controlled by political influences. As professional groups are less diversified
enough to support competition policy, the building of the foundation of academic

62

William Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition
Economies: the Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 265, 306 (2001). Kovacic cites statement of Michael Trebilcock and Laffont who
examined reform efforts of transition economies.
63
Cha, Omnipotence ofKFTC: one of three retired senior officers moved to big law
firms [1¥-~ ~.!fl ~:Aa .!fl: ~ ~ {}Jf- 3 ~ =F 1 ~ rH ~ .£. ~ .Q_.£. -& 7-1 ], Hankyung (Aug.
8, 2007), available at http://www.hankyung.com/news.
25
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research and the enhancement of professional skills are too weak to play a pivotal role
for rooting competition culture. The upgrade of professional groups and consumers
groups requires patience in time. 64

(3) Weak Foundation of Legal Institutions
1) Less Serious Attitude to Cartel
Most DCs have not adopted or enforced competition law until recently. Only sixteen
DCs had operated formal competition law until 1990. The reason for the absence of
competition law in DCs was clear: there was no need. Widely practiced governmental
control over economic activities and state-operating enterprises did not allow anticompetitive business behaviors by companies or industries. 65
However, the number of countries which adopted competition law in the 1990s
increased ten fold, starting from five in the '80s, and eventually reaching fifty. If
countries under preparation to adopt competition law are included(of which there are
twenty seven), the level of expansion pertaining to the implementation of competition
law is even more striking. The in-detail analysis of the reasons of the sudden increase is
in IV.
It is noted that among the DCs which adopt competition law cartels are treated with
less attention than other competition law issues. 66 Most competition authorities in DCs
have focused more on monopoly control, or unfair business practice than on cartel

64

William Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy Institutions in
Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L. 403-420 (1997).
65
Singh, supra note 58, at 6.
66
See id.
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regulation. 67 The different treatment may reflect the priority of competition policy in
each country. The less priority leads to the less serious attitude as Ch. 1. III reveals.

68

In terms of enforcement of competition law, a survey oftop- and middle- management
firms in each country indicate that competition authorities in advanced countries are 40
percent more effective than their counterparts in developing countries.

69

However, the

damages from cartel activities in DCs with few serious investigations against cartels are
not to be considered trivial, ifless than those in the advanced countries.

70

2) Ambiguous Distribution of Administrative Discretion
Discretion of government agencies is poorly defined by rules that supposedly need to
be transparent and fair. Public officers play broad discretion spontaneously, which are
seldom under public review. Conflict of interest rules came in few cases. 71 The
ambiguous distribution of power caused resistances from other economy-related
departments, which resulted in attack on function of competition authorities. 72
3) Procedural Hurdles for Rigorous Competition Law Enforcement

67

Sanghyun Lee, Using Action in Damages against Cartels in Developing Countries,
CURRENTS lNT'L TRADE L. J. (Winter 2008).
68
Ratio for the level of enforcement in DCs compared to that in advanced countries
does not reach the ratio of damages. See III of Ch. 1.
69
IMD, WORLD COMPETITIVENESS YEARBOOK 2000 (IMD, 2001 ). The World Bank
Group, ANNuAL REPORT 2002, (2002), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/2002/index.htm (visited on Jul. 16, 2008).
70
See II. 1. of this chapter.
71
Kovacic, supra note 64, at 421.
72
KFTC was criticized with its overarching investigation, arguably impeding in affairs
of other departments. Ki-Hyun Cha, Is an administrative guide a collusion ? [a-~ Aa .Al.S:.
7} 1@-wolc}Y], Hankyung (Aug. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.hankyung.com/news
I
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Quite a few transition economies are short of the institutions that allow expeditious
review and compulsory procedure. 73 Such insufficient enforcement tools impede
rigorous investigation and punishment. In addition, incotTect accounting data and
widely-spread window-dressing are additional hurdles for competition authorities to
find cotTect data?~ Auditing and screening functions remain immature.
On the other hand, some countries have restrictions on evidentiary standard. In
Russia, the evidence which verifies a price-fixing agreement should be a writing which
shows a concerted conduct. 75 Other countries permitting spoken conversations to prove
a concerted action may not approve the expansive use of surveillance techniques such
as wire-tapping. 76
However, as the powers of competition authorities grow bigger and successful
practices accumulated, it is expected to refonn the insufficient institutions. 77 The
Supreme Court in South Korea, along with the interpretation of cartel prohibition of
Monopoly Restraint Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), lightened the evidentiary standard for
proving a cartel by holding that the existence of restrictive business practice(RBP)s, e.g.
the same price, and the restriction of competition in a related market, notwithstanding

73

OECD GFC, supra note 48, at 6.
Kovacic, supra note 64, 426-27. He introduced an interview with the manager of a
state-owned firm and the incorrect information that he submitted.
75
Kovacic, supra note 64, at 426; Vladimir Capelik & Ben Slay, Antimonopoly Policy
and Monopoly Regulation in Russia, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY
IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES, 65-66 (Ben Slay ed., Westview Press. 1996).
76
Kovacic, supra note 64, at 426. Judy Whalley, Priorities and Practices- the Antitrust
Divisions Criminal Enforcement Program, 57 Antitrust L.J. 569, 571 (1988).
77
Fourteen emails with public officer, Hang-Rok Oh, at KFTC (from Dec. 18, 2006 to
Jan. 19, 2007) (on file with author). According to him, companies under investigation
have never rejected the administrative investigation which are not compulsory with
warrant but powered with sanction of maximum US $ 200,000 in case the companies
74
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the absence of the proof of a collusive agreement, are sufficient elements to prove a

carte1.78
4) Deficient Judicial Function
Judges in developing countries' courts are inadequate umpires for enforcing
competition law which requires economic analysis. 79 Unlike the U.S.'s historical
development of antitrust law, some judicial bodies have not only expressed a lack of
interests in economic reasonings but suspended their trials, especially in private actions,
until competition authorities issued final decisions. 80 Some judicial or semi-judicial
systems 81 in DCs that are tainted with corruptions are more inclined to be captured by

78 S.Ct.[tll ~ ~] 2002.3.15. Decision[ ~JI] 99-¥-6514,6521. Art. 19 section 5 of
MRFTA states, where two or more enterprisers are committing such acts as price-fixing,
market allocation, or price restriction, that practically restrict competition in a particular
business area, they shall be presumed to have committed an unfair collaborative act
despite the absence of an explicit agreement to engage in such act.
79
See Kovacic, supra note 64, 420-21; BahaaAli El Dean, and Mahmoud Mohieldin,
On the Formulation and Enforcement of Competition Law in Emerging Economies: The
Case ofEgypt, Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, 13 (Sept. 2001). Kovacic points
out exceptions at FN 50 by describing aspects of Zimbabwe's judicial and commercial
law jurisprudence that would facilitate implementation of a competition policy system.
See also Kovacic, supra note 62, at 306.
80
The District Court of Seoul, in Daum Inc. v. Microso in South Korea, sus ended
~
the civil action by the time Korean Fair Trade Commission issued its final_ ~ecisiop. ?
;7 ~
Other developing countries have such judicial branch problems as considerable delays
and a lack of independence. See Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Mexico :s- New Institutional
Framework for Antitrust Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L.REv. 1149, 1177 ( 1995); see also
Malcolm Rowat et al. eds., Judicial Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean
(World Bank Technical Paper No. 280, 1995); John Bentley, Egyptian Legal and
Judicial Sector Assessment, Report prepared for the U.S. agency for International
Development (Washington D.C.: 1994)
81
Decisions related to competition law can be issued from the administrative body in
charge of competition policy, e.g. FTC, as well as the judicial body. Semi-judicial
decisions are the decisions from the administrative body.
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interesting parties as competition law cases usually impose a large amount of fines on
companies with substantial market shares.

82

(4) Political Resistances from Existent Interest-Holders
Countries which experienced a communist party' control had difficulty in
overcoming anti-reform resistance against market-oriented economic reform including
anti-monopoly and anti-cartel regulations. Although the transitional governments
adopted policy measures to reduce state ownership ofbusiness enterprises with
pressure from international organizations, state-owned enterprises still occupied a
pretty large share of developing economies. 83 The national-leveled reforms due to less
developed democratic system are ineffective from the level oflocal public officers to
regional governmental bodies even to national ministries. 84
Domestic producers, to make matters worse, participate in the political opposition.
The threat from competitive foreign companies incites domestic producers to pressure

82

A research by Transparency International demonstrates that, in more than twenty-five
countries, at least one in ten households reported paying a bribe to get access to the
court system, and that widespread corruption in judicial bodies impedes development of
legal system. Herald Tribune Europe, Judicial corruption undermining legal systems
worldwide, (May 24, 2007), available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/05/24/europe/EU-GEN-Britain-TransparencyJudicial-Corruption.php (visited on Apr. 3, 2008).
Particularly, in South Korea, seven officers received cars from Hyundai Automobile
company which was under investigation of KFTC. People Power 21 [ %~ <B ~ ], Unfair
Business Practices ofpublic officers[ .:g.-¥-~~ .9l ~.:g.;;ta 7-1 ?-11], Nov. 24,2006,
available at http://www.peoplepower21.org/?s0 1:i :b 18223-12-1-1164340490 (visited
on Apr. 3, 2008)
83
The World Bank, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP, 1 (The World Bank, 1995).
84
Kovacic, supra note 62, at 304.
30

governments to use trade sanctions 85 or to postpone strong competition policl 6 . The
former interest-holders' resistances against trade liberalization would involve the use of
corruptive measures to pay bribes to public officers. 87 It would take time to make
compromises with them.
On the other hand, new competition authorities, whether they are created within an

exiting ministry or are established as new entities, lack the political ties or bases which
would support their active enforcements by overcoming objections from resisting
enterprises. The new authorities are susceptible to criticism, thereby being much
influenced by the shift of political regime. 88

2. Difficulty of Reaching Consensus regarding Cartel Law among DC groups
(1) Classification of Developing Countries under UNCTAD
The category of DCs, distinctive from developed countries, includes a broad level of
socio-economic development from South-East Europe to heavily indebted poor
countries in Africa. 89 As the category includes such a diverse range of countries, it is

85

Such sanctions with respect to competition law are predatory pricing or anti-dumping
suits. Kovacic, supra note 64, at 423.
86
Kovacic, supra note 62, 302-304.
87
It is especially true of public officers in charge of tax code violations under the guise
of settling tax claims. See id., at 304.
88
KFTC, although it has its twenty-seven-year-old history, are criticized for its large
amount of fines and overarching investigations in South Korea. Ki-Hyun Cha, Series of
Omnipotence ofKFTC: indiscrete investigatory pressure to industry ['.!f-± ~~' i?".Aa
.!fl] (~) {1-'i} 7-11 .!f-~r~ ~J.} ~~], Hankyung (Aug. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.hankyung.com/news. A Korea's major newspaper ofHanhyung wrote a
series of nine arti~les criticizing KFTC' overarching investigation, disharmony due to
leniency policy, large amount of fine, and a hybrid function of administration and
{udiciary without participation of entrepreneurs.
9
According to UN's definition of developing countries, in international trade statistics,
countries from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries while
31

not apparent which level of development the category of developing countries places
emphasis on. The thesis examines respective categories ofDCs under 2005 UNCTAD
Handbook of Statistics. 90
1) Major Petroleum Exporting Countries
This group consists of all OPEC member countries and non-OPEC countries where
the share of petroleum and petroleum products was not less than 50% of their total
exports and exports of the products reached at least US $ 1.5 billion on average
from '99 to '01. 91 Some countries, e.g. Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, of CIS may belong to
this category. With significant revenue from petroleum trade, the countries are trying to
diversify their economic structure. 92 The competition policy, particularly cartel
regulation under less diversified national industry, is less highlighted than other
economic regulatory laws and policies as efficiency-focused market system does not
grow sufficiently to consider consumers' welfare seriously. The development of
democratic politics and legal system does not grow maturely to empower competition
policy and cartel regulation.
2) Major Exporters ofManufacturers (MEMs)

countries of eastern Europe and the former USSR countries in Europe are not included
in under either developed or developing regions. However, from the perspective of
cartel regulation, this thesis includes these countries in developing countries. UN
Statistics Division, Definitions, available at
http://unstats.un.orglunsd/cdb/cdb_dict_xrxx.asp?def_code=491 (visited on Apr.2,
2008)
90
UNCTAD, HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, 10-16 (2005).
91
See id. at 12. Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and United Arab Emirates are OPEC members. Bahrain,
Congo, Gabon, Yemen, and Oman, among other countries, belong to non-OPEC
countries within this group.
92
Isabel Gorst, Wealth is being deployed to cut dependence on oil, FT Special Report of
Azerbaijan, at 2 (Jan. 25, '08)
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This group

93

is made up of twelve countries with such standards that the share of

manufactured goods was not less than 50% of total exports and that exports ofthe
products amount to at least US$ 20 billion on average during the same three-year
period. Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) belong to the group.

94

As

manufacturing industry in the countries has produced significant products, their
economies reveal considerable competitiveness in manufactured goods. Efficiencybased market systems play important roles in further development, and the vitality of
competition policy and cartel regulation is recognized to exports. The protests from
business group need to be controlled by political and legal systems. The effective cartel
enforcement is in urgent need along with regulation of the other competition law areas.
3) High-Income Developing Countries
95

Countries with per capita GDP above US$4,500 belong to the group apart from two
above mentioned countries. As the level of GDP is beyond a medium level, the scale of
consumers' welfare may necessitate effective enforcement of competition policy and
cartel regulation similar to the NICs. Legal, economic, and political development can
affect the level of development of domestic cartel regulation.
4) Middle-Income Developing Countries
Countries with per capita GDP between US $1,000 and $4,500 constitute the group.
As cooperation is still emphasized rather than competition in domestic market, strict
enforcement of cartel regulation or competition law will face hard protests. Although
93

Besides Brazil, India, China which belong to emerging markets called BRICs,
Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, along with NICs, belong to the
r;oup. UNCTAD, supra note 90, 12.
4
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea are called NICs.
95
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Puerto Rico belonged to the group in 2000.
96
Bolivia, Dominica, Fiji, Peru, and Morocco belong to it. See id. at 12.
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South Africa recently enacts competition law strictly under the auspice of democratized
government and legal tradition, most countries in this group do not demonstrate
effective enforcement of the competition law and cartel regulation.
5) Low-Income Developing Countries
Countries with per capita GDP below US$1 ,000 form low-income developing
countries. This group includes the least developed countries (LDCs), landlocked
countries, and heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). Particularly, LDCs, designated
and reviewed regularly by UN ECOSOC, are under special treatment of international
trade law because the countries endure per capita GDP below $ 750 and weak human
resources characterized by nutrition, health, education, literacy, and economic
vulnerability. 97 Cartel regulation or competition policy in this group usually does not
appeal to the public or public officers. As norn1al enforcement of cartel regulation is
difficult to expect, special treatments are needed in the group.

(2) A Remote Chance for Harmonized International Cartel Law in the South
The prospects for the majority of developing countries to reach an agreement to
enact international cartel law under the competition approach remain very low, due to
diverse levels of situations where they are located. Although they agreed with the 1980
UN Set, including the anti-cartel provision, many of them have adopted the liberalized
97

Total 50 countries belonged to LDCs in 2005. Three-year average estimate ofGDP
per capita under $750 is qualified for inclusion in the list but above $900 means
graduation. Economic vulnerability criterion consists of i) instability of agricultural
production, ii) instability of exports of goods and services, iii) the economic importance
of non-traditional activities, iv) merchandise export concentration, and v) the handicap
of economic smallness, and the percentage of population displaced by natural disasters.
UN, What are the Least Developed Countries, available at
http://esa.un.org/unpp/definition.html#LDC (visited on Dec. 23, '07)
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market approach since the late '80s. Current diversification within the group, along

with the growth emergence markets, and subsequently different attitudes to the
competition law hinder the further development ofintemational cartel law. As the
disruptive negotiation in Cancun indicated, the ACP 77 group, representing mostly
low-income countries, expressed strong objection against adopting competition policy
as one of the Doha agendas. On the other hand, G-21, representing high-income or

d

middle-income countries, was not seriously against the competition policy issue,
although it took a hard line attitude against agriculture negotiation.
Low-income countries with a less diversified economic structure and low capital
investments have different interests in cartel regulation from high-income countries
where industries need to grow further in a competitive market. From the former
countries' perspective, sovereign restriction accompanied with international cartel
regulation might undermine cooperation necessary to develop national industries. On
the contrary, most high-income countries want to raise their industrial competitiveness
through the implementation of sophisticated competition law and its enforcement,
including a cartel regulation. They want international standards and cooperation with
advanced competition authorities to assist in their current cartel practices.
On the other hand, major petroleum exporters (MPEs) have different interests in
cartel and competition law from major exporters of manufactures (MEMs). As a
considerable portion of the national income in MPEs depend on petroleum under
governmental management, legislations for efficiency-maximizing market structure do
not attract much interest. They might have a negative impression on competition-policy
supporters who condemn state-monopolies and governmental control over petroleum

35

production. Meanwhile, the MEMs, most of which have enacted competition law, are

No

more inclined to be concerned with the loss of consumers' welfare that develops under

Eo

the market economy and have interest in international cartel law. It is because the

Fo

international law can potentially regulate international cartels which would be beyond
the reach of their competition.~

~~~ 7
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V.

International Competition Law Reflecting Development

ir
1. NIEO as Evolution of Economic Co-operation among Developing
Countries
(1) Emergence ofNIEO

The successful political cooperation under the Non-Aligned Movement, among
countries which were not allied to either the United States or the Soviet Union, bu~
a part ofthe so called the Third World, was joined by newly independent countries in
1960s, leading to economic cooperation among them. With the growth of their power in
the international community, the Third World countries expressed their arguments in

-

cooperative ways through the UNCTAD. The UNCTAD, established in 1963, was a
forum where interests of developing countries were integrated through discussion,
through which subsequent development-oriented declarations were initially adopted,

----------- ·------- ----------------

-----

and new economical and legal principles were created. The emergence of the Group of

---

77, Declaration on Non-Alignment and Economic Progress at the third Summit of the

98

The effort of extraterritorial application of competition law by developing countries,
even MEMs, does not demonstrates effective investigation or strict punishment against
international cartels. Refer to Ch.1. V.
36

t

Non-Aligned States in Lusaka in 1970, and the adoption of' Action Programme for
Economic Co-operation among Non-Aligned Countries' at the Georgetown meeting of
Foreign Ministers in 1972 are such examples.
The fourth Summit of the Non-Aligned States in Algiers, held in 1973, introduced
the concept of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Subsequently, the UN
General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Establishment ofNIEO in May, 1974,
the most important interest of which was in correcting both unequal distribution of
income among countries and the existent economic system which had maintained such
inequality and had been established mostly by industrialized countries beside DCs, not
independent at the time.
(2) Contents ofNIEO
The NIEO aimed for the prosperity of the whole international community,
especially by focusing on the development of the developing countries.

99

The NIEO

had a broad coverage of issues, including trade, commodities, the allocation of radio
frequency spectrum(RFS)s, and MNCs.

100

The foundation ofthe NIEO was, among

other things, upon the sovereign equality of states, their broadest cooperation, full and
effective participation in the solving of world economic problems, their full permanent
sovereignty over its NRs, regulation of the activities of transnational corporations, and
their right to regain effective control over their NRs and economic activities under
colonial domination and foreign occupation. 101 The more concrete founding principles

99

GA Res. 3201 (S-VI), 6 (Special), UN GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess. Supp. No. 1, at 3, UN
Doc. A/9559 (1974), para. 2 and 3.
100
SUSAN SELL, POWER & IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ANTITRUST, 72 (State Univ. ofN.Y. Press, 1998).
101
See UN G.A. Res. 3201, para. 4 (a) to (i).
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ofNEIO are preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries, just

cart(

and equitable relationship between the prices of raw materials, primary commodities,

to th

and goods exported by developing countries and those imported by them, the need of

Tl

developing countries to concentrate all the resources for the cause of development, and

intll

the need for all states to put an end to the waste of natural resources including food

aim

products. 102 NIEO even includes the founding principle of facilitating the role which

dev

producers' associations may play within the framework of international cooperation, 103

Ml'-

besides accelerating the development of developing countries as well as assisting in the

la"

promotion of a sustained growth of the world economy.

in t

(3) Impact ofNIEO on Cartel Regulation

ratl

The point which the NIEO heads toward is a more development-oriented approach

reg

rather than one centered around the freedom of market. The concrete methods allow

bu

seemingly unequal treatment which supports countries with weak economic foundation.

W(

The original cause of competition law also promoted an equal distribution of income.

su

The principle of facilitating the producers' association under the NIEO, however, has

ba

the potential to be in conflict with the rule of competition law. The means of facilitating

P~

the producers' association, by rule of thumbs, covers the restraint of competition among

in

producers, which has a negative impact on consumers' interests. The reason why the
NIEO treated commodity cartels differently from private cartels is that developing

fc

economies relied on commodity production and that, for their economic development
and their public's survival, commodity cartels needed to be separate from private

102
103

See id., para. 4 G) to (s).
See id., para. 4 (t).
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cartels. The powerful impact of the OPEC on the global economy in the 70s contributed
to the mentality ofNIEO.
The UN Set which regulates RBPs ofMNCs came about from the increasing
influences of the South on the international economy and politics. Developing countries

aimed to restrain anti-competitive activities of the MNCs which impeded economic
development, making most of their national interests by controlling the activities of the
MNCs. A dozen DCs enacted domestic REP-controlling legislations, modeled after the
laws of developed countries; however, the legislations played different roles from those
in the original countries. It was not a foundation to promote competition policy, but
rather a part of the governmental control system of economic power. It was not a postregulation for direct control over market powers of companies established in the market,
but rather a prior restraint for settling the legal responsibility of market powers that
were not regulated before. 104 A cartel regulation belongs to the RBP-control. Without
supplemental conditions to enforce competition policy, the RBP regulations had the
basis on national economic policy which was susceptible to political influence.
Particularly, cartel regulations with such a policy basis tend to be under-enforced with
insufficient support.
Meanwhile, the North, especially the U.S., accepted with willingness the negotiation
for international codification restraining RBPs, as the U.S. wanted merits of antitrust
and a free market economy to be widely acknowledged. The U.S. would promote the

104

SELL, supra note 100, 147-149.
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drafting of the code in a sophisticated manner, reflecting its rich experiences in procompetitive policy. 105
(4) Demise of the NIEO and its impact on the UN Set
During the 80s, the NIEO lost its significant power in the 70s. The North went away

T
add

from the UN Set in light of new policies developed under domestic practices. The

reg

influence of the Chicago School of Economics strongly challenged antitrust policy in

up(

the U.S. thereby leading to more exposure to the economic analysis of efficiency with a

red

focus on output and price. 106 While monopolistic behaviors or vertical restraints with an
enhanced efficiency are approved under this approach, the horizontal cartel behaviors

pn

are to be prohibited. In addition, the emergence of Japan as a strong competitor in a

lm

technology industry affected the competition policy of the U.S. and the EU in a
permissive way because Japan had pursued a lenient anti-trust attitude as to corporate

ef

cooperation e.g. joint R&D. As a result, the U.S. export cartels were immune from

bi

antitrust enforcement under the 1982 Export Trading Company Act designed for

cc

promoting export. Meanwhile, cooperation for a new R&D was encouraged with a

fl;

waiver of the antitrust law under the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act, which,

a

however, excluded commercialization efforts such as joint manufacturing and
production. Similarly, the EC, in 1984, adopted blanket provisions allowing R&D
arrangements, including commercialization, 107 and exempted joint ventures from Art.

li

85(1) of the Treaty of Rome. The lenient antitrust approaches of Japan, the U.S., and

u
H
11

105

SELL, supra note 100, 143-149.

106

!d. at I 58-159. Only business practices that reduce output and increase price are

anticompetitive; business practices that expand output are pro-competitive.
107
See Commission Regulation (EEC) No.418/85 of 19 Dec. 1984.
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the EU in the 80s undermined the spirit of the UN Set in spite of the warnings of the
UNCT AD Secretariat's annual reports.

108

The development issues starting from the RBPs ofMNCs in the UN Set, which
addressed the interest of the South, did not produce further concrete provisions in cartel
regulations. While the North kept away from the agreement, the South threw doubt
upon the power of the Set.

109

With the lessening power of commodity producers, a

reduced number of direct foreign investments, and the increasing foreign debts of
developing countries in the 80s, Southern solidarity grew weakened.

110

A resurgence in

protectionism in the North and a drop in commodity prices made matters worse. The
loss of strong negotiation powers led to the weakening of the UN Set.

111

In response to

the feeble compliance of the UN Set, the South group tried to inspire further
effectiveness in the UN Set. All the proposals, such as providing the Set with legally
binding power, shifting the status of the group reviewing compliance to a strong
committee level, and convening in subsequent review conferences, were rejected due to
flat disagreement from the North. 112 Moreover, as the IMF and the World Bank placed
a Northern-styled competition regime as a condition to its loan program, many
developing countries enacted competition laws, including cartel regulations. The other
countries in the South abandoned the NIEO approach and adopted the trade
liberalization policy including a competition law and a cartel regulation stubbornly
insisted by the U.S.
108

Sell, supra note 100, 162-3.
!d., at 142.
110
!d., at 34.
111
!d., at 32-33. Even OPEC's solidarity was undermined by member countries'
109

cheating e.g. overproducing.
112
!d., at 170-71.
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(5) Legacy ofNIEO

beside

Although NIEO is weakened, it has had a significant impact on current international

theec

law. It has established or confirmed important international economic laws such as the

count

acknowledgement of sovereign control over national resources, distinctive treatment of

interD

commodity cartels from private cartels, and developmental-concern in the global

prod1

economic system. The rules are deserving notices as they achieved a consensus of the

c

North and the South in comparison to current disputes. Following is an in-detail
discussion of its impact on international law.

mea!
gap'

2.

Emergence of International Development Law

By mid 1970s, the influence ofthe NIEO on international law generated new legal

fom
trad·

principles which try to reduce the current gap between the economic development level

due

of industrialized countries and that of developing countries. Formal equality-based

con

principles in international trade law, such as non-discrimination and national treatment,

the

created without participation of most developing countries, did not pay attention to the
agenda of 'development', the goal that developing countries desired to achieve. Facing

res·

the lack of consideration of their interests in international trade law in spite of their

Re

increase of political power, developing countries had strived for a set of new rules

COl

which would be designed to regulate economic relations between developed and

frc

developing countries. The new rules tried to be distinctive from those applied to

pr:

economic relations between developed countries. From the establishment ofUNCTAD

tho

through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement

11.

Establishing the WTO (the WTO Agreement) to the Doha Ministerial Declaration,

11

A
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beside the free trade agenda, special considerations have been provided with regard to
the economic development of developing countries (DCs) and least-developed
countries (LDCs). The following rules were established under the cause of constituting
international development law: non-reciprocity, differential treatment, and approval of
producing countries' association
(1) Non-Reciprocal Principle
The non-reciprocity principle, in contrast to the existent reciprocity principle, is a
measure to guarantee real equality of opportunities between trade partners with a wide
gap of economic development. According to the so-called 'implicit reciprocity' theory,
formal reciprocity can not be applied to the exchange of concessions in the North-South
trade, which is operated under a structural asymmetry of demand. The asymmetry is
due to such double-edged dependence of developing countries that any trade
concession by a developing country leads to tendencies to increase its imports and to
the exacerbation of the disequilibrium of its external trade. 113
The non-reciprocity principle was adopted into international agreements or
resolutions by international organizations. General Principle Eight of Final Act and
Report at the first session of the UNCT AD states that developed countries were to grant
concessions to all developing countries and not to require any concessions in return
from them. 114 Subsequent resolutions of the UNCTAD affirm the non-reciprocal
principle. Developed countries should extend all the concessions exchanged among
themselves, e.g. reducing of tariff or other barriers, to all DCs and not expect
113

See id. at 80-81.

4

UN, Proceedings ofthe U.N. Conf. on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), Final
Act & Report, at 10-11, Second Part, AI., U.N.Doc., E/CONF.46/141,Vol.1, U.N.Sales
No.64.II.B.ll (1964).
li
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reciprocity for their favorable measures.

115

In addition, the GATT addressed the

concept of non-reciprocal treatment at Art. XXXVI para. 8 of Part IV of the GATT
1964,

116

and para. 5 and 6 of 1979 GATT Decision 'Differential and More Favorable

Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries', so called the
Enabling Clause.

117

Although para. 6 of the Enabling Clause as well as Art .:XXXVI

para. 8 ofthe GATT applied the principle to the lease developed countries(LDCs), para

1
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5 of the Enabling Clause expanded the application to all DCs rather than limiting it to
LDCs.

118

The Enabling Clause did not mention the temporary characteristics of such

obli

special treatments, thereby implying their possibility as permanent measures in the

Cm

future trading system. Recently, the UN Millennium Declaration focused on the special

Alt

difficulties of the DCs, the countries with transitional economies facing globalization,

wit

and the LDCs. It urged the industrialized countries to grant duty- and quota-free access

SU<

to essentially all exports from LDCs.

119
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(2) Differential Treatment

115

UN, Proceedings of the united nations conference on trade and development, 3rd
Sess. Report and Annexes (Vol.l ), Res. 46(111), para.l.III. at 60 & Res. 82(111), at 61-2,
U.N.Doc. TD/180, Vol. I, U.N. Sales No.E.73.11.D.4 (1972). See also id., 4th Sess. Res.
91 (IV), para. 1.10. & 11.15(d)at 15-6, U.N. Doc. TD/218 (Vol.I), U.N. Sales
No.E.76.II.D.10 (1976).
116
Developing countries claim that Part IV has been without practical value as it does
not contain any obligations for developed countries. WTO, Work on special and
dif(~rential provisions, 4, available at http://www. wto .org.
11
Art. XXXVI para. 8 states, the developed contracting parties do not expect
reciprocity for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of the less-developed contracting parties. Para. 5
of the 1979 GATT Decision use the same languages except using 'developing
countries' instead of 'less-developed contracting parties'.
118
GATT, Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and
Fuller Participation of Developing Countries ( 1979).
119
UN G.A., GA Res. 55 Sess. 55/2, para. 15 (A/Res/55/2) (2000).
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The differential treatment in favor of developing countries started with demands
Jffi

the DCs, particularly the LDCs, to pay special attention to their needs and

tuations. The first success that realized the differential treatment was Generalized
,ystem ofPreferences (GSP), a work ofUNCTAD in 1964 although it conflicted with
he Most Favored Nation (MFN) clause based on the equality and non-discrimination
principle of international trade law. It came out after the four-long years of arduous
negotiations to be inserted into the existent GATT scheme as a waiver to the
obligations of the Agreement under Art. XXV para. 5. The International Law
Commission of the UN formally acknowledged the GSP as an exception to the MFN.

120

Although the GSP did not fully embody arguments of international development law

within the traditional GATT system, 121 it was an international acknowledgement of
such new legal principles as non-reciprocity and differential treatment, reflecting
international economic relations between countries with a wide gap in economic
development. The resolutions ofUNCTAD have explicitly affirmed preferential
treatment for DCs and particularly LDCs. 122
In response to it, there is an argument that differential treatment is not a separate
legal principle but an exception with limited application.

120

123

As one of international

Paul Berthoud, UNCTAD and the emergence of international development law, in
UNCTAD AND THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 71, 80 {ed.
Michael Zammit Cutajar, 1984). Art. 23 among proposed articles on the MFN principle
from the UN's International Law Commission (ILC) states that a beneficiary State of a
MFN clause (a developed country) is not entitled to treatment extended by a developed
granting State to a developing third State on a non-reciprocal basis within a scheme of
~eneralized preferences established by the granting State.
21
See id., at 78-80. In-detailed arguments of developing countries and weakness ofthe
GSP were explained.
122
UN GA. Res.82(III) A.l(b)(c)&B2; Res.91(IV) 1.6,9,13&14.
123
Berthoud, supra note 120, at 83-85.
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competition laws, the UN Set requires, under the title of ' preferential or differential
treatment for developing countries', the development, finance, and trade needs of the

1
over

developing countries, particularly of the LDCs, be taken into account in the application
of the UN Set in order to ensure its equitable application.

124

However, from the

para

perspective of international trade law, the ILC of the UN hesitated to accept the

favo

treatment as a general legal principle by stating that the tendency of formulating a

spec

concept of differential treatment had not yet crystallized sufficiently to permit it to be
embodied in a clear legal rule in light of the MFN clause. 125 Particularly, the ILC

nee1

argued that the GSP as a temporary reliever, which continued beyond the initial period

bet

of ten years, would not resolve the long-term problem but exacerbate the economic

inv

of the
situations. 126 In addition, Art.-~III
..__..

approves, with special procedures,

the

f members whose economies can only
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free but temporary

om
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support low standards of living and are in

e early stage of development. 127 The same

de\1

ber whose economy is in the process of

to 1

article allows government assistance to a m

development as well as the former member}s on the condition that the special treatments

Ag

do not allow any deviation from MFN, and on-discriminatory administration of

wo

quantitative restrictions (QRs).

128

J.

\\J\t- N CA~

()2/

rel;
COl

inf
124

Part IV. Sec. C (iii) ofthe UN Set.
125
Berthoud, supra note 120, at 85. Report of the International Law Commission (ILC)
on the Work of its Thirtieth Session, 1978, UN Doc. A/33/10, 173 ff; ILC, Summary
record of the 1494th meeting: Most-Favoured-Nation clause, vol. 1, 100, UN Doc.
A/CN.4/SR.1494 (1978), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/index.htm (last visited
on Sep. 23rd, 2007)
126
ILC, supra note 125.
127 Para. 3, 4 ( a) , Sec. A, B, and C of Art. XVIII.
128
Para. 4(b), Sec. C & D. Para. 20 & 23 of art XVIII, art. I (MFN), and art. XIII (nondiscriminatory administration of QR).
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The very passive attitude as regards to the differential treatment can be
overwhelmed by many concrete and detailed laws reflecting the treatment. GATT
JI1inisters agreed to adopt so called the Enabling Clause as GATT Decision in 1979.
para. 2 enumerated several circumstances in which to apply differential and more
favorable treatment, besides GSP under (a), such as non-tariff measures under (b) and
special treatment on the LDC under (d). Para. 3 states that the differential treatment to
DCs shall be designed to respond positively to their developmental, financial and trade
need. Para. 8, succeeding the initial treatment, provides that a particular account shall
be taken of the serious difficulty of the LDCs in making concessions and contributions

in view oftheir special economic situations and needs. 129 Moreover, Art. XXXVII of
the GATT requires developed members to consider diverse concessions to meet LDCs'
necessity of economic development. Para. 1 (a) of the same article orders that the
developed members should accord high priority in reduction and elimination ofbarriers
to products of particular export interest to LDCs. Furthermore, in art. IV ofthe General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), in order to increase participation ofDCs in
world trade, the point of emphasis is on the negotiation of specific commitments
relating to strengthening the domestic services capacity, efficiency, and
competitiveness ofDCs through access to technology, improving their access to
information networks, and liberalizing market access in sectors of supply of export
interest to them.
Recently, the WTO ministers in the Uruguay Round (UR) adopted lots of
provisions in over-all agreements for the differential and more favorable treatment of

129

GATT, Decision of28 November 1979 (L/4903).
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DCs and LDCs. 130 Among other things, the Agreement Establishing the WTO specified

loW

that there is a need for positive efforts to ensure the economic development of DCs,

the

particularly, the LDCs. 131 They also decided that expeditious implementation of all

pro·

special and differential measures in favor of the LDCs shall be ensured through regular

cou

reviews, and that MFN concessions on tariff and non-tariff measures agreed in the DR
on products of export interests to the LDC may be implemented autonomously, in
advance and without staging. 132 The rules and provisions in the UR should be applied

is t:

in a flexible and supportive manner with sympathetic consideration to specific concerns

em

ofthe LDC. 133 Additionally, the General Council issued, in June 1999, the Decision on

nm

Waiver regarding Preferential Tariff Treatment for LDCs, which allows waivers from

rer

the WTO rules in favor of them. Moreover, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects

pre

of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) also adopts this treatment in its Preamble, Art.

wt

66, 134 Art. 66.2, 135 and Art. 67. 136 The UN Millennium Declaration called on the

de

industrialized countries to provide more generous development assistances to DCs,

pr1

financial and technical assistance to the land-locked DCs, and to deal with debts of
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130

See HEATHER DOCALAVICH, THE UN AND THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE, 75 (Mason
Crest Pub. 2007): WTO, Annex II: Summary of Provisions Contained in the UR
Agreements for the Differential and More Favourable Treatment of Developing and
Least Developed Countries, available at http://www.wto.org.
131
GATT, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 2nd para. of chapeau.
132
GATT/WTO, Decision on Measures in Favor of Least-Developing Countries, 2
(i)&(ii).
133 eel'd . ("')
m .
134
The art. 66 provides LDCs with a longer time-frame to implementation Delay for up
to ten years from most TRIPS obligations and the possibility of extension following
duly motivated the request.
135
The art. 66.2 requests developed members to provide incentive to companies to
encourage technology transfers to LDCs.
136
The art. 67 requires technical assistance for the LDCs' to be provided. Art. 12.3 and
12.7 in Agreement on Technical Barriers of Trade of the UR require very similar
technical assistance for the LDCs.
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loW- and middle income DCs with measures which can make their debt sustainable in

the long-term, e.g. a debt relief program and the Barbados Program of Action. 137 All the
provisions that allow special and preferential treatment to LDCs or developing
countries approve the differential treatment as the general legal principle.
(3) Approval of an ICA

The necessity of regulation over an agreement over producing primary commodities
is emphasized more than the security of consumer interests through non-regulatory
competition. In international trade with food or non-renewable natural resources, a
normal market mechanism does not stabilize 'inelastic' supply and demand of the nonrenewable natural resource, which not able to manipulate, in a short time, the
production which needs relatively long adjustable time and the indispensable demand
which daily life activities accompany. The fact that most LDCs and quite a few DCs
depend on export earnings from commodity production is noteworthy. Unless
producers' economic interests are specially considered, they might face excessive
price-reducing competition and end up with pre-mature exhaustion of the limited
natural resource, and volatile price of commodities. Such results harm the interest of
importing countries as well as exporting countries with subsequently very low export
earnings.

137

th

GA.Res.55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55 Sess., para. 15 to 18, U.N.Doc.A/Res/55/2 (2000).
The Barbados Programme of Action is a plan for developing small island DCs under
the formal name of 'Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small
Island Developing States.' Refer to Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable
Development ofSmall Island Developing States, Bridgetown, Barbados, 25 April-6May
1994 (U.N. publication, Sales No. E.94.I.18 and corrigenda), chap. I, resolution 1,
annex II).
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The argument for international arrangements is based mostly on concern about

The

developing countries' stable external revenues and raising the stability level of

sUch as

international trade. Art. 57 of the draft Havana Charter provides that member recognize

'

that intergovernmental commodity agreements are appropriate for certain achievements

'

gen

foundil

among other things, to prevent the serious economic difficulties which may arise when

States(

adjustments between production and consumption cannot be effected by normal market
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138

Consumers' interests that can be

compl

protected through fierce competition in a market may be weakened in the short term by

balan'

the ICAs that moderate market competitive conditions because the price-reducing

count

forces alone as rapidly as the circumstances require.

competition of

tiP product is restrained by the agreement. In the long term, however,
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the supply of non-renewable natural resources may last for a longer tim~ The
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importance of securing the sustainability of commodity production has achieved
international consensus through numerous resolutions, including UN Conference on

seem

New and Renewable Sources of Energy, the Havana Non-aligned Countries' Policy

equi'

Guidelines on the Reinforcement of Collective Self-Reliance among Developing
Countries, and the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations

harn

Development Decade (hereinafter DD III). 139

trea

(4) Assessment
pre·
138

UN Conference on Trade and Employment, Final Act and Related Documents, 1948,
UN document E/CONF. 2/78, at 39. The International Natural Rubber Agreement held,
as its objectives, the stability of the export earnings from natural rubber of exporting
members and the increase of their earnings at fair and remunerative prices. See Art. 1,
rara. (c), 1979.
39
Sec. III. H of the DD III Strategy. See Moses T. Adebanjo, Economic Cooperation
Among Developing Countries: A Component ofInternational Development Strategy, in
UNCTADANDTHE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS, 175, 185 (ed.
Michael Zammit Cutajar, 1984).
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I
The new legal principles to establish the NIEO had a firm basis on 'general norm,
such as GATT Art. 1, because the principles were embodied as exceptions or waivers to
t~

~

s,

general principle under the existent international agreement. The NIEO found its
~\\l'I\1"'-S

founding international agreement in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States(CERDS) which recognizes sovereign power of states over their natural
resources. 140 The CERDS is considered as a framework code toward generalized
compliance under a binding power as Art. 31 obligates all states to contribute to the
balanced expansion of the global economy by considering interests ofboth developing
countries and developed countries. The DD III also focuses on the rational development,
management, and utilization for purpose of preventing early exhaustion of finite

\

resources and overburdening of renewable resources. 141
International development law is in the process of making effective the NIEO,
seemingly in conflict with the traditional international legal principles. To promote
equitable international trade and competition among developed countries and
developing countries, the new area is necessary to be put into effective practice and
harmonized with the existent international law. Although special and differential
treatment (SDT) is necessary in competition law as well as trade law, lengthy debates
as to the effectiveness ofSDT in the area oftrade law argues that non-reciprocal
preferences causes relatively small benefits to most recipient countries and that benefits
140

The CERDS is adopted by UN GA, 12 Dec. 1974. GARes. 3281, UNGAOR, 29th
Sess., Supp. No.3 I, at 50, UN Doc.A/9631 (1975). It is appraised as modern expression
of basic principles of international public law because it is impossible that the
traditional fundamental rights deriving from the existence of states have their realistic
and effective projection, able to ensure an international order on the basis of justice,
equity and cooperation, without recognition of these economic rights enumerated under
the Charter. Berthoud, supra note 120, 91-94.
141
Sec. II.
51

t.

from the SDT go to exporters in the recipient countries but negatively affects long-tenn
development by creating inefficiency and encouraging rent-seeking activities. 142

COl

~ LH~_!'ever, a cartel regulation and the other areas in competition law require a sufficient
level of capacities to analyze market data and point out illegal behaviors to have

go

effective enforcement power. Through. international agreement, competition
authorities in the developed countries need to provide technical aids, experience, and

st

enforcement know-how. In addition, international competition laws may allow more

h

exemptions to competition laws in the DCs that are facing urgent development issues
than it does to those in advanced countries. However, the exemptions shall not be on

c

arbitrary bases but under objective criteria. 143
So as to look into the difference ofnyo~e~mes in tertlls of competition law .l.t.s.. (1:1._...,\
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including a cartel regulation, analysis of the fundamental approach of respective regime
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Competition Law: Development Approach v. Market Approach

As multinational corporations (MNCs) occupy more portions of international trade,
international trade regulations, focusing on removing governmental barriers to
competition in markets under the GATT regime, need to address private barriers, that is,

142

Hoekman, Michalopoulos, and Winters, Improving Special and Differential
Treatment: Some proposals, in PITOU VAN DIJCKAND GERRIT FABER ED., DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES AND THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA OF THE WTO, 95-96 (Routledge,
2006). See ILC, supra note 125.
143
See id. at 99.
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R}3Ps of the MNCs, such as a cartel or abuse of market dominant position. 144 The
concern of the countries whose economic systems are sensitive to the RBPs of the
MNCs tried to enlarge the coverage of international trade law from the traditional
government-imposed barrier to MNCs' RBPs. However, since legal institutions and
economic powers of developing countries with small-size markets are not in such
strong positions to regulate the MNCs as those of developed countries where their
headquarters are located, developing countries' negotiation with a MNC by each
individual country has not produced satisfactory results.

145

A group of developing

countries utilized, as an alternative solution, the regulatory power of international
organizations, such as the UN and UNCTAD, where they had political influence with
their weight of voting power based on the number of their members. As a result, the
international competition rnulations reflected the development-oriented perspective.

~~
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The representative examples of the development-oriented international competition law
came out as the UN Set in 1980 and Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations in 1988 146 .
On the other hand, market-oriented international competition laws, which reflect the
practices of developed countries, came out in a distinct path from that of the
development-approach. Originally, modem competition laws in developed countries
came into existence to regulate anti-competitive business practices which imposed
144

Dean and Mohieldin, supra note 79, at 26; Levenstein and Suslow, supra note 29, at
807. They cite a speech by the Former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust
Division of the US Department of Justice.
145
Singh analyzed the reasons as the follows: i) inadequate development of the legal
and institutional framework, and ii) lack of information and difficulties of proving that
p,rices were manipulated by international cartels. See Singh, supra note 58, at 12-14.
46
Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations is adopted by the UN
Economic and Social Council, 1 Feb. 1988. UN Doc. E/1988/39/A~d.1 (1988).
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harm on competition in markets. The birth of conglomerates through industrialization

inte

caused concentration of market power or abuse of the dominant position of the

con

conglomerates, which were a big threat to small-sized enterprises' survival. 147 In

cov

addition, the collusive and exclusive business practices among competitors, or

reg

cartelistic behaviors, restricted competition in price or quality of protect, and reduced
significantly the consumers' welfare that had been maximized through competition in

cle

markets. 148 The maintenance of competition was the very object of competition law
practice. 'Economical efficiency' as the sum of consumers and producers' welfare grew

an·

as the main method by which cases in violation of competition law could be decided. 149

co

Development issue, as the developing countries' most important concern, was set aside
under the realm of other economic policies. 150

in

The market-oriented competition law, which had played an active role in advanced

th

markets, took its efforts to control the MNCs' anticompetitive activities in the form of

fu

the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 1976. 151 Under the Guidelines,
the MNCs should refrain from participating in or purposely strengthening the restrictive

fc

effects of international or domestic cartels or restrictive agreements which adversely

n

affect competition and which are not accepted under an applicable national or

1
b

147

See Standard Oil Co. ofNew Jerseyv. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 47-49,31 S.Ct. 502,510-11
(1911).
148
See Rail Road Trust Inc. case ofthe U.S. S.Ct.
149
Dean and Mohieldin, supra note 79, at 4, Dean and Mohieldin explains the
'economic efficiency' as the maximization ofthe sum of the discounted present value
of the surpluses of consumers and producers which assumes static and dynamic
efficiency in the way that the current welfare losses may be tolerated if the same factors
generating the losses also cause efficiency gains in the long run.
15
For detailed information, refer to Ch. 4.
151
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were adopted by the OECD
Council on Jun. 21st, 1976.
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internationallegislation. s In addition, the MNCs need to cooperate readily with
competition authorities by providing information under applicable safeguards. 1s 3 The
covert tendencies of cartel conspiracy in countries with an under-enforcement of cartel
regulation and unskilled competition authorities made difficult the effective
enforcement of cartel regulations. The complexity of the MNCs and the difficulty of
clearly perceiving their hidden behaviors aggravated the degree of ineffectiveness.
After the Guidelines, so as to promote cooperation of competition law and minimize
anticompetitive activities, developed countries made their efforts both individually and

..

1 4

collectively by bilateral cooperation agreements, and regional agreements. s

In the '90s, the developed countries' group which succeeded in establishing a new
international organization, the WTO, suggested four topics, representatively known as
the Singapore issues 1ss including competition policy, on the negotiation table for
furthering global free trade policies. Through lowering governmental trade barriers in
national markets, the member countries of the WTO exposed their domestic markets to
foreign products. However, the DCs which lowered public trade barriers still
maintained private trade barriers such as collaborative and exclusive business activities.
The under-enforcement or lack of competition law against such anti-competitive
business practices led to the adoption of competition policy into the multilateral trade
negotiation ofthe WTO. The concealed desires of advanced countries to correct anti-

12

s Para. 3. See also para. 1 prohibiting the MNCs from abusing a dominant position of
market power through anti-competitive acquisitions, predatory behaviors, unreasonable
refusal to deal, abuse of industrial property rights and discriminatory pricing.
IS3
Para. 4.
14
s Refer to Ch. 2 for the in-detailed research.
Iss The four issues are investment, competition policy, governmental procurement, and
trade facilitation, which were dropped out at 2003 Cancun Ministerial Conference.
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competitive activities in emerging markets and to facilitate multinational corporations•

beha

active cross-border merger and acquisition under harmonized merger regulations Illigbt

adflli

have incited them to address the competition law. The OECD Recommendation against

cooi

Hard Core Cartel in 1998, the WTO Doha Declaration in 2001, and the Guiding
Principles and Recommended Practices on Merger Notification and Review Procedures

are 1

of International Competition Network (ICN), are examples of the market-approach to

R&:

international competition law.
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The 'development approach' focuses on the increase of employment and the

und

protection of human rights in particularly developing countries rather than on

exe

promoting efficiency and lowering price. 156 Collective actions toward development

em

among DCs or LDCs tended to be recommended or at least condoned although the

me

actions lead to cartel activities such as price-fixing or output quantity restriction. 157

vic

Concretely, inter-governmental arrangements for producing non-renewable natural

sii

resources or commodities including agricultural products were permitted under the

ne

approach. On the other hand, although a cartel as one of collective restrictive business

ec

practices (RBPs) is prohibited, 158 private MNCs' collective RBPs need to be under

m

control of governments from the viewpoint of the development-approach as well as the
market-approach. 159 Para. 8 and 10 ofDraft Code of Conduct ofTNCs, besides

a
tl

156

Stein Rossen, Global Management of Processes ofChange and Adjustment, in
UNCTAD AND THE SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE: THE FIRST TwENTY YEARS, 260, 287
(Michael Zammit Cutajar ed.,1984).
157
See id., at 285 and 287. Rossen states, the conclusions of a report to UNCTAD V in
1979 included recommendation concerted measures at the inter-governmental level that
would promote structural changes in the world economy and a favorable environment
for sustained development at the global level. !d. at 285.
158
See para. 37 ofDraft Code and para. 3 ofPart IV, Sec. D of the UN Set.
159
See Rossen, supra note 156, at 286-87. The protection-oriented government policies
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behaving under observance of domestic laws, regulations and established
adJDinistrative practices, particularly, require conforming to development policies and
cooperating with governments to contribute the development process.
Distinguished from the market approach, however, exemptions to cartel prohibition

are to be under positive consideration of the competition authorities. An exemption of
R&D cartel is more likely than not to be approved by the competition authorities so that
long-term investment policies of the MNCs in developing countries may be promoted
under governmental controls. In addition, under the development approach, so called
exemptions to crisis cartels are to be allowed so generously as to sustain the level of
employment and economic development of the developing market. Efficiency, as a
method to achieve development, is not an exclusive measure to decide upon the
violation of competition law and cartel regulations in developing countries with mostly
small or middle-size markets where developments in overall economic areas are
necessary. Competition policy needs to be in the coordinating position with other
economic policies toward the development of economies in developing countries'
market.
From the perspective of the market-oriented approach, since the development is not
a major concern of developed' countries, competition policy and cartel regulations of
their countries have operated with its foundation on economical reasoning through
sophisticated efficiency arguments rather than with a development purpose. As a result,
the market-oriented competition law does not permit a R&D cartel which produces

were tackled by the efforts ofUNCTAD in the similar way to the market-approach. It
cites a report to UNCTAD V (1979), UNCTAD document TD/225, Policy Issues in the
Field of Trade, Finance and Money and their Relationship to Structural Change at the
Global Level.

_____________________...._.
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products with controlled prices or restricted output quantities unless the improved
efficiency by far outweighs the decreased consumer welfare, because the cartel reduces

st1

th

current and future chances to increase economic efficiency, e.g. reduced price and
increased output, through reducing competition in markets. Even in the case of a crisis

a

cartel in economic recession, the market-approached competition law has argued, as the

p

U.S. Supreme Court has held, for a long time, that any kind ofhorizontal price restraint
violates the competition law because the restraint restricts competition of price, which,
while reasonable at the time, could prove to be unreasonable later. 160

4. The Concern ofDCs about Competition Law
(1) Theoretical Disputes
Economists have discussed the relationship between competition and development.
In a traditional theory, it is acknowledged that the greater the intensity of competition,
the better the economic performance. Modern economic theories threw a serious
question to the proposition by indicating that maximum competition is not necessarily
an optimal degree of competition for promoting economic welfare in the static sense or
maximizing the growth of productivity in the dynamic way. 161 The proponents of

160

The U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,213 (1941). However, recently,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that a vertical agreement setting minimum resale price
should be decided based on its impact on competition in a market. Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2714- 18 (2007). As a result, per
se illegal rule is limited to a horizontal price-fixing agreement.
161
Singh, supra note 58, 7. Singh cites Amsden and Singh, The Optimal Degree of
Competition and Dynamic Efficiency in Japan and Korea, 28 EUR. ECON. REV., at 941951, and LAFFONT, supra note 57, at 237-57. Singh added, in footnote 11, that the
concept of competition which he discussed is as regards an incentive to elicit maximum
individual or organization effort while the one formulating general equilibrium leads to
a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources under specific conditions.
58

strang competition policy place emphasis on removing regulatory barriers to entry with

the assumption that competition can be a return to a market, similarly to competitive
equilibrium in the long run rather than a constant state of market equilibrium. 162 Such
assertions may conflict with development of developing countries where quite a few
public barriers to trade have existed to promote domestic enterprises. However, the
government barriers can play a role in establishing secure bases for investment and
long-term efficiency gains with the exchange of reducing a static economic efficiency

in the short term. In the same line, the Evolutionary Economics argues that a proper
competition policy in developing economies should have more interest in science and
technology policy as well as industrial policy toward enterprises and innovation. 163
Even a recent theory argues that inter-firm co-ordination among horizontal competitors
can cause substantial welfare benefits in relation to innovation. 164
The economic development of East Asia, especially in Japan, South Korea, and
recently China, has not strived for economic policy to maximize competition but to
achieve an optimal balance ofboth cooperation and competition. 165 Countries in less
developed circumstances need to upgrade their technological and managerial

162

The proponents are Dasgupta, Stiglitz, and Bain. See Dean & Mohieldin, supra note
79,6-7.
163
Bob Rowthom, Reviews: Evolutionary Economics, 111 Prospect (Jun. 2005)
(reviewing Paul Ormerod, Why Most Things Fail (2005), available at
http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_ details.php?id=6906 (visited on Apr.18,
2008)).
164
William Baumol, When is Inter-firm Coordination Beneficial? The Case of
Innovation, 19 INT'L J. OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 727, 736 (2001).
165
HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET
HISTORY OF CAPITALISM, 15 & 21 (Bloomsbury Press/Random House, 2008) 15 & 21.
While Chang illustrates the examples of South Korea and Japan, economic policy of
China recently adopted free trade regime pervasive under remaining control of the state
after its accession to WTO.
59

capabilities so as to achieve a rapid and sustained growth of economy which is
considered a priority of economic development. Such an upgrade is possible only when
infant sectors grow under the protection of government, as countries with successful
economies are currently experiencing.

166

A group of economists argue that advanced

countries have forced developing countries to adopt the free trade regime, which

e

impedes economic development in the long term, at the cost of effectively proved

'

mixed policy options. 167 They criticize that the free trade theory has promoted
specialization in sectors with low productivity in poor countries rather economic
development and that free trade is suitable only for countries at the same level of
development. 168 Apart from some developing countries with big internal markets, the
bulk of developing countries should be allowed to pursue their own policies even in
competition law areas. A combination of co-operation and competition will enhance
more social welfare than competition policy alone. 169

(2) Appropriate Competition Policy in DCs
The primary purpose of competition policy in developing countries can not be the
promotion of competition in and of itself, but fostering economic development as well.
The difficulty of developing countries in devoting their efforts to maximizing
166

Martin Wolf, The Growth of Nations, 6 FIN. TIMES (Jul. 21, 2007). For instance,
industrial districts in Italy and other European countries through the Marshall Plan in
ftost-war period.
67
CHANG, supra note 165, 74-78 & 158-9. See also ERIK REINERT, How RICH
COUNTRIES GOT RICH .. AND WHY POOR COUNTRIES STAY POOR, 165-181 (Constable &
Robinson Ltd, 2007). Reinert illustrates the retrogress of Mongolia's economy after its
sudden market open in 1991 and names it as primitivization which contrasts to
rJobalization which economic policy aimed at originally.
68
CHANG, supra note 165, 73.
169
Singh, supra note 58, 8.
60

competition is due to its budgetary constraints, under-developed skills or institutions to
enforce competition law, and small-sized enterprises with small capital. The
competitive equilibrium assumes quite a few conditions,

170

most ofwhich are lacking

in the developing world. Especially, a high level of investment as necessity of
economic development needs to be based on reasonable, if not high, rate of profits.
With the securing of the reasonable profits in priority in developing countries, the level
of competition policy may as well choose too little as too much.

171

The governments of

developing countries have adopted a coordinative approach regarding investment so as
to prevent the waste of insufficient resources.
Since they are facing limited resources, they want to operate the hybrid policy of
balancing competition and cooperation in optimal ways for their economies. The
competition laws, in light of the economic circumstances, need to make an adjustment
to the original laws from developed countries. 172 Their concrete aspects may differ in
each country, but three issues are to be addressed.
First, a cartel regulation shall include a research and development (R&D)
exemption for the utmost necessity in increasing investment in technology. The
investments that are essential for economic development in the developing world can
170

LAFFONT, supra note 57, 237. The conditions are large number of participants in all
markets, no public goods, no externalities, not information asymmetries, no natural
monopolies, complete markets, fully rational economic agents, and a benevolent
~ovemment which provide lump sum transfers to achieve any desirable redistribution.
71
Competition goes too much when it leads to price-reducing wars with sharp falls in
profits and when it diminishes the desire to investment of companies. See Singh, supra
note 58, at 16.
172
See Paul Cook, Colin Kirkpatrick, Martin Minogue, and David Parker, Competition,
Regulation, and Regulatory Governance in Developing Countries: An Overview of the
Research Issues, in Leading Issues in Competition, Regulation, and Development
(Edward Elgar eds, 2004), available at http://www.competitionregulation.org. uk/publications/ ere_books/Leading%20issues. pdf.
61

be increased when cooperation in a market is treated as legitimate without threat of
cartel penalties. However, the possibility of abuse is to be challenged under screening
procedures with regular intervals.

fl

Second, so called a crisis cartel may be approved under reasonable conditions.
Strict anti-cartel enforcement was not accepted even in the U.S. during the Great
Depression when a large scale of demand contraction and excessive capacity
prevailed. 173 When less diversified business structures with small enterprises are
damaged beyond the normal level by the recession, autonomous collaborated behaviors
in a manner less restrictive to competition system should be temporarily approved
under limited conditions. The maximum time span for the exemption is to be addressed
in the related provision so that the collaboration can not be maintained long enough to
generate a negative result such as a chronicle cartelized market. The collaborative
behaviors in the light of direct harm to consumers and to market mechanism are to be
reviewed by competition authorities. Such reasonable measures as a collective
production plan to escape from current difficulties are examples of approved
collaboration. Consistent enforcement of competition law with the limited conditions
can control abuse of the cartel exemption.
Third, state-operating cartels with respect to non-renewable natural resources are
the area where developing governments derive their financial resources. Excessive
competition to exploit such natural resources generates a waste of excessive capacity
which leads to exhaustion ofthe natural resources. If the limited sources from which
developing governments can have stable incomes are treated in the same way as a

173

0

See Appalachian Coals v. U.S. 288 U.S. 344, 360-63, 53 S.Ct. 471,474-76 (1933).
62
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Illanufactured product under a cartel regulation, it will lead to promoting an insensible
competition policy which does not distinguish public entities or non-renewable
resources from private entities or reproducible products. The non-renewable natural
resources which governments themselves operate should not be under a cartel
regulation unless extreme cases occur such as the arbitrary controlling over price or
production irrespective of market demand.

VI. Roadmap toward Binding International Cartel Agreement

1. Wide-spreading Competition Policy to the Developing World
(1) Modeling Competition Law Reflecting Economic Development

Global economies can not avoid expanding competition policy as well as trade
liberalization policies since the trade liberalization of the WTO, which has covered
developing countries as well as advanced countries, become effective. The
liberalization policies necessitates competition policy to restrain restrictive business
practices arguably as private market barriers caused by monopolistic or collaborated
local companies or as the abuse of market-powers caused by foreign investors. The
emerging economies, particularly, which have enjoyed the benefit of trade
liberalization and strict domestic competition policy in advanced countries, face
pressures to adopt a competition regime along with further trade liberalization from the
advanced countries.
Market-principle-based competition laws in advanced countries, however, are not
welcomed by developing countries although their advanced skills are worthy of

63

adoption. Developing countries with a priority on economic development still want to
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sustain their national economic growth under protection. They have inner-concerns that

otbf

the unfamiliar regime of competition law might enable competitive foreign companies

sen

to tread over, arguably, their less competitive domestic companies. It is one of the

nee

reasons why competition law with cartel regulation has been unpopular in the

bel

developing world.
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To persuade developing countries to adopt competition laws including cartel
regulations, it is important to assuage their fear by introducing developmentperspective competition law to them. Modeling a competition law in the light of their
urgent necessity of economic development or their initial stage of practice is to be the
first step. In cartel regulations, a recommendable example includes the exclusion from
the regulations or the authorization of several types of cartels or state-operated cartels
as they represent public interest that is overvalued by each respective country. The
public interest may be served through R&D, rationalization, or supporting small and
medium sized enterprises, international competitiveness, or technical and economic
progress. 174 The possibility of abuse as far as the exemption is concerned is to be
discussed in Ch. 5.

(2) Activating Domestic Cartel Regulation: Assistance in DCs' Enforcement
Under-enforcement of a competition law or a cartel regulation has been a
characteristic of the DCs which had adopted the regulation. It was because competition
authorities do not place emphasis on anti-cartel policy, do not have experts or practical
174

Ulrich Immenga, Conflicts between Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: A
Comparative Vzew on Potential Responses, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES:
KEY ISSUES AND COMMENTS ON THE WTO REPORT (1998) ON TRADE AND COMPETITION,
350-51 (Roger Zaech, ed., 1999).
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tcnow-hows, or do not receive sufficient institutional and financial support. Among

that

other things, it might be due to the public's low level of awareness regarding the

L

1es

serious damage to the DCs' interests caused by a cartel. The international community

·'

needs to make an effort on providing research data regarding cartels' damages and the
benevolent long-term effects of active anti-cartel policy, introducing successful
investigation practices, and providing update knowledge and skills as to cartel
investigation to authorities.

Picture of Road Map

Binding Multilateral Agreement as
to Cartel

Wide-spreading Competition
Policy to the Developing World

1) Int'l Agreement for Aid and
Cooperation among Competition
Authorities
- Modeling Competition Law
Reflecting Economic
Development

2) Extending Bilateral or Regional
Agreement

- Activating Domestic Cartel
Regulations

3)

Use ofPlurilateral AQI'eement

4)

A Narrow Annroach

5) A Broad Approach

2. A Strategy for Binding Multilateral Agreements
(1) Int'l Agreement for Aid and Cooperation among Competition Authorities
According to Revised Recommendation of the Council of the OECD concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices affecting
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International Trade (Doc. C(86)44 of 21 May 1986), a cooperative procedure asks a

iJlves

requested member country to take appropriate remedial actions, including an action

as to

under its legislation on restrictive business practices (RBPs). The procedure is beyond

Th

the coverage of the positive comity principle 175 because it allows the requested country

tore

to take measures in a case where the competition law of the requested country has not

boW

been violated and does not permit any remedial action. 176 Procedure for international
aid for competition authorities in their novel stage will be a good initial legal

a cc

foundation for international community to go for a binding international cartel law.

wh

(2) Extending Bilateral Agreement and Regional Agreement: Limitation of

thf

Extraterritorial Application

co

Domestic legislation often has difficulty in dealing with an international cartel.

ag

Currently, the extraterritorial application principle of domestic law against international

re

cartels looks to prevail in competition law practices in major advanced countries.

e<

However, the extraterritorial application, as a temporary phenomenon, causes conflict
with the sovereignty principle of international law since the enforcement against a

d

company or activity in a foreign country is an overreaching of the territory-based

c

jurisdiction principle and the investigation requires an examination of a personnel or

1

collection of evidence located in the other territory. To facilitate the oversee

175

It requires the requested country to take a measure only when the involved activity
violates its competition law.
176
l.B.4. ofRevised Recommendation ofthe Council ofthe OECD concerning Cooperation between Member Countries on Restrictive Business Practices affecting
International Trade (Doc. C(86)44 of21 May 1986).
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investigation, it needs close cooperation with authorities from other related countries so

as to make bilateral agreements.
td

ry

The recently developed 'comity' principle under the bilateral agreement is an attempt
to reduce the obstacles caused by extraterritorial applications. The comity provision,
however, exposes a loophole when the substance of competition laws between
requesting and requested countries differs. As the Hart Ford Case indicated, the law of
a country where cartel activities occur, which is the U.K., allowed the cartel activity
while the law of a country under the effect of the cartel, which is the U.S., penalized it.
The U.S. could not ask the U.K. to enforce its competition law against the cartel under
the positive comity. The extraterritorial application was an effective way to protect the
consumers in the U.S . from anti-competitive effects of the cartel. Therefore, bilateral
agreements for achieving a convergence of cartel regulations are efficient tools to
reduce problems out of extraterritorial application between countries with similar
economic development levels.
Meanwhile, a bilateral agreement between countries with different level of
development is unlikely to work well. Immature skills and development-oriented
competition policy in a less developed country can be main hurdles to achieving the
bilateral agreement because an advanced country will not trust the effectiveness of
cartel regulation of the developing country or overall legal system. Meanwhile, the
developing country worries the impact of the efficiency-oriented competition law on its
market.
As an international cooperative measure of competition policy, a bilateral agreement
between countries under a similar economic level is an important foundation.
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Afterwards, such a bilateral agreement can be extended to cover another or more

pro

countries as the antitrust agreement between Australia and New Zealand included

cor

Canada. Moreover, a regional agreement regarding competition law can be the other

hill

foundation to build multilateral cartel regulations. The facts that the EC Treaty ofRome

AS

or APEC adopted provisions of competition law including cartel regulations are noted.

in1

(3) Using Plurilateral Agreement

lii

As the WTO competition policy negotiation proved, the consensus-based decision to
launch international competition law or international cartel law causes so much conflict
of opinion among the interests of countries with different levels of practice with the law,
that the conclusion or launch of the law itself may not be expected in a short time. A
plurilateral agreement can reduce the cost of negotiation and launch as only the
member states which have interest in the cartel regulation may participate in the
negotiation. There is no need to negotiate with countries which contest international
cartel law. The law is effective to only members which adopt the agreement. As the
cartel law or competition law can be effective under certain infrastructures and a level
of economic development, such an optional approach with a plurilateral agreement may
fit its characteristics. The burden of confined sovereignty through its binding power
may be reduced by such options as allow only interested countries to accede.
(4) Narrow Approach: Building International Cartel Law with the Narrow
Coverage
Although there will be divergence among countries depending on each country' s
circumstance as to the substance of cartel regulation, it is important to reach an
agreement of punishing egregious cartels with proper sanctions to eliminate improper
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profits through the cartels. A narrowly defined cartel can achieve the agreement more
conveniently than the broadly defined one. It is because a certain type of cartels under
bard core cartels can accommodate international consensus than other types of cartels.

As many countries penalize bid-rigging, the bid-rigging can be an initial object of
international cartel regulation with binding power. Price-fixing and production
limitation may be the subsequent objects of the international regulation. It is noted that,
in light of respective country's situation and development perspective, several
exemptions with outweighing public effects should be acknowledged in the regulation.
(5) Broad Approach: Establishing Cartel Law under International Competition

Regime
As the analysis of advanced and developing countries' competition laws demonstrate,
effective cartel practices have proved to be possible with the operation of the whole
competition regime. Since effective enforcement of competition law requires several
conditions from a certain level of economic development to economical research, as
this thesis suggests, binding international competition law with specific and concrete
provisions are less likely to attract member states sufficient to take the international law

into effect. To reduce the fear of DCs and the burden of advanced countries from
acceding to the international competition law, principle-based competition law is
recommendable. It will be good if the principles in the law are the ones which countries
have widely agreed with, e.g. control over monopoly practices and prohibition of hard
core cartels. Subsequently agreed concrete procedures, such as compliance,
•

hannonization, and coordinated cost-reducing procedure, can compliment the
principled-based agreement. The special and differential treatment (S&D) shall be

69

considered for a flexible commibnent to international competition law including cartel

in ope

regulation. The S&D treatment, which determines the level of commitment in light of

princi

the level of its competition culture as well as economic development in each country,

aclcno

can attract more member states as the members of the treaty.

regul:
cases

VII.

Conclusion

the s.

International competition law can not avoid considering the development-

poli1

perspective of competition law since the majority of the constituents of international
organizations which tried to adopt competition law are experiencing developing market

corr

economies or all under the category of least-developed economies. As the 2003 Cancun

the

Ministerial Conference demonstrated, the unilateral market-oriented competition policy

trac

from the advanced countries was not welcomed in the developing countries' context

Ac

even though competition law produces legal guidelines to business activities among

sm

competing companies along with providing much benefit in increasing consumers'

en

welfare and efficiency. The failure looked to be predestined when Mark Brown, a head

ret

of the UN Development Program as one of the leading bodies in the development effort

de:

of UN, focused on the necessity of strengthening internal capacity and institutions as

ec

well as the training of people rather than trying to insert an infrastructure or an industry

c;

into a nation without taking into account its social and economic context. 177
Reflecting the development-approach, from the perspective of developed countries,
there need to be flexible rules accepting exceptions to cartel regulations and assistance

I
t

177

Linda Fasulo, an Insider's Guide to the UN, 169-170 (2004 Yale Univ. Press).
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in operating cartel regulations in developing economies. In light of the non-reciprocal
principle and the SDT ofNIEO, some exceptions, under temporary bases, should be
acknowledged. The developing countries under the initial period of activating cartel
regulations or with immature techniques need to benchmark successful punishment
cases against hard core cartels. There may emerge a problem as to the confidentiality of
the shared information. Such an issue needs to be addressed with multilateral
agreements among countries involved in information sharing for support of competition
policy in DCs.
From the developing countries' perspective, on the other hand, introducing
competition law including cartel regulation, with which they are unfamiliar, is to enact
the operation of free market mechanism based on competition and not to condone
traditional collusive behaviors among competitors in normal commerce activities.
Active enforcement of the competition law in the process of economic development
sometimes may result in the loss ofless-competitive domestic companies. Effective
enforcement of competition law, including cartel regulations, in developing countries
requires substantial time, legal institutions, and investigation techniques. 178 The
developed world needs to demonstrate the point that competition policy benefits their
economic development and to provide technical support and know-how to enforce
cartel regulations and competition law .179

178

Singh, supra note 58, 6-7 & 13-15. Singh cites F.M.SCHERER, COMPETITION
POLICIES FORAN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY (Brookings lnst., 1994) and argues
that it takes about 10 years for countries to acquire the necessary expertise and
experience to implement such laws effectively.
179
For argument for an appropriate framework for international cooperation, see Singh,
supra note 58, 14-15.
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Major aspects of international development law, e.g. differential treatment, non-

cal

reciprocity, and convention of commodity-producing and consuming countries in

po

markets, need to be adopted by international competition law since the international

sit

competition law is currently in the initial stage and the wide gap of experience in
practice between advanced countries and developing countries can not be regulated
under a single standard. Concretely, state-operating cartels in non-renewable natural
resources, although they affect international economy, are to be approved under the

d

state-sovereignty principle unless it severely restricts rights of the other countries.

a

Commodity cartels under state-operation need to be consoled in the light of economic

I

structural dependence on the trade of the commodities in LDCs. Private cartels, on the
other hand, are to be regulated by international competition law, regardless of the
market-approach or the development-approach. Exemptions to cartel regulations,
however, may be provided particularly in the context of economic development. With
the economic situation in mind, research and development, overcoming crises, recovery
of small and mid-sized enterprises, technical standards and rationalization of
production or distribution are exemplary cases where cartel activities are to be allowed.
However, the main rules ofWTO law, such as MFN, national treatment, and the
opening of service markets to greater competition, may not be damaged by the
international competition law. The S&D treatment shall operate as an exceptional basis
of mechanism that reviews infotmation submitted by a benefit-recipient country in the
light of an original objective and the effectiveness of the measure. 180 Such
considerations can reduce the fear and objection trom developing countries where

180

See Hoekman ets., supra note 142, 100-01.
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cartel regulation and competition law are enacted in their nascent stage or under
political consideration for adoption. The roadmap, which this thesis introduced, reflects
situations and concerns of the developing world.
As binding international cartel law can help foster competition policy in less
competitive markets, it will support MNEs or companies from advanced countries
which want to expand their market. On the other hand, it can also proffer benefits to
developing countries where the level of economic development outgrows its low level

and international trade occupies a growing portion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
It is because further economic development needs competition policy to overcome

inefficiency in markets and public policies. International competition law. including

cartel regulation, will encourage and support the settlement of competition policy in
their markets.
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Ch. 4. The Regulation of Cartels in Developing Countries

I.

Introduction

Mark Brown, the head of UN Development program, stated that, with focus on
importance of the independent capacity-building ofDCs, development is not a linear
thing, whereby we could solve human suffering with throwing money. According to

him, developing countries and those who assist them should invest in people through
education, health, and make space for a strong private sector with suitable rewards
along the way to development in the shape of aid from the World Bank and other
donors. 1 Compared to other issues in competition policy, an effective cartel regulation
causes the reform of business environment into a competitive one by directly raising
efficiency and consumers' welfare. Therefore, the effective cartel regulation contributes
to building a strong private sector under a competition culture because a cartel causes
inefficiencies through the malfunction of market mechanism and direct damage to
consumers' welfare. Transitional economies' concern about keeping long-standing
state-monopoly is not an issue for cartel regulations. Protecting domestic companies
from foreign investors' mergers and acquisitions is only a collateral problem in cartel
regulation. Activating effective cartel regulation in DCs, therefore, looks to generate
net benefit to DCs, even LDCs.
The practices of cartel law in DCs, however, do not reveal a strong attitude in
implementing the law. The reality of their cartel policies demonstrates that they face

1

LINDA FASULO, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE U.N., at 170 (Yale Univ. Press, 2004)
1

poor resources e.g. insufficient personnel and funds, ineffective institutions, immature
skills, unstable support for anti-cartel policy, and a lack of understanding of
competition norms. DCs are not equipped with the type of environments for the
rigorous enforcement of cartel regulation in comparison with advanced countries that

v.:

have developed cartel regulation and its enforcement with a long duration of time and

an

much investment of money and human sources. It is impossible that DCs support or

iti

approve international competition law or cartel regulation with the coarse

cc

circumstances left intact in the countries.

st

As the front part of strategy for founding international cartel law, this chapter

c:

addresses the development of cartel regulatory regimes by studying four examples of

c

development of competition laws, respectively, in advanced and developing countries.
It moves its focus on the issue of consensus-building for cartel regulation in developing

countries by demonstrating the low awareness of the advantages of cartel regulation,
the relationship between competition and development, and methods to activate
domestic enforcement against cartels. This chapter further provides research on legal
institutions of cartel regulation through studying political economic theories and
investigating how to place both a social foundation for its effective enforcement and
economic sources for the legal regime. At last, it addresses the issue of raising
capacities to create an effective regulation and, particularly, the ways to cooperate with
developed countries.

II.

Development of Cartel Regulation in the North and the South

•
2

1. The Standard of Cartel Regulation in Advanced Countries
(1) The U.S.
The Sherman Act, a principal competition legislation in the U.S., was adopted by the

u.s. Congress during the economic situations in 1890 when the complaints from smalland-middle-size companies and consumers were raised because of the high prices
imposed by cartel members. Although there were some derivative decisions, the U.S.
courts have developed a judicial rule of per se illegal separately from the rule of reason
standard under common law tradition. thereby dividing cartel cases according to each
category. Up until the end ofWorld War II in 1945, the U.S. looked to be the only
country to enforce cartel regulation and competition law seriously.
The Sherman Act, adopted as a result of hot discussions regarding a competition issue,
penalized a 'commerce-restraining' agreement in stead of a 'competition-restraining'
one, without enumerating its in-detail category. 2 The language of Section 1 of the Act
implies that consensus as to competition-restraining activities was not successful. As a
trust or a cartel practice restricted competition, causing a threat to sustaining the whole
economy and the survival of non-member small or middle sized enterprises (SMEs ),
the new Act targeted a trust or a cartel under its original plan. However, it was in seven
years after the U.S. adopted the Sherman Act when the Supreme Court announced that
a horizontal price-fixing agreement was illegal under the Section 1 of the Act, whether

2

The Sherman Act§ 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890). Every contract, combination, in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100
million if a corporation, or $1 million if any other person, or by imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
3

it is valid or otherwise under common law. 3 Subsequent cases enabled the U.S. courts
to develop sophisticated case laws constructing the Section 1 of the Sherman Act which
prohibits every trade-restraining agreement including a cartel. 4 Regarding such cartels
as price-fixing, market-allocation, output-restriction, and group boycott, the judicial
body has developed a strict per se illegal rule which does not allow any defense except
ones explicitly allowed by legislations. 5 The rule is the result of judicial experiences
that, in light of economic analysis of such hard core cartel, any positive effect that the
hard core cartel might generate is outweighed by enormous damages that the cartel
brings about. Therefore, the rule proclaims that the judicial body will not be involved in
economical reasonings in the types of cartels.
In the other areas, besides the hard core cartel, cartel law practices are subject to rule
of reason analysis of the judicial body. As to the other types of cartels, such as a
collective refusal to deal, courts have considered the defense ofbenevolent effects to
economies and have issued decisions out on the balancing of negative effects against
positive effects ofthe cartels. U.S. courts expressed their intention that the judicial
body will consider economic reasoning only in the other type of cartel cases.
Despite the jargon of Section 1 of the Act, the main standard for the judicial body to
decide violation of the Section is the probability of the restraint of competition or
whether there existed net harm to the public, recently defined as consumers' welfare in
3

Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 341-42 (1897). The decision (5-4) had
five supporting justices & four dissenting justices.
4
U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6 1h Cir. 1898), modified and aff'd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899); U.S. v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 19 S.Ct. 25, 43 L.Ed.
259 (1898); Northern Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
5
U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 47 S.Ct. 377, 71 L.Ed. 700, 50 A.L.R.
989 (1927); U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Fashion originators'
Guild of America (FOGA) v. FTC, 312 U/S. 457 (1941)
4
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economical term. In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. (1899), the Supreme Court affirmed the
opinion of the Court of Appeals that a market-division agreement falls on the common
6

law's restraint of commerce and harm to public interest. The Trenton Potteries case,
on the price-fixing of toilet bowls, confirmed the importance of public interest by
stating that the Sherman Law and judicial decisions are based upon the assumption that
the public interest is best protected from the evils of monopolies and price control
through the maintenance of competition and proclaiming that price-fixing is per se
illegal without consideration of its economic effect and rival economic theories. 7 The
Socony-vacuum oil case dismissed reasonableness argument and followed the per se
illegal rule by stating that the reasonableness of prices has no constancy due to the
dynamic quality ofbusiness facts underlying price structures .8 It implies that
consumers are able to enjoy the best result from a market when price is determined by
market system reflecting business facts e.g. demand, supply, and prices of alternative
products in the market.
On the other hand, the U.S. has maintained narrower concrete exemptions of cartel
regulation than other countries. Export cartels are exempted from the Webb-Pomerene
Act, which are analyzed to cause harm to importing countries by raising prices or
restraining consumers' welfare. Agricultural cooperatives, cooperative research and
development arrangements, insurance companies' rate-setting, baseball player

6

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 211, 237-238 (1899)
U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392,395-396 &399 (1927).
8
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,221 (1940)
7

5

assignments, and labor union collective bargaining practices are exempted from the

te

Sherman Act. 9
a1

(2) The United Kingdom {The U.K.)

tl

After the WWII, the U.K. which had loosened a strict attitude regarding a cartel
through common law, has developed sophisticated legislations and enforcement system

0

of competition law throughout more than half a century period. It took a long time to

tJ

adopt legislations regarding competition, particularly cartels, and enact them effectively.

a

The White Paper on Employment published during the WWII suggested that a
competitive economy would make a policy of full employment most likely possible,
which contributed to enacting the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Act (MRP A)
1948 as the first modern competition law. 10 The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission, established by the MRP A 1948, issued its Report on Collective
Discrimination. In respect of the minority opinion of the Report which urged effective
sanctions on restrictive business practices including cartel activities, stricter regulations
regarding restrictive practices, separately from monopolies, started under the
Restrictive Trade Practices Act {RTPA) 1956. 11 In 1968, the RTPA was reformed to
strengthen its control over cartels, which extended the provision of powers to catch
information agreements, and made unregistered but registrable agreements void in

9

FREDRIC M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FORAN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY,
52-53 (Brookings Inst. 1994).
10
Richard Whish, The Competition Act 1998 and the Prior Debate on Reform, in THE
U.K. COMPETITION ACT: A NEW ERA FOR U.K., 2 (Barry J. Rodger & Angus
MacCulloch eds., Hart Pub. 2000). Whish cites Cm6527 (1944). See id. fn 4.
11
See id. fn 5. Whish cites Cmd 9504 (1955).
6
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terms of any re1evant restnct10ns.

12

However, the trial produced unsatisfactory resu1ts

because the legislation lacked the investigatory power and its sanction sufficient to
attack serious cartels. Meanwhile, innocuous agreements were registered so as to avoid
the uncertainty of complex provisions of restrictions and the risk of voidness. 13
Through the Fair Trading Act in 1973, at last, the U.K. expressed its serious attitude
of enacting competition policy. The enactment ofthe 1973 FTA had its background that
the U.K. joined the European Economic Community in the same year and that Art. 85
'·

and 86 of the Treaty ofEC, related to competition policy, were directly applicable. The
1973 FTA established the Office of Fair Trading, created the role of its Director
General, and included service industries, formerly regulated under the RTP A.
Subsequent legislations made changes to the U.K. system of competition law. However,
still investigations and law enforcements against hidden cartels were inactive while
much sources were spent on registrations of innocuous cartels. Several Restrictive
Trade Practices Orders 14 tried to reduce the duty for registering innocuous agreements.
Green and White Papers issued from the UK government proposed that the RTP
legislation should be reformed toward an effective one and modeled on Art. 81 of the
Treaty ofEC.

15

As one ofthe trials to overcome weak powers to punish unlawful

12

See id. at 3.
z'd.
14
The Restrictive Trade Practices Order in 1989 (SI 1989/1 081 ), in 1996 (SI 1996/348),
in 1996 (SI 1996/349), in 1997 (SI 1997/2945), and the Anti-Competitive Practices
Order in 1980 (SI 1980/979).
15
Review ofRTP Policy (Cmnd7512) (Mar. 1979), Review ofRTP Policy: a
Consultative Docwnent (Cm 331) (Mar. 1988), & Opening Markets: New Policy on
RTP (Cm 727) (Jul. 1989).
13 .,ee
('
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cartels, substantial fines were imposed on participating firms in a ready-mixed concrete
cartel in 1995. 16
Reform for strong competition policy was not possible due to political disputes

pt

related to the adoption of the EC-typed cartel regulation until 1998 when the Labor
Party took a helm over British Government. 17 Section 2 of the Competition Act 1998
adopted languages very similar to the Art. 81(1) of the EC Treaty. The provision
prohibits agreements, decisions of association and concerted practices (hereinafter
agreement etc.) which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or
distortion of competition. Section 2(4) reflecting Art.81(3) proclaims any agreement etc.
prohibited by subsection (1) as void. Financial penalty against a cartel was raised up to
10% of turnover for every year of the infringement up to maximum three years. The
Act has several exemptions, such as individual, block exemption, or parallel exemption
for e.g. R&D and specialization agreements. 18 Section 2(3) adopts the implementation
approach of EC Treaty. Meanwhile, the U.K. government and a legislator disagreed
with the adoption of the pure effect doctrine even in case when the EC interprets the
implementation in a broad way enough to include effect. 19

(3) France
16

The Restrictive Practices Court imposed £8.4 million. Fair Trading (Autumn 1995
issue). ReSupply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No.2); DGFT v. Pioneer Concrete (UK)
Ltd and Another [1995] 1 AC 456; [1995] 1 AllER 135.
17
Barry Rodger & Angus Macculloch, Prohibition: Prohibiting Cartels, or Permitting
Verticals? Or Both?, in Rodger & Macculloch, supra note 10, at 171-72.
18
Provisions for individual and block exemptions are sections 4 to 9 while parallel
exemption system is based on section 10. See id. at 170 & 177. Section 4 under a strict
authorization system provides the power to grant an exemption to Director General.
19
Id. at 176. In Gencor Ltd v. Commission [1999] 4CMLR 971, a merger case, the
Court of First Instance opened the potential for a wide interpretation.
8

t

While France has a culture in favor of individual liberty, it has a negative attitude
against a free market system. Such irony is due to the contribution of an industrial
policy to a successful transformation of France's economic structures in the era of post
World War II. The government policy to promote high-tech industries was successful
in raising their international competitiveness, although attempts to promote some
inefficient industries, such as textile or steel industry, resulted in the loss of government
budget. The anti-cartel provision of the Napoleonic Penal Code which generated the
tolerance of cartels during the pre-war times was actively applied to a few cases due to
the strict requirements of the criminal statute, e.g. the difficult proof of artificiality and
abnormality of the desired price?0 The lenient attitude against cartels shifted when a
decree issued in 1953 (modified in 1958) prohibited agreements that impose minimum
prices or trading margins, agreements which allow an individual trader to discriminate
habitually in terms of sale or through refusal to sale, and concerted actions which aimed
at interfering with ·competition. These prohibitive behaviors are allowed under certain
exemptions, such as market improvement and economic progress by rationalization and
specialization? 1 However, the 1953 decree was not effectively enforced because
industrial policy prevailed over competition policy.22 Such prevalence of industrial
policy precluded the growth of public awareness of competition culture and norms. One
example of such government intervention still remaining in industries is the newly

20

Refer to Ch. 2, III. 2. 2) (C)
Rodger and Macculloch, supra note 17, at 34.
22
The governmental policy strategically focused on several high-tech industries e.g. the
aero or railroad industry. State-operating companies led investment in the high-tech
industries. Such policy succeeded in raising France's economic level.
21
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elected central-right winged president's promise to pressure big retailers to reduce their
prices as an initiative to boost households' purchasing power.

23

Rest
prob

On the other hand, the negative perspective of a free market mechanism has been

undc

reduced by the integration to the EU market system which adopted competition rules

imP

under Art. 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, and by a new liberalism from the Anglo-

cau,

Saxon countries, the U.K. and the U.S. Although not preferring a radical deregulation
over almost all areas, France privatized quite a few public service industries and public

(~

monopolies under the 1992 grand marche interieur (big internal market). 24 Art. 7 of

ll

Decree No. 86 (1 Dec. 1986) ofthe remodeled competition law ofFrance adopted a

res

similar provision found in Art. 81 ofthe Treaty of Rome and applied a general

ac1

prohibition to all kinds of concerted restrictive practices. On the other hand, Art. 10, No.

re:

2, Dec. No. 89 exempted economically desirable cartels on the legislative basis.

w

di
(4) Germany

la

After the WWII, on the contrary to the former approach condoning cartels, West

0

Germany started to develop strong competition laws by the adoption of democracy and

e

a free market system under the influence of the new Freiburg School, economists who

1

were firm believers in a competitive free market system and pointed out the distortions
which cartelization brought about in the German economy.Z 5 The Act against the

23

Ben Hall, Sarkozy unveils measures to curb prices, FT 10 (Nov. 30, 2007)
Christian Stoffaes, Chairman ofthe Board, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et
d'lnformations lntemationales, Speech at 2007 Fordham Conference, in ANNuAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL
ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY (hereinafter IALP), at 256 (Barry Hawked. Fordham Law
Institute(FLI), 2007)
25
See id. at 29-30. Ludwig Erhard, the first economic minister who pursued a strict

24
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Restraint of Competition of 1958, as a stringent competition law, adopted the
prohibition principle which prevented collaboration itself among horizontal competitors
under Sec. 1 with such special exceptions as structural crisis, rationalization, export,
26

import, and condition (discount and payment terms) cartels . The Cartel Office took a
cautious position at first, but gradually held strong actions against the cartels.

(5) Analysis

In the course of economic development, advanced countries faced competitionrestricting business activities among enterprises including cartels, and treated such
activities with different attitudes. For instance, Germany, with a focus on waste of
resources from excessive competition, adopted a general approval policy subsequently
with control over abusive activities. On the other hand, the U.K. and the U.S., although
different in degree, have kept stringent cartel-prohibiting policies under the common
law tradition that free competition generates public good. The analyses of development
of competition law in advanced countries indicate that several bases of competition law
enforcement decide its coverage and strength. The following picture demonstrates the
level and strength of competition law enforcement depending on several external
conditions in a country.

competition policy, later became the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
Walter Eucken and Franz Boehm, economists, were major adherents to the School.
26
Id. at 30.
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Since a competition-restricting activity, particularly a cartel, contributes to the
accumulation of corporate wealth, the companies with a substantial proportion of
existent market shares, face the temptation to avoid severe competition and exclude
new competitors by collusion. Meanwhile, consumers have endured negative effects
from such competition-restriction through increased prices, reduced output, and
stagnated quality. Since public policy makers find more interest in economic growth,
which consists mostly of corporate production, they find more favor in pro-corporation
policy including competition-restricting measures. However, economic growth through
such wealth-expanding policies does not provide efficiency-based competition in a
market. As entrepreneurship, nurtured under a competitive market structure, is an
important element to economic development, competition policy plays an important
role in further economic development.
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]

Competition-facilitating rules as well as free trade rules function when a market
economy outgrows an initial level and expands for further growth. The first box on the
right sided bottom in the picture illustrates this. The achievement of cross-border free
trade is diluted by anti-competitive activities in domestic markets, such as exclusive
business practices, and inefficient or unfair activities of existent companies.
International laws regulating international trade have developed to reduce or eliminate
competition-restrictive activities of the existent companies as private trade barriers.
Although cartel-facilitating academic researchers in Germany were regarded as
prominent economists in the past era, they did not foresee the integration of the
domestic economy toward the regional market, such as the EU, and the global market.
An individual country can not win merit-based competition in other markets while

looking over anticompetitive inefficiencies, e.g. a cartel in a domestic market. France's
example illustrates the increasing awareness of the importance of anti-cartel law when
it faced the integrated market of the EU and the global market. Although France used to
keep a national-champion policy in strategic industries, it is now a serious anti-cartel
law enforcer.
The legal system needs to be developed to support accumulation of competition law
jurisprudence. The second box from the rigl1t-sided bottom indicates this. The
independent institutional system in charge of competition law is necessary to enforce a
high level of competition policy; the objective of competition facilitation is depreciated

or not considered when the pro-corporate political pressure affects competition law
enforcement or decision. For instance, in the U.K, the Office of Fair Trading was
established for the competition policies. Investigation under legal procedure,

13

transparent decision-making through publication, exposure to public discussion, and the

Fu

authorities which review initial decisions contribute to competition law development

com

In Germany, the Federal Cartel Office in charge of the anti-cartel policy has developed

wbc

competition norms under its independent policy goal. In the U.S., the Antitrust Division

con

of the Department of Justice has worked against hard-core cartel activities through Sec.

witl

1 of the Sherman Act to achieve judicial decisions on penalizing their activities as a

roo,

felony under criminal law. Other cartel activities go to the FTC, for balancing their

ant

anticompetitive effect against pro-competitive effect. The FTC has issued its decision

be(

for which judicial review is available.

ant

It is not easy, however, to activate competition law under un-democratized political
institutions or societies because it needs political support from less powerful social

lel

members, such as consumers and small-and-middle sized companies. The third box
from the bottom illustrates it. In the U.S. when Congress adopted the Sherman Act,

sa

angry local railroad companies excluded by national trusts and users facing high fees

hi

were strong advocates on passing the Sherman Act. Although the Supreme Court
hesitated to follow a strict application of Sec. 1 of the Act under the U.K. common law
tradition,

27

Congress continued to pursue its initial goal of strong competition policy by

adding supplementary legislations, such as the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
Committee (FTC) Act.

27

Some justices opposed literal interpretation of 'every restraint of commerce' by
adding a restriction to the language of the provision such as undue or unreasonable.
Finally, the rule of reason standard was adopted in the Standard Oil ofNew Jersey case
in 1911. In hard core cartel cases, the Supreme Court has excluded the rule of reason
rule from the U.K. common law tradition since the Trenton Potteries case.
14

Furthermore, competition law enforcement needs academic research for aiding
cOlnpetition policy,

28

as the fourth box from the bottom shows. Particularly, economists

who strongly advocate competition law place hypothetical foundations for pursuing a
competition policy. Germany could not have developed a modern competition policy
without positive participation from the Freiburg school. The U.K. also activated
modern anti-cartellaw because of government papers warning of the negative effect of
anti-competitive practices on the future British economy. The U.S. antitrust law has
been under strong influences of powerful economical analyses, such as Chicago school
and Harvard School.
At least a medium level of economic development involved in international trade,
legal system, political democracy, and academic background decide the level of
competition law enforcement as the picture above shows. When more conditions are
satisfied, the level of competition law enforcement goes stronger. The bigger arrows, as
higher from the bottom, demonstrate such stronger enforcement. The analysis of
development of competition law in advanced countries supports the hypothesis.

2. Cartel Regulation in Developing Countries
(1) South Africa
South Africa adopted the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act(RMCA) of
1955 as its first general competition law. The RMCA regulated a number of
monopolistic conditions with an administrative examination of rule of reason on the
standard of public interest. The Board of Trade and Industries in charge of
28

MAHER DABBAH, THE lNTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY, 57 (Cambridge
Univ. 2003)
15

investigations, recommendations of remedies, negotiation and supervision of

tbt

compliance, had no independent powers while the Minister of Trade and Industry had

no

decision power. The overall structure of the investigation and decision-making is
susceptible to political pressure. In addition, the law did not have active enforcements

di

during its twenty-four year history?9 A review of the RMCA in two decades evaluated

pl

that the RMCA was unsuccessful in light of its poor regulatory records and a dramatic

n

increase in oligopolies. 30

e

In response to critics against deficient enforcements and political influences, the
Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act (MPCA) in 1979 was created.
Although the Competition Board, newly established for enforcing the MPCA, had its
own independent power of investigation into competition complaints, the Minister of
Trade and Industry still had the power to appoint members to the Board and make a
final decision whether he accept or refuse a recommendation from the Board, which
makes a room for political influence. 31 Although a regulation issued by the Minister
stipulated that such cartel practices are per se unlawful as horizontal collusion on price,
terms, or market share and bid rigging, and that violation of the regulations are crimes,

29

Among a total of eighteen investigation cases ordered by the Ministry, It looks that
there were the eight cartel cases which were found to be contrary to the public interest.
Almost all cases turned out to be in negotiated settlements without penalty. Sanction
was imposed on one case by the Ministry. OECD, Competition Law and Policy in South
Africa: an OECD Peer Review, 12 (2003), available at
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/52/1312958714.pdf (visited on Apr.28,2008)
30
The Competition Commission of South Africa, About Us: the Introduction, at
http://www.compcom.co.za (visited on Apr. 27, 2008)
31
Eleanor Fox and Dennis Davis, Industrial Policy and Competition-Developing
Countries as Victims and Users, in supra note 24, at 163.
16

there was no history of criminal sentence beside one guilty plea case. Overall, there was
not much improvement even through the 1979 MPC Act. 32
The economic development of South Africa was centered the extraction industry of
diamonds and gold for export purposes. The economic policies of South Africa
protected investors in the industry and tried to widen the economic growth to local
manufacturing and farming. Monopoly concessions were conferred on state-owned
enterprises around the tum of the 191h century. On the other hand, racial discrimination
was reflected in public policies and protected white-owned businesses from black
enterprises' competitions, thereby maintaining low labor costs from a large black-labor
supply. Policies of autarky and import substitution under governmental intervention
were strengthened when the international community imposed economic sanctions
against racial discrimination policies. 33

In the era of apartheid repression, however, the enforcement of competition law under
the industrial policy, which had been designed to promote South Africa's economy,
was not active. Among other reasons, the political climate of South Africa contributed
to the under-enforcement of competition law. South Africa has adopted a socialistic
economy since the African National Congress passed the Freedom Charter in 1955,
which made a weak foundation of implementation of the competition policy that

32

According to Department of Trade and Industry, the 1979 Act did not address the
extent of concentration of ownership or vertical or conglomerate relations, and had
little leverage to prevent mergers expanding concentration. In addition, it did not have
an explicit provision for strongly prohibiting anticompetitive activity. See id. On the
other hand, OECD criticized that public interest as its substantive standard was
undefined. See OECD, supra note 29, 13.
33
Id., at 9- 10.
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requires focusing on market forces.

34

The minority government, representing the white,

had limitations to pursue a competitive and free market system as it discriminated the

pl

black in economic activities under the apartheid.
However, after the democratic government assumed power in 1994, it developed a
reconstruction and development program, which included strict antitrust legislation to

a

create a more competitive business environment and remove anticompetitive practices.

s

The 1994 Constitution tried to rebuild the state and its laws on a democratic

c

foundation. 35 The National Economic Development and Labor Council (NEDLAC)

t

launched consensus-building among government, business and labor, and community
NGOs, and organized debates over the proposed competition law with their broadly
inclusive participation. 36 With the five-year debates and political support, the 1998
Competition Act, presented by the Minister of Trade and Industry, took effect with a
priority on the national economic reform plan. The new Act aimed at overcoming the
shortcomings of the old Act, promoting competition jurisprudence, and improving the
chronic imbalances of the South African economy inherited from apartheid. Three
major objectives of competition policy, such as efficiency promotion, competitivenessstrengthening, and equity-enhancing, are reflected under Sec. 2 of the Competition Act
of 1998. 37 According to the Competition Tribunal, when the equity objective conflicts

34

Fox and Davis, supra note 31, at 164. Prior to 1955, South Africa's economic system
was capitalism with the most highly concentration in conglomerate forms.
35
OECD, supra note 29, 11.
36
Jd. at 16.
37
The purpose of the Act is, according to Sec. 2, (a) to promote the efficiency,
adaptability, and development ofthe economy, (b) to provide consumers with
competitive prices and product choices, (c) to promote employment and advance the
social and economic welfare of South Africans, (d) to expand opportunities for South
African participation in the world market, (e) to ensure SME's equitable opportunity to
18

with the efficiency objective as a main concern of competition policy, equity can
prevail over efficiency only when the loss of public interests related to equity is
considerable and certain.

38

Competition-restrictive horizontal agreements or concerted practices or decisions of
an association of competitors are prohibited under a 'rule of reason' if they
substantially lessen or prevent competition in a market. The prohibition can be
overcome when pro-competitive gains outweigh the anti-competitive effects, however
the pro-competitive gains are limited to technology, productive efficiency, or other
factors related to the competitive effect ofrestraint.

39

On the other hand, in practice, a

per se rule applies to the most serious anti-competitive horizontal agreements, e.g. price
fixing, market division, and collusive tendering, without requiring a showing of actual
harmful effects or permitting a showing of net efficiency.

40

The per se rule is limitedly

extended to a competition-restrictive agreement regarding any other trading condition
closely connected to price, quantity, and quality. 41 The exemption from the Act,
reflecting other social or economic policies, such as promotion of small-business
competitiveness, applies to both standards, rule of reason and per se illegal. 42

participate in the economy and (f) to promote a greater spread of ownership,
particularly of the black people. The purposes from (a) to (c) can be categorized under
efficiency and the (d) under competitiveness while (e) to (f) are under equity.
38
Schumann Sasol Ltd v. Prices Daelite Ltd, 2001-2002 CPLR 281 (CT), available at
http://www.comptrib.co.za/decidedcases/html/23LMMAYO 1M.htm. Fox & Davis,
supra note 31, 167-8.
39
Section 4(1)(a) of 1997 Competition Act. See OECD, Country Studies: South Africa
-Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy, 22-23 (May 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/58/34823812.pdf(last visited on Nov. 13, 2007).
40
Sec. 4(1)(b).
41
OECD, supra note 39, 23.
42
Sec. 10.
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The Act shifts the burden of proof regarding an anti-competitive agreement to a
defendant. If firms engaged in a common practice have a common director or
substantial shareholder, or reciprocal significant ownership interests, they are presumed
to have made the agreement. The presumption can be rebutted when defendant proves
that the practice was a normal response to prevailing market conditions.

43

The intent of

this policy is to encourage firms related through complex and loosely-connected
investment structures to dismantle the structures or to make their control relationships
more transparent. Agreements entirely among the members of a corporate group of
wholly-owned subsidiaries or similar structures are not prohibited under either the rule

'f:Jk'on or the per se rule."
. In spite of the reforms of the 1998 Competition Act, there has been rare enforcement

action against horizontal restraints. With the 1998 Act, none of the cases reportedly
succeeded on imposing a penalty on horizontal restrictive agreements although some
investigations are underway. 45
The reason for the under-enforcement of South Africa's anti-cartel policy is i) less
focus on cartel enforcement than monopoly enforcement, ii) low public awareness of
cartel-causing damages, and iii) the difficulty in locating horizontal agreements. First,
solving the chronic monopoly and subsequent economic concentration issues in the
context of South Africa's economy and politics takes priority over competition policy.

43

Sec. 4(1)(b) and Sec. 4(2)
Sec. 4(5). OECD, supra note 39, at 23.
45
OECD, supra note 39, at 13 & 23-24. The paper reported two cases, one on an export
cartel resulting in the Competition Commission's decline to accept a proposed consent
order and fine, and the other on fee and other restrictive practices in the legal profession
service sector, resulting in a failure of imposing conditions on an exemption of the
sector in a trial.
44
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A competition commissioner from South Africa who participated as a panel to the
}\lllerican Bar Association(ABA) Annual Session of Antitrust Law acknowledged that

the anti-cartel practice has not taken a priority position in practice. 46 In considering the
huge amount of damage to consumers and to the market caused by a cartel, the
f

acknowledgement of the commissioner implied that even experts did not consider
seriously the severe damage that a cartel generates in markets let alone the public.
Moreover, while a monopoly is externally revealed by market share investigation, a
cartel with covert agreements is not easily uncovered by price investigation because it
requires additional proof demonstrating collusive behaviors. The inherent difficulty in
locating a cartel contributed to under-enforcement of cartel regulation.

(2) People's Republic of China (PRC)
The central-planned economy under the reins of the communist party has pursued its
fundamental reform toward a market-based economy since 1978 when Deng Xiaoping
initiated it. Before 1978, the state owned most enterprises, set prices for almost all
goods and services, and assigned workers to enterprises. Farm workers in rural areas
labored as members of communes according to the state's plan. However, the planned
economy brought about enormous inefficiencies such as low production and low
quality due to the low incentive for hard-work, or the waste of resources based on
inaccurate forecasts. 47 State-owned enterprises (SOEs) with convoluted social
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@ Interview with ~ommissioner, outh Africa's Competition Commission (Mar. 31,
2006). The authorrifttre thesis in erviewed, on the topic of cartel enforcement, with
South Africa's commissioner who participated as a panel in the 2006 ABA Annual
Session of Antitrust Law.
47
Bruce Owen, Su Sun, and Wentong Zheng, Antitrust in China: the Problem of
21

objectives did not generate results in efficient management but in a waste of resources.

the d

Reform to provide autonomy and property right to enterprises and farmers sped the

JllOS1

increase of local productivity and the emergence of private enterprises. In 1992, when

of al

the Chinese Communist Party officially pronounced a socialist market economy as a

cotn

goal of the economic reform, private enterprises and foreign investment inflow grew at

bod

a tremendous speed. By 2004, the private enterprises, which had occupied only 0.2% of

is e

China's national industrial output,48 accounted for 55.6% ofGDP, 58.9% ofretail sales

'

and 62.3% ofexports.

49
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Through economic reform, political leadership become more aware of the

prt

anticompetitive harms of undue state control over the economy, and felt a threat from

,,,.
i

rapidly-increasing foreign capital flow, which led to an interest in competition law.

(C

Under a strategic plan, the government substantially reduced control over non-essential

le

industries, e.g. electronics and textiles, while retaining control over key industries. Still,
industrial associations, consisting ofSOEs subject to the control ofthe government,
sanctioned anti competitive practices of their members and even adopted selfdisciplinary prices with function similar to price-cartels. There was no institution in
place to correct the inefficiencies in the administrative practices.
On the other hand, China' legal system does not demonstrate sufficient capabilities to
support consistent enforcement of competition law. The National People's Congress
(NPC), the legislative body, has a simplistic approval procedure while the
Commissions for Legislative Affairs (CLA), under the NPC, researches and modifies

Incentive Compatibility, 1(1) J. COMP. L. AND ECON. 123, 126-7 (2004).
48
Report of China's State Statistics Bureau. See id. at 127.
49
Id. at 128.
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the draft with comments from experts. The State Council in the executive branch,
mostly in charge of law enactment and enforcement, can act without a legislative grant
of authority. The law enforcements are subject to a narrow scope of judicial review,
complicated procedure for a review and bias in favor of the government. The judiciary
body with much discretion, although supposed to be independent under the Constitution,
is exposed to the influence of the leadership in the Communist Party and government at

all levels. In addition, due to a lack of stare decisis, interpretations of the Supreme
People's Court can not be cited by other courts. As a result, predictability based on
precedents is weak.
As an initial form of competition law, the Countering Unfair Competition Law
(CUCL) had worked since 1993 by 2007. The CUCL expressed the intents of the
legislators to safeguard the transitional economy with the following goals: wholesome
development of the socialist market economy, encouragement of fair competition,
curbing unfair competition, and protecting the rights of businesses as well as consumers.
The substance of CUCL had the characteristic of a nascent stage in competition law.
Art. 15 of the CUCL prohibited a broad coverage of anticompetitive business practices,

including the banning of price-fixing or bid rigging, along with traditional unfair trade
practices, e.g. business bribes. infringement ofbusiness secrets, and misleading
advetiisements, 50 which resulted in overlaps with liabilities under other laws. 5 1

50

Owen et. al., supra note 47, at 138-9. They argue that a society where legitimacy of
competition law is skeptical usually incorporates into its competition law consumer
protection, or the issues of unfair practices that promote economic efficiency, which
even dominates its competition law practices. On the other hand, in China, the unfair
trade practices were supervised by a local agency under the leadership of a local
government which had to reflect other local interests, e.g. local development.
51
For an example in overlaps of bidding-rigging responsibilities, art. 27 of CUCL states
23

However, insufficient subsequent legal process did not coordinate the overlaps. 5:! In

provic

addition, the CUCL did not have regulations regarding the M&A. market allocation,

laW c1

boycott, and resale price maintenance. 53 Moreover, the regulation of abuses of
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administrative monopolies by governmental agencies was seldom enforced due to other

disct

public objecti ves ofthe law, such as regional development. 54

also

The Provisional Rules for Prevention of Monopoly Pricing (effective Nov. 11, 2003)

und1

included the prohibition of price coordination, supply restriction, and bid rigging. The

roar

similar treatment of monopoly and cartel practices can confuse business people under

join

the Rules and weaken the warning against collusive behaviors among companies, the

Eni

market share of which do not reach a monopoly position but can still restrict

act

competition significantly. From the competition policy's perspective, while monopolies

pre

can be pro-competitive or unavoidable, hard core cartels are almost always harmful to

ad

consumers under a per se illegal principle and need to be avoided. 55 If the law did not
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that when bidders collusively act to force up or down the bidding price, or a bidder
colludes with a tender-inviter for the purpose of pushing out their competitors, the
successful bid shall be invalid, and the supervision and inspection department may
impose a fine of not less than RMB 10,000 but not more than RMB 200,000.
Meanwhile, art.53 of the Law on Tender Invitation and Bidding added, with invalidity
ofthe bidding, that a fine should be not less than 5% and not more than 10% ofthe
amount of successful bid, illegal gains be confiscated, and qualification of bidding may
be revoked one or two years, along with subsequent public announcement. Criminal
responsibilities should be investigated.
52
OECD, OECD Global Forum on Competition (GFC), Contribution from China, at 5,
CCNM/GF/COMPIWD(2001)10 (Oct.2, 2001). The paper illustrates the overlap of
liabilities ofbid-rigging both under Art. 27 ofCUCL and Art. 53 ofthe Law on Tender
Invitation and Bidding.
53
OECD, supra note 52, at 4.
54
Art. 7. See also OECD GFC, The Objectives of Competition Law and Policy the
Optimal Design of a Competition Agency--- China (Session I), at 3,
CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2003)1 (Jan.9, 2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/62/23720833.pdf(visited on Jul.l8, 2008).
55
Owen et. al, supra note 47, 143.
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provide a clear division of legitimate and illegitimate business practices, competition
JaW could deter enterprises' pro-competitive behaviors. 56

The 2007 Anti-Monopoly Law has been recently adopted after more than a decade of
discussion from 1994. Although the Law is considered as targeting foreign mergers, it
also included the banning ofhorizontal monopoly agreements as cartelistic behaviors
under Art. 13. The prohibited cartel activities are i) price-fixing, ii) output-limiting, iii)
market allocation, iv) limiting of the purchase of new technologies or new facilities, v)
joint boycott, and vi) other agreement determined by the Anti-monopoly Law
Enforcement Agency. 57 However, the AML does not apply to alliances or concerted
actions of agricultural producers and rural economic organizations with respect to
production, processing, sales, transportation, and storage of agricultural products. 58 In
addition, the prohibitions may not be applicable if the parties' aim is i) to improve
technologies, or develop new products, ii) improve efficiency or unify standards, iii)
improve competitiveness of small to medium enterprises(SMEs), iv) serve public
interest causes, e.g. protection of environment or energy, v) overcome economic
downturn, vi) secure legitimate interests in foreign trade, e.g. export or import cartel, or
economic cooperation, and v) other reasons stated by the State Council. 59 The
justification will be acknowledged ifthe agreement do not restrict competition
substantially in the relevant market, and if consumers share the benefits of the

56

57

Id. at 144.

Susan Ning, Overview of the Anti-Monopoly Law of China, at 3 (Mar. 2008)
manuscript, on file with ABA Section of Antitrust).
8
Art. 56. See id.
59
Art. 15. See Sharon Mann, Enforcement of China's Antimonopoly Law, at 8 (Mar.
2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with ABA Section of Antitrust).
~unpublished
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agreement.

60

Art. 7 applies to state-owned enterprises in sectors which affect national

economic lifeline and state security, e.g. telecommunications, energy, and financial

the

services, or where exclusive operation and sale are implemented.

cor

The passed AML, as response to recent cartelistic behaviors of trade associations,
prohibits trade associations from organizing companies in their industries to take

Cc

monopolistic actions. 61 In spite of the conspicuous institutional reforms, 62 China's
unchanged refusal to adopt the whole competition culture and to focus on consumers'

cc

interests under its unique political and legal system might function as impediment to
effective cartel regulation. In 2006, when China's vitamin C trade association raised

...
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price, U.S. consumers brought class action suit to the Supreme Court of Eastern District

b

New York. 63 Although the AML includes private parties' rights to compensate

I

damages,

64

and to receive relief, such rigorous usage of action in damages, as the U.S .

case illustrates, can not be easily achieved without a rich pool of competition law
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experts, transparent judicial system, supplemental financial support for competition
authorities, and legal institutions to facilitate private actions like class action.

I,

(3) Mexico

60

Art. 15. See Ning, supra note 57, at 4.
Xinhua, China adopts anti-monopoly law, Aug.30, 2007, available at
http:///www.chinadaily.com (visited on Nov.l5, 2007). As a recent case of cartelistic
behaviors, instant noodles trade association in China increased price of instant noodles
by 10% in July 2007, thereby causing social antipathy.
62
In terms of authority, rather than diversity, China tried to bring competition issues to
the central authority because the CUCL revealed the lenient practices oflocal agencies
in favor oflocal interests.
63
In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 237 F.R.D. 35 (June 7, 2006).
64
Art. 50. Actual loss, defendant's profit, and plaintiff's legal expenses belong to
damages. Owen et. al, supra note 47, 147.
61
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Mexico adopted active industrial policies with the basic idea of protecting so called
the 'infant industry' during the 60s. Under these policies, the government had taken
control over market price and launched state-owned enterprises to reduce the evils of
private monopolies under the monopoly prohibition of the 1917 Mexican
Constitution. 55 As a result of such policies, Mexico succeeded in promoting some
important industries but caused huge inefficiencies and market distortion, particularly
collusive practices, due to excessive government control until the mid 80s.
Around 1984, however, came out negative results from the protection-oriented
economic policy, such as the inefficiencies of resource allocations due to few options,

high price and low quality, reduced entrepreneurial creativity, and highly concentrated
market. The negative points were evaluated to outweigh some successful outcomes of
the policy. Such analysis led to a policy shift toward open trade without targeting a
specific sector distinguished from the pick-and-choose type policy. The unstable
market situations under the closed national market, such as high and variable prices,
exploding interest rates, and unpredictable exchange rates, urged an open economic
structure. The wide coverage of an open market policy brought about the adoption of
free trade agreements (FTAs), free investment, and deregulation policies. Partners of
overall FTAs under the open market policy were forty three countries, among which the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, and the subsequent FTA
with the European Union are famous. 66 The opening of the market expanded the trade

in imports and exports, respectively by 1000% and by 555% during the 1984 to 2002
65

OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: An OECD Peer Review, 12 (Jun. 4,
2004), available at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/11115/31969311.pdf (visited on Jul.
18, 2008).
66
FLI, supra note 24 (IALP), at 248 (2007); OECD, supra note 65, 10.
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period when economic policies had been shifting.

67

Import liberalization stimulated

domestic competition in tradable goods industries. The adoption of the Federal Law or

practic

Economic Competition (LFCE) and the creation ofthe Federal Competition

conut

Commission (CFC) were necessary due to Mexico's commitment to the proscription of
anti-competitive business conduct under NAFT A.
On the other hand, economic crises, such as the peso crisis of the mid 90s and

right 1
the st

subsequent disorders, accompanied the policy shift to open trade. 68 The difficulties led

woul

to governmental reacquisition of formerly privatized firms. Although Mexico's

by aJ

economy recovered through strong exports, ex-president Salinas who was in charge of
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open trade policy and his political successor president Zedillo faced severe criticisms.
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Competition law and the CFC were considered as involuntary institutions imposed by

Me

NAFTA. With the 2002 economic development program of President Fox who was

c

elected democratically, competition policy sustained its position as a prominent tool

pr;

within the program in spite of insufficient public support. The subsequent practices of

ef

the CFC to pursue strong competition policy, the judicial acknowledgement of its

tb

authority, and legislators' support of the law, notwithstanqing the lobbies of powerful

e:

:•
I
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interests, enabled the successful operation of the CFC throughout its development. 69
The WTO Mexican Telecommunication case occurred in the context where the open
trade policy still conflicted with remaining anti-competitive government practices. The
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) has a Telecommunications Annex
and a Reference Paper which requires signatory nations to maintain reasonable
67

OECD, supra note 65, 10. Trade with the U.S. and Canada tripled after the
implementation ofNAFTA.
68 d
It . at 12.
69
ld. at 14.
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measures to prevent major suppliers from engaging in or continuing anti competitive

if

practices. 70 When the Mexican regulatory agency, the Federal Telecommunications
Commission (COFETEL), authorized multiple Mexican firms to terminate calls in

)f

Mexico, it adopted rules which provided the largest Mexican carrier, Telmex, the sole
right to set the termination fee and required that all other carriers elevate their prices to
the set level. Additionally, the rules required market sharing among the firms that
would be available at the Telmex-set price. The U.S. brought a complaint to the WTO
by arguing that Mexico arranged a cartel for price-raising and market-sharing as an
anti competitive practice not pursuant to the GATS. In this case mixing public with
private restraint, the penal held that such rules were against commitments which
Mexico made to accede to GATS and Annex on Communication. 71
Cartels are regulated as either absolute or relative monopolistic practices. Absolute
practices are prohibited per se and agreements are legally void without allowing any
efficiency defense while relative monopolistic practices may not be found illegal unless
the respondent has substantial power in a defined market and fails to prove an
efficiency defense. 72 The latter standard represents the rule of reason standard applied
to collective boycotts, and other competition-restrictive practices under Art. 10. Sec.
VII as a catch-all provision. The per se prohibition applies to four types of hard-core

70

Art. 1(1) of Reference Paper to the Telecommunications Annex to the GATS,
reproduced at 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997) &Art.5(a) of Annex on Telecommunications to the
GATS.
71
Eleanor Fox, The WTO s First Antitrust Case-Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory
for Trade and Competition, 9 J.lNT'LECON. L. 271,279 & 281-290 (2006). Panel
Report, Mexico: Measures Affecting Telecommunication Services, WT/DS204/R
(2004) & WT/DS204/9/Add.8 (2005).
72
Art. 9 regulates absolute monopolistic practices while art. 8 does relative
monopolistic practices.
29

cartels: price fixing, output restriction, market division, and bid-rigging under Art. 9.
Absolute prohibition has played an important role of eliminating the remaining price

due to

constraints. Mexico's law regulated the prices of most goods and services until the mid

procl~

80s and the Ministry of Economics encouraged industry members to discuss and set
price levels in business chambers. Still, there remained legal provisions which

byob

authorized the federal government to set a maximum price. 73 By reforming price-

focu~

control and business-chamber provisions, the market-setting price mechanism was
instituted but still there were traditional price setting customs among companies. To

pern

overcome this challenge, the 1998 LFCE Regulations specified that certain

Min

circumstances would constitute circumstantial evidence of price fixing such as two or

sma

more competitors adhering to a price announced by a business chamber.

.
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While the 1998 LFCE had administrative sanctions, such as corrective orders and

oft

fines for monopolistic practices, the 2006 revision 75 increased the fine and let the CFC

mo

refer to prosecutors for criminal charges against the involved individuals such

pet

monopolistic cases as severely affected the necessities market. However, the use of

ce1

criminal charges appears to be ineffective in light of the recent comment of the

co

chairman of the CFC that Mexico does not have criminal sanctions. 76 The only instance

so

of criminal referral of a price fixing case, involving an association of tortilla

st

73

71

Mexico's CONST. Art. 28 allows the federal government to set maximum prices for
articles or services deemed necessary for the national economy or popular consumption.
Art. 7 of the LFCE implements the provision by stating that an agreement between the
Ministry of Economics and producers to discuss an action necessary to minimize its
effect on competition is not a violation of the LFCE.
74
OECD, supra note 65, 19.
75
The new law includes attractive leniency program and improved procedures for
investigations. FLI, supra note 24, at 265.
76
Eduardo Perez Motta, Chairman ofMexico's Federal Competition Commission,
Speech at 2007 FLI's IALP Conference. See id.
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manufactures in 2000, resulted in a public prosecutor's decline to pursue a criminal trial
due to the insufficient proof of a charge.

77

As to extraterritorial application, the CFC

proclaimed that the LFCE applies to all agents whose actions impact markets in the
Mexican territory.

78

However, the CFC has avoided investigating a controversial case

by obtaining jurisdiction over foreign entities through voluntary submissions and by
focusing on cooperation agreements with foreign competition authorities. 79
Although the LFCE has not acknowledged small-firm defenses, small firms are
permitted to coordinate business activities under a program administered by the
Ministry of Economy which facilitates the creation of one entity or partnerships among
small and medium sized firms and exposes them to scale economies and increased
efficiency. 80 As to other exemptions, Art. 28 of Mexico's Constitution, the foundation
of the LFCE, states that the state function in 'strategic areas' is not deemed to constitute
monopolistic practices, such as the postal service, telegraph and radio telegraphy,
petroleum, nuclear energy, electric power, radioactive minerals, the functions of the
central bank in producing coins and paper currency, which the Art. 4 of the LFCE
confirms. Moreover, export associations, operating as export cartels, are exempted with
some requirements. 81 However, the LFCE provides no exception on the ground that a
state or local agency undertakes to restrict interstate or foreign commerce. Mexico's
77

The sub-group of the association agreed on different prices and there was no
agreement among the association's members to fix a single price. OECD, supra note 65,
19-20.
78
!d. 17. See also CFC, Annual Report, 28 (1994).
79
OECD, supra note 65, 17.
80
See id. at 20.
81
Art. 6 states five requirements: (i) region's main income source, (ii) the goods not
sold or distributed in Mexico, (iii) voluntary membership, (iv) no grant or permit issued,
and (v) compliance with the law of the domiciliary state. The English-version ofLFCE
is available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/Mexico/Competitionlrnxcom1.html.
31

Constitution approves the power of federal government to regulate anti competitive acts
of state authorities e.g. establishing an interstate trade barrier. 82

(4) South Korea
South Korea adopted its competition law, the Monopoly Restraint Fair Trade Act
(MRFTA) in 1980 after several trials starting from the late 60s. The enactment ofthe
MRFTA was due to the acknowledgement ofpoliticians that Korea's economy, where
conglomerates had maintained oligopoly market structures, could not be strengthened

,,

r:

sub-group ofthe Ministry of Economic Planning (MEP) until 1994, so the Act did not

r:

make an impressive achievement. As the Yong-Sam Kim (YS) administration adopted

s

without establishing competitive markets. The MRFTA previously operated under a

globalization and competition as a political motto since 1993, the Korea Fair Trade

am

Commission (KFTC), an independent institution from MEP, took the role of

att

implementing competition policy. However, the economic reform of the YS

co

administration was appraised as producing less fruit than expected in five years when

K

the Korean economy faced a lack of foreign exchange under the influence of the Asian

K

financial crisis. The YS administration requested rescue funds from the IMF. South

t]

Korea had to endure being subject to the conditionality of the IMF loan. The
subsequent Dae Jung Kim (DJ) administration, taking regime during the economic
crisis, proclaimed both restoring the economy and establishing a democracy as their
main goal. With the pressure on conglomerates to dispose inefficient companies, the DJ
administration focused on the restructuring of industries and the restoring of confidence

82

Mexico's CONST.Art. 117 sec.V and Art. 14 & 15 ofLFCE.
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00 Korea's

credibility. The KFTC, the institution in charge of competition policy, went

forward to regulate inefficient conglomerates and improved its reputation among the
public.
Total cartel cases on KFTC imposed sanction
Year

'81-'92

'93

'94

'95

'96

'97

'98

'99

Cases

91

16

19

26

36

22

37

34

Year

'00

'01

'02

'03

'04

'05

'06

Cases

47

43

47

23

35

46

46

total

555

Since 1994, when an independent KFTC was launched, the number of cartel cases
amounted to more than 20 annually as the table below demonstrates. The serious
attitude ofKFTC against cartel regulation went along with the independent operation of
competition authorities since the surcharge was contributed to the yearly budget of the
KFTC and cartel surcharges occupied more than half of the total surcharges of the
KFTC. KFTC brought a few criminal referrals with all of them ending up with a fine on
the culprits.
It was with a more democratized bureaucracy and political turmoil due to the IMF

conditionality that significant improvement of investigations and criminal referrals was
made. As Korea's economy was under pressure to root open and create competitive
structure as a condition of the IMF rescue loan, competition law enforcements grew
strict. The level of cartel enforcement went seriously increasing. Although the
concentration of economic power in conglomerates and mergers were the major issues

33

to which the competition authority of the KFTC devoted itself to satisfy the structural

pre

adjustment program of the IMF, surcharges against cartels and criminal referral cases

be:

of the KFTC have increased since 2000, as illustrated below. 83 The KFTC announced

reJ

that the proportion of cartel surcharges out of the total of surcharges was on average

tal

61.2% during 20 years and 96.2% in 2005. 84 The KFTC, with its utmost interest, even
proclaimed 2004 as the year for sweeping cartels and 2006 as the year of regulatory
improvement.
Surcharge against Collusive Behavior (Cartel) of KFTC
'81-'98

'99

'00

'01

'02

'03

'04

'05

49

15

12

8

14

9

12

21

TotalS

51.9

23.3

127.8

26.7

50.6

108.6

28.8

249.3

AverageS

1.06

1.55

10.65

3.34

3.61

12.07

2.4

11.9

Criminal

4

3

4

5

3

Year
(US$ mil)
Cases with
Surcharge(S)

0

0

4

Referral

The further adoption of incentive systems, such as the leniency program in 1997 and
rewards to whistle blowers in 2002, contributed to the recent increase of cartel cases.
An initial cooperator which submits a paper report to the KFTC, prior to launching of

an initial investigation, can be exempted from the KFTC's sanction under the leniency

KFTC, Whitepaper [if:Aa ~ ~ ~-"i], 127-128 (2004); KFTC, Whitepaper [if:Aa ~ C1l
~ -"1 ], 186 (2007).
84
The average proportion is calculated from 1986 to 2005. KFTC, Proportion of
Surcharge against Cartel [ E..~ 411 ~ l:ll it], available at http://www.ftc.go.kr
83

7r
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program. The qualification for exemption can be extended to cover a second reporter
before investigation and an initial cooperator after its investigation even through verbal
reports. The discretionary exemption is changed to mandatory exemption. 85 As the
table below reveals, the leniency program has brought about tremendous effect
particularly since 2005. Meanwhile, a reward system is supposed to provide a monetary
award of maximum US$ I million to a person who reports illegal cartels and submits
evidence to the KFTC. Currently, the reward system has exposed eight illicit cartels.
However, total award reaches no more than US$ 105,000 on all reporters. 86 A more
generous level of award will expectedly contribute to activating the reward system in a
short time.

The application of leniency program at KFTC 87
Year

99

00

02

03

04

05

06

Case

1

1

2

1

2

7

7

0.3

0.4

3.4

-

174

55

Surcharge

1.3

(US$ mil)

The KFTC had initial cases to practice the extraterritorial application of the MRFT A
through investigating international cartel cases, in the vitamin and graphite electrode
industry, in 2004. The investigations ended up with issuing surcharges to multinational
companies which do not a branch in Korea. Recently, the KFTC cooperated in an

85

The mandatory exemption consists of no sanction to the first reporter or cooperator
and 30% reduced sanction to the second reporter.
86
KFTC, supra note 83, 182-3 (2007).
87
See id. at 182.
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investigation into an international freight delivery fee conspiracy against airplane
companies, thereby preventing a company from obstructing related evidence. 88

ecoll

The KFTC promoted consumer awareness through the cases where a large scope of

colD

consumers obtained compensation. In a school uniform bid-rigging and price-fixing

illlP

case, major uniform manufacturers and distributors made price ranges in each locality

an f

and interrupted official bids at schools. The KFTC issued a large surcharge against the

the:

manufacturers and placed a criminal referral against major implementers under the

wh

violation of Art. 19 (1) ofthe MRFTA. 89 Subsequently, 3,525 consumers who

wi1

purchased the uniforms with a high price brought a private suit to a court to redress

thf

monetary damages caused by the fixed price and received around a total US$

cw

217,000. 90 After crushing the cartel, the uniform price went down.
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(5) Analysis
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n
88
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KFTC's threatening investigation covering several industries including semiconductor and construction cartels [3 ~ 7 ~, ~ ~ Ail-& 1f- Aa ~ , ~ .5:. ~11, :{! 11 %
~ l:IJ- ~ ~;,.}] (Mar. 7, 2006), available at
http://blog.korea.kr/mainllog_print.do?blogld=40000072&logld=40000863
89
Art. 19 (1) of MRFTA, under the title of prohibition of w1fair collaborative acts,
states that no enterpriser shall agree with other enterprisers by contract, agreement,
resolution, or any other means to jointly engage in an act, or let others do an activity,
for exan1ple. (i) an act fixing, maintaining, or changing prices, (ii) an act detennining
tenns and conditions for transactions of goods or services, or payment of prices thereof,
and (viii) any practice that substantially lessens competition in a particular business
area by means of interfering with or restricting the activities or contents of business. In
addition, Art. 315 of Korea ·s Criminal Code impose maximum two-year imprisonment
or seven thousand dollars on bid-riggers.
90
Jin-Hee Lee, Did you remember school uniform suit 4 years ago: court decided that
the manufacturer redress damages to parents [4\1 1"!, Ji1. ~~% 71 ~ i>"}tJ Y77}? ~ ~'
"Jil~jjl~;,.}, ~.!f-.2.o1l ~llJfl1}-5-}4" Jtr~], Chungnam Sisa, Jun. 28,2005,
available at http://www.bjynews.com/news/read.php?idxno=9348
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First, complex institutions of competition law are to be adopted when a national
economy, after experiencing a limitation in inner growth, opens its market to foreign
companies. The DCs face the necessity of having a competition policy and effective
implementation when they raise the level of development of a market economy beyond
91

an autarky economic structure and facilitate companies' business activities. Although
they might have a basic level of regulatory legislation on unfair business practices
when they do not fully open their market, the legislation is likely to be under-enforced
with insufficient support for and less emphasis on competition. In the PRC, for example,
the CACU included basic regulations on anti-competitive activities, such as hard core
cartels, with other business torts. It was after China acceded to the WTO when it
adopted its complex competition-regulating legislation including anti-cartel provisions.
Without competition pressure from global markets, companies do not devote their
energies to improving their strength, thereby leading to collusion among competitors or
abuse of monopoly power to maintain their existent positions. Cartel regulation is under
more attentions when the market mechanism to secure free and fair competition
becomes more pronounced and when the awareness that cartels cause tremendous
damages and inefficiency is widely spread to market systems. Governments with a plan
of economic development propose competition laws, the result of which depends on the
political structure of each country. In the PRC, the National Congress usually passes

91

See MARTYR TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW: A NEW DIMENSION FOR

THE WTO?

74 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006). Taylor mentions Papua New Guinea's
historic stance as the foundation of his argument that an important precondition for
competition law is an effective institutional setting and threshold level of economic
development but did not further explains the meaning of the effective institutional
setting.
37
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drafts from local governments while, in South Korea, the Congress vetoed
governmental drafts several times in the 60s and early 70s.

tht

Second, the serious enforcement of competition law depends to a significant degree
on politics where institutional, financial and public support derives from. The rigorous

an

enforcement of competition law, particularly cartel regulation, needs political support.

pa

For instance, South Africa put serious effort into the enforcement of competition law

lo

since the democratic government representing the majority of the black people oriented

c

economic reforms towards open market and competition in 1994. In Mexico, an open
market and competition policy were adopted in 1984, which succeeded through the

a:

democratized government ofthe Fox administration in 2002. In South Korea,

D

strengthened competition law, initiated in the 1993 Yang-Sam Kim administration, was
rigorously enforced in the 1998 Dae-Jung Kim administration and the subsequent 2002
!.·.

Moo-Hyun Rob administration. Sometimes strengthened competition policy was one of
the conditions or requirements in negotiations with oversee counterparties, such as
Mexico's commitment in NAFTA, or the conditionality of a rescue loan from the IMP.
People representing the weak part of a national economy opposed a competition policy

I

i.

as well as an open market policy, but governments with a democratic foundation and
with benefits from strong export increases could sustain their original positions.
Third, development of a legal system contributes to the foundation and progress of
competition law including cartel regulations. Administrative decisions with respectable
legal and economical reasonings, judicial holdings under consistent and reasonable
interpretations, and legislative support for a specialized governmental agency in charge
of competition policy are vital elements for furthering competition law since

38
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transparent decision-making and a review process with predictable results come from
the formerly illustrated legal facilities. For example, in Mexico, the Supreme Court
affirmed the statutory scheme of the CFC, which had been criticized for its weak power
and their delayed judicial review, and its collection of fines. The Court held that a large
part of LFCE is constitutional. The Congress has not amended the LFCE in spite of the
lobbies from rent-seekers who tried to exempt their industries from the LFCE.
Currently, the CFC is not considered any more as weak or ineffective to collect fine. 92
Moreover, the World Bank (WB) recommended that developing countries should put
an emphasis on institutional strengthening rather than enacting competition laws that
may be misunderstood or improperly enforced. 93 Although it does not further analyze
the meaning of institutional strengthening, it is constructed as capacity-building of the
institution in charge of enforcing competition laws. Next to open market economy and
democratic political system, the legal system including administrative and judicial
function is the most important institution to develop competition laws in light of the
experiences of the advanced countries, e.g. the U.S., the U.K, and Germany. The
recommendation of the WB confirms the argument of this thesis.
Fourth, cartel regulations in the DCs have presumption provisions with a background
policy. In South Korea, Art. 19 (5) states that, where two or more enterprisers are
committing any categorized act which practically restricts competition in a particular
business area, the enterprises shall be presumed to have committed an unfair
collaborative act despite the absence of an explicit agreement to engage in such an act.

92

OECD, Competition Law and Policy in Mexico: an OECD Peer Review, 13-14 (Jun.
4, 2004), at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecdlll/15/319693ll.pdf (visited on Jul.l8, 2008).
93
Taylor, supra note 91, 74.
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Such presumption provision has its intent of relieving the less-experienced competition

ev

agency, the KFTC, from finding the proof of a secret cartel agreement itself. The

T1

Supreme Court in South Korea held, with regard to the provision, that the KFTC does

b<

not need direct proof of an agreement for the unfair collaboration, or a cartel, as long as
it can prove that competitors engage in a cartelistic activity which restricts competition

e:

in a market. 94 In Mexico, the 1998 LFCE regulations include the provisions specifying

c

that the CFC will deem that certain circumstances, such as when two ore more

c

competitors adhere to a price announcement from a business chamber, will constitute

(

circumstantial evidence of price fixing. The regulation implies that the CFC has a
policy to get rid of traditional price control from business chambers consisting of
industry members. 95 In South Africa, when firms engaged in a common practice have a
common director, shareholder, or reciprocal ownership, they are presumed to have
agreed, which can be rebutted by a showing that the practice was a normal response to

..
'.

prevailing market conditions. 96 The presumption in the policy is to encourage

.,,~·~

companies related through complex and loosely-connected investment structures to

II
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dismantle the structure or at least to make the control relationship transparent. 97

1,1,

.. _

However, the wide application of the presumption provisions needs caution because
pro-competitive business activities may satisfy the elements of the provisions. To
secure sufficient counter-proof, a proof of the absence of the agreement, to overcome
such presumption is an almost impossible burden to related parties. The role of the
presumption provisions is confined to supplementing the lack of circumstantial

t:ll ~ ~ [The Supreme Court of Republic of Korea], 99-T 6514, 6521 (Mar.15, 2002).
OECD, supra note 92, 19.
96
Sec. 4(1 )(b) & 4(2) of 1999 Competition Act.
97
OECD, supra note 29, 23.

94
95
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evidences for a cartel and cartel enforcement ofless-skilled competition authorities.
The presumption provision of South Korea has not been used often since the judicial
body approved the interpretation. 98
Fifth, since economic research is not pervasive in the context of DCs to back up pure
efficiency or consumer-welfare based competition enforcement, the objectives that the
competition laws pursue take into consideration a development-perspective as well as a
competition-perspective. The 2007 PRC competition law has, besides the original
objectives of competition law, e.g. protection of fair competition and enhancing
economic efficiency, the unique objectives in China's context, which are maintenance
of 'public interests' and promotion ofthe healthy development of socialist market
economy. The public interest cause works as a concrete exception to a monopoly
agreement including a cartel agreement. 99 Although the exception illustrates saving
energy, protecting the environment, and providing disaster relief, the public interests
can include the stabilization of an economic situation, development of the whole
economy, or the increase of employment. 100 Foreign investors worry about the patriotic
application of the 'public interest' through protecting of a domestic market from
foreign companies. China's concerns about both the acquisition of domestic companies
by multinational corporations (MNCs) and additional competition for small and middle

98

Email interview with Hang-Rok Oh, public officer, KFTC (Jan. 2007).
Art. 15 (iv) states monopoly agreements may be exempt to service public interests
such as saving energy, protecting the environment, providing disaster relief.
100
OECD interprets, similar to the cases of Germany or other EU nations, that public
interest refers to economic situation and employment, etc. See OECD Global Forum on
Competition, China Sess. I, at 4. Concretely, Art.l5(v), exemption for crisis cartel, is
for stabilization of an economic situation. Para.(vi), exemption for international trade,
is related to economic development. Para.(vii) is the general exemption provision
which allows the power to specify to the State Council.
99
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sized enterprises (SMEs) make the worry severe. 101 Although the ambiguity of public

s

interest dilutes the cause of competition law, however, such worry is not likely to bring

e

about general partial enforcement. As the practices of competition in advanced
countries reveal, only an insignificant portion of regulation cases apply the exception.
Every country, either developed or developing, needs an exception to cartel
regulation enforcement as well as in other competition law issues. In consideration of
the level of economy in more developed economies, the DCs cannot avoid allowing
more exemptions to cartel regulations than advanced market economies. Among other
things, the cartel for enhancing competitiveness of SMEs is approved in all four DCs
above, 102 and other countries, e.g. the de minis rule ofHungary. 103 Advanced
competition law with a focus on efficiency does not currently approve such an
exemption but treat SME issues with monopoly restraint. However, in the past, even the
U.S. had antitrust law served to protect small firms from competition. 104 Relatively
insufficient resources compared to industrialized countries, the urgent necessity to
increase competitiveness of small companies in open markets, and the large number of
101

Owen et. al., supra note 47, 131-133.
Sec. 10 of the '98 Competition Act in South Africa. In Mexico, the LFCE does not
provide any SME exception, but, so as to encourage scale of economies, the Economics
Ministry' program for integrating companies with small and middle size, allows the
establishment of a single price by the joint venture or activities and small firms'
participation in the venture. In South Korea, Art. 19(2).VI. enumerates the enhancement
of competitiveness of SMEs as an exemption of the unfair collusive acts. PRC still has
the perspective that repetitive investment at low levels by small businesses generates
suicidal competition. In 1999, the Bureau of Civil Aviation prohibited airlines from
offering air ticket discounts, citing the adverse effect of price competition on the
healthy development of the airline industry. See Owen, et. al., supra note 47, 132.
103
Hungarian competition law in 1996 has a de minis rule stating that agreements of
minor importance, regardless of their content, are not prohibited if the combined market
share of the parties is below 10%. Ferenc Vissi, Antitrust in Transition Economies: the
Hungarian Experience, in IALP, at 558-59 (1999).
104
Owen et. al., supra note 47, 124.
102
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SIOall companies and their importance in domestic markets support the SMEs
g

exemptions from cartel regulation in the DCs. Similar to the SMEs exemptions, the
other exemptions in the DCs need to demonstrate policy bases so that the exemptions

may not extend to unreasonable cases. in the DCs. Requiring the relationship of the
policy bases to competition-promotion within time plan and w1der government's
screening can avoid the possibility of the abuse of the exemption.

III.

Building Consensus to Enforce Cartel Regulation

1. Cartel Regulations within Competition Policies
Competition laws in DCs, where a competition culture is not developed to a
sophisticated level, have simple but overbroad types of cartel regulations, thereby
omitting regulation over some cartels and making the uniqueness of cartel regulation
vague. On the other hand, the competition laws in DCs often have the regulations of
other business torts as the CUCL ofPRC demonstrates. The less delicate divisions of
cartel regulations from other business torts, however, are inappropriate tools to cope
with the competition-restraining activities of cartels which require sophisticated
investigation skills with expertise knowledge, an understanding of the importance of
competition toward economic development, and political support. Cartels are treated
similarly to a misdemeanor or as an act with a low penalty in spite of large damages.
Such under-enforcement causes repetitive commissions of cartels because their large
profits outweigh penalties. The large profit may lead to bribery for maintaining their
existent positions. The under-enforcements of cartel regulations are usual phenomena
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ofDCs where the primitive level of cartel regulation is established or competition laws

re~

including cartel regulation are implemented with a lack of experience and insufficient
resources.

co

Some cartels give a positive effect to the development of a market economy in the

is

DCs although the effect is temporary. Export cartels do not generate harm to domestic

co

market mechanisms and domestic consumers unless a product returns to the exporting
country. Cartels among SMEs can form a foundation for further economic development
by promoting economic cooperation in the weak part of economies. Similar to the

tr

'infant industry' defense in international trade law, SMEs cartels need special treatment

d

as bases of future economic growth. However, the inefficiencies from the restriction of

a

competition, when accumulated enough to function as impediments to a market

c

mechanism, will drag down the impetus of corporate entrepreneurship and further

(

growth of an economy.
The initial institution of cartel regulation, although needed to be adopted by LDCs, is
to be transformed into a complex competition law which has cartel regulations as a part.
I'
· ··~
I ·

The appropriate time for this transformation is no later than when economic
development in DCs reaches the high-income level under categories ofDCs, e.g. South
Korea and Mexico.

105

Alternatively, in the case where a political motive drives

competition policy, e.g. South Africa and China, the time to transform is when the
economic development of a country reaches the middle-income level. 106 The cartel

105

According to the UNCTAD Handbook of statistics, having a current GDP per capita
above US$ 4.500 is considered a part of the high-income level group ofDCs.
UNCTAD, UNCTAD HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS, UN Doc. TD/STAT.30, 12 (UN. 2005).
106
DCs with a per capita GDP between US$ 1,000 and 4,500, e.g. South Africa, is in
the middle-income level group. See id. While China belonged to the low income level
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regulation is not effective without fully understanding competition in relationship to
economic development. The high degree of economic development necessitates a
competition policy including a cartel regulation because inefficiency in national market
is a main obstacle to high economic growth which can be effectively overcome with a
competition law regime.
On the other hand, cartel rules may have the plural objectives or the exemptions of
competition law reflecting diverse economic situations, political backgrounds, legal
traditions and cultures of commerce of each country. The fair distribution of economic
development or the protection of SMEs or rural sectors is an example. However, the
acknowledgement of such objectives should not deter the effective enforcement of
cartel regulation because active cartel enforcement does benefit both the sound growth
of domestic economy and fair distribution of wealth to consumers.

2. Economic Development and Competition Law
(1) Development without Competition?
This chapter tries to answer the question whether economic development is possible
· without a competition policy including a cartel regulation. 107 Although economic
development needs the private entities' strenuous efforts to raise their wealth, a type of
public policy, so called industrial policy, can increase value-creation in the private
sectors toward economic development. An industrial policy has been found in many

group in 2005, China's per capita GDP approached US$2,458 in 2007. China's overall
GDP in 2007 reached $3.249 trillion, the fourth largest in the world. See US
Department of State, Bureau ofEastAsian and Pacific Affairs (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/18902.htm (last visited on Apr.21, 2008).
107
In this chapter, competition policy includes cartel regulation and its active
enforcement as the inevitable area.
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countries in many different forms, although some countries with a strong competition

con

policy are reluctant to use the term. In order to figure out clearly the relationship

con

between competition policy and economic development, the question of whether

con

industrial policy can achieve economic development without competition policy is to
be answered.

cor

1) Defining Industrial Policy and its Effect in relation to Competition Policy

dat

Industrial policy is described as state activities involving the economy, including all

lar:

policies which aim at an increased industrial performance in general. 108 In the broadly

pol

defined meaning, it looks to include competition policy as competition policy belongs

go·

to a state economic policy. However, the distinction between the two polices is on the

lee

goal. While an industrial policy targets at increasing national industrial performance,

m€

the competition policy aims at increasing competition in a market, thereby facilitating

tee

efficient allocation of economic resources. 109 An increase in national wealth through
industrial performance can be made in a short term without increasing competition.
Meanwhile, increasing competition in a market might cause to decrease national wealth

de

in a situation when competitive foreign companies take their profit out of the domestic

th

market. In light of the situations above mentioned, both policies look to have different

M
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effects on national wealth.
Arguably, industrial policy has three types of patterns to pursue economic
development: firm-size oriented policy, sector-oriented policy and framework-
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Ulrich Immenga, Conflicts between Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: A
Comparative View on Potential Responses, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES:
KEY ISSUES AND COMMENTS ON THE WTO REPORT ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, 346
(ed. Roger Zaech. Kluwer Law Int'l, 1999)
109
Scherer, supra note 9, 2.
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condition-improving policy. To analyze the relationship of industrial policy with
competition policy, it would be more accurate to examine each policy type from a
competition policy perspective.
First, a firm-size-oriented policy is created to facilitate large and powerful
corporations, so called national champions. As to the policy, research and empirical
data indicated that in the long-term the policy could produce such negative result that
large corporations were not successful in further developing economies while the

°

policy would cause positive effects in the short term. 11 For instance, the South Korean
government's unbalanced industrial policy in favor of conglomerates in the 60s and 70s
led to a market concentration, corruptive relationships with bureaucrats, a shortage of
medium-sized firms, and high market barriers for innovative small enterprises with new
technology in the 80s and 90s.lll
Second, a sector-oriented policy makes an economy grow through focused
investments and governmental support on several industries with a strategic economic
development plan. The two main examples are the French government's emphasis on
the defense industry after WWII through public procurements oflarge projects, and
Mexico's regulatory policy on the transport, telecommunication, and financial sector.

110

William Baumol, Entrepreneurship: Productivity, Unproductive. ami Destructive,
98-5 J. OF POL. Eco~. (1990); Wolfgang Fikentscher, Collaborative Activities among
industrial Competitors- in German, European, and U.S. Antitrust Law. and in the Draft
lnternarional Antitrust Code in the GAIT!WTO System, in lNT'L HARMONIZATION OF
COMPETITION LAWS, 109, 116-17 (Chia-Jui Cheng eds. et al., 1995). The main positive
outcomes are economies of sale, learning-by-doing, economies ofscope (spin-off) and
lower transaction costs while negative outcomes are inefficiencies from monopoly and
rent-seeking.
111
Hun-Joo Park, The Perspective ofSmall Business in South Korea, KDI School
Working Paper Series 06-13, 2-5 (Dec. 2006).
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However, the sector-oriented policy has the high risk of being misled by insufficient

i,od;

information and asymmetrical information. Economists point out the possibility of

go'

government failure through a state not possessing enough information to correct future

ofi

planning. 112 In addition, a state may have less of an ability to obtain valuable

so:

information involving markets than firms, subject to industrial policy, with a wide

we

social network. 113 The contributions of the three strategic industries in Mexico are
outweighed by inefficiencies, high prices, and government failures. 114 The

na

anticompetitive price-fixing in Mexico's telecommunication industry was

ec

115

In the Mexican Telecommunication termination

or

fee 116-fixing rule case, after Mexico acceded to the WTO agreement to liberalize and

fa

open its telecommunication market, a major issue was the rule of the Mexican

m

acknowledged by the WTO panel.

regulatory agency which endowed the right to set the termination fee on the largest
~~£::
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Mexican carrier, Telmex, and required the other authorized carriers to share the market

u

at the price set by Telmex. The U.S., which argued that the rule which allows Mexico

c

to operate a cartel facilitates anticompetitive practices, won the dispute. The WTO

d

panel decision held that the cartel activities were not relieved from anti-competitive

c

behaviors on the bases that they operated as state acts in the name of public interest and
112

Ha-Joon Chang, Globalisation, Economic Development & the Role of the State,
136-137 (Third World Network, Zed Books Ltd. 2003). Chang cites Burton and
Grossman.
113 ld.
114
Motta, supra note 76, at 216-220 & 245-247.
115
Panel Report, Mexico: Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
WT/DS204/R (June 1 2004). Mexico did not appeal. See WT/DS204/9/Add.8 (Aug. 19,
2005)
116
The 'termination fee' is the price which Mexican carriers charge foreigners to
receive in Mexico calls originating abroad, a considerable portion of which the U.S.
carriers were obliged to pay. Fox and Davis, Industrial Policy and CompetitionDeveloping Countries as Victims and Users, in supra note 24 (IALP), 170.
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industrial policy. 117 On the contrary to its former focus on industrial policy, the French
government pursued a competition policy under the Treaty of Rome during the process
of its integration into EU .118 The past experiences of government failure in the 70s and
80s, e.g. unfruitful public assistance to the steel, textile, and machine tool industry,
were reasons for such policy shift. 119
Third, there is a framework-condition-improving policy which indirectly affects
national industrial performance and competitiveness. Infrastructures to stabilize
economic conditions e.g. transportation, level of education of workers, and tax burdens
on business as whole, are important industrial frame work conditions that need to be
focused on by public officers and legislators. Art. 157 of the Treaty of Rome includes
more concrete policies, such as the adjustment of industries to structural changes, the
development of favorable conditions to inter-company cooperation, and the improved
usage of innovation and technology. Such policies contribute to promoting the
competitive advantage of industrial locations in international business. Although the
development of inter-company cooperation may conflict with the promotion of
competition, Art. 157 states that it should not provide a basis for the EC to introduce
measures which might lead to a distortion of competition.

2) Limitations of Industrial Policy: the Importance of Competition Policy

117

Id. at 169-72.
Stoffaes, Speech at 2007 Fordham Conference, in supra note 24, at 256. See id. at
260. Politically, France recently experienced a resurgence of industrial nationalism in
front of a series of international mergers, but to a much less degree than the degree of
former industrialization in the 1960s and 70s.
119
!d. at 259-60.
118
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Industrial policy without the consideration of its impact on competition produces

The

negative results on economy which impede further economic development. In an

}ibera

economy under the strong control of governmental policies, competition within a

contr

market is less severe than expected. It is because the focus of companies on

dem<

competition in a market is affected by their incentives to obtain benefits from

com}

governmental policies. In addition to the less focus on competition of private

indU

companies, collaborative behaviors led by governmental policies diluted the importance

Sorn

of cartel regulation under competition law. As a result, restrictive business behaviors of
existent companies, including cartel activities, tend to be condoned or treated less

con

severely than other economic regulations. As restrictive business practices prevail,

whi

economic inefficiency increased and created hurdles to further economic growth and

SaJ

raise competitiveness between industries. In the long term, economic benefits through

oth
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industrial policies, which do not consider competition policy, may be outweighed by

,..

subsequent diseconomies.
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In addition, industrial policy is not a panacea to cure national poverty but is
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susceptibly exposed to the exclusive activities of existent market participants in order to
maintain their inefficiencies, thereby tending to be corrupted. Moreover, as a
government has less incentive than market-participants and less of a chance to be
accessible to up-dated information than private parties, the governmental-forming
policy generates un-intended inefficiencies, obsolete policy decisions, and avoidance of
responsibility, thereby causing a failure of public policy. 120

120

Immenga, supra note 108, 348.
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The current popularity of a privatization and liberalization policy under neoliberalism reflects governments' efforts to follow the success of shifting governmental
control to private control under a market system. As the former example of Mexico
demonstrates, protection-oriented industrial policies caused a lower level of
competitiveness in the Mexican economies. Rooting a competition culture into
industries has been progressing under the sincere efforts of the Mexican government.
Some advanced countries which focused on improving competitiveness and revenue in
the domestic industry, e.g. the U.S. and West Germany, have developed strong
competition policies including strict anti-cartel enforcement. The Treaty of Rome
which adopted market liberalism and competition policy originally from the AngloSaxon countries, such as the U.K. and U.S., has invoked a competition culture into
Ill

other countries with less liberalized economic systems as shown by the former example

!

of France. Still, in France, some industries, e.g. electricity, are under state regulation.

i.

Providing such a public service is, however, not an automatic exemption from

p
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competition rules. Public-service offering companies, either state-owned or private-

rI
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owned, may not be engaged in monopolistic practices unless they are in an inevitable
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situation.

Jl

3) Temporary Protection of so called 'Infant Industry'

51

Public policy to protect so called the infant industry

121

for a temporary period is

}ligh·

needed. If not, competitive foreign companies may dominate entire industries. Highly

one 1

competitive industries in industrialized countries demonstrate the effectiveness of

inter

protective policies, e.g. Toyota of Japan in 1930s, and manufacturing industries of the

is ar

U.S. in 1830s. 122 However, it is noticeable that developing countries with fear that

U.S.

foreign companies take control over domestic markets have kept a negative attitude in

ofC

opening up their markets, even in the mature industries. Such protective policies
generated uncompetitive infra-structures, thereby causing harm to consumers who had
no choice but to select low quality and high priced products or services in less efficient
markets. With existing cartel practices accumulating, the protective industrial policies

cer

cause a lot of damages and inefficiency in the market. In the long run, the policies can

sh1

impede the development of competitive industries, contrary to the original goal of the

Cc

industrial policy. For example, South Korea's legal service market has not allowed the

po

entrance of foreign law firms into the country until July 2007 when the Ministry of

in

Justice proposed the Foreign Legal Consultant Bill which allowed foreign law firms to

in

have a branch office in Korea. 123 The result of long-lasting strong protection policy was

121

'Infant industry' came from infant industry argument for protectionism. Infant
industry means an industry which does not have economies of scale as other
competitors from industrialized countries but high potential to contribute to economic
development in developing countries. The industry needs to be protected until it attains
similar economies of scale.
122
In the 1830's, the average tariff of the U.S. was 40%, the highest in the world,
allowing the development of manufacturing industries until World War II when the
country achieved the manufacturing supremacy. More recently in 1939 Japan kicked
out General Motors to protect Toyota which at the time was uncompetitive in the global
market. Wikipedia, Infant Industry, available at
http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/Infant_industry (visited on Apr.29, 2008)
123
The backdrop for opening up traditionally closed legal market was the Free Trade
Agreement with the U.S. and the negotiation ofthe Doha DevelopmentAgenda(DDA)
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high-priced legal services and the stagnancy of market growth. Although Korea has a
one hundred twelve year-history of modem legal services and the scope of its
international trade is the tenth largest in the world, the scope of the legal service market
is around US$ 1.4 billion in sales, which is only 0.2% of GDP .

124

The proportion of the

U.S., U.K, Canada, and Japan's legal service market to GDP has remained around 2 %
ofGDP.

(2) Economic Development through Competition
When industries grow out of their nascent period, they need to be exposed to a

certain level of competition for further development. As companies grow larger, they
shall face higher level of competition both in domestic and international market.
Ill

Competition in itself has proved as an incentive in making economic development

!
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possible by focusing companies' attentions to consumers' concerns, thereby leading to

~
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innovation and better service. High-level business culture with focus on consumers'
interests can be developed through cartel regulation.
A trade liberalization policy pursuing a free market system needs competition policy
as its complimentary measure. Although trade policy for welfare-maximization needs

•

!

governmental intervention into a market, the intervention which drives the focus of
companies toward a governmental measure can cause inefficiencies in markets and, in a
case of policy failure, welfare losses.

125

Meanwhile, competition policy focuses on

which required the government to open its legal service market.
124
2006 GDP of South Korea is around US$ 888 billion. Jung-Won Ryu, South Korea
scope of legal service market and its opening, (Nov. 24, 2004) available at
http://www.lawtimes.co.kr (visited on Nov. 16, 2007).
125
YUSAF H AKBAR, GLOBAL ANTITRUST: TRADE AND COMPETITION LINKAGES, 5
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raising efficiency and drives the attention of companies toward consumers through the
establishment of a competition-facilitating scheme. Under the open economies which
have been involved in the competitive international trade, domestic competition law
can expose domestic companies to the discipline of market mechanisms in advance. In
order to correct derivative negative effects of trade policy, governments need to use
advantages of competition policy.
Particularly, when cartel regulations are not effective in domestic competition law,
enterprises tend to collude with strong foreign competitors and cause price increases
and market allocations. As cartel members want to maintain their existent market share
and revenue, they reveal exclusive behaviors to new market-participants, thereby
treading down the potential chance of developing new products or increasing market
share. As a result, new enterprises face many blocks in order to participate in the
market with existent participants without having the chance to compete with each other
based on merit.
Effective enforcement of cartel regulation brings about many benefits. The reduction
''<

of cartels transfers wealth from companies to consumers. Price decrease and market
share shift due to new participants are usual market phenomenon after cartels were

,I
.~

crushed. Consumers with more product selections may be educated to find a better
product, thereby facilitating the possibility of competitive enterprises gaining higher
market share and revenue.

(Ashgate Pub., 2003). Akbar distinguishes trade policy from competition policy. Trade
policy focuses on government activity with basis on multilateral negotiations to be
applied ex-ante. Meanwhile, competition policy emphasizes on private entities under a
cases-by-case approach to be applied on ex-post basis.
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(3)

Synthesis: Harmonizing Cartel Regulation and Economic Development

A free market system is a vital connecting tool between cartel regulation and
economic development. Under the state-regulatory economic system, market
participants pay more attention to obtaining public assistance by winning public
contests rather than focusing on attracting consumers in markets. The historical
experience ofthe collapse of the former Soviet Union demonstrates that a stateplanning economy or dirigisme does not bring about growth in economic wealth and
welfare. Unless in an extreme depression period when a free market system did not
operate effectively enough to distribute products and resources to people, competition
law including cartel regulation can promote economic development through invoking
competition mechanism into free market economy.
Competing private entities' cartel behaviors in normal free markets deceitfully
transfers welfare from consumers to sellers through high priced and low quality
products or boycotting new competitors from entry. The inefficiency caused by the

.:
~

=

cartel and investment into the maintenance of status quo rather than innovation are the
outcomes of a cartel. While some monopoly practices cause net pro-competitive effects
outweighing anti-competitive effect, cartel behaviors directly exploit consumers'
welfare and causes inefficiency. The chart below illustrates comparison between
competition policy and industrial policy in the pursuit of economic development.
Picture: Competition Policy and Industtial Policy
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Growth of Corporations

Open Market

Market Protection

Price under Competition

Regulated Competition

Free Competition

Governmental Intervention

The dark arrows represent stronger support as time passes while white arrows
represent weaker support to economic development.

Governmental intervention leads to regulated competition, and goes with market
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protection. The growth of corporations under state-intervening and protective market
may function well in a temporary period, but does not constitute a strong incentive to
innovate themselves. If economic development is not limited to the temporary growth

...,

,, '
1

.~.,
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of corporation but includes growth of wealth of the total population and the rooting of

r·~·:

an economic structure and legal institution for furthering autonomous economic growth,
deprival of consumers' welfare as well as a split-over of cartel activities remaining in
the market will operate as hurdles to further economic development.
Market economy has proved that a free and competitive market itself can be a strong
incentive to further investment and development. Free market established under
competition policy produces low priced high quality products. Corporations invest into
technologies for efficient production. Such a free competitive market does not wither
56

but enhance its size when the corporations face an open market. The structure of open,
free, and competitive market contributes to promoting consumers' welfare. In the long

run, it provides great institutional support to economic development.

J
J
]

Industrial policy toward economic development in this sense needs to adopt
competition policy. Mexico's chairman ofCFC confirmed the importance of
competition policy by stating that industrial policy should be carefully tailored to
consumers' interests by counteracting the lobbying efforts from existing firms. 126 In
addition, the EU's Commissioner of Competition, Neelie Kroes, stated that industrial

]

policy should not seek to shield domestic industry but to place conditions for market
participants to flourish with increasing competition. 127 The WTO members with a high
level of market economy are equipped with an effective competitive environment
which is evaluated as a comparative advantage which trains their companies under a
global-level competitive pressure. 128 Anti-cartel law enforcement is as an important
policy measure the very condition for market participants with good quality products to
flourish.
It is understandable that the EU placed a priority on competition policy over

industrial policy under title XVI of the industrial policy of the EU Treaty. The Treaty
stipulates that it does not provide a basis to bring any action that might produce
distortions of competition. When the EU's position of prioritizing competition policy
including cartel regulations is agreed with by other countries in the international
community, a consensus of international cartel regulation would be sufficiently reached.
126

Motta, supra note 76, 212.
Neelie Kroes, speech at 2007 FLI's IALP Conference, in supra note 76, 204.
128
Roger Zaech, Competition Law as Comparative Advantage, in TOWARDS WTO
COMPETITION RULES, 400-01 (Roger Zaech ed., Kluwer Law Int'l, 1999)
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The German Monopolies Commission's conclusion stated, to this cause, that the debate
about how a national trade policy can develop measures to protect domestic industries
and business sectors only reveals the lack of an internationally orchestrated and
functioning competition policy.

129

3. Modeling Cartel Law in the context of Politics and Economic Development
(1) Necessity and Advantage of Adopting Competition Law
When a country take the open-trade approach, it is necessary to adopt a proper level
of competition law depending on its economy's circumstances. Private monopoly
practices or collusive behaviors of formerly competing companies can make private
trade barriers to new foreign competitors. As foreign direct investment, after trade
liberalization, facilitates mergers and acquisitions with existent domestic companies,
the government needs a policy measure to prevent a severe concentration of market
power or mergers with severe anticompetitive effects. The public measure, if enforced
without sophisticated guidelines or founding data, might threaten the market
participants' active business practices due to the unpredictability of the measure, which
could deprive benefits of trade liberalization from the market. The well-structured and
consistently-enforced competition law including cartel regulation is a benevolent
framework for business practices which can attract more investments and other
important production factors, e.g. know-how, labor, and energy. 130

(2) Treating Political Interests with Limited Criteria
129
130

Fikentscher, supra note 110, 117.
Zaech, supra note 128, 401-2.
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When a country enacts and pursues competition law, each country considers one's
own public interests. The public interests usually reflect political interests since
political supports are necessary to initiate and strengthen the enforcement of
competition policy. Such public interests are expressed as the objectives and in
exemption provisions of each competition law. 131 The provisions involving public
interests may justify political interests to affect competition law decisions.
However, influences on competition law from politics shall not be arbitrary. The
statutory limitations need to be supplemented with the enumeration of concrete
categories of public interest and with a proof requirement of outweighing values. The
consistency of administrative practices and judicial reviews is to be secured with
administrative guidelines. The institutionalization of political independence of
competition authority can reduce the abuse of political influences. 132 Establishing a fair
competition norm in a domestic market system under non-discrimination principles is
deeply related to ensuring an adequate level of independence of a competition authority.
With limited political influence, impartial cartel regulations will cause no prejudice, if
any, to foreign companies working in domestic markets.

(3) Reflection of the Development Perspective on Cartel Regulation
As a measure to foster a competition policy in the South, the singular goal of
efficiency or consumer welfare in cartel regulation from a pure economical perspective
is not welcomed by the DCs, although it contributes to the economic development.

131

DABBAH, supra note 28,61-2. Dabbah cites DOERN & WULKS, COMPARATNE
COMPETITION POLICY, 15 (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1996).
132
!d. at 62.
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Unless DCs reach to an advanced economic level, economic development will be the

J

most important concern of the South. The DCs shall find value in competition policy
through contribution of the policy to economic development. In light of the situations

'

pl.

competition laws in the DCs need to adopt the economic development as one of its
objectives. 133 Concrete applications of the objective come out as exemptions of cartel
regulations or other regulations in competition law.

Cl

c
Ifthe incorporation of economic development into competition law can not be
acknowledged, the majority of developing countries will not be likely to devote their
resources to enact a competition law. They will hesitate or refuse to adopt the law
because they fear that competition regime may work against economic development.
Unlike the ambiguous public interest reflecting political interests, economic
development is unlikely to be abused in a way that it stems the sincere enforcement of
cartel regulation. Economic development is a less ambiguous term because it has the
measuring tools to find out how much economic development has been achieved, e.g.
GDP or GNP. It is relatively not difficult to determine whether there is economic
~:

.

.

development outweighing inefficiency from cartelization.
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4. Raising Public Awareness of Competition and Cartel Norms

133

Art. 1 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of2007 in PRC has 'the promotion of the healthy
development of social market economy' as one of its objectives. Art. 1 of MRFTA of
South Korea also states 'balanced development of the national economy' as one of its
objectives.
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Arguably, there are two ways to raise public awareness of cartel regulation along with
competition policy: the effective enforcement of the regulation or legislation and the
placement of a foundation of competition advocacy.
Successful domestic cartel investigations increase the public awareness of the
damages caused by cartels, and deter potential conspirators. In Mexico, the CFC was
criticized for its weak enforcement by politicians from the opposition and the public.
Criticism grew severe when the public endured economic crises after the initial
adoption of competition and market liberalization policy. With the continuous supports
from the Fox administration in power and a series of decisions from judicial branch, the
CFC continued to enforce cartel regulations and competition law, thereby gaining
enforcement power and getting rid of the former weak image. In South Korea, the
K.FTC focused more on cartel regulations by punishing both domestic and international
cartels, effectively operating leniency programs, and announcing 2007 as the year of
treading over cartels. Although the business community expressed opposition against
the seemingly uncontrolled power of the KFTC, discussion on the proper institution of
a competition agency or appropriate level of fines brought the issue of the cartelcausing damage into the public sphere.
Competition advocacy encourages the competition authority's participation in
economic policy decision-making, and proposition of the economic policies which
causes less detriment to consumer welfare or builds competition-facilitating foundation.
As adoption and application of such an economic policy can determine the level of
competition in an economy, participation is a good way to invoke a competitive spirit
in economic policy.
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On the other hand, the public needs an education on the benefits of competition

nee

because the public sometimes resist newly adopted competition policy out of the

tha

concern of severe competition and, in extreme situations, cartel regulations which

D<

causes direct harm to consumers welfare. Discussion regarding competition policy,

th<

seminars with scholars and practitioners, review of major successful cases, and research

be

of advanced competition practices and the role of competition in economic

ju

development are good ways to stimulate experts and mass media to spread the

tu

information on the necessity of cartel regulation and cartel damages to the public. 134

e}

The publicly available data on competition regime e.g.

decisions~

summaries of

p1

investigation, and press releases, help the private sector to learn competition law

p1

enforcements and thereby promote discussion in the public. The guidelines on cartel

n

regulation, leniency policies, or exemption processes, similar to merger guidelines in

p

advanced countries, let business communities' practices comply with the law. 135 The

c

public's ability to bring specific questions in a situation is helpful to reduce confusion

a

on cartel enforcement.
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Making Institutional Supports to Cartel Regulation
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1. Adoption of Sanctions: Step-by-Step Frame
( 1) Civil Enforcements
Civil sanctions include corporate fines and injunctive relief. First, corporate fines,
categorized as administrative fines in civil law countries, are popular sanctions
134
135

DABBAH, supra note 28, 66-68.
See id.
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necessary to deter cartel activities which generate huge economic benefits to companies
that collude. Most of the advanced countries, e.g. Germany, France, and Japan, and
ocs, e.g. South Korea, Mexico, and China, adopt the administrative corporate fine as
their main anti-cartel sanction. Although the ideal level of deterrence needs the fine to
:h

be around 150% of turnover in the light of undetected cases,

136

current statutes in

jurisdictions with strict anti-cartel sanctions confine its maximum fine to 10% of
tumover. 137 The suggested level of fine may work as an utmost deterrent but places an
excessively un-proportionate burden on the company, similar to corporate capital
punishment. The reasons are because the penalty provides financial harm to innocent
peoples related to the companies, e.g. stockholders, employees, and because the
negative spill-over of possible bankruptcy may affect the whole national market,
particularly the small markets of developing countries. The payment ability of the
convicted corporation, additionally, shall be taken into consideration to decide the
amount of the fine.

On the other hand, the corporate fine may reveal another negative effect. Business
managers or executives, although aware of such financial sanctions, might participate

in a cartel under discretion and leave the company in advance before the company pays
the fine. So-called the agency problem, under different incentive designs, comes out in
the circumstances where business managers may take the risk of being charged with a
cartel because they can receive a reward of high profits deriving from a cartel

136

John Pingleton, Marie-Barbe Girard and Simon Williams, The Fight against Cartels,

in IALP, at 16 (ed. Hawk, 2007)
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Examples are the EU, and Japan. See id., at 15, and Cecile Aubert, Instruments for
Cartel Deterrence, and Conflict of Interests, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST,
128 (Vivek Ghosal and John Stennek eds., 2007).
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conspiracy and they do not pay any corporate fine, unless they are charged with a rare
personal penalty. This situation necessitates an individual penalty against managers or
executives, either financially or physically. As individual financial penalties can be
paid by the companies under a hidden employment contract, non-financial personal
penalties need to be attached to individual financial penalties.
Second, injunctive relief needs to be adopted in domestic cartel law as it reduces the
extension of damages on the market by on-going cartels. The probable basis for such an
injunction are i) evidence on the collaboration among competitors or intent to restrict
competition and ii) the probability of huge damages caused by the cartel. Injunctive
relief can work not only as an administrative sanction but also as a private action. In
most cases, as public enforcers have more capabilities to recognize cartel activities and
the power to collect evidence, the relief, e.g. injunctive order, can be issued by
competition authorities. 138
(2) Criminal Enforcement
The lack of probability of optimal fines and the impact on innocent corporate
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personnel highlights the necessity of individual criminal penalties. 139 Strong individual
sanctions are appropriate in criminal justice system where penalties against individuals

..,

have worked and protections of their rights have been developed through criminal
procedure. 140 Individual fines and imprisonment are the traditional penalties in criminal

138

For instance, the MRFTA in South Korea enabled the KFTC to issue cease and
desist orders when companies commit undue collaborative behaviors or cartels.
139
Sheridan Scott, Criminal Enforcement ofAntitrust Laws: The US. Model- A
Canadian Perspective, in IALP, 67-68 (2007). Scott cites Richard Posner's economical
justification and Werden and Simon's practical justification of incarceration, thereby
afcplying the analysis to all criminal sanctions possibily including disqualification.
1 0
Protective procedures for an indicted person are 'beyond reasonable doubt' standard
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laW under a procedure for defending individual rights. They can work as effective

r

deterring sanctions against cartel participants. 141 As individuals are more averse to risk

than corporations, the same level of deterrence can be reached through punishment
against culpable individuals without corporate penalties which affect innocent
people.

142

Such an opinion, in light oflreland, UK, and Canada experiences in criminal
n

enforcement, is noteworthy that criminalization is not an area that can quickly achieve
expected results but requires a sufficient base of experienced staff and institutional
supports from active civil enforcements and other regulatory works, e.g. market studies,
under a long term plan.

143

South Korea's under-enforcement of criminal penalty against

cartels during the last twenty five years confirms the difficulties in entrenching rigorous
criminal enforcements in a young competition authority. 144 As the enactment of
criminal penalties against cartels requires a substantial investment of resources in
institutions and procedures, the best time for active criminal enforcements would be in
a decade after civil sanctions have been successfully entrenched into a country. In order
to pursue effective criminal enforcement, both public awareness and social culpability

..

of conviction, strict evidential hurdles, and so on.
141
Pingleton, et al., supra note 136, 17. They state that cartel members are careful not
to commit the offence in countries where cartels are criminalized.
142
Scott, supra note 139, 76.
143
Pingleton, eta/., supra note 136, at 20-22; Scott, id., 70-73. The crown has
experienced difficulty in securing convictions in contested price-fixing cases and
attaining the maximum fme level due to Canadian criminal courts' reluctance to convict.
For in-detail cases, see id. at 70-71. For further arguments, refer to Ch.4.1.(3),
Ch.5.V.2.(3). & 3.(2).
144
Sanghyun Lee, Activating Action in Damages to Improve Criminal Penalties against
Cartels: Comparative Analysis of Competition Law of the US. and South Korea,
CURRENT lNT'L TRADE L.J., 58 (2008).
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of cartel-caused damages as necessary elements of criminality should sufficiently
increase with entrenched civil enforcements.

V

In addition, 'director disqualification' is the other type of punishment against a

beb

culpable corporate officer. Under the 1986 Company Director Disqualification Act in

imi

the U.K., English courts have the power to disqualify individuals from acting as a

of'

director of a company or being involved in the management, promotion, or formation

1

of the company. The 2002 Enterprise Act (2002 EA) added, besides criminal penalties

As

for people engaged in a cartel, particularly, Ch. I of the Competition Act 1988 and Art.

co1

81 of the EC Treaty as the basis of the disqualification. 145 The 2002 EA enabled the

co

OFT to apply for a Competition Disqualification Order (CDO) specifically. Although

su

the disqualification is not a criminal penalty under criminal procedures, it causes direct

fn

damage to the director's reputation, earnings, and future career, thereby a severer
penalty than an individual fine. In exchange for adopting the alternative honor-based
penalty, trade-offs are to be considered such as the loss ofbusiness expertise and the

a~

subsequent impact of disqualification of able businessmen on economic development.

Sl

The object of disqualification is limited to the director level and does not include

fl

middle management. 146

c

c
(
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Ch. I of the Competition Act 1998 is the domestic equivalent of Art. 81 of the EC
Treaty. Section 2 under Ch. I prohibits coordinated practices of two or more competing
enterprises from attempt to restrict or restricting competition within the UK. It
illustrates price-fixing, production control, market allocation, and discriminatory
treatment to other competitors. McDermott, Bird & Bird UK: Competition provisions of
the EA 2002 enter into force (Jul. 31, 2003 ), available at
http://www.twobirds.com/english/publications/articles/UKCompetitionprovisionsofthe
EnterpriseAct2002enterintoforce.cfm (visited on May 1, 2008)
146
/d. at 18-19.
66

(3) Private Action
Victims, such as consumers or new competitors. still endure damages from cartel
behaviors after the collusion is revealed and administrative or criminal sanctions are
imposed on participators. The necessity of redressing the damage requires the adoption
of a private action in damages.
The trial procedure of a private action depends on public enforcement in some points.
As private parties have less power and ability to bring initial cases to courts than
competition authorities, preparation of private suits starts with the public release of
competition authorities' investigation. 147 In addition, a private action is usually
suspended until a decision from a competition authority is issued. This delay comes
from the necessity of a judicial body to review teclmical decisions and supporting
evidences adopted by a competition authority.
Moreover, the incentive ofbringing a suit by private parties, patticularly consumers
as the main victims of a hard core cartel, is limited as an individual consumer endures a
small-amount of loss for damages. The tiny portions of individual welfare loss can
reach a sum large enough for an action in damages only under the system of a mass
consumers' joint suit. Class-action and treble damages unique in the U.S. are for
overcoming the limited private incentive to bring private actions to court. The adoption
of class action system as an incentive for consumers to bring a suit, however, needs to
consider its trade-offs, e.g. the shrinkage in business cooperation and the increase of
legal counsel costs under the threat of mass litigation, and the reform of civil
procedures for its efficient operation. The trade-off cm1 be reduced if class-action treats

147

Lee, supra note 144, 64-65.
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a hard core cartel with relatively clear border line with legitimate business practice

institution:

and has a measure to manage large costs, e.g. imposing the costs on a losing Party.14S

tocUS on c

s,

With respect to the system oftreble damages, the damages need a jurisprudentia} basis
to justifY the excessive amount of damages under the proportionality as a constitutional
principle. Similar to a corporate fine, its subsequent financial burden to innocent
corporate employees and shareholders impedes the adoption of such severe financial
compensatory systems.

2.
(1) B

CotnP1
practice

On the other hand, the activation of private actions can contribute to spreading public

collusiv

awareness of the damages that a cartel causes, as shown by the U.S. legal history. 149

ocswl

Plaintifis who bring private actions may be either consumers or competitors who

related

endured the hatm of hmizontal collusion. As they bear monetary loss due to an

becom

anticompetitive behavior, they have incentive to bring a suit under proper legal

countJ

institution. In the cow1tries where the level of criminal enforcements is less than

autho

expected due to low public awareness and subsequent low investment. institutional

com~

supports for activating private actions can be an effective strategy to strengthen

inde]

criminal enforcement. As public awareness regarding cartel regulation increases

delh

through active private actions, competition authorities can have a growing number of

prac

advocates for their enforcements. 150 Because more public support leads to the

1

highlighting of cartels in politics, more govemmental budget can be allocated to

coo

activating criminal enforcement. In order to finnly entrench cartel regulations, the

ev1

facilitation of private actions for compensation with support from appropriate legal
15"
15:
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/d., at 66.
149
/d., at 65.
150
Scott, supra note 139, at 76.
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institutions for mass-consumer litigation is a better strategy than placing inefficient
focus on ctiminal enforcement as advanced countries have proved. 151

2. Leniency Program and Bounty System
(1) Benevolent Institutions to DCs
Competition-screening authorities in DCs do not have much experience or expert
practice skills. Meanwhile, cartel-members do not expose covert evidences of their
collusive behavior to investigators, although there are some nai've cartel members in
DCs who do not know anti-cartel regulation and let public officers have all the internal
related data. The more penalties against cartel members, the more covert the conspiracy
becomes. Particularly, when an international cartel were reveled by an advanced
country, and when the cartel is doubted to affect markets in DCs, competition
authorities in DCs face hurdles to investigate related multinational or foreign
companies with domestic competition laws. Related companies usually do not launch
independent companies or open even branches in DCs and are less likely to keep or
deliver to competition authorities in DCs the information of competition-restricting
practices in the region. 152
The leniency program, which exempts or reduces sanctions for a cartel member who
cooperated before or during a cartel investigation through submitting important
evidence of collusion, can help young competition authorities successfully pursue
penalties against a cartel. Researchers argue that the extension of the leniency program
151

Lee, supra note 144, 61-63. For more explanation, refer to Ch.5.V.3.(2).
KFTC, KFTC's Experience in Dealing with International Cartels, 7-8 (2004), at
http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgramMarch2004/KE.experience.Jand.
pdf (visited on Aug.26, 2008)
152
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to a second informer or a first informer after the investigation is launched may be
efficient because, in light of a budget constraint of the investigatory agency and the
difficulty in locating proof, the extension can save the cost and time of finding decisive
evidence. 153 In young competition authorities in the DCs, under the pressure to show

C(

off their effectiveness, a speedy investigation and locating key evidence are the
important factors to bring awareness to the public of cartel damages to consumers and
the necessity of cartel regulation and competition policy in their countries' economies.
The program, in spite of critics, proved effective not only in the U.S., which
introduced the program originally, but also in other countries which subsequently
adopted it. 154 Aubert argues that two major reasons of its success in the U.S. are due to
the fear of imprisonment for corporate officials and the increase in fines. 155 In South
Korea, the continuous efforts to reform the program towards a more transparent and
expanding system, which lures a cartel member, have successfully upgraded the system.
The eligibility, procedures, and benefits of the leniency became concrete. 156

(2) Bounty System
!.

f ~
I ''

153

Aubert, supra note 137, 126.
The U.S. adopted the program in 1993, the EU in 1996, and South Korea in 1997,
which achieved notable successes in prosecuting cartels. Aubert, supra note 137, 125.
Refer to South Korea's increase of cartel penalty which applied the leniency program in
this chapter, II.2.(4)
155
See id.
156
The beneficiaries not only include the first informant before investigation, but also
the second informant. The benefit is mandatory exemption for the first informant and
30% reduced penalty for the second informant, which is confirmed through providing
the informant conditional amnesty position during the subsequent investigation. Oral
application is valid, subsequently within 15 days, with supplemental documents. See
KFTC, supra note 83, 180-82 (2007).
154
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While the leniency program, applied to a cartel-participating member, reduces or
exempts the penalty depending on the timing and type of cooperation, a bounty system
gives a large monetary benefit to everyone who informs a competition authority of a
conspiracy or submits evidence of a cartel to the authority. Private actions for
redressing the damages due to a cartel do not belong to the bounty system because they
usually follow public investigations and a competition authority does not give monetary
rewards to private plaintiffs. Some examples are the U.S. Civil False Claims Act
(CFCA) which rewards the reporter of fraud in procurement contracts with a substantial
share of the collected fines and South Korea's Reward for Cartel Reporter (RCR)
which endows a monetary prize of up to US$ 1 million on a cartel informant who
submits related evidence.
The bounty system itself, with similar characteristics of a whistle-blowing program,
makes pay-off because it makes more revenue increase than the cost of paying a reward.
More discovered cases under the bounty system can contribute to the increase of fines
which outweighs the total payment of the bounty. According to the KFTC's analysis,
total payments of all RCR cases are less than 16 % of an average fine per case, and less
than 2 % of total fines out of the cases supported by the reports with evidence. 157
Similarly, in the U.S., total rewards under the CFCA are around 16 to 20% of total fines
of cases reveled by bounty system. 158 Meanwhile, over 80 % of the fines went to
redress governmental revenue loss due to bid-rigging.

157

Since the RCR was adopted in 2002, total payment of reward in South Korea is US$
104,930 while the total fine of eight cases supported by the report with evidence is US$
5,357,200. The average fine per case is around$ 670,000. KFTC, supra note 83, 182-3
(2007).
158
The total reward is much higher than Korea in consideration of compensation for
71

Moreover, the bounty system is effective to deter a cartel as it provides a reward to

1

any person involved in a cartel who reports the conspiracy. The system garners huge

de'

potential threats, if not calculable, to potential conspirators. As cartel participants need

obi

to secure at least more profit than the bounty for the maintenance of secrecy, the reward
system makes cartel formation and operation costly.

(3) Problems

they cause problems in the economy and society. First, the coverage of a cooperator
under a leniency program is so wide as to cause an unfair result. For example, the
company which creates and operates a cartel as a leader with substantial market share
through soliciting other cartel members with threats or fraudulent promises may
exclusively benefit from leniency by reporting the cartel. The other participants who
hesitantly followed the leader can face a large fine.
Second, commercial atmospheres in domestic markets may change from cooperation
to mistrust. Trust takes a long time to build but just a few occasions can break the trust.
.J
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Despite the advantages of a leniency program and bounty system, critics argue that

,_.

I

The result of mistrust can lead to a decrease in joint venture-like common investment or
R&D, lack of cooperation among SMEs, which are pivotal elements for developing a
national economy. The bounty system brings about a closed corporate human
relationship by limiting cooperation-related information that flows to only a few
individuals.

foregone future wages. Until Sep. 2003, U.S. Dep. Of Defense and the Dep. Of Health
and Human Services recovered $1,592,513,253 with reward of$ 291,031,106, and$
5,117,682,597 with$ 851,646,391 to informants. Aubert, supra note 137, 125. fn. 3.

72

m

m

l to

Third, the bounty system creates adverse incentives for high-level executives who can

tge

decide corporate behaviors. They might temporarily collude in the hopes that they can

need

obtain bounties in the future although shareholders wanted competition. 159

:ward

Fourth, amnesty to corporate managers who participated in a cartel might cause a
political reluctance in that influential corporate figures were beyond the coverage of
law. Even advanced countries as well as the developing countries that have economic
dependency on corporate growth expressed their hesitation in punishing the CEOs of

at

. corporat10ns
.
. the country. 160 such 1oose enfiorcements can mvo
.
ke corporate
maJor
m
managers' recognition that they will not face severe punishments in any cartel activity
as long as they cooperate immediately after they find out the investigation into their

conspiracy.

(4) Proposals for Improving Both Institutions

Solicitation of a largest company in a market for cartel participation can brings
n

about other small-sized competitors involuntarily joining in a market where the

:t.

solicitation is difficult for small companies to reject. The leniency program needs to

or

exclude such solicitor from its benefits. The program needs to exclude a cartel member
using a coercive or fraudulent measure because other members were involuntarily led
by the member. This type of requirement is found in the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
159

See id. at 126.
Christopher Caldwell, Financial crime and punishment, Fin. Times (Mar. 24, 2007);
Song Jung-a, Hyundai chairman avoids jail, FT, at 17 (Sep. 7, 2007). A presiding judge
in charge of the chairman's embezzlement trial mentioned much contribution of
Hyundai Motor to Korea's economic growth as one of the major reasons for the lenient
penalty. He added, after stating that the chairman, its hands-on leader, was the symbol
of the company, "I am also a citizen of the Republic of Korea. I was unwilling to
engage in a gamble that would put the nation's economy at risk."
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DOJ where leniency beneficiaries are limited to corporations which are not leaders or
originators of the illegal activity and do not coerce others to participate. 161 However

'

current criticism in the U.S. as to the requirement opines that the firm or person with
the highest level of culpability has the greatest motivation to be subject to the

t1

government's amnesty inducement. 162 The exact balance between the necessity of
limiting beneficiaries and of designing an incentive for efficient practices shall be made
depending on each country's culture and legal system.
Regarding the mistrust issue, while a competition culture is an important virtue for
sound market economy growth, the securing of sound business cooperation needs to be
highly evaluated. If cooperative measures, such as exemptions for R&D, SMEs'
competitiveness, and the overcoming of depression, are to be allowed in cartel
regulations and other commerce laws, worries over mistrust can be lessened. Publishing
explicit guidelines from competition authorities on cartel law violations will help
reduce the concerns.
Incentive-design for managers comes from conflict of interests between shareholders
and managers. Managers receive a salary in relation to companies' profits under a
temporary contract period, whatever business practices they are employed in. They are
exposed to temptations to collude with competitors. Shareholders, who do not decide
on concrete business practices, have a more negative attitude toward competitionrestricting activities. Stock-related compensation for managers can reduce such a gap in
interests. As the example of stock-option illustrates, since managers receive company

161

Leslie W. Jacobs, Criminal Enforcement ofAntitrust Laws- Problems with the US.
Model, in IALP, 25, at 38 (ed. Hawked., FLI, 2006).
162
Id. at 38-9.
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stock as a part of their salary, they will at least share similar interests with shareholders

~,

and have a risk-averse attitude toward violations of competition law.

th

bounty system should exclude, from the coverage ofbeneficiaries, people who created

163

In addition, the

the illegal conspiracy, in other words, managers who made up the conspiracy in order
to prevent conflicts of interest because they could receive the benefits of individual
lade

amnesty and corporate immunity under a leniency program. Otherwise, they may gain
from dual benefits.
Regarding the injustice issue, in the developing world where public awareness of the

be

anti-cartel norm is less widespread, public resistances to the leniency program will not
create problems, as current practices in advanced countries reveal. So to prevent abuse
of such programs by cartel members with trivial or irrelevant evidences, the leniency

tng

program needs some restrictions. The scope of cooperation shall require decisive
evidence to prove a cartel conspiracy e.g. a document pointing to a conspiracy.
Germany's leniency program adopted this requirement to prevent cartel members from

5

submitting ambiguous or incredible evidence out of the intent to be discharged. In
addition, the benefit of full immunity shall require cooperation at the pre-investigation
stage. The first cooperator after the investigation or the second cooperator shall not be
immune from penalty but receive a reduced penalty. The level of reduction shall take
into consideration the time of cooperation, e.g. 20% of the original penalty before the
investigation (80% reduction), or 50% of the original penalty after investigation (50%
reduction). Meanwhile, the bounty shall reach a large amount to compensate for the
loss of a job for an informant.

163

Aubert, supra note 13 7, 127.
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v.

Capacities Building through International Cooperation

CooI

andl
1. Practical Aid from the Advanced Competition Authorities
Young competition authorities in DCs require aid and advice from advanced

prac
sup]

countries to develop their practice skills. The modem design of competition policy in

thet

South Africa, for instance, owed in a large part to expertise counsel from the advanced

reg

competition policy experts. Although South Korea adopted a modem competition law

ala

with its own initiative in the context of economic and political development, its

co·

enforcement was modeled after successful institutions of advanced competition

He

authorities, e.g. the U.S., Germany, and Japan. The KFTC's investigations of

st

international cartels, e.g. electric graphite or vitamin cartels, similar to other

li

competition authorities' practices, were initiated by a public announcement from the

I

U.S. DOJ that discovered an international cartel conspiracy. Although the KFTC did

a

not fully enjoy sharing information with other competition authorities due to the lack of
any bilateral agreement and confidentiality issues, the public officers of the KFTC were
able to obtain publicly available information from the competition authorities of the
U.S. and the EU. 164 The KFTC acknowledges that its future investigation against an
international cartel will, to a large extent, depend on preceding investigations from such
advanced competition authorities. 165
International organizations as well as individual industrialized countries have assisted
to further improve competition law and cartel regulation through practical experiences
164
165

KFTC, supra note 152, 5-7.
/d. at 5 & 8.
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and wisdom. The International Competition Network (ICN), Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCT AD) have operated conferences and meetings to provide
practical tips from .advanced competition authorities. 166 The UNCTAD focused on
supporting the entrenchment of competition law in DCs pursuant to the UN Set, and
thereby provided technical assistance, for instance, to Jamaica and Kenya, and other
regional cooperation, e.g. CARICOM, UEMOA and SACU. 167 In addition, OECD
along with its Competition Committee has endeavored to promote cooperation in
competition law enforcement through issuing a series of Council Recommendations.
However, as OECD does not include LDCs or many DCs with its strict membership
standard, its efforts to encourage the cooperation of competition law have demonstrated
limited, although successful, effect on immature competition authorities. Although
DDA negotiations are struggling, the WTO received the EC's multilateral framework
agreement including, as one of three elements, specific support for competition
institutions in developing countries. 168

2. Settling a Firm Foundation of Competition Policy

166

Each organization has different characteristics, e.g. practical support of competition
law enforcement for the ICN, contribution of competition policy to economic
development centering the North for the OECD, and promotion of competition policy
centering the South for the UNCTAD.
167
UNCTAD, UNCTAD'S Contribution, Within its Mandate, to the Implementation of,
and to the Review ofProgress Made in the Implementation of, the Outcomes of the
Major UN Conferences and Summits, at 16, TD/B/53/6 (2006), available at
http://www.unctad.org/enldocs/tdb53d6_en. pdf (visited on Mar. 18, 2008)
168
Harry First, Evolving toward What? The Development ofInternational Antitrust, in
THE FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST- FROM COMPARATIVE TO COMMON
COMPETITION LAW, 23, at 39 (JosefDrexl ed. Staempfli Pub., 2003).
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(1) Unilateral Aid

con

For capacity-building in the initial stage, young competition authorities require

con

unilateral aid, although temporary, from the previously experienced competition

aut

authorities. The special and differential treatment principle of international trade law is

ym

to be applied in a similar way. At the early stage, young authorities need to concentrate

inc

on both entrenching a competition policy under whole national economic policies and

col

obtaining political support to further develop the competition policy. Direct harms to

tht

consumers and inefficiencies by cartels in markets will be publicly acknowledged

co

through subsequent effective enforcements along with the aid of economical research.
(2) International Agreements among Similarly-Leveled Competition Authorities

th

Just after the nascent stage, externally, a bilateral agreement with other competition
authorities with a similar enforcement-level under a close economic relationship

cc

supports further development. 169 A bilateral agreement, for effective cooperation
through the positive comity principle during this stage, does not seem to attract
countries with different levels of economic development or competition policies.

I'

c
Q

I
Advanced competition authorities are not induced because they do not consider young

c
r

competition authorities trustful in sincerely keeping confidentiality and pursuing
enforcement. OECD's Best Practices for the Formal Exchange oflnformation between
Competition Authorities in HCC Investigation of 2005 (2005 OECD Best Practices),
although a multilateral agreement, and U.S. International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1994 {1994 IAEAA) as the legal basis ofbilateral agreements
169

See Andrew Gunzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1501,
1546 (1998). Through illustrating economic models, he argues that the greater the
similarity in trade, the smaller the compensatory transfer payment that must be paid
from countries that benefit from the antitrust law agreement to countries that do not.
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confinn the concern of advanced competition authorities. 170 On the other hand, young
competition authorities hesitate because the threat of stronger sanctions from advanced
authorities may undennine voluntary cooperative attitudes from defendants in front of
young competition authorities. As a result, advanced authorities with strict laws are
inclined to adopt extraterritorial applications of domestic laws. 171 By the time a
competition law is to be finnly established as an effective law through assistances and
the efforts of a young competition authority, the competition authority would find more
cooperation with a similar level of or closely related competition authorities.
Competition authorities under a regional market-integration agreement or those with
the similar level of economic development or domestic market size would have a
greater possibility of benefits from regional or bilateral agreements. 172 The exchange of
confidential infonnation between Canada and the U.S. in the Citric Acid case 173 is an

170

OECD, Best Practices for the Fonnal Exchange oflnfonnation between
Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations, at 4, II.A.3 (2005),
available at http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/1!33/35590548.pdf (visited on Jul. 20, 2008).
It states that a competition authority under request of exchange of infonnation from the
other competition authority should have discretion to provide or not to provide the
requested infonnation. One of the enumerated reasons justifying refusal to the
exchange is that the requested jurisdiction believes that confidential infonnation under
request may not be sufficiently safeguarded in the requesting jurisdiction. Meanwhile,
Sec. 12 of 1994 IAEAA enumerates concrete ways to secure confidentiality in an
international antitrust assistance agreement, including requirement of remedial actions.
171
Even the prosecutorial ability of the UK Office of Fair Trading in its maiden
international price-fixing criminal case is doubted by the US DOJ Antitrust Division,
thereby causing the defendants to be convicted twice for the same conspiracy. Michael
Peel, UK group attacks price-fixing court deal with US, FT (Dec. 13, 2007). Gunzman,
szrra note 169, 1507 & 1532-3.
17
Id. at 1546.
173
Bruno Zanettin, COOPERATION BETWEEN ANTITRUST AGENCIES AT THE
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, 154 (Hart Pub. 2002). In the Citric Acid carte case, a counsel
for one of the Japanese defendants out of fear that the US proceedings would result in
Canada proceedings immediately cooperated with the Canadian Bureau in order to
obtain the best settlement for its client under the Canadian leniency program.
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example of successful cooperation. The success was possible since both continued to

ini

sincerely pursue criminal penalties against cartels and to maintain effective cooperation.

do

Canada's investigation caused a serious concern for the legal counsel of a Japanese

co

defendant regarding a future charge in the U.S. which will be facilitated by MLAT

or

between two countries. Pursuant to the recommendation of the counsel, the defendant

co

applied for a leniency program in the U.S.
Achieving a multilateral agreement for exchange of information is also more
successful when members are in the similar level of economic development. Appendix
ofOECD's Recommendation Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Practices

dt

Affecting International Trade 174 is an example which includes procedural measures for

si

cooperation through supplying information to a requesting member, and seeking
oversea information by means of a request. However, as OECD consists of countries
which enjoy a high standard of economic development, the procedural measures do not

d

apply to a majority of developing countries.

v

(3) Cooperative Investigatory Techniques
Cooperative investigation, currently active, is able to help other competition
authorities develop investigation skills. The Guiding Principles of OECD acknowledge
such coordinative investigation by suggesting concrete steps. 175 The five steps are i)
providing notice of time period and schedule for decision-making, ii) sharing

174

OECD Council, Guiding Principles tor Notification, Exchange of Infonnation Cooperation in Investigation and Proceedings, Consultations and Conciliation of
Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, Appendix, C(95) 130 final (Jul.
27 & 28~ 1995)
175
OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation between
Member Countries on Anti-competitive Practices Affecting International Trade, at 1,
I.A.2. & at 8, para. 5, C(95)130/FINAL (1995).
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information subject to domestic laws governing confidentiality, iii) pursuant to the
ion.

domestic laws, requesting that the subjects of investigation voluntarily permit the
cooperating countries to share some or all of the information in their possession, iv) coordinating discussion regarding remedies which require cross-border actions, and v) in
countries where advance notification of mergers is required, requesting that the
notification include a statement identifying notifications made to other countries.
The cooperation in investigation works even between a young competition authority
and the advanced one which may lack tools to investigate a cartel organized in the
developing world. 176 Some examples of the cooperation are joint drafting or
simultaneous issuance of dawn raids, subpoenas, civil investigative demands, document
requests, which can reduce the risk of the destruction of far-located evidence by a
conspirator with an oversee office. 177 A recent simultaneous investigation into a freight
delivery fee fixing conspiracy among international airlines by competition authorities
with a related airline company's major branch in their respective jurisdiction, including
a DC, demonstrates the effective usage of some of the new techniques. 178

3. Challenges from the Exchange of Confidential Information

176

Karel van Miert, International Cooperation in the Field of Competition: a View from
the EC, in IALP, 13 (Hawk ed., FLI, 1997).
177
Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust Cooperation, in ANTITRUST GOES GLOBAL: WHAT
FUTURE FOR TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION? 98, 113-114 (Evenett, Lehmann, and Steil
eds., Brookings Inst. Press. 2000); van Miert, supra note 174, 17.
178
KFTC participated into DOJ and EU Commission's simultaneously raiding major
airlines for investigating a global cargo price fixing case by interviewing cargo business
executives and removing documents from Korean Air. Officials raid firms in air cargo
price-fixing inquiry takes in Asian lines, lNT' L HERALD TRIBUNE (Feb. 15, 2006), at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/15/business/cargo.php (visited on Dec. 11, 2007).
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Overall international cooperation in competition law, particularly, in cartel regulation,
is not so popular as in other laws, such as criminal law, tax law or securities law where
close cooperation approaches have been implemented. 179 Although investigatory
cooperation is one area that helps DC and advanced countries assist each other, it does
not necessarily lead to the level of exchanging information. It is no wonder that
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (1994 IAEAA), which adopts the
exchange of information including confidential data under strict standards, has
produced only one agreement between the U.S. and Australia for more than a decade. 180
A research analyzes several reasons for the unpopularity, among other things, as i) little
incentive for the waiver of a confidentiality rule, ii) imbalance in the power of
competition authorities, iii) worry over the dilution of privilege and leniency programs,
and iv) national interests in maintaining confidentiality rules. 181 This thesis suggests
several strategic ways to overcome the problem.
(1) An Incentive System for a Leniency Applicant who Waives Confidentiality
First, although the exchange of information occurs, cartel cases have obtained little
benefit from it. The information which has been exchanged is limited to publicly
I - •
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released information. Although, through a bilateral cooperation agreement, exchange of
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information operates more conveniently, confidential information obtained through
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Zanettin, supra note 173, 128-31. See OECD, OECD and Non-OECD Economies
Agree to Continue Work on Tax Information Exchange (Aug. 6th, 2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org (visited on May 13, 2008)
180
Its formal title is 'Agreement between the Gov. of the U.S.A. and the Gov. of
Australia on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance (1999)'. The agreement is the
only one which has been successfully negotiated and met strict standards under Art.
12(2) of 1994 IAEAA that allows exchanges of even confidential information. See
Taylor, supra note 91, 113-115.
181
Zanettin, supra note 173, at 131-145; Waller, supra note 177, 108-9.
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leniency program, which is pivotal evidence in many cartel cases, is not to be shared
.
unless a cooperatmg
party agrees.

182

Unl"k
1 e merger cases, w h ere companies have

incentives to waives confidentiality to negotiate speedy decisions or joint resolutions in
cross-border transaction, the waiver of confidentiality in international cartel cases is
considered to be little incentive with much at stake. 183 It is because it can bring about
subsequent litigations including public sanctions and private actions in other affected
jurisdictions. As an incentive-promoting system, there should be linkage among
leniency programs or a system which links a leniency applicant to reduction in
penalties or damages in other countries. 184 Under the system, a leniency applicant
which waived confidentiality in a country can have benefits from the leniency program,
or of reduction in damages (in a private action) or penalties (in public enforcement) of
the other country which enjoys the exchange of information through the waiver. For
example, once a person who is investigated waives confidentiality rule in the U.S.
under a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT} with Canada, he/she shall enjoy a
reduction or immunity of the penalty under Canada's leniency program. However, even
under the incentive system, confidentiality waiver might not work well with respect to a
country where its competition authority does not demonstrate an effective investigation
capacity. A person under investigation would expect neither a severe penalty from the
182

Telephone Interview with Hye-Rim Chang, Public Officer, The Department of
International Cooperation at KFTC (May 13, 2008).
183
Taylor, supra note 91, at 113.
184
Telephone Interview with Hee-Eun Chung, Public Officer in charge ofleniency
program, KFTC (May 13, 2008). Ms.Chung acknowledged that there was a trial of
OECD to exchange confidential information obtained through leniency program, which
failed due to lack of member countries' consents. van Miert, supra note 174, 24. Miert
states that in cases of serious infringements like cartels, the necessary good will is not
there, unless the companies are willing to cooperate in order to get more lenient
treatment.
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country nor a serious attitude to conserve confidential data of the country. Still

forme

incentive for the waiver is low, but expected loss subsequent to the information-sharing,

neith

e.g. exposure of information to private sector through a corrupt official or unsecured

althO

data preservation system, is large.

cons

In light of the situations, the countries which need the exchange of information and

then

expect many waivers should develop a domestic legal system to build trust from cartel

Al

members in other countries and other competition authorities. Institutions for building

aid '

trust are a system which secures the limited usage of the information and one which

in tt

enables the serious maintenance of confidentiality. Concrete measures are to be
mentioned later. 185 In addition, in order to induce a person who is investigated to waive

mu

confidentiality rule, the countries which want exchange should indicate effective cartel
enforcements and the transparent linkage to their leniency programs of a waiver.
(2) A Multilateral Information-Exchange Agreement with Preferential Treatment
Second, the issue of power imbalance is currently unavoidable. As Ch. 1 illustrates,
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the U.S. and EU have the most serious anti-cartel enforcement and some advanced

re

countries impose comparably large fines while other countries endure under-

et

enforcement of cartel penalties. International cooperation between countries with
different level of competition law enforcement does not work well. A cartel

p

investigation in one country with strong competition policy does not induce a cartel
participant to reveal their conspiracy to a 'young competition authority' which

i

subsequently launched investigation. It is because the cartel participant does not expect

'

the young authority to be so competent or to have so willingness to penalize them as the

185

Refer to the following (3) for the concrete measures of the systems.
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former country with strict competition policy. For instance vitamin cartel members did

'

neither reveal their conspiracy to nor cooperate with Brazilian competition agency
although they revealed their conspiracy to U.S. DOJ.

186

The cartel members must have

considered that Brazil had no leniency program or competence to successfully convict

them.
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Although the gap of competition law enforcement can be mitigated through practical
aid or assistance from advanced competition authorities and international organizations,
in terms of the exchange of information, a multilateral cooperation agreement reflecting
preferential treatment for less experienced competition authorities is worth trying. The
multilateral cooperation agreement should facilitate the exchange of information which
covers a wide range, including confidential information. Such a wide range of
information exchange can contribute to active enforcement of competition laws against
an international cartel through promoting competition authorities' abilities to gather
overseas evidence. 188 However, the same level of information exchange under
reciprocity principle does not help young competition authorities to develop their
enforcements as explained below.
In light of the special circumstance of immature competition authorities, a
preferential treatment for young competition authorities will work better for achieving
186

Mariana Tavares de Araujo, The Brazilian Experience on International Cooperation
in Cartel Investigation, 7 (2002), available at
www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/central_documentos/documento _trabalho/2002lldoctrab2l.pdf (visited on May 2, 2008)
187
!d. at 4.
188
Taylor, supra note 91, 114. Since Canada and the U.S. reached an agreement for
sharing confidential information on competition law enforcement in 1990, Canadian
prosecutions against international cartels uncovered by the U.S.DOJ resulted in around
US$ 100 million-amount fines of Canadian competition authority during the next
decade.
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the facilitation of information exchange and the development of competition laws in
their nascent stages. The preferential treatment is that young competition authorities
may exchange a current level of general information while experienced authorities
should allow even the exchange of confidential information. A party who is considering
applying for leniency program of a mature competition authority does not need to be
concerned about the differential treatment. One reason is that he can enjoy the benefit
of linked leniency program among mature competition authorities. Another reason is
that several hurdles for young competition authorities to pursue their anti-cartel
enforcements regarding an international cartel will prevent the effect of sharing
confidential information of the party from being expanded to an extent that overall
young authorities impose severe fines. As the international vitamin cartel case
illustrates at Ch.l, 189 most competition authorities of developing countries did not
succeed in imposing heavy fine on the cartel members although some of the authorities
had exchange of information from the U.S.
Lastly, limitation in the exchange of information voluntarily provided to competition
authorities under leniency program is necessary in less experienced competition
authorities of which competition law enforcements need to be increased. As a former
vice-president ofKFTC agreed, KFTC can not exchange information obtained through
leniency program as public officials are under duty to preserve confidentiality of secret
of an enterprise. 190 When the coverage of information-exchange extends to those
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Refer to Ch.l,V.4.
Interview with Byung Bae Kim, former Vice President, KFTC (Mar.27, 2008). The
author had an interview with Byung-Bae Kim, former vice president ofKFTC, at 2008
ABA Session of Antitrust. He stated that, due to KFTC's legal obligation to keep the
confidentiality of information under leniency under Art. 62 ofMRFTA, the information
190
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obtained through leniency program, enterprises would continue their uncooperative
attitudes against young competition authorities because business information, once
voluntarily submitted under domestic competition law, can flow abroad thereby
exposing the enterprises to subsequent penalties. Although there is a system which
links a leniency applicant to the reduction of penalty in other countries, fines from
advanced competition authorities will lead to passive attitudes of cartel members in
front of less developed competition authorities. From the perspective of promoting
cartel enforcement, the evidence obtained from leniency program in DCs should be
limitedly or not shared with other competition authorities unless the investigated party
agrees.
(3) A System which Secures Limited Usage of Shared Information
Third, in order for an information-offering country to have trust in the recipient's
usage, shared information shall strictly be limitedly used only for the original purpose
by a competition authority. When the information is exposed to other authorities or for
other purposes, it may result in the collapse of international cooperation system due to
mistrust. 191 1994 IAEAA stipulates that antitrust mutual assistance agreement will be
terminated if the confidentiality under such agreement is violated with respect to
antitrust evidence, and if adequate action is not taken both to minimize harm from the
violation and to ensure that the confidentiality is not violated again. 192 Imposing a
serious penalty on the people who abuse the information can strengthen the security of
the information. Procedural controls, e.g. the screening of a high-level executive officer,

would be difficult to share even though there is an international agreement regarding
information-exchange.
191
Taylor, supra note 91, 115.
192
Art. 12 (2) (G).
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a limited time-frame, and prior agreement for compensating damages from the breach

bee

of confidentiality, may be complimentary measures.

car

Moreover, when the confidentiality rule provides to a competition official a lot of
discretion on whether evidence may be shared, the possibility of abuse may increase

co:

due to domestic interests. The abuse undermines precious public supports for young

th1

competition authorities. The partly adoption of mandatory information-exchange into

re

international cooperation practice will contribute to reducing the abuse. Mandatory

in

exchange with respect to evidence obtained through compulsory investigation, in

c1

distinction with information through cooperation, is one example. This measure can be

1

an incentive system for cartel members to cooperate with competition authorities.

a

VI.

Conclusion

The analysis of the histories of advanced competition laws indicates that
development of cartel law is facilitated by four conditions: i) progressing a market
economy along with an open international trade policy, ii) political support on the basis
of a democratic power system, iii) developed legal institutions that can produce
competition jurisprudences, and iv) economic research which figure out economic
damages from a cartel. Particularly, cartel regulations in the U.S., Germany, and U.K.
are the typical models which demonstrate that cartel regulation has been developed
with the foundation of the conditions while France's cartel regulation has been
stimulated by the EU competition policy. Moreover, study of advanced cartel
regulations, particularly, France and Germany, demonstrates that cartel regulations had
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been infrequently enforced by themselves until the whole competition regime supported
cartel regulations.
The comparative research of cartel regulations in the four major DCs shows that a
competition policy need to be seriously implemented around the time when they open
their domestic markets to foreign competitors. Political support is a key ally which can
reduce objections against the launching of competition law and can provide
institutional, financial, and public assistance. In addition, a substantial part of
competition law development depends on the level of development of the legal system.
The progress of rules and reasonings through the accumulation of both administrative
and judicial decisions can contribute to a sophisticated system of competition laws and
cartel regulations. A cartel regulation with a presumption provision may be beneficial
to alleviate the burden of proof that a young competition authority must present to
penalize a covert cartel. The foundation of economic research for a competition policy
is relatively weak in the DCs, which leads to more room for political influence. The
coverage of exemptions from cartel regulations needs to be much broader in DCs than

in advanced market economies. Otherwise, DCs will not acknowledge competition law
or cartel regulation at all. The wider exceptions reflect politicians' concerns that the
poor economic environments in the DCs might be undermined by a competition culture.
Although an industrial policy, in a strict meaning, may look to conflict with a
competition policy, inefficiencies inherent in governmental policy, as an obstacle to
further economic development, necessitate the encouragement of competition in a
private sector through privatization and liberalization. However, the immediate
adoption of a competition policy to the general scope in DCs should be approached
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cautiously because there are quite a few industries where indigenous poor economic
situations lead to the collapse of weak domestic companies when they compete with
foreign companies. However, the protective policy which shields weak industries from
international competition shall be limited, under regular renewals, to a period
temporary enough to stimulate autonomous efforts to raise efficiency. Since continuous
economic development requires a competition policy and the cartel regulation is the
maxim of the competition policy, an industrial policy should be harmonized with the
competition policy and, particularly with the cartel regulation to lift economic
development.
The model cartel regulation in competition law may adopt other objectives reflecting
public policies as well as competition-facilitation. Particularly, as political support is
necessary to a successful enforcement of competition laws, the allowance of political
influence as objectives in the DCs competition law is inevitable. However, the
competition authorities should be equipped with preventive tools to control
arbitrariness. Economic development, among other political influences, is the
appropriate objective to be introduced because it can be measured with economic
analysis, thereby removing abuse of political influences. In order to raise the level of
pubic awareness about the damages that cartels cause, the effective enforcement of the
regulation and the creation of a foundation for competition advocacy are important
ways to achieve effective cartel enforcements.
As a method to assist cartel practices in DCs, an exemption provision should be
allowed to approve some kinds of cartels which can promote long-term competitiveness.
To control its arbitrary usage by a political body, however, several institution or
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,.
systems are needed, such as an independent panel with competition experts, transparent
decision-making system, and a regular review system of exemption.

In addition, a leniency program and a bounty system do a lot of good to help cartel
investigations. Several concerns on these reward institutions have been expressed,
which can be minimized with the reform measures which can limit the possibility of
abuse of the institutions, e.g. the exclusion of a leader who used a coercive or
fraudulent method, the approval of efficient cooperation, incentive-design systems to
prevent managers' abuse, the requirement of decisive evidence, etc.
To build the capacity of competition authorities, young competition authorities need
practical aid from advanced competition authorities and international organizations.
Internally, policy priority is to position a competition policy firmly under the whole
economic policy and to widen the foundation of political support. Externally, bilateral
or regional agreements between countries with similar levels of competition authorities
under a close economic relationship will help to achieve more.
International cooperation agreement in competition law has been less popular than
those in other law areas because there is a threat of subsequent litigations and penalties
after offering information, the imbalance in power of competition law between
advanced and young competition authorities is large, business information related to
competition law is linked to national interests, and reciprocal mistrust in securing
confidentiality impedes the exchange ofbusiness information. The creation and
operation of systems which promote incentives for private parties to cooperate or
secure confidentiality is necessary to solve problems. A linkage system that leads a
leniency applicant in a country who waives confidentiality rule to benefits of leniency
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programs or reduction in penalties or damages (in private actions) in other countries
which obtain the information through the waiver is a good model. On the other hand, a
multilateral cooperation agreement which adopts preferential treatment with respect to
a range of information under information exchange provision is another desirable
system. The preferential treatment will lead cartel members to cooperate with
competition authorities in DCs. Since less experienced countries still face many hurdles
to imposing fmes on an information provider, the provider will face similar penalty
compared to the situation that he cooperates with a competition authority in an
advanced country. Reducing discretion ofpublic officers in decision of exchanging
information is one way to promote cooperation from the cartel members. The strict
limitation of the usage of shared information on the case concerned and to the
competition authority which requested the data needs concrete measures to secure the
limitation, e.g. remedies, penalty, and termination of cooperation agreement. Successful
enforcement of domestic cartel laws with limited usage of shared information can
contribute to building up trust among competition authorities. Leveling the playing
field for competition authorities in the North and the South can, in the long term, make
international cooperation strengthened by reducing current mistrusts.
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Ch. 5. The Need for the Development of International Law on Cartels

I.

Current Stage of International Cartel Regulation

Although many cases of bilateral cooperation have worked successfully, negotiation
for a binding multilateral agreement under the World Trade Organization, which is the
Doha Development Agenda(DDA) including competition policy, faced strong
resistance from a majority of developing countries(DCs}, e.g. the African Carribean and
Pacific (ACP) group comprising seventy seven DCs. Meanwhile, assistances and
cooperation from the International Competition Network(ICN) attracted both
developing and developed countries. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development(OECD), since its 1998 Hard Core Cartel (HCC) Recommendation, has
produced regular reports on the progress of cartel enforcement of its member countries.
The OECD, through granting observer status to a non-member country, has encouraged
a developing country, which has recently adopted competition law or which is
preparing the adoption, to reveal its status to obtain opinions and advice from advanced
countries. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD) has
continued to have regular conferences on development issues, including the
relationship of development with competition, since it produced the UN Set in 1980.
The support for competition regimes from the UNCT AD has been offered by assisting
in launching new competition laws in emerging or transitional economies. However, an
insufficient political power for competition policy under the UNCTAD may stem a
further commitment to regulate private cartels.
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Regulating cartels still sounds threatening to the economic development of quite a
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few developing countries, the economy of which depends on the production of primary

cor

commodities and do not have enough local markets to raise competitive companies.
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Developing economies need to foster small or mid sized domestic enterprises until they

cal

grow large international companies which can compete with foreign global companies,
whereby increasing national production and employment. Cartel regulations which

ef

restrict cooperation in markets looks like an obstacle to their economic policy.
Meanwhile, a commodity agreement in developing economies brings important
monetary resources to boost the economies. Although a commodity agreement is
excluded from the definition of a cartel, many DCs still worry that an international
cartel regulation may extend to control an important economic tool, the commodity
agreement. Their concern is reasonable because the broad definition of a cartel may
cover intergovernmental producers' associations (IPA).
This chapter, based on the analyses of the former chapters 2,3, and 4, is divided into
two parts, respectively addressing strategies for a binding international cartel law and
reforms for effective intergovernmental commodity agreements (ICAs). This chapter
examines current popular methods. First, this chapter discusses the limitation of
bilateral agreements in the framework of international cartel regulations. Second, it
examines hurdles to achieve multilateral agreements. After figuring out certain
weaknesses, the chapter then demonstrates several strategies for achieving a
multilateral agreement in the long term. A front part argues that a plurilateral agreement
approach supplemented by a bilateral agreement is a realistic intermediate way to
achieve a binding international cartel regulation, and suggests two approaches to a

2
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binding multilateral cartel law: a nruTow and a broad approach. The narrow approach
concentrates on specific aspect(s) of cartel, e.g. bid-rigging, while the broad approach is
a principle-based multilateral agreement towards the competition regime including
cartel regulations.
The second part consists of policy-focused discussion for appropriate models for
effective IC As. It argues that, rather than former market-interrupting measures, e.g.
buffet stock and supply control, market-adjusting measures and structural policy will be
effective and long-lasting functions of an ICA in commodity markets. In light of close
relationship of commodity production to sustainable development, this thesis proposes
two ICA models as multilateral systems, i) a model which focuses on the productivityincrease and ii) the other model which induces multi-stake holders to participate in and
use their expertise for the operations of an ICA. At last, it suggests the roles of ICAs
dealing with food commodities in the current high-food-price era.

II.

Limitations on a Bilateral Agreement as a Major Measure on International
Cartel Law

Currently, bilateral agreements are favorable measures in facilitating cooperation
between competition authorities. However, although bilateral agreements have their
unique and important roles, 1 they have the following in-nature limitations: large
transaction costs, dissimilar legal schemes, the lack of reciprocal confidence, and
practices susceptible to national interests. Such hurdles work negatively on the way to a
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Refer to Ch. 2. II.
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binding international cartel regulation. A bilateral agreement cannot a major tool but
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should remain as supplementary one on the way to the creation of a binding

substa

international cartel law.
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1. Large Transaction Costs in the light of a Wide Coverage ofNetwork
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Let's assume that ninety countries at this moment have cartel regulatory law~. In

two c

order to cooperate effectively under a bilateral agreement regime, each country needs to

the 1'

have eighty nine bilateral agreements to cover all the other competition authorities.

the J

According to a mathematical calculation, this network which links all the countries

been

with cartel law with each other requires a total of 4,005 bilateral agreements. 2 Even

exte

with a conservative estimate, under the assumption that an individual country wants a
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cooperation agreement with thirty countries with a similar level of cartel policy or

mal

economic development, the network needs around 1,335 agreements. As the number of

we]

countries with cartel regulation continues to grow, the number of required bilateral

fro,

agreements shall increase geometrically. The cost of making so many commitments can

to 1

outweigh the benefit of it. The large cost leads to a negative attitude on a bilateral
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agreement.
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2. Dissimilarity in Cartel Regulation
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The applicable mathematical formula is N=(n*(n-1))/2. 'N' is the number ofbilateral
agreements required while 'n' represents the number of countries with competition laws
including cartel regulations at a given time. See Martyr Taylor, INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION LAW: ANEW DIMENSION FOR THE WTO? 120-121 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2006).
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Cooperation through the use of bilateral agreements becomes effective when the
substance and procedure of cartel regulatory regime work similarly under similar legal
systems. For example, a memorandum ofunderstanding(MOU) between Australia and
New Zealand in 1988, covering cartel regulation, has been appraised as a representative
case on close cooperation because the innovative procedures of the MOU allowed the
two countries to extend their jurisdictions into reciprocal territory. The MOU between
the two common law countries was made in the context where the integration between
the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 and the New Zealand Commerce Act 1986 had
been increasing. 3 The highly hannonized competition laws, common law system, and
extensive bilateral trade in both countries contributed to the achievement.

4

On the contrary, differences in procedures and substances of cartel regulation can
make international cooperation difficult. 5 A positive comity principle does not work
well when the substantive or procedural cartel law of a requested country is different
from that of a requesting country. Particularly, cartel laws in the developing world tend
to reflect their national interests more than those in advanced countries, which leads to
diverse cartel regulations. It is no surprise that bilateral agreements have been made by
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Simpson Grierson, Bridging the Great Divide, FYI Competition Law (Jul. 2004),
available at
http://www.simpsongrierson.com/pdf_ display.cfm ?pathto=/assets/publications/competit
ion law/bridging the great divide- July 04 final. pdf (visited on Apr. 21, 2008). On June
29th, 2004, the Australian and New Zealand government announced a joint study on the
hannonization of two competition laws.
4
See Taylor, supra note 2, at 119-120; Kevin C. Kennedy, Symposium: Global Trade
Issues in the New Millennium: Foreign Direct investment and Competition Policy at the
WTO, 33 GEO. WASH.lNT'L. REV. 585, 621 (2001).
5
European Commission Group of Experts on Competition Law stated in 1995 that it is
difficult to imagine the emergence of a level playing field if this were to be founded
only on a group of inevitably heterogeneous bilateral agreement. Taylor, supra note 2,
at 139.
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centering on the most advanced competition authorities where economic efficiency has
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been acknowledged as the major objective.
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3. Lack of Reciprocal Confidence Between Old and Young Competition

wl

Authorities
Cooperation will not work well without trust in the capabilities of reciprocal

0

competition authorities, e.g. investigation, evidence-gathering, and security for

a

exchanged information. The possibility of abuse of power or corruption by officials

(

with discretion under an un-transparent administrative system in competition
authorities of developing countries may make advanced competition authorities less
trustful. The mistrust of the advanced competition authorities on the authorities with
less experience and skills may cause disruption in the creation of widespread bilateral
agreements.
In a recent oil-transferring marine hose price-fixing case, three British executives,

who pleaded guilty in the U.S. courts, had to promise to plead guilty for a UK case with
similar charges in front of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The practice pursuant
to an international agreement between the U.S. DOJ and UK Office of Fair Trading
(OFT) is that a competition authority which has investigated an international cartel may
obtain promises of guilty pleas for a case under investigation by another competition
authority. Although in-detail contents of the agreement between the UK OFT and the
U.S. DOJ are not revealed, the practice raises important issues regarding the
infringement on the human right for a fair trial and intervention into sovereignty
principle. In terms of human rights, it matters whether it violates the double jeopardy

6

principle for the three defendants. As a governmental authority in the U.S. requested
defendants' promises of guilty pleas in a case of the UK, it can violate the defendants'
right to have fair trial in the UK, unless the agreement has the same effect as legislation
which can intervene on individual rights under constitutional law.
The agreement contributed to the progress of the first price-fixing prosecution of the
OFT. However, the practice revealed the mistrust of the U.S. DOJ on the UK
authority's capability to perform a proper prosecution itself, 6 and the dependence of the
OFT on the US DOJ's prosecution. Although the positive comity principle, which
enables one party to ask the other party to enforce its competition law in its jurisdiction,
promotes reciprocal respect for the sovereign function of cartel enforcement in each
territory, practical cooperation between countries with different levels of cartel
enforcements, as the marine hose price-fixing case indicates, may impede the
performance of the positive comity principle. The UK may argue that the intervention
into sovereign function is acknowledged for its progress of cartel practices under the
agreement, but the practice conflicts with normal cooperative activities under a bilateral
agreement, e.g. simultaneous raid and information-sharing.

4. Practices in favor of Inherent National Interests
Most bilateral agreements are feeble to resistance on the basis of national interest.
Administrative officers in charge of investigation and issuance of civil penalty under
competition law are unlikely to enforce competition laws strictly if such enforcement
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Michael Peel, UK group attacks price-fixing court deal with US, FT (Dec. 21, 2007).
7

causes hindrances to their national interests. 7 Moreover, under the voluntary
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cooperation approach, which most bilateral agreements use, 'patriotic' regulations and

approve

enforcements in favor of domestic welfare rather than global welfare are inevitable. 8

officerc

Courts issued, from time to time, decisions preferring national interests to international
comity on antitrust cases. For an example, U.S. Courts have held that the Act of State

Antitru

doctrine is not a defense to an antitrust complaint when a foreign sovereign only
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approves or condones, not compels, a certain conduct. 9 Particularly, requests for
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Taylor, supra note 2, 121-122.
JosefDrexl, Comments on Harry First: Decentralized Antitrust Enforcement and the
Evolution of an Int'l Common Law ofAntitrust (hereinafter Comments on First), in THE
FUTURE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTITRUST- FROM COMPARATIVE TO COMMON
COMPETITION LAW (hereinafter the FTA) 53 , at 57 (Drexl. eds, Staempfli Pub. 2003);
Andrew Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. Rev. 1501, 15241531 & 1540-41 (1998); Douglas E. Rosenthal, Jurisdiction and Enforcement:
Equipping the Multilateral Trading System with a Style and Principles to Increase
Market Access, 6 Geo.Mason.L.Rev. 543, 568 (1998). Guzman illustrates the economic
models for proving the biased competition law and its application.
9
Refer to Ch.2 III.1.(2).1) and VI.3. Among other cases, Hartford Fire Insurance v. CA,
509 U.S. 764, 795-796 & 798-99, 113 S.Ct. 2891,2909 & 2910-11(1993). However,
there is a case which resulted in forcing incompatible duties. Westinghouse, which had
breached contract to supply uranium to electric utility companies due to an international
uranium cartel's refusal to supply and been suited in re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F.Supp 316, 319 (J .P.M.D.L.1975), sought to
produce documents located in Canada, Australia, Britain, and South Africa through the
letters rogatory procedure. However, both the Canadian and Australian courts refused to
respect letters of request to produce documents in their countries. While the High Court
of England accepted the letters rogatory under the Hague Convention on the Taking of
Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, to which the U.S. and Britain are
signatories, the House of Lords denied effect to the letters in response to British
producers' appeal. Subsequently, in a separate antitrust action lodged by Westinghouse
against uranium producers of the international cartel in 1976, a district judge
acknowledged its jurisdiction and ordered the disclosure of these documents despite the
foreign statutes which impose criminal penalties against the information disclosure.
The following interlocutory appeal regarding the jurisdiction of the District Court with
amici curiae from appellants' governments was rejected. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Rio Algom Ltd, 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-1256(7th Cir. 1980); Tina J. Kahn, The Protection
ofTrading Interests Act of 1980: Britain s Response to US. Extraterritorial Antitrust
Enforcement, 2 Nw J. INT'LL. & Bus. 476 (1980).
8
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confidential business information by governments have been very difficult to be
approved as the documents relate to important national trade interests. 10 A high-level
officer of the OFT in the UK agreed that the reason for the lack ofbilateral agreements
between the U.S. and member countries ofthe EU even after the 1994International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA) is due to the member countries' fear
that sharing certain information will lead to the loss of competitive advantage in their
·
· ·
II
busmess
entitles.

III.

Hurdles to Binding Multilateral Agreement

1. Reasons for Failure to Reach a Binding Multilateral Agreement
Even though over ninety countries have adopted domestic competition laws
including cartel regulations under the auspices of international organizations, e.g. WTO,
UNCTAD, and OECD, most oftheir enforcements are in the initial stage of
development or do not have the sufficient capabilities to pursue international cartels
and even tacit domestic cartels. In response to immature practices, international
organizations, such as ICN and OECD, have highlighted the facilitation of domestic
enforcement, e.g. through reducing barriers for information located overseas. 12
However, trials for major international organizations to achieve a multilateral
10

The Westinghouse litigation brought modification or enactment of five foreign
statutes. The most important was the British Protection of Trading Interests Act (1980).
See Kahn, supra note 9.
11
Interview with Stephen Blake, Deputy Director on Cartels, UK OFT (Mar. 26, 2008).
The author attended 56th Antitrust Law Spring Meeting of American Bar Association in
Washington DC in 2008, and had an interview with Blake.
12
Harry First, Evolving toward What? The Development ofInt 'l Antitrust, in supra note
8 FTA, at 42-43.
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agreement have not reached the level of a binding competition law or cartel regulation

tllarl

in spite of their continuous efforts.

com

(1) The Lack of International Consensus
The reasons for such failures or standstills of the trials can be analyzed with

'~

'I

P

persuasive arguments. 13 The conspicuous obstacles to a binding agreement are diverse

ena

national interests, such as political power holders' perspective on competition, the level

cor

of dependency on state enterprises or major products from the perspective of the

cor

national economic structure 14 , the level of economic development, the foundation ofthe

ec<

legal system and economical research, or the fear of the restriction of state sovereignty

pn

or domestic enterprises' activities. However, the most important obstacle among the

co

former reasons is an insufficient consensus on international cartel regulation. 15 Still, the

en

majority of developing countries and LDCs do not believe that international

stJ

competition laws, including cartel regulations, will support their economic

w

development because economic efficiency promotion through competition policies do
not always increase domestic wealth. They want, at best, a domestic competition policy,

d

modified by development concerns and uninterrupted by international law. Still, a

0

substantial number of countries among the WTO members have not adopted

I

competition laws, including cartel regulations at al1. 16 Some of the countries argue that

s

13

Refer to Ch. 3. II.
It is deeply related to nationalism which protects national champions from open
competition. Kennedy, supra note 4, 620. Kennedy mentions this national pride as a
strong hurdle to a successful multilateral agreement.
15
/d., at 603-5 & 608. Some countries favor price-fixing.
16
As of 1999, among 144 member states, only 70 states adopted competition law. A
Business Roundtable WTO Policy Paper: The WTO's Role in Maintaining Competitive
Markets (May 2003), available at http://www.businessroundtable.org (visited on Apr.
22, 2008).
14

10

rnarket failures in open international trade are not serious enough to enact generic
competition laws including cartel regulations. 17
(2) Insufficient Preparation: Insufficient Development of Institutions
Another group of countries have internal oppositions severe enough to delay
enacting cartel regulations because they have to spend many financial sources to the
competition-facilitating institutions. 18 These countries do not place much value on
competition in economic development process. Often, they usually have less diversified
economic structures with a focus on commodity productions. Equitable distribution of
profits and production are more emphasized than an increase in efficiency through
competition. In addition, political support from small and medium size
enterprises(SMEs) for adopting a competition regime is not strong enough to overcome
structural weaknesses. Less democratized communication of political opinions and
weak foundations for SMEs are the reasons for the feeble support.
Similarly, due to the lack of institutions and resources, the other group of countries
does not want sophisticated competition law including cartel regulations. 19 The group
of LDCs, where financial resources and institutional bases are limited, is an example.
Besides a low level of economic and political development, the un-transparent legal
system and arbitrary discretion in the group of countries are not proper to competition
law enforcement. As predictable rules in competition policy and cartel regulations
contribute to promoting competitive entrepreneurship, a certain level of capacity in the
17

Brunei belongs to this group of countries. See id.
Malaysia belongs to this group. See id. at 74.
19
!d. Papua New Guinea formerly belonged to the group but enacted competition
legislation in 2002. As to the group, The World Bank recommended that such nations
should concentrate on institutional strengthening rather than enacting competition laws
that may be misunderstood or improperly enforced.
18
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legal system and economical analysis of market data is required to operate the

china ar

competition law regime.
(3) Diversification of Interests within the Developing World
The conflicting viewpoints on anti-competitive business practices between the North
and the South, although once converged for the UN Set in 1980, did not produce

inere as

conspicuous compromising results in the DDA, thereby ending up with removing the

prices

competition issue from the agenda. The economic powers of the North, although having

haver

acknowledged the development concerns of the South in principle under its growing

willn

power, 20 did not permit to accommodate the concerns to concrete provisions in the UN

to de'

Set. While the cartel regulation in the UN Set prevents enterprises from agreeing to fix

For<:

prices, it does not have exemptions for R&D, crisis, or small-size enterprises, which are

appe

beneficial for sustaining or developing markets in less developed economies. The WTO

Sou

regime, in favor of free trade, tried to reflect efficiency-oriented objectives of

pos·

competition but did not produce any adjustment or exemption which reflects unique
economic circumstances pursuant to the level of economic development in the South.

am

The recent diverse voices within the South, different from the 1970s, were the result
of independent policies that developing countries pursued to solve their economic
crises since the mid 1980s. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, most ofthe
communist regimes shifted their economic systems towards a market economy, thereby
devoting their efforts to entrenching free and competitive markets. Some of them, for

21

4
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example, China and Russia, succeeded in developing their economies. Along with
20

SUSAN SELL, POWER & IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPRTY
AND ANTITRUST, 21 & 27-32 (State Univ. ofN.Y. Pr., 1998).The South' power in
international community came from OPEC's demonstrated strength and commodity
power.
12
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china and Russia, markets in India, and Brazil, so called emerging markets, are
expected to grow fast. On the other hand, as the current credit crunch stemming from
the poor sub-prime mortgage markets spreads financial depression from the U.S. to the
EU, the exchange value of the U.S. dollar grows weak. On the contrary, OPEC's
increasing influence on the global economy along with the recent surge of commodity
prices signals another shift of economic power in the world. 21 The emerging markets
have recently enacted whole competition law regime although the level of enforcement
will not be as rigorous as advanced countries. 22 The remaining countries have struggled
to develop a market economy but their salient achievements need adjustment and time.
For example, many African countries are attracting foreign investment, but still do not
appear ready for competition regimes? 3 Although there has been a power revival in the
South, the same allied opinion within the South from the 1970s appears not to be
possible due to many of the transitional and emerging markets effectively developing
free and competitive markets and adopting competition regime. Quite a few transitional
and emerging markets are pursuing the path which the advanced countries have taken. 24

2. Inherent Limitations of Multilateral Agreements

21

Javier Bias, OPEC gathers in Abu Dhabi for crucial decision on production, FT (Dec.
4, 2007); Bias, Sharp rise in costs puts pressure on returns, FT (Dec. 4, 2007).
22
After Russia enacted the new Federal Law 'On the Protection of Competition'
(No.135-FZ) in October 2006, China adopted the Anti-Monopoly Law in August 2007.
Meanwhile, Brazil and India has longer history of competition law. Brazil and India
have run its competition laws, respectively a competition law no.4137 since 1962, and
the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act since 1969.
23
Andrew Bounds and Laura Dixon, EU to dilute trade deals to avert crisis, FT (Nov.
19, 2007)
24
Vietnam, Hungary, and Russia are representative examples of transitional economy.
Mexico, India, and China belong to major emerging markets.
13

Although a multilateral agreement is a very effective method in promising uniform

ex

international cartel law or competition law to all nations through consent, any

df

multilateral negotiations take long to achieve unanimous consent. The expensive and

b1

5

uncertain process often results in the lowest denominator? The international legal

ft

principle, pacta tertiisnec no cent nee prosunt, under Art. 11 of the Vienna Convention

b

on the Law of Treaties, states the rule of unanimous consent to make multilateral

c

negotiations effective. Since all participating countries have national interests in
conflict with the utilitarian good, the unanimous consent rule is susceptible to minority
members' selfish vetoes, or large nations' political power. Multilateral agreements tend
to have minimal content which can attract unanimous consent in order to avoid dissent
from even a minority. Usually the agreements are time-consuming and costly. As the
standstill of the DDA negotiation demonstrates, the strenuous efforts among supporters
are, in many cases, less successful than expected. The uncertainty of becoming a
success lessens the incentive for supporter groups to devote further endeavors.

3. Fear of Restraining Sovereignty

Providing binding power to a multilateral agreement brings about more or less the
restriction of sovereignty of an individual country, although it does not restrict very
much the freedom of action of contracting countries?6 As an independent state, a

25

See id. 138-9.
Maher M. Dabbah, The Intemationalisation of Antitrust Policy, 151-53 (Cambridge
2003).
26

14

Jllember country will not limit its domestic power unless there is an efficient benefit in
exchange of such a restriction. In a circumstance where it is not easy to find a common
denominator among member countries, a binding multilateral agreement cannot avoid
big challenges. However, the procedural cooperation and substantial harmony coming
from a multilateral cartel agreement can generate sufficient benefit compared to a
bilateral agreement which requires more time and money to achieve the same goal. The
careful selection of common denominators and the acknowledgement of different
national interests in each country will be the main issue for achieving a binding
multilateral agreement.

4. DDA Not Working as a Bumper to the North and South Conflict
The slow-paced multilateral agreement susceptible to an external minor dispute, once
achieved, can control international cartels effectively. However, in light of the current
multilateral negotiation process of the DDA, international consensus sufficient for
multilateral cartel or competition regime was lacking among the South. The strong
support from the DCs in the South for the multilateral competition agreement, the UN
Set in 1980, shifted to strong rejection from the same group against the WTO Doha
Round with similar competition-regulating provisions in 2003, around two decades
later. Although acknowledgement by the South of the objective of the DDA and WTO,
which is the realization of free trade in overall sectors, enabled initial negotiations, the
opposition by a majority ofDCs against the inclusion of competition provisions into the
DDA made the competition issue dropped off from the negotiation table. The point that
the UN Set and draft competition provisions under the DDA use very similar language

15

implies that the shift of position held by a majority ofDCs regardless of similar

when

provisions might have a political basis. A consensus for a multilateral competition

cultu:

regime has not sufficiently grown in spite ofthe passage ofthe UN Set in 1980.

obst~

Subsequent trials for multilateral agreements demonstrate that the consensus for a

roult

binding international competition regime is very feeble, although one of them achieved

devt

a soft-law-based global cartel regulation, which is 1998 OECD HCC Recommendation.

inte

It is necessary to redress the fear of or real loss from adopting a binding international

pen

competition regime. However, the current DDA regime with a broad coverage of

con

delicate trade topics seriously affecting national markets cannot place sufficient focus
on the balance of interests in negotiating a competition regime between the North and
the South. The exclusion of a competition policy was an inevitable result, which

in1

reflects the perceptive gap between the North and the South with respect to competition

di

law. Such difference ofpositions comes from the level of economic development

C(

because a competition law can be modified in accordance with the level of economic

ir

development.
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IV.

1.

Strategies for Achieving a Binding Multilateral Agreement

An Intermediary and Two Strategic Approaches

( 1) A Plurilateral Agreement as an Intermediate Measure
A plurilateral agreement towards competition law may be a good intermediate path to
a binding multilateral agreement. At the current stage, when many bilateral agreements
have been made out of the necessity of cooperation among competition authorities and

16

when the ICN assists the works of competition authorities in immature competition
cultures, the failure of competition policy discussion in the DDA cannot be a permanent
obstacle to the creation of a binding multilateral agreement. A plurilateral approach to a
multilateral competition regime may overcome strong objections from a majority of
developing countries because the approach needs to attract countries that have an
interest in cooperation with respect to a competition policy, and does not need to
persuade countries that do not prepare for or have strong objections against a
. . po1"tcy. 27
competition

(2) A Narrowly-Focused International Cartel Law: A Narrow Approach
Clearly separating international competition laws regarding private cartels from
international commodity law regarding ICAs or IP As contributes to averting divergent
dissents from different national perspectives on a competition policy. Unlike other
competition law issues, cartels impose direct harm on consumers' welfare and cause
inefficiencies in market mechanisms except in some cases where exemptions are
allowed due to outweighing public welfare. Hard core cartels are seen as causing a lot
of direct inefficiencies and harms on consumers by a majority of economists. The
prohibition against cartels has obtained an increased level of international consensus
centering on advanced markets, as shown by the OECD recommendation. The recent
Doha Declaration explicitly proclaimed the hard core cartel provision as one of the

27

Rosenthal, supra note 8, 569; TAYLOR, supra note 2, 298-300. A 'Group of Experts in
Competition Law', appointed by EC Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert (EC
group) proposed a WTO plurilateral competition agreement in 1995.
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issues to be further discussed. There is more of a possibility that a binding agreement

cartf

on only cartels under the definition of this thesis is to be reached. 28

cart<

whi1

As much as possible, the object of international cartel regulation should be narrowed
enough to achieve international consensus. A narrowly focused topic, e.g. bid-rigging

coii

regulation, can break the current standstill. The first reason is that, as shown by the

enf•

success of the OECD Hard Core Cartel Regulation, such a focused topic can achieve an

has

international consensus in an efficient way without discussing complicated issues of

sec

divergent competition law. 29 Bid-rigging is one of the areas in cartel regulation which

agi

has achieved wide consensus in regulation among countries. In many countries, before

fm

cartel regulation or competition law was adopted, bid-rigging had been treated as a

'J

separate crime that causes a detriment to the public function of a government~ f. '--9

t.,

Regardless of the adoption of cartel regulation, not only advanced countries, e.g. the
U.S., but also many DCs and LDCs have penalty provisions against bid-rigging. 31

ar

Second, the bid-rigging has been considered to cause huge loss to governmental budget
and occupy a high portion of cartels cases. According to a research which analyzed 845

C(

28

Rosenthal, supra note 8, at 560. Rosenthal introduces prof. Petermann's paper which
urged a competition agreement to focus on hard core cartels with international
dimension.
29
Kennedy, supra note 4, 604. According to a table showing consensus level, hard core
cartels (HHCs) on price-fixing, bid rigging, output restriction, and market allocation
have the highest degree of consensus to regulate through multilateral agreement. Export
cartel, vertical restrains, abuse of a dominant position and mergers are following HHCs
in o er of the level of the consensus.
( ]o Sduth Korea and Republic of China have bid-rigging penalties in other laws, separate
from competition law. For in-detailed information, refer to Ch.4.II.2.(2)&(4). ~
31
The U.S. government has made bid-rigging conspiracies with a higher priority. See
John Connor, and Robert Lande, American Antitrust Institute Symposium: Thinking
Creatively about Remedies: How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for
Optical Cartel Fines, 80 TuLL.REv.513, 543 (2005). For DCs and LDCs, refer to
Ch.3.111.2(2).
18
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cartels in 234 markets, almost one third of the markets were affected by bid-rigging
cartels.

32

Particularly, developing countries have discovered and punished bid-rigging,

which occupies significant portions of cartel enforcement under the less developed
competition regime. 33 On the other hand, bid rigging regulation could be underenforced due to corruption or protests from existent interest-holders. 34 Currently, WTO
has a plurilateral agreement on Government Procurement which includes provisions for
securing competitive procurement process. 35 By developing a binding multilateral
agreement with focus on bid-rigging, international cartel law can place a precious
foundation of a binding multilateral cartel agreement.

(3) International Competition Law: A Broad Approach
The adoption of a whole competition regime with cartel regulation, under a broad
approach in comparison to the former narrow approach, is necessary for enacting active
cartel regulation. Effective cartel regulations have been possible within the whole
competition regime according to the analysis of this thesis regarding competition

32

Connor and Lande, supra note 31, 536-37. Connor and Lande mention that bidrigging might be about one-fifth less injurious than other forms of collusion as it raises
price less than other collusions and occurs locally or nationally rather than international
scale. However, as they acknowledge that big-rigging has been treated in the harshest
way in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, it is true that bid-rigging has achieved the most
consensus in punishment among other cartels.
33
OECD, Global Forum on Competition(GFC): Contribution from China, at 8-10,
CCNM/GF/COMPIWD(2001)10, (Oct.2, 2001). All the cases introduced by China
were bid-rigging.
34
Taylor, supra note 2, 205-207. It mentions the under-enforcement ofbid-rigging in
Japan, so called 'dango'.
35
Id. at 207. See Art.VI.4(Technical Specifications), X.1(Non-discriminatory Selection
Procedure) and XV. I (a)(a Condition of Limited Tendering) ofWTO Agreement on
Government Procurement.
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policies in industrialized and developing countries.

36

This analysis demonstrated that

or

general administrative or criminal sanctions which regulate cartels only are not able to

econ

cultivate the sufficient capacity of examining market data and the screening of

dom

exemptions. South Africa, for example, had demonstrated the under-enforcement of

agre

cartel regulation since 1955 when it adopted the first law regulating cartels until it

of c

enacted a modified complete competition regime in 1998. 37 France had shown scarce

In

cartel enforcements since it enacted a criminal penalty against cartels in 1923 until it

cou

fully acknowledged and devoted itself to working on a whole competition law regime

Alt

in relation to its integration into the EU market.

ph:

However, the operation of a competition regime requires several requirements, such

m(

as, a democratic political process which enables a reflection of public opinion, the
development of a free and open market economy, the improvement of a reasonable
legal system, and the support of economic research. 38 This analysis implies that many
developing countries where they lack at least one of the requirements cannot enact

tl

effective competition policy. It takes time to fully enact whole competition law with

tl

satisfaction of the requirement while the concentration on cartels under the narrow

c

approach can be possible in the first stage. 39 Although the broad approach constrains
the possibility of the success of cartel regulation in DCs, it suggests practical
requirements for enacting effective cartel regulation. The requirements can work as the
major conditions for DCs to meet in order to operate effective cartel regulations.

36

Refer to Ch.4.II.l (5) and 2(5).
Around eighteen actual cartel cases were brought during around the fifty years. See
Ch.4.II.2(1 ).
38
See Ch.4.II.l(5).
39
Rosenthal, supra note 8, 561.
37
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On the other hand, since competition policy has a deep relationship with domestic
economic development, concrete provisions in competition law might conflict with
domestic economic policy, thereby making countries hesitate to accede to the
agreement. As an inevitable result, the broad approach might attract a limited number
of countries.
In order to overcome the limitation due to the four requirements and the hesitation of
countries, a broach approach should be launched with principle-oriented provisions. 40
Although competition law agreement in APEC with respect to competition policy is a
plurilateral agreement, its provisions centering on principles demonstrate one of the
models worthwhile to consider as a broad approach.

2.

A Plurilateral Cartel Regulation

A plurilateral agreement regarding cartel regulation is expected to be formulated by
the countries where the level of active enforcement of cartel regulations does not meet
the expectation of competition law enforcers due to various obstacles. One main reason
of the hurdles is the insufficient international cooperation among competition
authorities. Although company practices tend to cross national borders, the difficulty of
finding evidences located in foreign jurisdictions still exists due to the lack of
institutional cooperation. To respond to the challenge of establishing the binding rule,
investigations into international cartels and cooperation will become an important step
towards a multilateral agreement on regulating cartels.
(1) Directions for the Plurilateral Agreement
40

!d. at 557-567. Rosenthal introduces principle-based proposals of the EC group, prof.
Jenny, Petersmann, Fox, and Shyam Khemani of the World Bank.
21

Noticeably, the goal of a plurilateral agreement is to share the benefit of converged

convergl

competition law regime through a widened network of competition law. Since a cartel
regulation without a complete competition law regime tends to be under-enforced, the

aroendll

effective enforcement of cartel regulation needs a total competition regime. With the

adjustn

whole competition law, the cartel regulation can effectively approach the level of

perroit1

expected enforcement that competition policy enforcers originally aimed for.

(2)

However, with the whole competition law regime which addresses all the issues in

AP

competition policy, potential members might hesitate to participate in the plurilateral

agreeJ

agreement with no mandatory accession, thereby placing little impact on further

New

multilateral agreements. In light ofthe fear on the restriction of sovereignty over

ofm:

domestic economic policy, it would be better to start from a procedural convergence

appr

with less of a burden on members. The harmonization of procedures in the plurilateral

evol

competition agreement has much more benefits than cost. The procedural convergence

and

can attract more foreign investment as it reduces the cost of legal searches into foreign

est~

competition law procedures. A conference, formal or informal, held by the agreement
can be a forum to learn advanced skills and experiences of cartel investigations as well
as to place the foundation of cooperative workings. Acquiring up-to-date information
regarding a cartel can reduce the loss to consumers and efficiencies in each member

41

C<
42

country's economy.

C•

Harmonizing the substances of the competition law should be the next step after the
purilateral agreement which covers procedural aspects is widely accepted. However, as
there exist some areas where a negotiation for substantive convergence is not ready, e.g.
merger regulation, the agreement would be achieved first in the issues where

22
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convergence is possible.

41

The APEC is a successful model that subsequent plurilateral

agreements pay attention to.

42

Concrete provisions may be added with further

amendments. In light of such a country which accedes to the agreement but needs an

adjustment period, a greater length of time with a minimum commitme
permitted. 43

be
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(2) The Expansion of a Bilateral or Regional Agreement
A plurilateral agreement can stem from the expansion of bilateral or regional
agreements joined by the other nations. 44 For instance, Canada joined the Australia and
New Zealand (ANZ) agreement. The expansion of some regional agreements consisting
of many members can have the potentiality to work as an alternative to a multilateral
approach. Examples of the expanding regional agreements are recognized in the
evolution of competition policy within Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
and the expansion ofEU competition law into Central and Eastern Europe. 45 The APEC,
established to facilitate regional cooperation including competition law and policy, has
developed international competition policy with several detailed plans since 1995.46

41

See Taylor, supra note 2, 419. Taylor calls such strategy as the 'selective
convergence'.
42
ld., 419-420. He calls APEC competition law as 'soft law principle'. He suggest the
concept of co-regulation in which certain provisions in converging areas would be
expressed with binding legal obligations while other elements in still diverging areas
would be expressed in ambiguous and non-binding terms under so called soft law.
43 ~d., 416.
44
See id., at 138-9; Rosenthal, supra note 8, 568 (1998).
45
Taylor, supra note 2, at 139-40.
46
!d. at 123. The Osaka Action Agenda as the APEC Leaders' Declaration in 1995
initiated a competition law and programme. In 1996, Manila Action Plan included
member nations' individual and collective action plans on competition policy. In 1999,
the nations agreed on the APEC Competition Principles.
23
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The accumulation of the plans produced a framework of common principles for an

In intt

APEC-wide competition policy (APEC Competition Principles).

can app

(3) Internal Agreement within International Organizations

increast

On the other hand, since the plurilateral approach does not require all of the members

The fir

within an international organization to participate, international organizations treating

to com

issues of multinational corporations can propose an international competition

to be c

agreement including cartel regulations as the part of their laws. Similar to constituent

ideolc

agreements in the Annex IV of the WTO Agreement, an international cartel law can be

regirr

adopted by member countries which wish to strengthen their ability to regulate

becal

international cartel activities pursuant to the law. With the plurilateral approach, the

inD1

UNCTAD or UN may have the benefit of achieving the creation of an international

COOJ

competition law including cartel regulation since not all members need to harmonize

quit

their views on cartel regulations in light of their diverse national interests and levels of

pri'

economic development.

Frc

Since a large number of countries recently adopted or considered the benefits and

re~

costs of a competition regime including cartel regulation, they need assistance from the

su

advanced countries with experience. When the benefit of sharing information or

ce

technical assistance is granted to new members, international competition law will be
palatable to the members. If accession to the international competition law is allowed

c

under strict qualification and the law imposes severe penalty on revelation of

a

confidential information, potential members' worry about the abuse of sharing
information will lessen.
(4) The Rationales

24

In international relationships, two theories derived from interpretivist neoliberalism

can apply to explain the difficulty of consensus between the North and the South and
increase the possibility of reaching the consensus among states with similar interests.

'ers

The first theory focuses on the 'consensual knowledge' which enables interested actors

~

to command sufficient agreement which serves as a guide to public polic .47 In order
to be consensual, the knowledge must transcend adhesion to a group and be transideological, thereby providing the basis for the construction of a new international

•e

regime. 48 However, cartel regulation in itself does not reach the level of consensus
because the cartel regulation as a part of competition policy meets negative responses

in DCs and LDCs and because the countries fears that the regulation may interfere with
cooperative atmosphere, thereby impeding domestic economic development. Moreover,
quite a few states still want to hold control over the free market that has competition in
'r

private sectors, although a growing number of countries have adopted competition law.
From the perspective of the countries which wants to control markets, the cartel
regulation might interfere with profits-earning from international commodity trade. Still
supporters of an international cartel agreement have not transcended the group
centering on advanced economies to reach the majority ofDCs and LDCs.
The second theory argues, through a lenient approach, that learning and knowledge
can play important roles in cooperation even when the consensus limitedly exists within
a particular group. Rothstein who argued the second theory agreed with the first theory
in the point that inter-group consensual knowledge is a relatively rare phenomenon. 49

47
48
49

Sell, supra note 20, 24.

see z"d.
See id.
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Further Rothstein insists that it is easier to build consensus within each group than
between groups because conflicts in values and interests at the inter-group level are

ne

likely to be sharpest and the need of each group to maintain unity may mean that the

tn

resulting group position is impervious to knowledge and learning and genuine

a1

bargaining. 50 As the consensus within each group can impede the building of consensus

t1

across groups, 5 1 the consensus in the advanced countries that efficiency-based

i•

competition is important for further economic development has hindered another
consensus-building between the North and the South in competition law. Although
many developing countries, or transitional economies have adopted competition law
regime as a result of developing countries' struggle to survive external economic
environment, still the DCs emphasize on economic development rather than on
competition because a majority of them have less competitive domestic industries and
need to promote cooperation rather than competition. In other words, although
efficiency-oriented competition ideology appeared to prevail over economic
development agenda due to the weakened unity in the Third World since the mid 1980s,
DCs have demonstrated that they prefer the importance of economic development to
efficiency-oriented competition through the first exclusion of competition policy
among several agendas and the subsequent failure of the DDA negotiation. Rather the
efficiency-oriented competition ideology has stemmed the growth of trans-group
consensus that a competition regime reflecting both efficiency and development can be
created.

50

51

See id.
/d.
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In spite of sharp disputes between efficiency and development, cartel regulation
needs to be promoted to intemationallaw to challenge against globalized practices of
multinational firms. In light of the difficulty in harmonizing the contents, a plurilateral
agreement as to cartel regulation is recommendable as a convenient method to reach
that harmonization. A fragmentary consensus, especially rooted in a discrete
ideological position and economic situation, cannot easily reach a mutual
compromise. 52 Although there is no mandatory requirement to accede to an agreement,
countries will opt for accession when they are aware of the necessity of international
law because many countries have voluntarily introduced competition law regime in
order to become competitive in a global economy. 53 The countries currently widening a
bilateral agreement or assisting in a multilateral agreement can save their time, efforts,
and money by becoming a member of a plurilateral agreement and suggesting that their
partners also become members.

3. A Narrow Approach: A Binding Multilateral Agreement Focusing on
Cartel

(1) Members and the Target ofthe Agreement

A multilateral agreement under a narrowed approach is conveniently made in an
organization consisting of countries with similar economic situations, e.g. the OECD,
rather than an organization of countries with diverse levels of economic development,

52
53

Id. at 31-32.
DABBAH, supra note 26, 48.
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e.g. the UN. 54 Even if full harmonization efforts towards an ideal law succeed in

w

achieving a multilateral agreement consisting of a large number of countries, the cost
for such achievement, e.g. time and money, will be significantly high. In addition, the
procedure of negotiation reflects political struggles between economic powers and

VI

diplomacy, thereby representing the opinions of powerful countries rather than those of

fi

less powerful ones 55 as the current WTO negotiation reveals. The result of strenuous

c

negotiations does not reach the level of real harmonization and is more in favor of
powerful countries. As membership of the WTO covered more than 150 countries, of
which DCs comprise three-quarters, 56 and as the Agenda negotiated a total competition
law, the failure of adopting a competition policy in the DDA was somewhat expected.
If a multilateral agreement consists of a group of countries with similar economic
interests, negotiation for the agreement will be more likely to be successful.
As to the coverage of the agreement, narrow coverage of a hard core cartel is
appropriate as the initial target ofthe agreement. The 1998 OECD recommendation
was possible through the narrowed approach. A narrowly-focused object is necessary to
achieve a binding multilateral regulatory agreement. Bid-rigging can be an initial target
for such a binding multilateral agreement as fraud against a governmental contract

54

Sell, supra note 20, at 75; Taylor, supra note 2, 342. Taylor wrote that, as a rule of
thumb, the greater the differences between nations and the greater the number of
nations involved in multilateral negotiations, the greater the range of issues upon which
agreement will be required, the more ambitious the harmonization effort (including
associated time and costs) required, and the less likelihood there would be of ever
reaching multilateral agreement. Even the experience of the EC consisting of a dozen
countries indicates that the harmonization of competition laws was difficult to achieve.
55
Taylor, supra note 2, 343.
56
Id., 420.
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which causes a huge waste in a governmental budget. 57 For example, the second largest
cartel in Western Europe was a Dutch construction-industry bidding conspiracy with
e

around US$ 80 billion in sales. 58 The economic development concern among the DCs
will not impede the reaching of a consensus on prohibiting bid-rigging as trust in state

of

{unction and integrity of governmental contracts are necessary components to economic
development. Protecting governmental budget from cheating through bid-rigging does
good to the public as the budget consists of a tax on the public. The social
condemnation against such an extortion of a public auction has been acknowledged as
most countries, either industrialized or developing, have severe sanctions on bidrigging. 59 Even the countries that do not adopt competition law have legislation on

57

In the UK, over hundred firms were accused for rigging their bids for multi-million
pound contracts. The conspiracy allegedly cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of
pounds. Building Firms Accused ofRigging Bids, SKYNEWS (Apr.17, 2008), at
http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,30400-1313122,00.html (visited on Apr. 24,
2008)
58
Connor & Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels:l995-2005,
American Antitrust Institute(AAI) Working Paper No.07-01, 15-16 (2007).
59
In the U.S., Sec. 1 of the Sherman Act penalizes a bid-rigger with a fine up to US$ 10
million for a corporation, or fine up to$ 350,000 and/or imprisonment up to 3 years for
an individual. In addition, such collusion among competitors may constitute other
federal felonies e.g. wire or mail fraud statute, or the false statement statute. Besides
criminal penalties, there remains a civil action provision, Sec.4 of the Clayton Act,
which enables victims to recover treble damages.
In the UK, under a cartel penalty provision, a bid-rigging participant faces a fine up to
10% of its annual turnover for the duration of the infringement and imprisonment ofup
to three years. The UK also allows civil liability.
In Canada, a fine for both an individual and a corporation involved in bid-rigging is
decided by a court and does not have a maximum confinement term. Individual can
face imprisonment of up to five years. Canada adopts civil damages.
In Korea, the KFTC can impose a surcharge of up to 5% of the turnover. As for
criminal penalties, an imprisonment of up to three years or a fine up to US$ 200,000
can be imposed. There remains civil liability. See OECD, Report on the Nature and
Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels under National Competition
Laws, 24-5, DAFFE/COMP(2002)7 (2002).
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collusive tendering. 60 In many cases, the severity of penalties against bid-rigging is

Marl

worse than other cartel activities. The KFTC in South Korea imposed a US$ 110
million surcharge on bid-riggers for a three-year military fuel conspiracy, 61 which is

senri-

one of the highest surcharges issued by the KFTC.

bene1

Subsequently, price-fixing which clearly brings enormous harm to consumers, needs
to be addressed as it is a convenient issue to reach a consensus on among members.

a del

Price-fixing, the most well-known form of cartel activities, has been considered a per se

hard

violation in many countries. 62 Although it reveals diverse aspects, its characteristic of

Reg

restriction of price competition makes it distinguishable from other acts. Price-fixing in
international trade, e.g. export cartels, has been treated with exemption from
competition law in quite a few countries as it reflects sensitive national interests.

bo1

Regular reviews are required so that such exemptions may not be abused in a way to

ag

hide other cartel activities.

an

Output-restriction which reduces the level of production causes the price-increase,
similar to the outcome of price-fixing. Except for some cartels where approval is

th
rr

necessary for sustaining overall economic structure or public interests outweighing
inefficiency, the output restriction falls on the violation of cartel law as a restrictive
behavior of competition.
60

U.N., MODEL LAW ON COMPETITION, UN Doc TDIRBP/CONF.5/7/Rev.3, Sales No.
E.07.II.D.7, 25 (2007). It illustrates the People's Republic of China (prior to adopting
the 2007 AML), and Kenya.
61
In a subsequent civil action where a subsidiary under the military department filed an
action in damages, a district of court in Korea held that a total of 81 million in damages
should be redressed. Press Release of KFTC, Civil action on the basis of military fuel
bid-rigging received US$ 81million recover [ie\t%ff- <f1 ~~~ ~i(:! ~l-}~4?01ll-i
810~ l:l~-'(}Jtl~](Jan . 2007), at
http://ftc.go.kr/datalhwp/20070123 101790.hwp(visited onApr.22, 2008)
62
U.N., supra note 60, 24.
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Market allocation as the artificial division of markets among competitors impedes
111arket-integration and restricts competition in the divided markets. The acquisition of a

semi-monopoly position through the allocation agreement takes away consumer
benefits which would have been otherwise possible, and attributes them to colluders.
While the former four behaviors under the category of hard core cartels do not invoke
a debate on subsequent pro-competitive effects, other collusive activities besides the
bard core cartel need in-depth study on the balance of pro- and anti-competitive effects.
Regulations of the collusive activities will be more appropriate under a broad approach.
(2) Contents of the Agreement
A multilateral agreement under the narrow approach requires all members to be
bound by the content of the agreement. However, international trials for a multilateral
agreement with sophisticated provisions covering all the competition issues have failed
and are not likely to succeed in the near future due to strong domestic interests. One of
the interests is for a country to maintain sovereign power over economic policy/as a
1,.--

I '-

multilateral agreement with broad competition causes the inevitable restriction of
sovereign power in choosing domestic policy and legislation. To reduce a country's
concern, it is important to examine the respective aspect of cartel behaviors with a
narrow focus. Only the anticompetitive behavior(s) that most countries agree to
regulate need to be included as concrete object(s) of the agreement under the narrow
approach. If this narrow approach tries to cover other horizontal agreements which do
not clearly show clear intents or results to restrict competition from the first stage, it
achieve international consensus for the creation of a
V'f\'-'--o_'v, + J~ ~ C<J-r?
1
binding international cartel agreement. Reaching a consensus will need serious
will be lmost impossible
-

-\-c0c.__
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discussions regarding each country's different standard of evaluating the
competitiveness of each categorical behavior under a collusive horizontal agreement.63

anti co

As past trials illustrate, the discussion may make the completion of the multilateral

regull

agreement very difficult. When first creating a binding multilateral cartel agreement,

great•

the clear enumeration of narrowed illegal cartel behaviors will support the compliance

that c

of companies working globally without confusion and will persuade countries to accede

gran1

to the agreement. Although the adoption of the rule of reason may arguably be proper

e.g..

regarding the other aspects of horizontal agreements, the narrowed anticompetitive
act(s) under the agreement matches the per se rule. The suggestion to use the per se rule

1)

against narrowly defined cartels is confirmed by the APEC countries' experiences. 64 A

E:

case with a pro-competitive effect outweighing an anti-competitive one needs to be

con

addressed with categorized exemptions under the per se rule.

obj

The exemption provisions that approve certain cartels with proof of outweighing

dot

efficiency or public interest reflecting situations in DCs should accompany the strict

de'

prohibition of cartels with the per se rule. The World Bank stated that it prefers limited

ex

competition law to no competition law at all. 65 Besides the one-entity exemption where

fr<

two competing companies merges or establishes a joint venture, a crisis cartel, a smalland-middle-enterprise(SME) cartel, a R&D cartel, and an efficiency cartel are the

oJ

examples of permissive cartels. Such exempted cartels, however, need to be screened

p:

by a transparent standard in order to prevent loopholes in the main binding rule.

66

If the
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(
63

Taylor, supra note 2, at 94 & 95.
!d., at 95.
65
!d., at 100. fn 45.
66
Kennedy, supra note 4, 624-625. Kennedy emphasizes on the competition advocacy
through the promotion of transparency as an effective competition policy.
64
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coverage of exemptions is too wide and allows the arbitrary approval of an
anticompetitive cartel, it undermines the trust in competition law including cartel
regulation. If exemptions are granted, the principle where any exemption should be no
greater in scope than necessary for the public interest should be stipulated. 67 It is noted
that quite a few countries within APEC are adopting a restrictive approach to the
granting of such exemptions as the exemptions can bring about more harm than good,
e.g. Japan and Korea's repeal of extensive cartel exemption.

68

(3) Exemptions from Cartel Regulations
1) Positive Roles of Cartel Exemption
Exemption from cartel regulation is an area in competition law that other policy
considerations may be reflected along with the promotion of competition as the primary
objective of the law. A large number of developing countries, where competitiveness in
domestic industries does not develop sufficiently, cannot promote economic
development without using industrial policies for their economic development. The
exemption which allows to use industrial policy with competition policy may take away
from the DCs the fear that competition may obstruct economic development, thereby
working as an incentive to adopt a competition law including cartel regulation. As one
of special and differential treatment (SDT) to DCs, cartel exemption for industry
promotion will solicit the support ofDCs for international cartel law.
67

See Taylor, supra note 2 , at 100.
!d., 99; CHAN-MOO HUH, KOREA'S MONOPOLY RESTRAINT AND FAIR TRADE ACT AND
CARTELREGULATION [i?":Aa7i 'lll~J!} 7} 2 ~itjjl], 109-112 (Bi-Bong, 2002). Korea's
Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act in 1999 repealed 20 cartel exemptions under 18 legislations.
The Act included repeal of fee-settlements in 9 professional services by each
association, repeal of the management of price and production in export of agricultural
products, and limitation of objects of collective optional contracts for small and
medium enterprises among other things.
68
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Besides the exemption for industrial policy, diverse cartels, e.g. a depression cartel, a
R&D cartel, and a cartel for professional organizations, are allowed to be exempted in
69

efiici

The cartels respectively work to overcome

:finn:

depression in overall the economy, to promote research and development, and to secure

Hov

professional ethical standards.

oveJ

many jurisdictions for reasonable grounds.

In addition, a cartel for producing primary commodities is inevitable to the survival
of producers, as the cartel promises fair reward to producers in LDCs under less

cor

diversified economic structure and smallholders in advanced countries. 70 A commodity

inc

cartel, which produces primary commodities, stabilizes the volatile prices of fann,

do

forest, fishery or any mineral product, the production of which needs to be planned

ill

beforehand with an expected demand. As the production of primary commodities

01

cannot meet the shift of demand as fast as artificial product due to its inflexible supply
condition, prices will increase rapidly when demand exceeds supply while prices will
decrease when supply exceeds demand. The inflexibility of commodity prices threatens
the survival of producers and consumers as their living depends on earning and
procuring from the commodity trade. The management of production with forecasted
demand contributes to sustaining the price stability of commodities.

2) Rationales to Justify Exemptions in the Developing World
A majority of competition policy researchers have objected to the exemptions
because the approval of certain cartels causes a loss in consumer welfare through a
69

See Ch. 1 Ill. 3.
FREDERIC M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD
ECONOMY, 52 (Brookings Inst., 1994). For instance, the U.S. exempts agricultural
cooperatives from the Sherman Act.
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}ligher price than one without a cartel and the reduction of incentive to increase a firm's
efficiency by maintaining inefficient firms in exchange of sacrificing either efficient
firms' growth or consumers' welfare, thereby diminishing market efficiency. 11
However, due to the insufficient information about DCs and LDCs, critics tend to
overlooks the scarce sources to invest further and severe obstacles in raising the level of
investment. If any exemption category is not allowed, the most efficient global
companies with mass intra-company capital will occupy a large part of domestic
industries in the developing countries. The result means the permanent collapse of
domestic industries in these countries as the examples of Mongolia and Peru
illustrate. 72 Providing temporary protection to cartels with long-term benefit
outweighing temporary damage to consumer welfare contributes much to the economic
development of LDCs and to the majority of DCs.
The experiences of advanced cartel regulations demonstrate that the exemptions have
been used in light of economic and political situations. Even industrial policies with
political support prevailed over the strict enforcement of a competition policy in
advanced competition law practices. In France, cartel laws had been under-enforced up

71

ld. 636-637 for crisis cartel. See also Taylor, supra note 2, 233; Spencer Weber
Waller, The Internationalization ofAntitrust Enforcement, 77 BOSTON UNN. L. REv.
343, 397 (1997); Rosenthal, supra note 8, 559-563. Rosenthal introduces opinions of
prof. Immenga, prof. Fox, and Shyam Kemani of the World Bank regarding elimination
of export cartel exemption.
72
Erik REINERT, How RICH COUNTRIES GOT RICH ... AND WHY POOR COUNTRIES STAY
PooR, 173-179 (Constable & Robinson Ltd., 2007). Since Mongolia opened up its
market to the world in 1991, almost overnight, most industrial sectors and production
were down by more than 90% in physical volume. In Peru, at the end of 1970s, abrupt
free trade caused industrial death. See id. at 183 and figure 15 for deteriorating terms of
trade.
35

to a few decades after the WWII. High courts in the U.S.

73

and the U.K. approved

internat

exceptional cases during great economic depressions. The U.S. governmental
cartelization plan to rescue a severely depressed economy was effective under the

regula1

National Industrial Recovery Act. 74 While the U.S. had adopted general exemptions for
entire industries in the first half of the 20th century, it enacted transactional or event-

dec ad

specific exemptions in the last half of the century. One of the latter examples is the

3)

1982 Export Trading Company Act which authorizes the creation and operation of joint

Alt

selling agreement relating to foreign sales.

75

~
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However, the exemption provisions have worked only as exceptions to principal anti-

abm

cartel rule. According to the experiences of other countries with cartel regulation, cartel

trea

cases approved by competition authorities occupy a tiny portion of the total of cartel

exc

cases. 76 In Germany, the Minister of Economics has the authority to override decisions

api

by the Federal Cartel Office (FCO) to prohibit a cartel under i) outweighed general

I

economic advantages, ii) justified predominant public interests, or iii) consideration of
73

Appalachian Coals Inc. et al. v. U.S. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
74
Due to its vague standard and unbridled discretion to President or private
associations, the NIRA turned out to be unconstitutional in the Supreme Court decision,
ALA Schechter Poultry Corp. v. US. (1935). RUDOLPH PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN
AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW, 130-1 (Rev. ed., Oxford Univ. Pr. 1996).
75
15 U .S.C. sec.4001-4003. See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Federal Statutory
Exemptions from Antitrust Law, 43-4 (ABA Pub. 2007).
76
South Korea also demonstrates only a few cases for cartel approval among
competitors under six exemption categories. Only four competition-restriction cases
among competitors had been approved for twenty-four years (1981-2004) while 138
cases by the association of entrepreneurs had been approved during the same period.
KFTC, Statistics regarding Approval of Cartels [_:g.:Aa ~ ?.11 ~ Jtl:§:l% 7-l] ~.!1!.: Jf- t:J-~
_:g.%ts~~ ~ A}~A}-.a~J~ ~A] ~~A]:Aa), at
db.kosbi.re.kr/include/download.asp?fl_nm=200511 OOO.xls&seq=200511 000 (visited
on May 5, 2008).
Meanwhile, Japan had six approval cases from 1947 up to 1957. Other cartels were
exempted from the coverage of Japan's Anti-Monopoly Law by other laws with
exemption provisions. OH-SEUNG KWON, ECONOMIC LAW ( ~ ~] ~ ), 132 (1999).
36
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international competitiveness of the firms. The division of power, which allows the
exemption of cartel regulation, has caused little, if any, noticeable trouble in cartel
regulation practices. 77 In the EU, only two crisis cartel cases were approved for
exemption under Art. 80(3) of the EC Treaty in the EU Commission during the last two
decades.

78

3) Screening Exemption Abuse
Although cartel exemptions are approved, a broad coverage of exempted cartels or
the usage of ambiguous terms, e.g. public interest, still brings about concern on the
abuse of exemptions. Insufficient legal restraints to political influences or lenient
treatments with bribery in DCs increase the possibility of abusing exemption. The
exclusive business practices of cartel members, although the cartel was previously
approved, impede the progress of efficient companies in the markets. 79
In order to prevent the abuse of an exemption procedure, any exemption should be no
greater in scope than necessary for the particular national concern to be addressed. 80
For this purpose, this thesis recommends a review system with three concrete
77

Ulrich Immenga, Conflicts between Competition Policy and Industrial Policy: A
Comparative View on Potential Responses, in TOWARDS WTO COMPETITION RULES:
KEY ISSUES AND COMMENTS ON THE WTO REPORT ON TRADE AND COMPETITION, 3 5152 (Roger Zaech ed. Kluwer Law Int'l, 1999). Until 1998, out of 121 prohibition of
mergers and sixteen demands of ministerial authorizations, 4% (six cases) had been
approved under specific conditions. In addition, the Monopoly Commission expressed
positive opinion as to the separation of power. Immenga states that the lesson applies to
cartels in the same way.
78
Andre Fiebig, Crisis Cartels and the Triumph ofIndustrial Policy over Competition
Law in Europe, 25 BROOKLYN J. INT'LL. 607,622 (1999). Two cases are Commission
Decision 84/380, 1984 O.J. (L 207) 17, 18 (so called Synthetic Fibres cartel) and
94/296, 1994 O.J. (L 131) 15, 17 (Stichting Baksteen cartel).
79
Taylor, supra note 2, 205. It illustrates a case where an oil import cartel in the U.S.,
once authorized by the US DOJ, later performed anti competitive conducts in the
domestic market, thereby resulting in a deprival of the authorization.
80 d
~ ., 100.
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conditions: i) an independent panel with the participation of competition experts, ii)

Kc

transparent and non-discriminatory decision-making, and iii) a regular review of

01

reasonability of the exemption. The authority in charge of cartel regulation usually has

be

the initial function of reviewing exemption applications. As political influence is strong

e:

enough to override a competition authority, the independence of the panel that makes
the decisions is to be secured. In addition, concrete analyses from competition experts
of the inefficiency of a proposed cartel as well as their benefits should be included in
the decision. Reasonable arguments on the decisions are to be published. Subsequent
petitions, trials, or legal debates can develop competition law jurisprudence and reduce
unreasonable political influence and the possibility of corruption. Standards for
decision-making should be so non-discriminatory that an exemption process should be
equal to associations with similar economic impacts regardless of members'
nationalities. Since an economic situation, one of the bases of decisions, may change,
the authority should screen the exempted cases in a regular time interval. In other
words, it should be under a regular review to evaluate whether the objectives, behaviors,
and negative effect of the cartels avert the standard of an original approval.
As competitive market structure grows entrenched, many cartel exemptions will be
withdrawn by a nation's own screening procedure. International law needs to address
the building of a transparent and clear exemption-screening system. 81 Among twenty
seven countries which adopted explicit export cartel exemption in their competition
laws, at least 37% removed the exemption during the last decade. 82 Particularly, South

81

Taylor, supra note 2, 99.
Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Suslow, The Changing Int 'I Status of Export Cartel
Exemptions, 20AM. U. lNT'LL.R.Ev. 785,815 (2005). They surveyed fifty-five
82
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Korea, through so called Cartel Repeal Act in 1999, repealed cartel exemptions of
nineteen legislations according to the analysis which indicated that the exemptions had
been abused or obsolete. 83 Japan also repealed its extensive cartel exemptions as such
exemptions caused more harm than good. 84

(4) Voluntary Export Restraint under the category of Export Cartel Exemption
Voluntary export restraint (VER) or voluntary restraint agreement (VRA) is an aspect
of export cartels as well as a measure of trade policy that has been utilized when the
government of an importing nation requests the other exporting nation to restrain its
exports voluntarily. VER or VRA requests tend to be made when an exporting country
arguably trades with unfair terms e.g. through dumping, export-subsidies, or causing
significant injury to an importing country's industry. 85 When the exporting country
does not accept the request, an import quota or anti-dumping/counter-veiling duty will
be placed. The VER provides benefits to both importing nations and exporting nations
in the following ways. First, a part of the increased high price under quantity restriction,
which would accrue on the importing nations' tariff budget, will go to the exporting
nation's pmducer. Second, the importing nation can avoid possible complaints from the
exporting nation to GATT based on the breach of MFN. 86

countries, and at least ten countries rewrote their competition laws by removing explicit
export cartel exemptions. Currently, seventeen countries offer statutory exemptions.
83
KWON, supra note 76, 156. Korea is currently making its efforts to prepare its second
Cartel Repeal Act of 2008.
84
Taylor, supra note 2, 99.
85
SCHERER, supra note 70, 49.
86
For in-detail explanation, refer to SCHERER, id. at 50-51 and Figure 4-2.
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On the other hand, consumers in the importing country endure loss due to high prices

net it

and reduced import quantity through either the VER or import quota. Since the

the p

importing nation is an initial actor in asking for such a measure, a court facing a private

of th

action subsequently brought by consumers will find it difficult to apply laws to the

bee~

situation that a decision may conflict with the trade policy of its government. In the U.S.

thar

a private action against members participating in the VER was not successful. 87
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api
(5) Regulation of Export Cartel: Positive Comity vs. Extraterritorial Application
An export cartel, which operates in a country but supply its product in a foreign
market, tends not to be regulated by a home country as they provide great profits to the

net
Wl

co

country despite damaging consumers in the foreign market. A research model illustrates
that international cartel law cannot include export cartel regulation as a part and that the

in

extraterritorial application of domestic cartel law in advanced countries will take a
regulatory role. 88 According to Gunzman's theory, a net exporting country is not

(

willing to provide its consent to a binding anti-cartel multilateral agreement because the

v

agreement, which eliminate export cartel exemption and includes positive comity

l

provision, restrains its export cartels and causes a loss in its national wealth. 89 Even if a

87

The Consumer Union brought a lawsuit against the VERs in 1969 adopted by
Japanese and European steel producers under the pressure from the U.S. government.
On the contrary to a district court decision that the VER violated the art. 1 of Sherman
Act, an appellate court held that negotiating the VER belong to the U.S. president's
foreign policy power. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., v. William Rogers et al, 352 F.
Supp. 1319 (1973); vacated on appeal in CU ofthe U.S., Inc. v. Henry Kissinger et al.,
506 F. 2d 136 (1974), CERT. DEN. 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
88
Andrew Gunzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.L.REv. 1501, 150305 & 1508 (1998)
89
!d., 1528-9. Positive comity provision requires a net exporting country to enforce its
cartel law against its export cartels.
40

net importing country enforces its domestic competition law against its export cartels,
the positive impact of the enforcement on the net exporting country is smaller than that
of the enforcement by the net exporting country on the net importing country. This is
because economic profits from the export cartels of a net exporting country are larger
than those from the export cartels of a net importing country.

90

In light of the situations,

a net exporting country sticks to export cartel exemptions and extraterritorial
applications of domestic cartel law against a cartel in a net importing country, while a
net importing country tries to propose international cartel law including positive comity
with no exemptions for export cartels. 91 A net exporting country represents advanced
countries while a net importing country represents developing countries.
Current multilateral negotiations against cartels reflect Gunzman's argument. For
instance, while the Model Law of the UNCTAD representing net importing countries
does not address the export cartel exemption, 92 the 1998 HHC Recommendation of the
OECD representing net exporting countries approves export cartel exemption along
with other national exemptions. 93 Meanwhile, both the Model Law and the
Recommendation did not address the extraterritorial application issue, which most
bilateral agreements address. It is thought to be that the U.S., with a strong
extraterritorial application policy, did not want to bring the issue to multilateral
90

A net exporting country is the nation where exports of imperfectly competitive goods
(artificial product on the contrary to agricultural product) outweigh its imports while a
net importing country is the nation where its imports outweigh its exports.
91
Gunzman, supra note 88, 1535-8.
92
Ch. III, Sec. II enumerates several conditions for exemption, i) advanced proper
notification, ii) who is engaged by companies subject to effective competition, and iii)
competition officials conclude that the agreement as a whole will produce a net public
benefit.
93
I. A. 2. b) (ii) of the OECD Recommendation take away from the coverage of
recommendation the arrangements excluded from national competition laws.
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international negotiations but brought the issue to a negotiation table with neighboring

exen

trade partners where extraterritorial applications established an actual dispute. A

revi1

bilateral agreement or a unilateral restraint which respect comity and self-restraint

prac

principle, as a realistic alternative to a multilateral agreement, can be appropriate
measures, which control the problems coming from extraterritorial application. 94
As the narrowed approach for a binding multilateral rule requires a consensus from
advanced economies in the nascent stage, an export cartel needs to be treated as one of
the exemptions allowed for public interest. 95 However, profits earned from export
cartels result from the sacrifice of the same amount of foreign consumers' welfare, and
export cartel practices are incompatible with non-discrimination principle. 96 Therefore,
the multilateral cartel agreement should negotiate to eliminate export cartel exemption

cc

as a long term goal. Moreover, each export cartel exemption is to be screened by each

tb

competition regulator under an international agreement for the possibility of abuse. 97 A

Cl

study on the application of the U.S. Export Trading Company Act designed to provide

a

small companies with cost savings through a common sales organization, reveals a

a

harsh reality where the law fosters hard core cartel activities rather than operate under

'

its original intent. 98 As a result, pursuant to similar standards of other public interest

94

Kennedy, supra note 4, 626.
Waller, supra note 71, 398. He mentions that export cartels are facts of economic life,
the attitude of which need to be adopted.
96
!d., 398-399; Taylor, supra note 2, 233.
97
SCHERER, supra note 70, 46. Scherer illustrated two concrete measures, e.g. the
registration of an association seeking export cartel exemption, and the disclosure of its
functions.
98
Among ninety four export trading companies (ETCs), around 25% of the total ETCs
worked closely to the intent of the Act, e.g. four for foreign government liaison, nine
for joint promotion activities, four for the promotion of aU .S. region, four for warranty
service, and seven for project coordination. The remaining 75 %of the ETCs were
95
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exemptions, regular reports on export cartel practices are to be submitted, screened, and
reviewed for further approval on the basis of the reports. When the export cartel
practices conflict with the original intent, they should lose their exemption status.

4. A Broad Approach: Multilateral Agreement on the Whole Competition
Regime

(1) Obstacles in Reaching International Competition Law
Activating an effective cartel regulation needs to co-relate with promoting a national
competition regime as the practice of cartel regulation requires the advanced skills and
the institutional power of a market analysis which can be facilitated under the whole
competition law. According to the former experiences of developing countries and
advanced economies, the incorporation of a hard core cartel regulation into an
administrative regime or criminal law system without an overall competition policy
will result in under-enforcement without sufficient support. Therefore, an effective
international cartel regulation needs to address the activation of a competition regime.

An international agreement which includes a whole competition law regime, however,
has more hurdles in securing sufficient accession than the former narrow approach.
Consensus as to the level of state involvement in economic development, the level of
competition in light ofthe necessity of cooperation among small or middle sized
enterprises(SMEs), the prioritization of the efficiency over employment or national

engaged in fixed prices (thirty seven cases), coordinated bids (thirty six), and customers
allocation (fourteen). !d. at 45.
43

wealth, will not likely be achieved as each country considers their unique economic

costs re

situations, such as the promotion of a less competitive industry, and the point that

interna'

competition itself does not always grow national economic wealth. The failures of

cons en

competition policy discussion under the WTO, e.g. the Cancun failure and the

benefi:

abandoning of the Draft International Antitrust Code by the WTO, reveal the lack of

laws, :

consensus regarding the adoption of a whole competition regime due to differing

of cox

interests among nations.

demc
(2) Principle-based International Competition Law

dom

1) Rationales

2)

In order to succeed in achieving a multilateral international agreement regarding

T1

competition law, core principles approaching a level of international consensus, for

objt

example, that private competitors shall not collude to restrict competition, should be
explicitly settled to guide the content and application of domestic competition laws. 99
The reason why a principle-based international competition law is prioritized is that
spending too many sources to achieve a level of nearly full harmonization of concrete
substantive and procedural provisions is a wasteful strategy in light of past failures.
Taylor argued that, through an attempt to quantify the benefits and costs of
international harmonization of competition laws, marginal benefit decreases and
marginal cost increases as national competition laws converge from status quo to full
harmonization under a total divergence-harmonization continuum. 100 In light ofhigh

99

TAYLOR, supra note 2, 76 & 95.
See id. at 338. Table: Convergence-harmonization continuum

100
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costs required for full harmonization of a competition regime, a better strategy toward
international harmonization is to concentrate more efforts to achieve international
consensus on several topics where consensus-making is less costly where greater
benefits can derive.

101

According to Taylor, laws prohibiting price-fixing, anti-cartel

laws, and laws regulating horizontal restraints other than cartels are three major issues
of competition law where convergence can expectedly bring about the most benefit. 102
The past failures in the creation of concrete provisions in international competition law
demonstrated that in-detail stipulations regarding controversial areas where diverse
domestic regulations exist could not make sufficient accessions or ratifications. 103
2) Objectives of International Competition Law
The principle-based agreement covering a whole competition regime may include
objectives, such as fair distribution, non-discrimination, and differential treatment in

Status
quo
Current
level of
convergence

Convergence
A state less than partial
harmonization within which
two or more nations achieve a
reasonable degree of
similarity in domestic
competition laws but continue
to hold different standards

Partial
harmonization
Uniformity of their
substantive
competition
obligations and
procedures between
60% and 80% of
their competition
laws.

101

Full harmonization
Near uniformity of
their substantive
competition
obligations and
procedures for more
than 80% of their
competition laws.

Taylor explains that the optimal point should be where marginal cost equals
marginal benefit, which falls somewhere between convergence and partial
harmonization in the continuum. !d. at 340-345.
102
!d. at 347. Taylor cites the Global Competition Policy (ed. Graham and Richardson)
(Institute for International Economics, liE) and requests attention to the liE Survey
stating the four major elements which creates great benefits.
103
!d. at 308.
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light of national interests, which have been disputed among countries with advanced

Co

competition law and those with less advanced ones. The principle-based international

appr

competition law will not lose its focus on strengthening efficiency due to the

but·

harmonization with other national interests, such as employment, investment for

extr

research and development, and protection of national security, because competition

leVI

regime and effective cartel regulation necessarily lead to the improvement of efficiency.

dor

The countries which accede to the principle-based agreement shall at least be urged to

car

put effort to enact such competition laws. 104 As a result, principles in international

car

competition law can work toward fostering international convergence for domestic

re~

competition laws. 105

TI

The concrete contents of a domestic competition law will depend on each country's

pr

policies, economic situations, and institutional developments. Although the principle-

m

based approach is adopted, however, the cartel regulation is unlikely to be so divergent
In a case of the APEC, the similarity in the general content and structure of competition
laws of member countries owes much to commonly accepted micro-economic theories,

1

precedents established by the earliest statutory formation of competition law, e.g. the

c

EU Treaty of Rome and the U.S. Sherman Act, and common economic influences

I

among the member countries. 106
3) Positive Functions of Principle-based International Competition Agreement

104

!d. at 358. Taylor state to the same cause that the agreement can pressure its
members to increase the level of competition in their domestic markets, and let the
competition regime established and work in a transparent way.
105
!d. at 354.
106
!d. at 75.
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Countries with advanced competition law practices do not need to criticize the
approach for ineffective rules or low level of convergence in DCs' competition laws,
but to stick to maintain the level of their current enforcements. 107 As long as
extraterritorial applications of competition laws are allowed, the acceptance of the low
level of convergence by advanced competition regimes causes little, if any, damages to
domestic laws in advanced countries. Rather, an international competition agreement
can work as a stick to pressure DCs to enact competition law seriously. Particularly,
cartel regulation will be under serious pressure to improve its enforcement as the
regulation has obtained the broadest consensus among other areas of competition law.
The acknowledgement of diverse regulatory regimes can diminish the DCs' blind
protests against a competitive market system, thereby leading them to more competitive
market systems.
4) An Example: GATS Annex on Telecommunications
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Annex on
Telecommunications is an example of a good model of a principle-based international
competition law. 108 Different from detailed provisions ofthe GATS, the Annex has
provisions which ensure several important principles for the telecommunication service
trade. Art. 4 of the Annex requires member countries to provide information on their
conditions of access to public telecommunication transport networks and services in
order to remove arbitrary restrictions through a transparent standard of information-

107

!d. 352. Joel Klein, assistant attorney-general of the U.S. Department of Justice,
stated that efforts to achieve a minimum set of competition principles could end up
legitimating weak and ineffective rules, which would not serve the goals of trade
liberalization. However, he neglected the benefit of enacting competition law in DCs.
108
TAYLOR, supra note 2, 360.
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submission. Art. 5(a), (b), (c) and (e) require member countries to provide access to

to ocs 1

public telecommunication transport networks and services through reasonable, non-

conditi<

discriminatory, and necessary conditions. The WTO Panel acknowledged, in the

in the c

decision of Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, that the use of

which·

an ambiguous word in the GATS Annex was intended for WTO members to reserve a

countr

degree offlexibility in meeting WTO members' commitments.

109
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(3) Special and Differential Treatment (SDT)

becau

SDT, as a precious principle of international development law, can be applied to an

comI

international competition agreement.

110

SDT has been adopted widely as an exception

inve!

to non-discriminatory principle including most-favored nation (MFN) and national

imm

treatment (NT) in international trade law since the New International Economic Order

acct

emerged. As international competition law and trade law have some areas in common

actl

and negotiations for an international competition agreement frequently took place with

LD

regard to international trade regimes, e.g. ITO, GATTIWTO and UNCTAD, non-

Me

discrimination principle has been argued as one of the objectives which an international

agJ

competition agreement should adopt. 111 In light of the close relationship between non-

ev

discrimination and SDT, that is, principle and exception, there is no reason why SDT

si1

should be excluded in an international competition agreement, separately from nondiscriminatory principle. Particularly, in light of a wide range of countries from LDCs

it
ll

109

See Report of the WTO Panel, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications
Service,WT/DS204/R (2 Apr. 2004); TAYLOR, supra note 2, 359.
110
TAYLOR, supra note 2, fn 88 at 325. He proposed SDT as one of general exceptions
of a non-discrimination principle.
111
!d. at 321-325; DABBAH, supra note 26, 241-42; Rosenthal, supra note 8, 563.
Rosenthal cites prof. Eleanor Fox's proposal.
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j

to DCs to advanced countries, which have adopted a competition regime, and several
conditions for effective operation of competition law, formal equal treatment may result

in the collapse of overall industries in LDCs and less competitive industries in DCs
which will work as fundamental forces for future economic development in the
countries. With the formal NT principle which does not allow adjusting measures,
current less diversified economic structure in LDCs and low-income DCs will have few
chances of cultivating domestic companies necessary for economic development
because global competitive companies request non-discrimination under domestic
competition law, thereby prevailing over domestic companies with a nascent level of
investment. With the formal MFN principle which does not allow special treatment,
immature companies from LDCs need to fight with global companies which have
accumulated capital, skills, and experiences in formal equal positions, which result in
actual unequal status. On the contrary, SDT helps less skilled competition authorities in
LDCs and DCs to obtain technical assistances from advanced competition authorities.
Moreover, DCs may have flexibility in complying with the obligations of the
agreement under respective time schedules for adjustment. 112 The SDT principle may
even permit a DC to be excluded from some provisions in light of its economic
situation.
In order to persuade DCs and LDCs, which enact competition law or are considering

its adoption, to accede to a binding international competition agreement, the SDT is
indispensable to establish international competition law .113 Through the SDT of GATS
Annex on Communications, DCs are allowed to help strengthen their domestic
112
113

TAYLOR, supra note 2, 415.
!d., at 142.
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infrastructure and capacity through technical cooperation with advanced countries, 114

falls ur

and to increase their participation in international telecommunication service trades and

5ucces

development programs of international organizations.

115

Art.6( d) mentions that special

consideration shall be made for development of the telecommunication infrastructure
and the expansion of service trade in LDCs.
Advanced countries can enjoy, in exchange of the SDT concessions, the enhancement

countr

Wit1
argue
wise

ofmarket access to markets in DCs. As the relationship ofSDT to NT and MFN is not

relati

a pennanent exception but temporary one, the establishment and operation of an

com

international competition law will provide level playing field even in DCs' markets for

ane

global companies. In order to prevent willful abuse by existent interest-holders,

the

transparent review mechanism with regular information submission by a council
consisting of representatives from both advanced countries and DCs shall be secured.
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(4) The Establishment of International Competition Law Procedure

in

As most procedural differences are not so directly related to public interest as
substantive differences, procedural negotiation has more of a chance to reach a
consensus. An international competition agreement needs, largely, three types of
procedures: compliance-securing procedures, harmonized procedures, and coordinated
procedures.
First, compliance-securing procedure discourages members from condoning
restrictive business practices within their territories. The dispute settlement procedure,
which solves conflicts regarding domestic competition law among member countries,
114
115

Art. 5 (g) and 6 (b).
Art. 6 (a), Art. 7 (a) and (b).
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r

falls under this category. The dispute settlement procedure is necessary for the
successful operation of a binding competition agreement as it can ensure member
countries' efforts to apply agreed principle-based provisions to domestic Iaws. 116
With respect to the institution in charge of dispute settlement, quite a few scholars
argue that a WTO-centered dispute settlement, which has operated successfully, is a
wise institution for dispute settlement system of a competition agreement with a
relatively weak-consensus basis.

117

Supplementary relationship between trade law and

competition law and past failed trials to achieve an independent institution suggest that
a newly reached international competition agreement will work better when it makes
the most use of the relationship with WTO.

A proposal for establishing a register of certain anti-competitive practices, including
current regimes, e.g. block exemption of cartel regulation of the EC treaty, is
noteworthy.

118

Through the international registration requirement and regular

information submission, potential anti-competitive business practices shall be tackled
and screened.
Second, harmonized procedures substantially reduce inconveniences from divergent
procedures. The harmonized procedures will lower the large transaction costs, which
have impeded companies' active operation in international business, of searching and
following different procedures for the same international transaction. 119 Some
researchers argue that harmonized international merger procedures should be
116
117

Rosenthal, supra note 8, 570.
!d.; Waller, supra note 71, 399; TAYLOR, supra note 2, 184;Kennedy, supra note 4,

606.
118
Rosenthal, supra note 8, 558-9. Through experts' report to the EC, prof. Jenny and
prof. Scherer urged the necessity of an international register.
19
Waller, supra note 71, 400; DABBAH, supra note 26, 271.
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prioritized among other procedural issues as divergent merger procedures have made

infonn:

companies spend much legal cost and time. 120 Different pre-merger notification
processes in countries as well as multiple merger guidelines under the impact of a

compe

cross-border merger have placed burdens on related companies. Concern regarding the

recipr'

revelation of confidential business information under the different procedures might

syster

stem robust business practices. 121 An international system designed to protect
confidential information is needed to reduce the concern as mentioned by the previous
Ch.4. 122 For example, an international merger report system can lessen the concern
accompanied to international M&A, thereby facilitating pro-competitive M&As to
progress.

Tl

Third, coordinated procedures maximize international cooperation among domestic

tbrc

competition law enforcers. The most effective cooperation until now has been
performed under bilateral or regional agreements. Such international cooperation has

rat

exposed its limitation to competition authorities in DCs, because advanced competition
authorities do not want to have bilateral agreements with less developed authorities.

123

Advanced authorities have hesitated to cooperate with less developed authorities due to

la'

mistrust in their capacities of enforcement and the preservation of confidential

w
tl

120

Rosenthal, supra note 8, 557-567. A group of experts who submit reports to the EC,
prof. Scherer, prof.. Fox, Khemani from the World Bank, and Schone from Neue
Zuricher Zeitung suggested proposals for a competition law model for the Central
European countries. Those of prof. Pingleton, Fox, Neven and Seabright included
international merger procedures.
121
Waller, supra note 71, 400; DABBAH, supra note 26, 271-2.
122
Refer to Ch.4.V.3. for challenges and suggestions of sharing confidential
information in international cartel procedure.
123
Rosenthal, supra note 8, 568. He mentions the over-breadth and excessive penalties
of U.S. antitrust law as the reasons why bilateral agreements involving the U.S. have
limited potential.
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information. Practical assistance and cooperation without a formal agreement have
provided insufficient benefits for less developed authorities to fully enforce their
competition laws. A binding multinational competition agreement should facilitate
reciprocal practical assistance in domestic competition law enforcement and build a
system to prevent confidential information from being abused.

V.

Applicability oflnternational Criminal Law as to Cartels

1. Economic Crimes in International Criminal Law
( 1) International Criminal Law
The international community developed twenty five categories of international crimes
through historic accidents and related treaties. Currently, international law has placed a
priority over criminalizing the most serious interventions against human life and safety
rather than against social, economic, cultural, and other interests. States are obligated to
make the most serious interventions crimes pursuant to the international compelling
law, ius cogens.

124

Some examples of the most serious interventions are aggression,

war crimes, unlawful possession, use or placement of weapons under the category of
the peace-keeping, and genocide and crimes against humanity under the protection of
fundamental human rights.

124

Jus cogens rules are those viewed as the most important of all, from which no
derogation is possible and are binding on all states and persons regardless of their
consent. The rules also give rise to obligation for a state to either punish or extradite a
violator. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, 9-10 (2nd ed. Ardsley,
'1998-'99).
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As crimes in the level ofjus cogens impose obligations on states to prosecute,

Ec

extradite. and cooperate in prosecution without granting immunity. they are under the

inteJ

tmiversal jurisdiction where any state may prosecute and punish the culprits. The

inte·

criminalization of the most serious interventions against human life and safety, e.g.

pub

genocide and war crimes. is based on custom, or a part of general principles oflaw as

reg

well as treaty provisions. Regarding an intervention which does not reach the level of

!\

jus cogens, states are not obligated but merely allowed to punish perpetrators unless the

bet

states accede to a specific treaty for punishing the crime. 125 Such interventions protect

in1

social, economic, and other interests. For example, crimes, such as 'unlawful traffic in

Cc

drugs and related drug offenses', 'international traffic in obscene publications', and the

a

'destruction and/or theft of national treasures', protect important social and cultural

p1

interests. Such crimes, as 'unlawful use of mails' and 'unlawful interference with

o

international submarine cables', protect communication. Meanwhile, the crime of

(

'unlawful acts against certain internationally protected elements of the environment'
protects the environment. 'Piracy' and 'falsification' have protected economic interests.
However, economic interests have been treated less importantly than other interests as
discussed subsequently. This category of international crimes does not impose
obligations on states unless a specific treaty which the states accede to imposes duties
on them. 126

(2) Economic Crimes

125
126

seel'd.
See id. at 62.
54
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Economic interests have been treated as the least important interest which
international criminal laws seek to protect let alone a part ofjus cogens. There are some
international economic crimes. 'Falsification and counterfeiting' and 'bribery of foreign
public officials' fall under this category.

127

'Piracy', traditionally acknowledged, is

regulated to protect tangible economic interests and human right. 128
Moreover, international economic crimes have been very slow to expand. It is
because the protection of economic interests has been applied less seriously through
international criminal law than the other interests related to human safety and lives.
Conflicting views from countries with diverse economic backgrounds impede reaching
a consensus on coordinating provisions. Although quite a few international laws
produce resolutions, their legal enforceability has been weak. The recent development
of international criminalization against bribery of foreign officer, e.g. 1997 OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, 129 was made only by advanced market economies because some
companies from advanced countries were treated unfairly by the foreign government
officers who had requested unlawful money.
It has been argued that four elements need to be met to constitute an international
crime: (i) intervention into a significant international interest, (ii) an egregious conduct
deemed offensive to the commonly shared values of the international community, (iii)

127

See id. at 100. It quotes M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, A DRAFT' INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
CODE AND DRAFT' STATUTE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, 62 (Martinus
NijhoffPub., 1987)
128
See id. at 59-60.
129
For background on the OECD anti-bribery convention, see an interview with
Eleanor Roberts Lewis, at
http://www. fsa. ulaval. calpersonnel/vernag/EHIF/ethique/lectures/Lewis.html.
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In a

transnational implications, either through the diversity of nationality of its perpetrators
or means which transcend national boundaries, and (iv) the necessity of international
criminalization in cases where a conduct does not meet (i) or (ii).

130

Economic crimes

eletnl

aclm«

'

however, are difficult to satisfy former conditions.

prOVl

offic

First, economic interest is not evaluated as significant to human survival as other

is nc

interests. According to Bassiouni, which divides normal international crimes into three
categories, an international crime, an international delict, and an international infraction

deVI

the meaning of an international crime is confined to normative proscription, the

pun

violation of which has possible negative impacts on the peace and security of

eco

humankind, fundamental humanitarian values, state action or a state-favoring policy. 131

eco

Meanwhile, a delict is defined as the normative proscription that affects an

cul

internationally-protected interest, and whose commission involves more than one state

ex]

or harms victims from more than one state while an infraction is a violation not in the

ag:

former two categories. 132 For example, counterfeiting, which interrupts the integrity of

ex

a national financial system, falls under the category of an international infraction. The

dt

categorization indicates that the integrity of a financial system is not treated as

'd

'

seriously as other internationally protected interests. Meanwhile, under this analysis,
piracy is attributed to an international delict because it threats the security of human-

n

beings on the one hand, but it infringes economic interest as tangible right on the other

c

hand. 133

130

BASSIOUNI, supra note 124, 96.

131

!d. at 98.
132
!d., at 98-99.
133
!d., at 99.
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In addition, (ii) 'egregious conduct deemed to offend a commonly shared value'
element is disputed in cases where an international conduct infringes an internationallyacknowledged interest. The element matters, particularly, in a case when a conduct
provides net economic benefits to quite a few countries. The bribery of foreign public
officials, although it interrupts pure public function and the sincerity of a government,
is not considered an 'egregious conduct' in some countries where economic
development concern and attraction of foreign investments outweigh the values that a
punishment for bribery seeks to secure. As a foreign-friendly public policy for effective
economic development is necessary in certain countries, the illegality of the means for
economic development does not invoke significant public resent or constitute serious
culpability among the public. Quite a few countries among LDCs and DCs have been
experiencing formerly mentioned situations. As a result, the necessity of a punishment
against the act of bribery is not acknowledged at least by the group of countries. For
example, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention did not impose on member states the
duty to criminalize 'officers for receiving bribes' from foreign companies under a
'demand' approach, but held them to a duty to penalize 'companies for supplying
bribes· to foreign officers under a ·supply' control. 134 In light of the point that the
members of the OECD consist of advanced market economies, the international
consensus on criminalizing bribe-offering under a supply side is still on the way
134

OECD, Art. I, sec. 1 & 2 of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (hereinafter Anti-Bribery
Convention), at
http://www. usdoj .gov/criminal/fraudlfcpa/intlagree/relatedlcombatbribe.html (visited
on Jan. 16, 2008). OECD website states that a total ofthirty seven states acceded to the
Convention, at
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34859_1_1_1_1_1 ,OO.html (visited
on Jan. 16, 2008).
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towards universal criminalization. This example demonstrates the difficulty in reaching
an international consensus under the category of economic crimes.

interr

influl
2. Cartel Law

(I) The Infringement of Significant Economic Interests
Damages caused by cartels are significant in both the developing world and

inter

Cc

industrialized countries. Inefficiencies in an economy, such as a deceitful transfer of

amc

wealth from consumers' welfare to producers' surplus, and the blocking of the access

inte

of new competitive companies to markets, are measured as an amount considerable

to~

enough to offset foreign aid to LDCs. 135 Additionally, cartels bring about its negative

qu;

side-effects on the competitive process and consumers' and potential competitors'
confidence in the functionality of a market. Moreover, they obstruct the equitable

crt

distribution of economic power. 136

of

However, the loss in consumers' welfare as the direct damage of a cartel is not

re

recognized as an international human right issue worthy of protection through criminal
penalties. Such evaluation indicates that cartel members do not recognize consumers'
interests under a competitive market and the exploitation of consumers' welfare as an
indispensable value in human life. Neither the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
in the UN nor the International Covenant on Socio, Cultural, and Economic Rights
(ICSCE) enumerate consumers' rights to have a product or a service in a competitive

135

Refer to Ch. 3. Damages of Cartels
John Pingleton, Marie-Barbe Girard, and Simon, The Fight against Cartels: Is a
'Mixed' Approach to Enforcement the Answer ?, in ANNuAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE

136

FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY

(hereinafter IALP), 10 (Barren Hawk ed. FLI, 2007).
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market. The absence of consumers' welfare or rights implies that, although
international consumer organizations are struggling to build competition advocacy,
influence the works of competition authorities, and reflect consumers' complaints in
governmental policies and judicial decisions,

137

the significance of the consumers'

interests does not reach the level of significance enough to constitute criminality.
Competition itself, although accepted as a precious virtue in a market economy
among industrialized countries, has not achieved widespread consensus among the
international community. A cartel as a private entry barrier enables existent companies
to sustain current market shares and profits without further efforts to innovate the
quality of their products or services. The cartel undermines existent and potential
market participants' trust in market mechanisms which work as an important factor in
creative investment and entrepreneurship. However, in the countries where the function
of a market is not developed to such a level, the public's trust in a competitive market
remains low. As a result, the functionality of a competitive market is considered to be
less significant in protecting with criminal penalties. In the countries where investment
resources are limited but economic development is urgent, coordinated and planned
investment through the promotion of existent companies can be a more effective policy
for economic development than the facilitation of competition because fostering
competition may lead to duplicate investments, which are thought to be merely 'waste·
in the countries. As competition or trust in market mechanism is not recognized as a

137

Consumer International (CI), Consumers and Competition: a consumer welfare
analysis of three retail markets in 14 EU member states, 30 (2007), available at
http://www.consumerintemational.org (last visited on Jan. 15, 2008)
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universally important value, restriction on the competition or intervention into the trust

coc

is not considered damages to an internationally-acknowledged significant interest.

cor
1

(2) Ethical Condemnation
A cartel, although it brings about significant economic damages to a market, is not

ex

considered egregious conduct among quite a few DCs and LDCs since the intervention
of the values that anti-cartel regulations seek to keep intact, such as competition and
consumers' welfare, are not universally acknowledged as heinous or odious crimes

CC

deserving criminal penalties. For instance, the African Caribbean Pacific 77 group

to

which vehemently objected to the adoption of competition policy at the DDA

tl

negotiation does not have social awareness on the value of or at least place an emphasis
on competition in order to maximize consumers' welfare or efficiency that advanced
countries have.

r

Intervention into a price-setting market mechanism through public policy is still
accepted as a normal measure of economic policy in many countries. Sometimes, when
the price increase ofvarious products creates a serious burden of inflation on an
economy, governments in many countries, e.g. France and Russia, are eager to
intervene, thereby fixing price. 138 This practice implies such a limited social value in
price-setting through competition. However, the price surge of food commodities
belongs to the area of commodity policy, separately from the area of a competition
policy. Commodity law under international law has acknowledged governmental

138

Ben Hall, Sarkozy unveils measures to curb prices, FT, 2 (Nov.30, 2007); Taming
Russian Inflation, FT (May 2, 2008); Neil Buckley, Russia to control food prices, FT
(Oct. 23, 2007)
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coordination of commodity price throughout production and distribution of a
commodity.
The blocking of new enterprises by existent companies from entering advanced
markets through unfair methods causes an infringement of commercial ethics as the
existent companies, usually from industrialized countries, use their existent share in a
market unfairly to exclude new-comers without consideration on merit or on efficiency.
On the other hand, multinational enterprises(MNEs), mostly from industrialized
countries, tried to monopolize markets in the DCs. The original aim of the UN Set was
to regulate such anti-competitve activities ofthe MNEs. However, society's blame for
the anticompetitive practices, including a cartel, is not raised to an international
consensus for criminalization. Support from economic research does not persuade DCs
to enact criminal penalties against a cartel although development economics, withering
nowadays, was popular in the 1970s. Insufficient scholarly works were too weak to
invoke opinion-leaders' interests or to raise low public awareness, to a level of social
ethics, on the harms of anticompetitive acts.

(3) The Necessity of Criminal Penalty
The necessity of criminal punishment is not so high. Under international law, the
type and the severity of sanctions against cartels are up to domestic legislative systems
to create unless an international tribunal in charge of RBPs or international cartels is
established and impose a criminal penalty on participants or unless an international
treaty explicitly requires member states to adopt a criminal sanction. Moreover, as the
experiences of other countries, e.g. U.K., Ireland, France, and South Korea, revealed, in
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spite of adopting criminal penalties in Monopoly Restraint and Fair Trade Act

Acct

(MRFTA), their actual enforcement has remained very low. 139 Even the U.S. practice

initi

demonstrates that defendants have prevailed in around 63% of criminal antitrust trials.

crin

The acquittal rate is three times higher than an average acquittal rate in typical criminal

whi

trials, which is less than 20 %. 140 The high acquittal rate in antitrust crimes implies that

pul

criminal punishment is not an effective sanction even in the U.S. where cartels

aw

members are held under the most serious penalty in the world. Furthermore, the

su]

investigation and prosecution against a cartel need highly skilled personnel with
practical experiences.
Therefore, focus on civil or administrative sanctions against cartels should be an
important threshold to entrench cartel regulation. Activating criminal enforcement
should be the following step after the threshold institution is settled. 141 A theory of the
step-by-step frame with respect to anti-cartel enforcement measures, as introduced by
the previous chapter 4, 142 is positively appreciated by high-level officers from
competition authorities in diverse countries, such as, Ireland, the U.K., and lndia. 143
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Pingleton et al., supra note 136, 17. Absent broad political and popular consensus
that cartel activity is theft, judges may simply impose fines on guilty executives or, if a
custodial sentence, suspend it or apply probation because, as Posner states,
imprisonment is imposed so rarely in antitrust cases that its deterrent effect may be
slight.
140
Barry E. Hawk, Criminal Enforcement ofAntitrust Law-Roundtable, in IALP, 117 &
131 (FLI, 2007). Pingleton uses an analogy that criminal cartel enforcement is the
highest risk/ highest-return stock that a competition agency can invest in.
141
Sanghyun Lee, Using Action in Damages to Improve Criminal Penalties against
Cartels: Comparative Analysis of Competition Law of US. and South Korea,
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L. J. 61-63 (2008); See Hawk, supra note, at 135.
142
Refer to Ch.4.IV.1.
143
The author attended the 2008 annual meeting of the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association, and heard that an officer, John Pingleton, who has worked
in both Ireland and UK competition authority, in light of his experience placed less
62

1

According to this theory, in jurisdictions where criminal enforcements have passed an
initial stage of entrenchment, private actions against companies need to co-operate with
criminal penalties against individuals because private action address private damages,
which criminal prosecution does not deal with, and, thereby, can effectively improve
public awareness on the damages that a cartel causes. 144 The improved public
awareness of cartel-causing damages can form civil advocacy as important political
support for effective criminal enforcements.

3. Assessment
( 1) The Prospect of International Cartel Crime
The international criminalization of cartel is by far less probable than binding
international cartel law. Even it is not appropriate at this moment when no binding
international law on cartels comes into effect. International law to impose criminal
penalties against cartel members is unlikely to be adopted, although it may be proper
after settling down an international cartel rule. Practical skills, financial resources, and
experts to pursue investigation and prosecution are very limited as a majority of
countries with cartel law have experienced very little enforcement or have recently
adopted a competition regime itself. In light of the former three elements for
international criminal law, an international criminal penalty against a cartel is analyzed
to be improper at this moment.

priority on criminal enforcement than administrative and civil actions. The other officer,
Vinodd Dhall, from India's competition authority focused on reputation- and
credibility-building through civil advocacy in the initial stage. Pingleton & Dhall,
Speeches at Annual Meeting of Section of Antitrust of the ABA (Breakfast with
International Enforcers) (Mar. 28, 2008).
144
Lee, supra note 141, 64.
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First, the value of competition or consumers' welfare is short of the level of

oftl:

significant interest worthy of protection by punishment of an international crime. The

con:

determination ofthe significant interest should be made in light of overall countries'

crin

evaluations. Most public policies' interests in competition or consumers' welfare tend

con

to be more limited than about economic development. Although the countries with a

ac~

diversified economic structure and competitive industries recognize competition as a

pe1

precious principle, countries with a less diversified economic structure, depending on

ca

raw-material production, consider competition as a threat to the survival of their weak

w

industries. With a heavy weight on commodity production and trade, the less

c<

diversified economies prefer stability under price and output control compared to price

c1

decreases under rigorous competition because their earnings for living, which are

lt

relatively small in most cases compared to manufacturing or service-focused countries,
depend on commodity prices. Their request for separating commodity agreements from
the competition issue has been acknowledged in international law for a few decades. 145
In a simple economic structure, a domestic market operates under uncompetitive
circumstances with poor financial resources. Governmental interventions into the
market are considered as necessary to manage limited materials and money.
Competition under an autonomous market system is a mirage far from reality. The
public's consciousness regarding the principle of competition is very difficult to grow
in the less developed economies.
Moreover, the value of consumers' welfare is not sufficiently recognized in the less
developed countries where a democratic political system, which can reflect the voices

145

Refer to Chapter 2.
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of the unorganized mass of consumers, is unstable or not working effectively. As
consumers are not such doctrinaire as economists, they do not have an interest in cartel
crime unless they witness the price-decrease after the destruction of a cartel or receive
compensation from the damages of a cartel. Furthermore, the insufficient foundation of
academic research regarding the effects of cartels on their economies is unable to
persuade mass consumers or opinion leaders who can invoke consumers' complaints on
cartel activities. If academic research discovered cartel-caused damages in markets, it
would help opinion leaders spread public awareness of the damages and build
competition advocacy. Even, the legal system or legislation that lets consumers receive
compensation for cartel damages does not operate effectively in the countries due to
less developed competition law and inefficient institutions.
Second, the limited experiences of free and competitive markets do not support
forming economic or commercial ethics on restrictive business practices including a
cartel. Rather, the managing of price level and commodity trade output with forecast
are more emphasized than preserving competition because a large number of the
population live by working on commodity production. As previously mentioned, the
lacks of academic research, a democratic system which can form competition advocacy
among the general public, and legal systems promoting private actions can work as
additional hurdles in forming commerce ethics regarding cartels.
Third, the acknowledgement ofthe necessity of international criminalization against a
cartel is not ripe enough to replace two elements, 'significant international interest' and
'ethical condemnation'. The cost in criminalizing cartels is huge for countries with less
experience in competition law. Even the advanced economies have gone a long way to
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achieve an effective criminal penalty regime with many resources and invested
personnel. For example, the U.S., which boasts of the most effective criminal penalties,
had at least seventeen years to convict the first dependant in a criminal case since it
adopted the Sherman Act in 1890. As a criminal prosecution necessitates evidence
from a market analysis, subsequent investments are required to establish a new division
with trained investigators e.g. the Antitrust-Division of the U.S. DOJ, close cooperation
between a market-screening institution and a criminal prosecutors' office, and to
educate and train more experts. The DCs hesitate to invest further resources as other
less costly sanctions can obtain a similar level of benefits.
(2) Suggestion
In consideration of the former analyses, some practical measures for a long-term

agenda of international criminalization of cartels can be proposed. Basically,
international criminalization should be the next step of furthering the former narrow
approach of a binding international cartel law. A limitation on the categories of
business activities under cartel crime and the co-operation of private actions to enact
effective criminal enforcement are concrete ways to pursue international

,
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criminalization.
First, the coverage of cartel activities as the object of the criminalization should be
narrowed down enough to minimize dissenting opinions against the adoption of
criminal penalties. For example, bid-rigging, which has already achieved a broad
consensus for criminalization, will be more appropriate to be categorized as an
international crime. Price-fixing and output restriction should be the next types ofhard
core cartels that can achieve a broad international consensus as the aspects of
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frequently occurring cartels. Market allocation will be the following candidate for
international criminalization.
Second, to gather evidence and to prosecute a cartel case effectively in a criminal trial
needs high-leveled capacities. Such abilities cannot be acquired in a short time but can
be cultivated through continuous investments under the auspice of political leadership.
However, political support is temporarily vulnerable to the change of economic
situations and the possibility of corruption or capture by interest groups. Although
administrative penalty is more convenient sanction for cartel regulation than criminal
penalty, administrative sanction under the control of a government is more susceptible
to political concerns as the administrative regulation operates completely under the
control of a governmental policy. When political situations shift toward an atmosphere
benevolent to entrepreneurs, regulatory powers of a competition authority will
inevitably follow such a trend.
As a result, more emphasis for operating a long-standing cartel regulation should be
on a private action as a recovery system as the previous chapter argued. 146 Continuous
efforts to raise cartel-enforcement capacities need assistance from non-public sectors
which consist of academic researchers, practicing lawyers, and the general public. The
facilitation of private action as a damage-recovery system is an important measure to
stimulate the level of public actions. 147 Through rigorous private actions, the general
public will be exposed more to the large damages which a cartel causes. 148 The
widespread public awareness and subsequent ethical blame against cartel members can
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Lee, supra note 141, 61 (2008). Refer to Ch.4.1V.l(3).
Refer to the step-by-step frame at Ch.5.V.2.(3).
148
Lee, supra note 141, 65.
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constitute civil advocacy for raising the level of public enforcement which includes

regula

criminal penalties.

affect•

Private action will place public enforcers under more pressure to pursue reasonable
outcomes in light of pending or subsequent private actions.
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Private actions also can

quan1

speed up administrative procedure because civil courts in charge of the private actions

agric

wait for competition authorities's final decision and its supporting evidence.
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In addition, rigorous private actions can threaten potential cartel members with a

inve

high amount of costs. Competitors who are attracted by a cartel conspiracy will hesitate

tern]

to participate in the conspiracy in light of the very high cost of private and public

argl

redresses. At the annual meeting of the Section of Antitrust of the American Bar

dol'

Association (ABA) in 2008, Stephen Blake, Deputy Director of the OFT of the UK,
acknowledged the importance of cooperative functions between private actions and

int•

public actions and the enhancement of effective deterrence through that cooperation. 150

VI.

Proposing a New Approach for International Commodity

re

Agreements (ICAs)
1.

cc
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Introduction

As the rapid surge of oil price and food price threatens global economies, particularly
fuel-importing countries and industrialized countries, out of their keen desires to
suppress inflation led by high primary commodity prices, argue that international
commodity agreements (ICAs) or international producers' association (IPAs) shall be
149

See id., at 65. Civil courts reflect technical decisions issued from competition
authorities which usually provide important evidence for pending private actions.
150
Deputy Director of Cartels at Office of Fair Trading in England, Stephen Blake,
Address at ABA Annual Meeting of Section of Antitrust (Mar. 26, 2008).
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regulated similarly with private cartel regulations. lSI Fuel-importing countries severely
affected by such fuel price-surges are the countries where alternative energy sources are
limited and where higher levels of energy intensity in their industries require much
quantity of oil. On the other hand, the analysis of the current price increase of major
agricultural products demonstrates that the inflation are due to, mostly, structural
factors, e.g. increasing demand for meat or wheat from emerging markets, low
investment and low productivity in agriculture, and increasing biofuel production, than
temporary cyclical factors, e.g. freak weather. 152 Similarly, the oil-price surge is
arguably attributed to increasing demand from emerging economies, e.g. China, weak
dollars due to less competitive U.S. economy, the limitation of OPEC production, the
slow growth of non-OPEC oil countries' production, and price-manipulation by
international hedge funds. 153

In spite of such economic situations reflecting increasing commodity prices, a proper
legal approach to international commodity trade can not neglect the importance of
commodity trade on less diversified economies, and the accumulated international law
regarding commodity trade. In light of past researches, the development of international
commodity law, and current economic situations, a legal approach to international
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Raphael Minder & Joe Leahy, Asia battles with surging food costs, 9FT (Jan. 10,
2008); U.N. GA, Report ofthe Secretary-General, International trade and development,
para. 4 A/62/266 ( 62nd sess.) (Aug.16, 2007). An IPAmeans the association of
rroducing countries rather than that private companies.
52
Minder & Leahy, supra note 151; Javier Bias, The End ofAbundance: Food Panic
Brings Calls for a Second Green Revolution, FIN. TIMES, at 9 (Jun.2, 2008).
153
Common Fund for Commodities (CFC), Current Trends & the New Development
Role of Commodities, 6 (Nov. 2006), available at http://www.cfc.org (visited on Jan.
19, 2008); Clifford Krauss, Chinese and U.S. Demand Drives Commodities Surge, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 15, 2008).
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commodity trade will be discussed in distinction with the former international private

pr

cartel law.
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2. Directions for Institutional Development
(1) The Reasons for the Collapses of International Commodity Agreements (ICAs)
Although I CAs had been flourishing under the auspice of the NIEO, there were
several structural weaknesses in ICAs. Such weak points led to the standstill or the
collapse of many ICAs which had worked effectively.
First of all, individual ICAs maintained global commodity prices to inflexible levels
under the fair price principle in spite of market situations. The inflexible maintenance
of price led to the waste of much money because the maintenance of prices similar to
the former levels cost lots of money in a situation when the production increased but
demand gradually decreased. The growing inefficiencies under ICAs generated much
indirect cost. Trade quotas and other restrictions of ICAs prevented resources from
being efficiently distributed in markets. They impeded the growth oflow-cost
innovative productions which could have prospered in competitive cultures.
The collapse of the International Tin Council (ITC), for example, was mainly
attributed to the large cost spent to sustain the price-level which does not reflect market
conditions.
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A buffer stock system, used to regulate price fluctuations by buying

commodities in times of excess and selling in times of scarcity, required the continuous
supply of sufficient capital in order to maintain the buffer pool even under the
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Eric J. McFadden, The Collapse of Tin: Restructuring a Failed Commodity
Agreement, 80 A.J .I.L. 811, 823 (Oct. 1986). McFadden analyzes the inflexibility of
official price range as its main culprit of collapse of International Tin Council.
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preposition that wise management and sufficient facilities for storing the stocks are
provided. Iss The long-term maintenance of high commodity prices reached the
exhaustive point ofbuffer pool capital reserves in many cases, one of which resulted in
the fall of lTC in 198 5.
Second, the majority ofiCAs were ineffective in practice. Increasing production of
food commodities with static demand in the 1980s and the early 1990s led to reduction

in commodity prices. Industrialized countries opposed against active functions of ICAs
which tried to maintain former prices. Some of them quit their membership. In light of
the circumstances, ICAs could not place direct influences on respective markets
although they offered important agoras for discussing and sharing crucial market
information and providing market surveillance. 1s6
Third, the conflicts between producing and consuming countries directly led to the
withdrawal of member states with significant portions in the global market, which
made ICAs defunct. For example, the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) of 1977
was weakened, after the world production boom in early 70s, by the European
Economic Community (EEC)'s political refusal to join the pact. The withdrawal of
EEC, along with the introduction of the innovative product of alternative sweeteners
and subsequent sugar price fall, led to the collapse of the IS A. A similar situation had
occurred in 1962 when the ISA collapsed due to Cuba's withdrawal from the world

Iss Edward Quill, The Failure ofInt 'I Commodity Agreements: Forms, Functions, and
Implications, 22 DENV. J. OF INT'L L. & POL'Y 503,507 (1994).
6
IS /d., 504-5.
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market on the basis of its political conflict with the U.S. and alignment with SinoSoviet Bloc.

pop'

157

difj
(2) Market-Related Policies
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1) Price Risk Managements (PRMs)

fut

The price stability of commodity trade does benefit exporting and importing countries
which include LDCs, DCs, and industrialized countries.

158

After the influence of ICAs

sp

grew weak, price risk management (PRM) has been used as an alternative way to

m

reduce risk of volatile prices. While direct market interventions, e.g. directly managing

h

supply quantity, have been rare, the new measures of PRM which use financial

tl

measures, e.g. options and futures, have contributed to sustaining stable markets. The
new measures, however, are arguably under the following criticisms: a little benefit
compared to their large cost, consequential inaccessibility of smallholders, and the
effect of speculative activities of hedge funds on markets. 159
First, the instruments of PRMs cost more than traditional forward contracts, so the
methods match the interests of the large-scale traders who trade a broad range of
commodities and use a variety of currency. The instruments increased exchanges in
commodity markets to a tremendous speed so that trade volumes in Shanghai Futures
Exchange went up more than four times during 2001-2. 160 Meanwhile, to smallholders
in commodity dependent developing countries (CDDCs), such measures were not
157

!d., 524-5.
!d., 536; Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order,
14 N.ILL.U.L.REV. 347,364 (1994).
159
CFC, supra note 153, 21.
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No. 04.II.D.23, 35 (2004).
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popular because fixed-price forward contracting arrangements cost much and required
specialized knowledge. Meanwhile, in light of the interests of the small holders,
different instruments ofPRM were developed in favor ofthe smallholders, the outcome
ofwhich is still unclear.

161

If they succeed, they can work as supplements to costly

future trading in the commodity exchange market.
On the other hand, an increasing amount of money operated by hedge funds or other
speculators in a financial market deviate prices of PRM instruments in a financial
market from prices in a commodity market. Researchers argue that the current oil pricehike is due to speculative activities of hedge funds in financial market. 162 According to
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), such high oil prices have
exacerbated a current trend of food price surges due to costlier fertilizer and diesel. 163 A
researcher argued, at a recent IMF conference, that speculators and hedge funds drive
up food prices. 164
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CFC, supra note 153,21. See Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry of Government of India (MCI of Gov. of India), Report on the Committee to
Recommend Operational Modalities of the Price Stabilization Fund for Coffee, Tea,
Rubber, & Tobacco, Ch.4 para. 4.12 (Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.commerce.nic.in/psf_report.htm (last visited on Jan. 19, '08). The
Committee recommends futures trading as the most efficient model in the long-term to
achieve stable commodity market.
162
Tony Jackson, Speculators accumulate as risks rise for world's poor, FIN. TIMES
(May 12, 2008). Barbara Whelehan, Rising food and fuel prices, Brankrate.com (May 7,
2008), available at http://biz.yahoo.com/brn/080507/25362.htrnl?.v=1. Whelehan cites
the statement of Loretta N apoleoni in her book, 'Rogue Economics', contending that a
hedge fund is one of the major rogue forces which rule the world, particularly in oil
ftrice increase.
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Javier Bias, UN says oil rise hits food prices harder, FIN. TIMES, at 2 (Apr.26/27,
2008).
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IMF Works With Vulnerable States on Food Price Policies, IMF Survey Magazine:In
the News (April28, 2008). It cites the statement of Prof. Takatoshi Ito ofthe University
ofTokyo in Apr. 2008.
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In spite of the above-mentioned problems, the trading of futures and options has a

Rome

benevolent impact as a system which can reduce the risk of price fluctuation. Unlike

oppo

the settling of prices to an inflexible level which distorts market mechanism and causes

areru

huge inefficiencies, futures trading uses anticipated demand and supply, thereby

2)

r:

interacting through an autonomous market mechanism. The loss of efficiency does not
occur. A research in India where a ban on agricultural commodities futures trading is

frm

under consideration as a political gesture to reduce public blame for hedge funds could

pn

not produce any firm evidence of the negative influence of the futures trading. 165
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Operating a robust futures market in developing countries can help so greatly assure
farmers that they can reap rewards for their investment at the early stage. 166

cc

Moreover, a spreading trend that poor farmers use deposit into saving accounts, in
African countries, 167 is noteworthy. The micro-financial service has produced
successful results and permitted small-size farmers leeway for waiting until market

I

prices of their crops increase. 168 Recently available mobile phone services in African
countries are providing the farmers access to market prices for their crops, thereby
enabling them to negotiate in an advantageous position. As long as the international
community tries to have transparent regulations against the dangers of hedge funds, and
to make financial services available for farmers' interests, several measures for PRMs
will be able to work effectively to stabilize commodity prices. Recently, the 2008
165

Javier Bias and Joe Leahy, India Futures ban mere posturing, FIN. TIMES, at 6 (May
7 2008).
166
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, A global approach is required to tackle high food prices,
FIN. TIMES, at 13 (May 15, 2008).
167
Tom Burgis, African farmers sow more profitable seeds, FIN. TIMES (Jun.l3, '08)
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According to the Microfinance Information Exchange, in 2006, African
microfinance institution served 5.7 million savers and managed US $ 1.2-billionamount deposits. See id.
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Rome Declaration on World Food Summit also urged governments to create
opportunities for the world smallholder farmers and fishers, particularly in vulnerable
areas, to participate and benefit from financial mechanisms. 169
2) Market-Intervention Policies
Diverse levels of market-interventions to prevent fluctuation of commodity prices,
from direct supply control to buffer stock operation to compensation for declining
prices, have been used, although generally the measures are difficult to sustain in the
long term.
(A) Supply Control
Supply-controls among major producing countries, sometimes joined by consuming
countries, have been used in many cases. For example, OPEC and ITRO, as
international producers' associations (IPAs), have used supply controls effected by
producing countries alone while the International Coffee Agreement (ICoA) and the
International Sugar Agreement (ISA) used a quota system which allows supply control
by both producers' and consumers' group. 170
(B) Buffer Stock System
Price management through buffer stocks has been used by a few ICAs, e.g. the former
International Natural Rubber Organization (INRO) and the International Tin
Agreement (ITA) as bipartisan organization, and producers' association, e.g. ITRO. As
169

Refer to para. 7.b). of2008 Rome Declaration on WFS.
OPEC decides total output level of members' crude oil and allocates quota to each
member. Carola Hoyos, OPEC set to defend$ 60 global minimum, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 20,
2006). Current ITRO consisting of major natural rubber producing countries also
announced unilateral output reduction. International Coffee Agreement (ICoA) made up
of both producing and consuming countries used import and export quotas. The
International Sugar Agreement (ISA) ofboth exporters and importers also chose the
quota system. See Quill, supra note 155, 523 & 524.
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the maintenance of a buffer stock requires much money to be sufficient to constitute a

requ1

pool for preventing price fluctuation and as countries with large domestic markets and

merr

large capital, e.g. the U.S., operated their own pools and objected to the price

mail

maintenance through a buffer stock, the buffer stock measure would lead to frequent

init1

collapses.
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(C) Compensatory Assistance
Compensatory measures can work to supplement the efforts to prevent price

pUl

fluctuation under the market mechanism. The compensatory measures provide financial

ou

assistance in relation to commodity price policy under the name of domestic and

fr<

international aid. As an example of international compensatory measures, the IMF has
enacted Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF). DCs may draw
necessary funds by showing the impact of the international commodity price fluctuation

s

on their economy, e.g. extreme food price surges, or cereal import excesses beyond

t

their control, and expressing a willingness to accept the IMF's conditions 171 . Since the
original Compensatory Financing Facility was introduced in 1963, one hundred and six
countries have drawn a total of US$ 33 billion-amount over the span of thirty six
years. 172
Meanwhile, the Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF), established in 1969,
provided assistance to members with respect to their contributions to international
buffer stocks of commodities. An ICA operating the buffer stocks must have met such
171

Krishna Guha, IMF bid to help Africans on food prices, FIN. TIMES, Apr.25, 2008, at

6.
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IMF, Review of the CCFF and Buffer Stock Financing Facility (BSFF)- Preliminary
Considerations, Ch.II.B.11.fn 11 (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http:///www.imf.org. On
average, in each year, 2.9 countries made 9.5 drawings for Special Drawing Right
(SDR) 0.7 billion (around US$ 1 billion) under the CFF.
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requirements as: its main objective is the stabilization of international prices, that its
membership consists of both consuming and producing countries, and that they do not
maintain artificially high prices during the long-term restriction of supply. During its
initial fifteen years, the BSFF had thirty nine purchasing cases for a total of US$ 0.81
billion. However, as an ICA which matches all the requirements has not existed since
1983, with one exception ofthe 1995 International Rubber Agreement, none ofthe
purchasing cases have come out since then. 173 As its operating cost is evaluated to
outweigh its benefit, 174 the BSFF grew ineffective and finally is currently terminated
from IMF. 175

\
On the other hand, India's Price Stabilization Fund (PSF) shows an example of a
domestic compensatory measure. 176 The PSF aims to provide financial relief to smallsize growers when prices of commodities such as coffee, natural rubber, tea and
tobacco fall below a threshold level without resorting to purchase and storage of the
commodities. 177 The measure tries to relieve smallholders of damages from extreme
price-fluctuations of commodities, particularly tobacco and rubber, 178 which they
depend on for living. The result of the recommended PSF scheme remains uncertain
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/d., para. 29 and box 5.
para. 33.
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The Legal Department of IMF, Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the
IMF: Thirtieth Issue: Termination of the Buffer Stock Financing Facility, Jun. 30, 2006,
available at http://www.imf.orglextemallpubs/ftlsd/index.asp?decision= 12142-(00/16).
Art. V, Sec. 3(a), (b), & (c) decided the termination of the BSFF.
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(2003).
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MCI ofGov. of India, supra note 161, Ch.1 para.l.6-1.7 & Ch.3 para.3.1.
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small farmers.
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currently because the scheme with a pilot nature is in its initial stage of its ten-year

red

planned operation. 179
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(D) Analysis
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Market-intervention policies of ICAs, in many cases, caused disputes among member

pr•

countries. Although the policies were effective and necessary for price stabilization,

m

they proved not to work well in the long term. It is because they have characteristics

la

against the market force and because, in most cases, discretion inherent in the policies

s1

generates conflicts between internal political powers, e.g. between large producers and

c

small producers, or between producers and consumers.

s

As a quota system or buffer stock system works differently from autonomous pricesetting mechanisms reflecting supply and demand in a market, a decision regarding the
appropriate level of production or price tends to represent political considerations of
member states. Decision-making through the political process can invoke a
member(s)'s dissatisfaction with the compromise. It results in the subsequent
withdrawal of the objecting member(s), and thereby the demise of an organization.
Particularly, a buffer stock system, which was popular decades ago, does not operate
well in ICAs. One remaining case of a buffer stock system can be found in the
International Tripartite Rubber Corporation (ITRC) as IP A with restricted membership.
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand with around 85% of the world's rubber production
accused the former INRO of its lack of focus on producers' interests. 180 The countries,
instead, established the ITRC to manage buffer stock for further market growth and to
179

Ch.3, para. 3.12-27. The PSF under a state government's supervision has operated in
a region of India since April 2003.
180
The insufficient focus on producers' interests led to the collapse of the INRO in
2001. Curtains down for INRO at its 42"d meeting, Bus. TIMES, Jul. 30, 2001.
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reduce rubber output of the three countries for securing minimum prices to domestic
producers. 181 It is questionable that the quantity-control system with restricted
membership will work well in the long run in spite of competition from non-member

er

producing countries. 182 The other example of internal disputes in ICAs relating to pricemanagement occurred with the U.S. withdrawal from the ITA in 1982. The U.S. as a
large consuming member with extensive stock, opposed the remunerative tin pricesupport ofthe ITA. While producing members disagreed with its policy to maintain the
ceiling price oftin at a low level, the U.S. declined to sign the ITA. Large costs for
sustaining the tin price, insufficient funds, and increasing tin exports from nonmembers brought the ITA to an end with massive losses. 183
Output control and discriminatory pricing in favor of non-members reveal the same
story. The collapse ofthe international coffee market in 1989 has something to do with
the U.S. dissatisfaction with the policies of the ICoA such as artificial maintenance of
high coffee price, low price sales to non-members, and continuous limitation of export
by producers. 184 The U.S. refused to accede to a new ICoA, and it is improbable that a
new agreement could be reached. The reason is analyzed as along with the refusal of
major consuming countries to accession and the difficulty in the allocation of the global
coffee market among the fifty-two producing countries. 185
Price-management through buffer stock and supply control has revealed the high
risk of failure in ICAs. However, price-management in primary commodities under
181

Phusadee Arunmas, Rubber: Top Three Exporters Agree to Co-operate, BANGKOK
Jul. 6, 2001.
182
UNCTAD & CFC, supra note 160, 35.
183
Quill, supra note 155, 516-18.
184
ld. at 521.
185 ld.

POST,
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international cooperation is acknowledged by international law as an important measure
for the sustained economic development in the world, particularly in DCs,

186

in light of

the states' right to natural resources and right of international cooperation. For example,
the maintenance of buffer stock for poor countries under aids from IMF may be
considered as a material PRM. Moreover, the trading of staple food, e.g. rice, in
relation to food security shall be under special treatment as suggested later. From the
long term perspective, the ineffective measures shall be modified by new measures
which can cooperate with market conditions better. The spreading ofPRM and step-bystep reflection of the free trade system can be one direction. The elimination of export
restriction and the gradual reduction of export subsidy or import tariffs will be issues to
be discussed.

(3) Structural Policy for Economic Development
1) The Diversification of Production
The above-mentioned market-management measures can not replace the role of
structural commodity policy as a majority of researchers would agree. 187 The
diversification ofproduction in CDDCs illustrates a good model of an ICA's work
which supports less competitive producers. The diversification policy suggests that the
differentiation of origin, production-style under family-farming system, and quality in
CDDCs' commodity production has an advantage in labor-monitoring, so that CDDCs
186

UNGA, GARes. 3201 (S-VI), 4.U),(m),(s), and (t), UN Doc. N9559 (1974).
AMER SALIH ARAIM, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMODITY ORGANIZATIONS AND THE
NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 213-15 (Praeger, 1991); Quill, supra note 155,
534. Quill cites Lincoln Gordon's article, Natural Resources and the International
Economic Order, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 45, 55
(Don Wallace, Jr. & Helga Escobar eds., 1977).
187
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should search labor-intensive quality products matching their environments, and
commercialize them. Some regions in CDDCs may have a competitive advantage in
fresh vegetables and cut flowers which require much water and labor. 188 In case of
Malawi, a southern Africa country, 9,000 farm families succeeded in commercializing
paprika peppers and birdseye chillies under the auspice of a British investment fund. 189
A more concrete example is the approach ofthe 'Fair Trade Certification (FTC).' The
FTC labeled products have attracted quality-product purchasers and provoked their
ethical sympathies because the purchasing of the products which meet strict economic,
social, and environmental standards reminds consumers of an image that they support
poor producers' 'good' efforts. 190
Although the initial cost for such quality-focused production and trade-increasing
infrastructures, if necessary, should be taken by countries themselves, assistances from
international agencies in charge of development and commodities, as CFC, UNCTAD,
F AO, are beneficial to encourage the countries to further endeavor. To some countries
without sufficient resources, international assistances are necessary. 191 As a response to
the recent food price surge, UN FAO and a meeting ofheads of UN agencies in Bern
recently urged that a fund amounting to US$ 1. 7 billion should be provided for seeds,
fertilizers, and other production-busting items in poor food-importing countries. 192

188

CFC, supra note 153, 20.
Alan Beattie, FT Series: Part 2, The Need to Feed (Seeds of changes: Africa seeks to
engineer an agricultural revolution), FIN. TIMES, Jun. 3, 2008, at 9.
190
Agritrade, Banana: Executive Brief, para.3.1 (Nov. 2007), available at
http:/I agritrade. cta.int/enllayout/set/print/ content/view/full/2505 (visited on Jan.
31, '08)
191
Amy Kazmin, Burma needs aid for year, FIN. TIMES, Jun.5, 2008.
192
Harvey Morris, UN taskforce to tackle global food crisis, FIN. TIMES,Apr.14, 2008,
at 2.
189
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Middle-east countries which reap much profit from high oil prices, as well as France
and Spain, expressed their willingness to join such assistance efforts. 193
Although a series of small-scale pilot diversification projects under EU

the
wil

diversification assistance to ACP banana suppliers during 2000 to 2005 revealed
difficulties due to environmental and geographical circumstances, e.g. periodic
hurricanes,

194

the diversification project for promoting agricultural products towards

st:I

quality-products should not be ignored as several recent cases demonstrate its

re

success. 195 The Plantation Reserve, the ultra-premium sugar brand of Barbados,

he

marched successfully in British markets under combination of Barbados government's
effort to commerce a superior product and foreign investment, thereby pumping up
Barbados' economy. 196 In addition, the decision by a lot of UK supermarket chains to
move to 'Fair Trade Certified' 197 bananas under the pressure of EU reform offered

193

Morris, UN to tap Gulf donors for aid, FIN. TIMES, Apr.30, 2008, at 3; Javier Blas,
Food summit to sidestep biofuels impasse, FIN. TIMES, Jun.S, 2008.
194
Agritrade, supra note 190, para.3.3. It cites the 2006 biennial report on EU's Special
Framework of Assistance (SFA) which addresses less benefit from the diversification
af?,roach than competition-approach.
1
It matches the conclusion of the Feb. 2000 evaluation ofEU's SFA and suggestion
of the 2006 report. See id.
196
Ricky Jordan, Sweet Taste of Success, NATION NEWS, Oct. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.nationnews.com/295689502108902.php (visited on Feb. 1, '08).
197
The Fair Trade Certified ™ guarantees consumers that the agricultural product with
the label met strict economic, social, and environmental criteria in the production and
trade of the product. Fairtrade Labeling Organizations (FLO), an international
organization, operates the Fair Trade Register by screening the compliance with the
criteria of each producers under the Register and extends, through regional agencies, its
auditing function to local importers, manufactures, and distributors. In the U.S.
TransFair USA verifies the compliances of local traders and manufacturers and endows
the Fair Trade Certified label on such products, as coffee, cocoa and chocolate, fresh
fruit, flowers, sugar, rice, vanilla, and tea and herbs. TransFair USA, Fair Trade
Certification Overview, available at
http://www.transfairusa.org/content/certificationloverview.php (visited on Feb. 1, 2008).
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relief to Caribbean island suppliers. 198 If more strategic methods are developed under
the auspices of international organizations and governments, the diversification project
will be a crucial way to support the survival ofless competitive countries.
2) Productivity Promotion
One of the main tasks to which ICAs should be devoted is the development of
structural policies. The diversification policy is criticized by agronomists who
researched the past green revolution in the 1970s. One of them argues that small
holders in very poor countries need to secure their own food by improving food
production before taking the diversification policy. 199 As arable land for food
production decreases due to the increase ofbio-fuel production, production increase
policy is highlighted in international organizations with interest in food commodities.
A policy for promoting productivity through research and technological innovation
has worked effectively in many cases. For example, under competitiveness-enhancing
support, in Surinam, a banana sector increased production tonnage per hectare by
122% from 2001 to 2005 while, in Cote d'Ivoire, production was raised by 321% from

°

1991 to 2004?0 Costa Rica, Belize, Cameroon, and Jamaica also demonstrate similar
level of production improvement under the technical assistance policy. 201

198

See Agritrade, supra note 190, para.3 .3 and 3 .1. It is confirmed by the prime
minister ofthe Commonwealth of Dominica's statement before a House of Commons
Select Committee that, as critical to Dominca's development, the fair trade banana had
reversed a catastrophic recession in his country.
199
Beattie, supra note 189. Beattie cites the statement of Glenn Denning, director of the
Millennium Development Goals Center in Kenya.
200
Agritrade, supra note 190, para. 3.3. Cote d'Ivoire's yield rate increased from 9.9
tonnes per hectare in 1991 to 41.7 tones per hectare in 2004. Its exports rose from
118,400 tones out of 12,000 hectares in 1991 to 229,000 out of 5,120 hectares in 2004.
201
Id. at para. 3.1 & 3.3. Cameroon raised the average yield rate by 13.9% between the
period of '94-'98 and that of '02-'04 and exports by 20% from '98 to '03. Belize'
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As private companies have cooperated with international organizations for

pro

productivity increase of food commodity, 202 they are expected to co-work with

sus

ICAs? 03 According to Agricultural Outlook 2008-2017 of the OECD and FAO, public

lav

and private investments in innovation and increasing farm productivity would greatly

wi

improve supply prospects by broadening the production base and reducing the chance
of commodity price spikes?04
As genetically modified (GM) crops have high productivity, research on their usage
need to be furthered? 05 However, as many people may still have concerns about their
negative impacts on human health, the usage of GM crops should be under strict and

p

transparent scientific scrutiny from the public safety perspective. As such scrutiny

r

needs a period long enough to cover their long-term effects on human body, the
research is more likely to be affected by lobbies from interests group and shifts in
political situations. To eliminate such external pressure and the public's doubt, the
research should comprise or at least under the screening of qualified representatives
from each interest group.
However, the increase of food production should be under sustainable management of
natural resources and the elimination of unsustainable patterns of consumption and

production increased by 61% from 472 boxes per acre in 2001 to 760 boxes per acre in
2004.
202
Refer to the following (4).3).
203
2008 Rome Declaration on WFS urged international organization and private sectors
to increase cooperation in researching, developing, transferring, and disseminating
technologies and policy approaches. See para. 7 .d).
204
Bias, The End ofAbundance (FT Series: Part 1, Need to Feed), FIN. TIMES, Jun.2,
2008, at 9.
205
Corrado Pirzio-Biroli, Chief Executive of Rise Foundation, How the DCs can help in
ensuring food security, FIN. TIMES, May 8, 2008, at 10; Beattie, supra note 189.
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production as the Rome Declaration on World Food Security announced? 06 As
sustainable development has been acknowledged as an important topic of international
law, the production increases regarding food commodities of ICAs or IP As shall be
within the frame of sustainable development.

(4) Sustainable Development
1) The Definition and the Foundation under International Law
While the regulation of economic activity in favor of environmental protection
provokes dissent from DCs arguing that the regulation is an intervention into sovereign
rights to exploit their natural resources, a compromise between economic development
and environmental protection has been searched. The result was the creation of a notion
of 'sustainable development'. Pursuant to the request of the Secretary-General of the
UN that long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development by

2000 or beyond should be created, the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED), in the 1987 report, 207 suggested 'sustainable development'
defined as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs. ' 208 This is a concept focusing on

206

FAO/SAD, Rome Declaration on World Food Security and World Food Summit
Plan of Action, W3613/E, fifth para. (1998).
207
The chairman of the WCED was prime minister Gro Harlem Bruntland ofNorway.
Under the impact of the leadership ofMr. Bruntland, the WCED is referred to as the
Bruntland Commission and the 1987 report is called as the Bruntland Report. Brown,
surra note 158, 377-378.
20
Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development, Ch.2 para. 1, available at
http://ringofpeace.org/environmentlbrundtland.html (visited on Feb. 5, '08)
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the responsibility of our generation to future generations by reflecting respect for
equitable rights of the future generations.

the c1

As the Declaration of Rio on Environment and Development in 1992 and the 2002

agric

Johannesburg Declaration proclaimed, sustainable development needs the balance of

deV(;

three dimensions, e.g. economic growth, environmental protection and social

vulr

development. The sovereign right to exploit their own resources under states' own

pro

developmental policies, acknowledged throughout the NIEO, is confined by the

thr«

responsibility to ensure that activities do not cause damage to the environment of other

ex]

states or areas beyond national jurisdiction?09 In addition, the right to development

co·

should be implemented so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs

(b

of present and future generations. 210 States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable

S\

patterns of production and consumption, and natural resource management is an

s1

overarching objective as well as essential requirement for sustainable development. 211
For social development, states should be committed not only to increasing access to
basic living requirements, such as energy, food security, and the protection of
biodiversity/ 12 but also to cooperate for a supportive and open international economic
system to achieve sustainable development. 213
2) International Commodity Law Reflecting Sustainable Development

209

UN GA., Report of The UN Conference on Environment and Development,
Principle 2 & 4 (A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Rio de Janeiro, 13 June 1992).
210
!d. principle 3.
211
!d. principle 8 & Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development
(Johannesburg Declaration), para. 11, available at
http://www.un.orgesalsustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POI_PD.htm
(visited on Feb. 5, '08).
212
Johannesburg Declaration, para. 18.
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In spite of urges of several declarations and a resolution of the UN General Assembly,
the current approach ofDDA to adopt a free trade and competition regime to
agricultural products and food commodities does not fully reflect the sustainable
development.

214

The competitive exploitation of primary commodities is not only

vulnerable to environmental degradation but also able to make a negative impact on
protecting diverse natural resources and securing equitable food distribution, thereby
threatening food security. While international competition law has not adopted an
explicit provision reflecting sustainable development in distinction with many domestic
competition laws which have approved exemptions for agricultural industry/ 15 Art. XX

(b) and (g) under 1994 GATT may be construed as adopting a concept similar to the
sustainable development. 216 On top ofthe foundation of GATT, more emphasis on the
sustainable development should emerge in international commodity law.
Inequitable profit distribution from food productions in spite of recently climbing
food prices highlights the lack of a system which distributes fair remuneration under
social sustainability. 217 In addition, the excessive exploitation, usually, of energy
resources causes a problem of unsustainable environment. The increasing usage ofbio-

214

Rome Declaration, World Food Summit Plan of Action, Commitment Four,
Objective 4.1(g)&(h); Declaration ofWorld Food Security: Five Years Later, preamble
and para. 21; UN, GAResolution on the Right to Food, para. 13, GARes. 56/155
(2002)
215
Many domestic competition laws have exemptions for agricultural, fishery, and
energy industries. In a case ofthe U.S., Sec. 6 ofthe Clayton Act approves agricultural
organization which pursues the purpose of mutual help. The U.S. also adopted the
Capper-Volstead Act to enhance the bargaining power of farmers.
216
Article XX, a general exception clause, allows a measure necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health under para. (b) and one to conserve exhaustible
natural resources under para. (g).
217
Amy Kazmin, Rocketing rice prices fail to benefit Asia s small farmers, FIN.TIMES,
Apr.29, 2008, at 2.
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fuel as an alternative to non-renewable energy sources reduces lands arable for other
18

food crops and aggravates the food crisis? As a solution to the problems, international
law can make member countries subject to obligations of conserving and managing
resources, and doing sustainable uses under effective international cooperation. For
example, Art. 6 oflnternational Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture (ITPGRF A) illustrate concrete measures for their sustainable use. As
genetically modified plants are more productive than traditional crops, the measures
under Art. 6 are mostly regarding promoting biological diversity under policyconsultation.

219

Especially, with respect to primary commodity production, international commodity
law should highlight cooperation among producers for further production and
environmental protection in distinction with competition law. However, the abuse of
such cooperation in a way to restrict competition should be screened so that the
negative outcomes of anti-competitive practices may not outweigh the benefit of
sustainable development.
3) ICAs as Multilateral System for Sustainable Development
As former ICAs demised or collapsed due to expensive market intervention measures,
ineffectiveness, and internal disputes, new strategies need to be considered for building

218

Blas, UN food chief urges rethink on biofuels, FIN.TIMES, Aug.l5, 2007, at 3;
Andrew Bounds, EU boosts biofuels despite concerns, FIN.TIMES, Jan.l5, 2008, at 2;
Blas, UN says oil rise hits food prices harder, FIN.TIMES, Apr.26, 2008, at 2. Int'
organizations estimates the contribution ofbio-fuels to the current food price rise from
10% to 30%.
219
Andrew Ward and Daniel Dombey, Bush boosts food aid and modified crops,
FIN.TIMES, May 2, 2008.; Fiona Harvey, Case grows for modified plants as biofuels
feedstock, FIN.TIMES, May 18,2008. For such promotion policies, see International
Treaty on PGRFA, Art. 6,2 (a) to (g), available at http://www.fao.org
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effective ICAs. Two models in this thesis suggest concrete forms of ICAs towards

J'..

sustainable development.
(A) A Model for Productivity-Increase and Benefit-Sharing
This model represents an international cooperative regime for raising productivity
and sharing benefits from the increased productivity. The facilitation of access under
the model promotes research for increasing productivity and diversification, which
enables to secure long-term commodity supply. Noticeably, a multilateral system fori)
facilitating access to plant genetic resources (PGRs) and ii) sharing benefits from the
utilization of the resources in a fair and equitable way was proposed by ITPGRF A. 220
Although former ICAs did not ignore the perspective, the ICAs which focused on
market-intervening measures did not spare much for such research. The emphasis on
the research ofiCAs enables the expansion of the genetic base of crops and the wider
use of varieties and species in on-farm agriculture. In respect of a request of
international cooperation,221 benefits from the enhanced use ofPGRs should be shared
fairly and equitably with DCs and countries in transitional economies in order to
support their sustainable usages of PGRs. Concrete measures include exchange of
information, access to technology, scientific research, investment in agriculture and
agribusiness, facility-development, capacity-building through education, and
partnership and collaboration with the private sector in DCs.Z22
As the productivity-increase model can has some aspects of international cooperation
in common with the following multi-stakeholder strategy, an ICA may take both
220

See Art. 10.2. For facilitated access to PGR, refer to Art. 12.3 (a) and 12.4 while,
benefit-sharing, refer to Art. 13.1 & 13.2.
221
Art. 7.2 (a) to (d).
222
Art. 13.2 (a) to (d); Para.3 of2008 Rome Declaration on WFS.
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models for its operation. For example, agricultural companies can sell supplies, e.g.

an<

seeds, or make purchase contracts with smallholder farmers for the cultivation of crop

of

varieties which are higher-quality and higher-yielding under the auspice of an ICA
consisting of, although partly, smallholders' representatives or private companies.

1
se

(B) A Model for Multi-stakeholders' Participation

sll

The other proposal is to respond to the needs of market participants and market

la

conditions through multi-lateral cooperation.

223

This proposal suggests that an ICA

st

should promote participation from multi-stakeholders, particularly, private sector

d

players, and smallholder producer organizations (SP0s)?24 The Sustainable Committee

a

Initiative (SCI), as a forum for multi-stakeholders under the auspices of the UNCTAD

s

and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)

225

,

belongs to this

model. The SCI aims at maximizing existent multilateral approaches for sustainable
development in the international commodity market through encouraging
complementary private and public sector contributions. The exemplary contributions
are the sharing of best practices, the discussion for better policies for improved social

223

International Institute of Sustainable Development(IISD) & UNCTAD,
Sustainability in the Coffee Sector: Exploring Opportunities for International
Cooperation, 14 (2003 ), at http://www.iisd.orglpdf/2003/sci_coffee_background.pdf
(May 6, 2008); Jason Potts, Building a Sustainable Coffee Sector Using Market-Based
Approaches: The Role ofMulti-stakeholder Cooperation, IISD, 10 (2004), at
http://www.iisd.orglpdf/2004/sci_coffee_background2.pdf; ICoO, Grounds for Change,
7 (Apr. 2006), at http://www.oxfam.de/download/Grounds_for_Change. pdf (visited on
Aug.28, 2008).
224
Para. 7 b) & d), 2008 Rome Declaration on WFS.
225
IISD is a Canadian-based non-governmental organization(NGO) devoted to the
development and implementation of policies towards sustainable development. IISD
has promoted open and effective international negotiation processes and co-worked
with other NGOs since 1990. For in-detailed information, refer to http://www.iisd.org.
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and environmental standards in commodity production and trade, and the performance
of scientific research and analysis on the impact of the policies and responses. 226
By reflecting the participation of smallholders and private sectors, ICAs can have
several important benefits. First, the governance structures of ICAs can be open to
small-scale producers' interests. The former structure ofiCAs with power centered on
large-scale producing or consuming countries will be reformed to reflect interests of
smallholders. For example, the SCI not only tries to learn from policies and practices of
diverse Voluntary Sustainability Initiative(VSis)227 , the major policy objects of which
are small producers, thereby offering forums for smallholders' communication and
sharing information. Recently, the International Coffee Organization(ICoO) is
pondering a recommendation that the Private Sector Consultative Board (PSCB)
established for global cooperation with private sector players should reserve, especially,
representatives for smallholder producer organizations(SPOs) out of exporting
countries' portion. 228
Second, the reform of ICAs is expected to provide diverse supports to the small
producers who have suffered from the lack of accessibility to technical assistances,

226

SCI, SCI Rationale and Road-map: 2008-2011, 1 & 11 (2007), at
http://www.iisd.orglpdf/2007/sci_roadmap.pdf(visited on Feb. 5, '08).
AIDEnvironment and the International Institute for Environment and Development are
the other participating NGOs.
227
Voluntary Sustainability Initiatives (VSis) refer to strategic programs which require
participating companies in the supply chain to improve the social and ecological
performance of their operations beyond legal requirements with collaboration with
multi-stakeholders and supply chain partners. Universitat St. Gallen, Interorganizational design ofVSis, at
http://www.logistik.unisg.ch/orgllogm/web.nsflwwwPublnhalteGer/Interorganizational
+design+of+voluntary+sustainability+initiatives?opendocument (visited on Jun.14,
2008)
228
ICoO, supra note 223, 9-10.
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financial facilities, and market data. The International Coffee Agreement(ICoA) of

chair

2007 proposes a Consultative Forum on Coffee Sector Finance (CFCSF) to facilitate

40.5

creative dialogues toward such benevolent policies as finance and risk-management for

in ru

small and medium-scale producers and local communities in coffee producing areas. 229

Si:

In addition, pursuant to Art. 16 ofthe ICoA which allows collaboration with NGOs,

org~

ICoO can play the role of a clearing house through supports from the SCI, e.g. the

will

collection and publication of economic and technical information.

230

Third, the participation of private sectors into ICAs' works will improve commodity

anc

production and supply chains231 through either diversification or productivity

pri

promotion policy. Kofi Anan, Chairman ofthe Board of Alliance for Green Revolution

D<

in Africa (AGRA)/32 which recently achieved a partnership agreement with major

pr

global agencies to improve productivity and rural incomes for smallholder farmers,

er.

explicitly stated that AGRA's strategic vision is to build partnerships which pool the

A

strengths and resources of the public and private sectors, civil society, farmers

P'

organizations, donors, scientists and entrepreneurs across the agricultural value

S'

1
229

See Art. 31 ( 1) of the ICoA of 2007
Pursuant to Art. 32 (1) of the ICoA which provides access to finances for small
producers, to technical information regarding productivity, and to market data from
differentiated coffee markets e.g. certified-sustainable coffees. See ICoO, supra note
223, at 10; SCI, supra note 226, 15.
231
A commodity-production chain means the way where agricultural supplies, such as
seeds, fertilizer, and tools, circulate to a farmer. Meanwhile a supply chain means the
way where agricultural products circulate from a producer to a consumer. So-called an
'agricultural value chain' comprises both production and supply chains.
232
AGRA is an association of farmers, agricultural businesses, scientists, and research
institutions with the form of a African-led partnership which works across the African
continent in order to rescue millions of small-scale farmers and their families in getting
out of poverty and huger. AGRA, established in 2006, has supported policies which
improve all key aspects of the African value chain from seeds, soil health, and water to
markets.
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chain.

233

AGRA, established with US$ 150 million from private funds, is spending US$

40.5 million establishing a network of 10,000 dealers to sell fertilizer and other inputs
in rural areas. 234
Similarly, forming the partnership of an ICA with private sectors or international
organizations, e.g. the SCI, which has expertise in reforming commodity supply chains,
will provide the ICA with an efficient production or supply chain network. The
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center in Mexico, a non-profit research
and training center with global network of overall organizations, covering public and
private sectors, and people who share similar development goals in around a hundred
DCs, is implementing a plan in cooperation with other international organizations and
private companies, to plant high-yielding maize varieties strong in tropical
environments, which will be distributed to African seed companies without royalties?35
An agreement for 'market-smart' subsidies designed to complement and stimulate

private sectors is worthwhile to be considered as a part of ICAs because former state
subsidies which replaced the private sectors were dismantled in African countries in
1970s pursuant to the advice of the World Bank but the private sectors have not grown

233

AGRA, Boosting Food Production in Africa 3' "Breadbasket Areas": New
Collaboration among Rome-based UN Agencies and AGRA, (Jun.4, 2008), at
http://www.agra-alliance.org/news/pro060408.html (visited on Jun.l4, 2008)
234
Beattie, supra note 189. AGRA was established with supports from the Rockefeller
Foundation and the Gates Foundation.
235
The International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center is more known as its
Spanish synonym, CIMMYT (Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maiz y Trigo).
CIMMYT works with African Agricultural Technology Foundation(AATF), a publicprivate research partnership in Nairobi, the private agricultural company Monsanto, and
the agricultural research systems in eastern and southern Africa for this project. For indetailed information, refer to http://www.aatfafrica.org/aatf_projects.php?sublevelone=30&subcat=5 (visited on Jun. 16, 2008)
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sufficiently to form effective production and supply chains since then.

236

Malawi's

subsidy scheme, which gives smallholders vouchers to buy seed and fertilizers,
succeeded in doubling the harvest between 2004-05, and 2005-06.
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(C) Eco-Labeling Systems as Cooperation between Private and Public Sectors

im

A successful result of cooperative efforts between private and public entities is a

Gt

labeling system for agricultural commodities. The labeling system is a concrete model

ec

which some international organizations launch to markets in industrialized countries in

CC

light of sustainable development. Such label systems as Organic,

238

Fair Trade

Certification (FTC),239 Rainforest Alliance Certified, 240 SA8000 of Social
Accountability International (SAI)/ 41 have grown through invoking consumers'
s

!d.
Beattie, Malawi cultivates cash gains for its farmers, FIN.TIMES, Jun.lO, 2008, at 3.
238
The distinction of Organic with FTC is the interest of Organic in cultivation or
raising free from using most conventional pesticides, synthetic fertilizers, sewage
sludge, genetically modified organisms (GMOs), or ionizing radiation, or antibiotics or
growth hormones. The related information is available at
http://www.organic.org/education/faqs
239
Meanwhile, FTC's interest is more on condition of farmers and laborers e.g. fair
prices, fair labor conditions, and democratic organizations for producers' profits. FTC
is also concerned about environmental sustainability by prohibiting agrochemicals,
GMOs in favor of farmers' health as well as preserving eco-systems for future
generation. In-detailed information is available at
http://www.transfairusa.org/content/certification/overview.php (visited Feb. 6, '08).
240
Rainforest Alliance (RA) is a non-profit organization established in 1987 to preserve
biodiversity and ensure sustainable livelihoods with focus on environment of Central
America. As one of its major works, RA set standards that conserve sustainability of
wildlife, lands, and wellbeing of workers and provide certification seal to those who
meet the criteria. Certification for agricultural products, former ECO-OK label, for
particularly coffee and banana, works as market incentives encouraging farmers to
comply with environmental and social standards. RA helps smallholders' accesses to
information of certified farm products and market trend by operating information center.
Refer to http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/programs/agricuture (visited on Feb. 6, '08).
241
Social Accountability International (SAl) is a non-governmental and international
organization of multi-stakeholders focusing on implementing socially responsible
standards. SA8000 is an international standard for improving working conditions based
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interests in sustainable goods. Although the current market shares of such labeled
products do not still reach a significant number, consumers' awareness of eco-labels
grows, thereby rapidly increasing the level of production and demand. 242 The positive
impacts from their sales on smallholder producers are never insignificant_243
Governments have already noticed the benefits of such products to weak sectors in their
economies and taken the role of a supervisor. After private sectors' efforts to
commercialize the Organic foods, quite a few governments, e.g. the U.S. and EU, have
been operating the sealing of the Organic label through public audit under national
laws?44
When an ICA tries to launch an eco-label as a concrete way of adapting
sustainability into the market system, more studies should be taken to improve
commercial traits of the label, such as quality-improvement or market-expansion
through diversification. 245 A relatively high price of labeled products, boosted by the

on International Labor Organization and thirteen international human right conventions.
To obtain the certification, companies need to pass on-site audit and assessment of
corporate practices by SAl-accredited auditing firms. The SA8000 may generate such
benefits as improved morale, reliable business partnerships, enhanced competitiveness
of products, and better worker-manger relationship. Refer to http://www.sa-intl.org
(visited on Feb. 6, '08)
242
Consumers' awareness of fair trade grows up to 27% in the U.S. in 2007 from 12%
in 2004. In the American coffee market, FTC occupied 3.3 % in 2006, which is eight
times more than the level in 2001. Fair Trade in Bloom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007.
Although the 'Organic ' food accounted for 2.6 % in the US food market in 2005, its
sales grew by 17 to 20 % annually during the past few years compared to 2 to 3 %
annual sales growth of conventional foods. Around 4 % oftotal agricultural land was
dedicated to organic food production in the EU. Even Cuba converted the whole
country agricultural production to organic and many of pesticides are not permitted to
be used by law. Wikipedia, Organic, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organic_food
(visited on Feb. 7, '08)
243
IISD & UNCTAD, supra note 223, 12 fn 33.
244
Wikipedia, supra note 242.
245
Art. 1 (7) & (9) of2007 ICoA. See UNCTAD, supra note 223, 12. It addresses the
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fair reward policy and license as well as the inspection fee, might result in difficulty in
attracting consumers who are sensitive to such high prices. The studies need to reflect
diverse perspectives of multi-stakeholders. For example, the ICoA of2007leads

sta

members' efforts to a way for developing a market and promoting the quality of

m~

products and consumption which include information campaigns, research, capacity

sc.

building and studies regarding coffee production and consumption.

246

ICoO opens the

room for multi-stakeholders by allowing voluntary finance from non-members, other
organizations, and the private sectors.

247
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A forum for cooperation among private entities, and both exporting countries and

cc

importing countries, along with the representatives ofNGOs who reflect the voices of

d

SPOs, can play an important role in the successful progress of eco-labels. The

p

prosperity of the label system largely relies on the level of consumers' purchase which
is affected by commercial strategies more likely to come through discussion among
private entities with expertise in marketing and public entities in charge of trade
conditions. An ICA consisting of exporting and importing countries, with the
participation of private sectors and representatives of smallholders, will be an
appropriate vehicle to carry out the cooperative work. In a coffee industry, the PSCB or
the World Coffee Conference under the ICoA will be such a model if it formally
accepts the participation of SP0s. 248

development of a consumer market for fair-trade labeled coffees as a effective response
to macro-economic conditions of global coffee market.
246
Art. 25 (1) and (2) of the ICoA of2007.
247
Art. 25 (3) and (4).
248
Art. 29 of the ICoA refers to the PSCB while Art. 29 of the ICoA addresses the
World Coffee Conference.
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(5) Analysis
As Art.XX(h) of GATT, as a general exception provision, approve the adoption of
state measures pursuant to obligations under any ICA, !CAs have operated diverse
market-intervening measures, e.g. supply control, buffet stock, and compensatory
scheme. However, the past demise ofiCAs indicates that the market-intervening
measures cost much and cause internal disputes regarding their operation. In light of
above-mentioned new proposals, ICAs should place focus more on cooperation on
diversification and productivity increase through fair benefit-sharing249 than on the
cost-demanding market intervening measures. As market-adaptive measures, the
development of diversified products, the cultivation of their markets, and research on
productivity-increase should have initiatives among other policies in ICAs. The
participation of the private sectors with superior capacities in the area of product
diversification, market cultivation, and the research is very desirable for the successful
functioning of the market-adaptive measures. As the market-adaptive measures are
intended not to control markets but to promote market supply, internal conflicts
regarding the measures will, if ever, rarely result in such disputes as would result in the
demise of ICAs.
When the policy for a fair benefit share is pursued, the policy should consider
protection of intellectual property for new techniques, effective commercialization in
markets, e.g. eco-label, and the necessity of special treatment for LDCs. Growing

249

See Sompong Sucharitkul, A Just World Under Law, 14 (2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Golden Gate Univ. School of Law Library). Sucharitkul
mentioned, generally, that cooperation is most needed in equitable sharing of shared
resources and conserving of endangered species, thereby contributing to the
maintenance of sustainable development.
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genetic plants can be developed with stable investment only when its techniques can

a

secure fair rewards under strong intellectual property regime. Under the auspice of

r

trademark regime, the eco-labels have contributed to the goal of fair benefit sharing.

f

Still, further research to improve the quality of products is necessary to cultivate their

'

markets in light oftheir relatively high price. SDT for LDCs, CDDCs and low income
food deficit countries(LIFDCs) should be incorporated into ICAs so that poor farmers
in the countries can subsist on their products.

3. The Roles ofiCAs in Food Trade
A market-based trade is acknowledged to be an important and effective method to
foster world food security by world leaders and experts. 250 Governmental interventions
through subsidies and export and import tariffs have been major targets which DDA
tried to reduce or eliminate as culprits which distort free international food trade.
However, food has been treated more as an object of important international human
rights than commodity under free trade regime. The sudden extension of a marketoriented trade regime to cover food commodity looks not to comply with the
accumulated international laws that have treated food from the human rights
perspective.
Since the Universal Declaration on Human Rights(UDHR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights(ICESC) had in common the right to
250

Rome Declaration, at eighth and tenth para.; Commitment Four of the World Food
Summit Plan of Action, para. 37; The World Food Summit, Declaration ofWorld Food
Security (WFS): Five Years Later, para. 12 (2002). See Beattie, Making Hay: As food
costs rise, farmers cling to their subsidies, FIN. TIMES, May 14, 2008, at 7; para.6.d)
&7.e), Declaration ofthe High-Level Conference on WFS: the Challenges of Climate
Change and Bio-energy (2008 Rome Declaration on WFS) (Jun. 5, 2008).
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a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of the people, including
right to food, international laws, e.g. 2008 Rome Declaration ofWFS, have perceived
food as an object ofhuman rights. 251 On the other hand, international laws, such as
WFS Plan of Action and ITPGRFA, have acknowledged that farmers have the right to
earn a fair return from their labor and management. 252 Although more focus has been
placed on people's right to food from the food security perspective, particularly in this
food shortage period, the right to food should not ignore farmers' right to fair
remuneration. International cooperation between them throughout the ups and downs of
food supply has been urged in order to ensure an equitable distribution of world food
supplies in relation to need. 253
On the contrary to a widely acknowledged international consensus in the human
rights perspective, the expansion of a free trade regime to international food trade has
achieved a low level of consensus. The standstill ofDDA reflects the low consensus
due to internal political reasons from individual countries. 254 The current food price
surge seems to drive countries which complied with the free food trade regime, e.g.
Philippines and India, back to the stage of autarky. Through enduring the food crisis,
251

See Art. 25(1) ofUDHR, and Art. 11(1)(2) ofiCESC. Subsequent international laws
are para.1 ofUniversal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, UN
World Food Conference, UN Doc. E/CONF.65/20 (1974), para. 1 ofRome Declaration
on WFS, The World Food Summit, W3613/E (1996), and para. 2 of UN GA Resolution
on the Right to Food, GA Res. 56/155, UN Doc. A/Res/56/155 (2002); Para. 1 & 3 of
2008 Rome Declaration on WFS.
252
World Food Summit Plan of Action, W3613/E, Commitment Two, Objective 2.1 (d)
(1998); ICESC, Art.11(2)(a) (1967). The Bio-diversity Convention and the ITPGRFA
protect farmers' right as breeders of plant genetic resources and biological resources
from intellectual property perspective.
253
See ICESC, Art.ll(2)(b). Universal Declaration on the Eradication ofHunger and
Malnutrition, Rome Declaration, UN GA Resolution on the Right to Food, and
Declaration ofWFS placed emphasis right to food as fundament human right.
254
Beattie, Trade Deal hopes fade as G4 talks fall apart, FIN.TIMES, Jun. 22, 2007, at 1.
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the countries grow not to trust open competition of the world food market any more but

F

now want a sufficient domestic food supply from the food security perspective.

tJ

In light of the circumstances, a modified or hybrid type of commodity trade regimes
will be a more appropriate institution for the international food trade. Efforts to
establish an international free 'food' trade regime 255 should go with complimentary
measures which meet human right perspectives and the needs of CDDCs and LIFDC.
Concrete measures include research for the productivity increase, emergency aid, crop
insurance, 256 technical and financial assistances, and SDT for LDCs and LIFDC. For
example, the GATT Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of
the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries addressed possible detrimental impacts of the free food trade regime on
LDCs and LIFDC, and suggested such institutional supports as a forum to offer an
appropriate level of food aid, guidelines to ensure the provision ofbasic foodstuffs to
LDCs, access to international financial institutions, and technical and financial
assistance for improving agricultural productivity. Moreover, the Agreement on
Agriculture under WTO Agreement limited food export prohibition or restriction in
light of the effect of such measures on the food security of importing countries? 57

255

For the alternatives, refer to Grant Aldonas, A Fresch Free Trade Agenda for DOHA,
FIN.TIMES, Jul.13, 2007, at 9.
256
Malawi and the World Bank will pilot a crop insurance against adverse weather.
Beattie, Malawi cultivates cash gains for its farmers, FIN.TIMES, Jun.IO, 2008, at 3.
257
UR Ministerial Decision, para. 5; Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement), Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A: Agreement on Agriculture
(AA), Part VI, Art.l2, para. 1 (a) and (b).
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Furthermore, the GATT Decision and the WTO Agreement approved differential
treatment for LDCs and net food-importing developing countries. 258
ICAs can work as important cooperators to a new free trade regime. ICAs can
59

operate a kind of pool-arrangemene which requires for major producers to reserve a
small percentage of production and from which net importing countries can draw an
indispensable amount in times of urgent need. It does not cost as much as buffer stock
system because it does not interrupt price-mechanisms in markets but temporarily
stores foods in each country. Emergency aid may be provided with the pool
arrangement. An ICA can offer more chances for member countries to participate in the
research for the productivity increase of a particular crop than any institutional vehicle.
The current price surge of staple foods as well as agricultural products, from
increasing demand and stagnated production along with other factors, is not a problem
which can work out in a short time with a free trade system. Although such free trade
regime may reduce distortion in markets, it is not likely to solve mistrust towards
agricultural policies among nations and poor people's starvation issue in LIFDC.Z60
International organizations led by the UN FAO are trying to propose aids with broadcoverage, as recent Rome Food Security Summit announced. 261 However, the reform of

258

The Uruguay Round Agreements (UR) Ministerial Decision, Measures Concerning
the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net
Food-Importing Developing Countries, para. 4 (1993-4); WTO Agreement, Annex lA:
AA, Part XII, Art.20(c).
259
Beattie, supra note 256. Beattie introduced a global food bank, suggested by
Joachim von Braun, as a concept of coalition for the caring. Dr. von Braun argued that
the Group of Eight rich countries with some ofbig food exporters establish it. As an
interim step, Dr. von Braun suggested a rice-pooling arrangement in Asia.
260
See id. Dr. von Braun agreed with the limitation of free trade regime.
261
Para. 5, 2008 Rome Declaration on WFS; UN FAO, Renewed Financial Effort in
Fight on Hunger: Countries Increase Commitment at Rome Food Summit (Jun.5, 2008),
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ICAs toward the ones with the roles of a reserve pool and a research center for raising

dev

productivity should accompany the global free trade regime and assistances from

bila

international organizations. An ICA with concentrated focus on a particular food

cou

product is in better position to produce the most appropriate and in-detailed measures

agr

with accumulated expertise. The operation of international organizations, e.g. UN, CFC

agr

and FAO, will be more efficient when they focus only on overall management of each
ICA's works, and other comprehensive issues, e.g. the limitation ofbio-fuel.

VII.

Conclusion

co

cc
International communities have strived for achieving a binding multilateral cartel

ec

regulation for quite a long time since the Havana Charter included cartel regulation
under a chapter for competition law distinguished from a chapter for commodity law,

fi

but failed in obtaining sufficient ratifications to be effective. However, the efforts have

u

produced little success except a recent non-binding multilateral agreement among

d

industrialized countries, the 1998 OECD Recommendation. This chapter examined the

(

inherent limitations of respective international agreements as binding agreements.
First, a bilateral agreement has proved to be an improper method in achieving a
binding international cartel regulation. The bipartisan structure of a bilateral agreement
reveals too large of transaction costs to achieve the effect which a multilateral
agreement can achieve. Dissimilar cartel regulations under diverse levels of economic

at http://www.fao.org/newsroornlenlnews/2008/1000858/index.html (visited on Jun. 15,
2008). Newly announced financial commitments during the Rome Food Security
Summit amount to US$ 18.36 billion, including U.S.A.'s US$ 5 billion, and France's
US$ 1.5 billion.
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development and a different legal system have worked as impediments in spreading
bilateral agreements. Insufficient trust between reciprocal cartel authorities makes a
country with relatively developed cartel practice hesitant to reach a cooperative
agreement with a country with less developed cartel practice. Even most bilateral
agreements do not have binding characteristics but recommendatory ones, particularly
due to conflicts of national interest.
Second, the reasons why past efforts toward a binding multilateral agreement have
faced a deadlock are analyzed as the following points: the lack of an international
consensus, insufficient institutions, and diversified interests within developing
countries. While competition, which a cartel aims at restricting, strengthens national
economies by promoting competitive sectors and economic efficiency, quite a few
developing countries fear that their weak economic foundations may be undermined or
fractured by eradicating domestic cartels. Besides their economic development, legal
institutions, political system, and the level of economical research in a majority of
developing countries are not sufficiently mature to adopt international cartel law.
Currently, growing diversification and subsequent different voices within the
developing countries, along with the weakened power ofNIEO, let industrialized
countries with advanced economies succeed in reaching non-binding agreements
regulating cartels with a small number of developing countries.
The multilateral agreement itself has inherent limitations although it has some
advantages, e.g. leading to uniform international law, as currently the effective
international trade law of the WTO agreement comes from the Uruguay Round as a
multilateral agreement. It usually takes much time and costs to reach the agreement
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with unanimous consent as the requirement under art. 11 ofVienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. The cartel law has proved to be a disputed area in light of immature
domestic competition law practice, less awareness of cartel-causing damages, and
domestic fear against competition. Even the U.S., with the strictest cartel practice in the
world, has demonstrated its unwillingness to accede to a binding international cartel
law as its business community has objected to it and as its competition-law experts do
not want to restrict with the law their jurisdictional power capable of reaching a foreign
cartel, and strong enforcement against cartels. In light ofthe divergent interests, the fact
that the DDA dropped competition policy out of its negotiation agenda is not surprising.
Third, the current widespread of free trade rule under WTO and the rapid
development of emerging economies and transitional markets signal severe competition
and tend to tempt companies, which are supposed to compete, to collude under a secret
cartel agreement, which causes huge consumers' damages in overall markets. The
necessity for a binding international cartel law will continue to grow. To successfully
address the necessity, the thesis suggests that, rather than a multilateral agreement, a
plurilateral agreement, either through the expansion of a regional or a bilateral
agreement or an internal agreement within a international organization, is a more
appropriate way to achieve a binding multilateral agreement as to cartels as a diverse
level of economic development, legal systems, political development, and economic
research have hindered a binding multilateral agreement of competition policy from
being reached. It would be better to start from procedural cooperation and convergence
and then to reach a point of substantial convergence as procedural cooperation can
attract more countries with less burdens on sovereignty. In the same line, international
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relationship theories support the argument that an international agreement can be made

~·

better within a group of states with similar interests rather than between groups with
different interests, e.g. between the North and the South.
This thesis suggests both a narrow approach and a broad approach for a binding
multilateral agreement. Under a narrow approach that the coverage of international
cartel agreement needs to be narrowed down sufficiently to achieve member countries'
consensus, the thesis suggests bid-rigging as the initial object for cartel regulation
because bid-rigging causes damages to public revenue important to any country, either
industrial or developing. Price-fixing, output-restriction, and market allocation are the
next objects. Such main categories are categorized as cartels which cause clearest anticompetitive damages according to accumulated researches and case laws. The other
horizontal agreements usually with the incidental effect of competition restriction
should be under a broad approach covering the whole competition policy as they
invoke discussion of pro- and anti- competitive effects. The exemption provisions
which exonerate cartels with proof of outweighing public interests are needed because
development-related exemptions, e.g. R&D cartel, depression cartel, SME cartel, and
industrialization cartels, can attract developing countries' accession to the agreement
because they reduce their concern about economic development through the
exemptions. However, the exemptions should be regularly reviewed by an independent
panel with the participation of competition experts under a transparent standard so as
not to be abused. An export cartel will be under one of the exemptions under the
narrow approach as industrialized countries representing net exporting countries want
to add it for its national interests and as the narrow approach requires the accession of
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the industrialized countries. However, it is to be reviewed under the same strict

not

screening standard.
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A broad approach comes from the experiences of the under-enforcement of cartel

fon

regulation in countries where the whole competition law was not enacted. 262 Activating

cri1

the effective cartel regulation needs to be parallel with operating the national

eitl

competition regime. However, in order to reduce the huge cost for the full

en

harmonization of international competition law due to gaps of competition law
development, principle-based international law is better than concrete-provisioned law.

pr

In light of a wide range of countries which is adopting or considering the adoption of

in

competition law, SDT in favor ofLDCs and low or mid income DCs should be

rc::

acknowledged. Moreover, international competition law procedures, which comprise
compliance-securing procedures, harmonized procedures, and coordinated procedures,

a:

should be established in priority over concrete substantive rules. Most of the procedural
differences can be reduced more easily as they are less related to national interest than
substantive rules. An international system for securing confidential information, e.g. an
international merger report system, is needed.
The discussion for adopting international criminal law as to cartels is immature at
this moment when binding international cartel law does not exist and the accumulation
of successful criminal cartel cases is limited to only a few countries, e.g. U.S. and
Canada. The competition or consumers' welfare maximized through the competition is

262

France and Germany before the WWII, and developing countries before the
adoption of sophisticated competition law on the foundation of economic, political and
legal development as well as economical research, e.g. Mexico before 1994, South
Africa before 1998, and South Korea before 1992 demonstrated the under-enforcement
of price-fixing regulation.
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not yet acknowledged as the interest worthy of protection through international
criminal law. Commercial ethics in the market is not sufficiently widespread enough to
form criminal culmination against cartels, let alone the necessity of international
criminalization against cartels. Activating private actions along with public sanctions,
either administrative sanction or criminal penalty, can invoke public awareness of the
criminalization of cartels.
As primary commodities have such unique characteristics different from artificial
products, as the inelasticity of production, state-involvement, and significant
importance to the economies of CDDCs, it is neither possible nor proper to apply cartel
regulation in competition law. Commodity production is related to several issues, such
as hunger, national intervention, equitable development between exporting countries
and importing countries, and environmental protection. The complicated interests
generated diverse international commodity agreements (ICAs) in order to regulate
production and trade with respect to each commodity. The ICAs should balance
conflicting interests between producers and consumers in terms of development and
hunger, and between current generations and future generations in terms of
environmental protection.
However, the ICAs have grown defunct, except a few examples, under internal
conflicts among members as well as under market-interrupting mechanisms since the
mid 80s. Inner political disputes regarding the operation of the quota system weakened
the operation of ICAs because the ICAs could not harmonize various interests among
member states within their operating tools. The huge cost of operating a buffer stock
system resulted in the disruption of other ICAs. On the contrary to the demise of ICAs,
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market management tools, e.g. PRMs, have grown more popular. In addition, the

th(

structural policies, e.g. production diversification in CDDCs, have gained momentum.
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The necessity of protecting the environment during the process of economic

S<

development invoked the international community to create the concept of sustainable
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development. Sustainable development urges states to protect the ability of future

n

generations while pursuing economic development. In international commodity law,
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sustainable development has more room to be applied as the competitive exploitation of
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primary commodities can endanger the protection of natural resources and equitable
food production and distribution. International law regulating sustainable development
should be developed more. As one of the concrete policies, cooperation among
producers for further production and environmental protection is an area where
international commodity law needs to address.
As a main vehicle for the cooperation, an ICA, formerly defunct, should be reformed
so as to work effectively under international commodity law. A main point of an ICA's
reform plan is to use market-adaptive measures, e.g. commercialization through
diversification, rather than to depend on former market-interrupting measures.
Concretely, two models for a reformed ICA are introduced. The first model is for
productivity-increase and fair benefit-sharing from the increased productivity. It
includes public or both public and private investment in technology and scientific
research and the protection of intellectual property. The other one is for the promotion
of multi-lateral cooperation. The latter model intends to reflect opinions of, particularly,
private actors and smallholder producers on the activities of an ICA in the commodity
market. As the SCI, established under the auspice of international organizations, e.g.
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the UNCTAD, has a plan to promote cooperation between the public and private
sectors for pursuing sustainable development in international commodity market, the
SCI's co-works with ICAs fall under the category of the second model. The model is
expected to generate several benefits, such as the reform of governance structure
reflecting voices from SPOs, benevolent financial and technical assistance to
smallholder farmers, and the improvement of commodity production and supply chains
through the participation of the private sector.
A noticeable example on which a reformed ICA may focus is an eco-label system.
The eco-label system falls on the harmonized approach which makes use ofboth the
first and second models, respectively representing incorporation of fair-benefit-sharing
into the commodity market and cooperation with private sectors for sustainable
development. Through accepting the entities ignored under conventional ICAs, a
reformed ICA will become a forum to discuss the ways of productivity increase and fair
distribution, which can reflect multi-stake holders' opinions.
Particularly, regarding food commodities, international law has acknowledged right
to food as a fundamental human right. On the other hand, farmers' right to have fair
reward for the agricultural commodity has been developed in light of farmers'
disadvantaged living conditions. Although the expansion of the free trade regime is
acknowledged as an effective measure to eliminate distortions in international food
trade, the blind application of free trade law to food commodities without respect to the
two rights cannot produce a desirable result. As the free trade agenda with respect to
food does not achieve as much consensus as the two rights mentioned above, a
modified commodity trade regime should be studied. Concrete measures which can
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work as supplements to a free commodity trade regime are the offering of financial aid
in the short term, and research for productivity increase and the facilitation of related
institutions for agricultural business in the long term. ICAs with special expertise in
each commodity are expected to play important roles in realizing the goals both in the
short term and the long term. A pool arrangement for producing countries to reserve an
amount of production for a temporary period can be an institution for offering
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assistance to food-importing countries in times of emergency food shortages.
di!
ei1

be
T
aJ

a

110

Ch. 6 General Conclusion

1. Compendium of Thesis

In summary, this thesis argued that a multilateral binding international cartel
regulation, desirable for furthering economic development, can be achieved by using
two strategies and that an inter-governmental commodity agreement (ICA) in
distinction with an international cartel should adopt reform projects, which focus on
either productivity-enhancement or allow the participation of multi-stake holders, or
both, in order to continue to function effectively in the international commodity market.
This thesis has developed verifiable academic and practical foundations for these
arguments.

In chapter 1, this thesis defined a cartel in the narrow way for the purpose of
achieving international cartel law. The reason is that it is very difficult to reach an
international consensus regarding the law when the definition of a cartel covers broad
aspects of competition-related activities. The typical aspects of hard core cartels, such
as price-fixing, output-restriction, market-allocation, and bid-rigging, are widely
acknowledged to bring about huge damages, both direct and indirect. From the
regulatory perspective in international law, the definition of a cartel needs to be
confined in 'an agreement for or merely collusive acts, which cause anti-competitive
impact on related markets, among independent entrepreneurs competing in the same
line of business for obtaining extra-profits.' With the definition, concentrating on the

1

typical aspects of cartels, widely considered as negative, will be an efficient way to

sev1

create international cartel law.

law

It is true that cartels sometimes generate benevolent effects, such as preventing the

A

wasting of financial and personal resources, cooperative investment on research and
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development, the securing of reasonable regulation in professional associations or by
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industry itself, and the prevention of extreme price fluctuation. Each country places a

COl

different level ofweight on a cartel's benevolent effects in comparison to its

in1

accompanying anticompetitive effects in light of economic and political situations, and

ca

legal development. However, historically, most advanced countries have adopted quite
a few exceptions to their strict cartel regulations. Therefore, some exceptions to cartel

ar

regulations with verifiable net pro-competitive impact or significant public interest

ac

should be acknowledged in international cartel law.
An ICA has been acknowledged under international commodity law, in distinction

e:

with a cartel under international competition law, because a commodity in distinction
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with an artificial product has unique characteristics from the economic, political, and
legal perspective. Although commodity trade is a significant factor which determines
national income in CDDCs, commodity supply and demand are inflexible, thereby
making commodity price unstable. As a result, states have been deeply involved in
commodity production and made restrictions on its trade. The characteristics
distinguish primary commodities from artificial products, thereby having developed
commodity law in distinction with competition law under international law. An
intergovernmental producers' association (IPA), although restricting competition more
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severely than an ICA, is regulated, along with an ICA, under international commodity
law as it deals with a commodity.
According to statistical research, a private international cartel causes damages in the
amount of around US$ 2.6 billion. It is formed in a highly concentrated market with a
few competitors where entry barriers exist, to which the markets in developing
countries (DCs) are more similar than those in advanced countries. However, as the
international vitamin cartel and electrode graphite cartel cases indicate, the level of
cartel enforcement in DCs was much lower than that in advanced countries. In order to
overcome such weak enforcement, international supports for cartel regulation in DCs
are needed. Particularly, a binding multilateral international cartel law can facilitate
active cartel enforcement in DCs.
Chapter 2 reviewed, in order, legal characteristics of international cartels, three
exemplary international organizations under doubt of being an international cartel, and
the development of international cartel law and commodity law. Before figuring out the
legal characteristics of a cartel, two types of international cartels should be categorized:
an agreement among competitors, and a loose association established by the agreement
among competitors. While the agreement-type cartel has no legal personality similar to
an international agreement, the association-type cartel can work as an international
organization with a legal personality. ICAs and IP As under the broadest definition of
the cartel fall under the category of an international organization.
Among international organizations under the suspicion of an international cartel,
OPEC, ITU, and lATA are analyzed. The OPEC, as one ofthe most effective and longstanding IP As, is not a private cartel under cartel regulation. An inter-governmental
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producers' agreement (IP A) consisting of sovereign states, the status of oil as a non-
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renewable natural resource, the absence of penalties against cheating, and the necessity
of sustainable development distinguish the OPEC as an IP A from an international
private cartel. Similarly, the activities of the ITU as a standard-setting organization

c

mostly of sovereign states possess fewer characteristics of an international cartel. Its

t

rate-setting practices necessary for accommodating several public interests, e.g. equity,
universality, and static efficiency, have resulted in price-decrease. The RFS allocation
is an inevitable regime for effective cross-border broad-casting at the current technical
level. On the contrary, the lATA can fall under the category of an international cartel
because the association of competing private airlines provides such practices as the
setting of passenger rates or air-cargo fees. In addition, its interlineable fare system has
effectively settled fares to the same level in spite of a non-binding recommendation. On
the other hand, slot-allocation and airport scheduling are considered as necessary
procedures for reducing congestion in airports unless they unfairly exclude new comers
in favor of existent large-slot holders.
Although there were prohibitions of profiteering through hard core cartel activities
from the ancient to the modem ages, sophisticated cartel regulations were developed in
the late 20th century among industrialized countries. In response to the emergence of
international cartels, centering around popular bilateral or regional agreements,
international competition law produced several multilateral non-binding agreements,
led by international organizations, e.g. UNCTAD, UN, and OECD. The level and scope
of cartel regulations have been improved and widened by regulatory development.
Unfortunately, however, recent efforts to adopt cartel regulation and competition policy

4
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in the Doha negotiation for binding multilateral agreements under the WTO were
collapsed by strong objection from the majority ofDCs and LDCs.
ICAs, separate from private international cartels, have been under international
commodity law because commodities have unique characteristics which should be
treated under a rule different from competition law. Regarding ICAs, international
organizations have issued resolutions, declarations and made treaties registered.
Although bilateral agreements have unique advantages, such as low cost and can the
negotiation on specific issues, bilateral agreements can not replace multilateral
agreements because bilateral agreements, as the foundation of international law, have
certain natural limitations, e.g. narrow membership. Developed amongst industrialized
countries, bilateral agreements have difficulty in improving the overall level of
cooperation among competition authorities. A multilateral agreement in light of former
failures needs to reduce conflicts of opinion between a majority ofDCs and advanced
countries.
Chapter 3 discussed concrete ways to reduce conflicts between developing countries
and industrial countries. The 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial Conference revealed that a
unilateral market-oriented competition regime under DDA, supported by industrialized
countries, would not be welcome by DCs even though competition law provides legal
guidelines to business activities among competing companies and proffers much benefit
in consumers' welfare and efficiency in DCs markets. Enacting a competition regime
unfamiliar to DCs in their economies causes a fear that less competitive domestic
companies might collapse in the presence of competitive multinational corporations.

'·
'
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In light of the concern, the effective enforcement of competition law in DCs,

including cartel regulations, needs substantial time, the development of legal institution
and market economies, and enforcement techniques. Before and during the time, the
developed world needs to persuade DCs that competition policy can benefit their
economic development and to provide technical supports and know-how to enforce
cartel regulation actively.
The reflection of international development law into the international competition
regime is the other solution for development-oriented international competition law.
·The non-reciprocal principle, special and differential treatment (SDT), and
governmental intervention may be adopted in competition law in light of the wide gap
between advanced and developing countries. However, the main rules ofGATT/WTO,
e.g. MFN, national treatment, may not be damaged by the international competition law.
State-operating cartels or statutory exemptions of cartels can be approved in the
context of economic development. A research and development (R&D) cartel, a crisis
cartel, small and middle-sized enterprises cartel, a cartel for efficiency-increasing
technical standard, and a cartel which rationalizes production and distribution may be
exemplary cases. However, those cartels should not be abused and should be screened
regularly.
This thesis proposed a roadmap to a binding multilateral international cartel
regulation. In order to overcome the lack of international consensus regarding cartel
regulation, the international community should strive to disseminate competition
systems to DCs. Establishing competition law which adopts economic development as
an objective of competition policy can help create a permissive mood. The effective

6

activation of domestic cartel regulations in DCs, however, needs external aids from
advanced cartel enforcers besides internal institutional improvement. Bilateral
agreements and regional agreements for operating effective cartel enforcement can
work as building blocks for a multilateral cartel agreement. The expansion of such
regional cartel agreements leads to a multilateral cartel agreement, as the EU treaty
including competition law finally created the 1998 OECD Hard Core Cartel
Recommendation. A plurilateral competition agreement can be a connector between
I•
I

non-binding and binding multilateral agreements as it induces countries to voluntarily
accede. Then, a narrow approach in a confined topic would be the first type of a
binding multilateral international cartel law. As the continuous active cartel
enforcement needs a whole competition regime, a broad approach of promoting
multilateral competition law should follow the narrow approach.
Chapter 4, after analyzing the development of competition regimes respectively in
four advanced countries and four developing countries, focused on consensus-building
for cartel enforcement with respect to economic development, and proposed
institutional supports for adopting cartel regulations, particularly sanctions, leniency
program, and bounty system. Finally, it argued that DCs should have international
cooperation in order to develop their cartel regulation.
The analysis of advanced competition regimes indicated that the development of
cartel law has been facilitated by four conditions, i) the development of market
economy under an open trade policy, ii) political support under a democratic power
system, iii) the development of legal institutions which can produce competition
jurisprudence, and iv) economic research which can support cartel regulations. The

I:.
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competition regimes in the U.S., the U.K, and Germany has been developed on the

ger

basis of these four elements while France's competition regime and cartel regulation

bee

have been recently promoted by its integration to the EU and the global trade regime. In

co:

addition, the analysis demonstrated that cartel enforcement had not been effective until

le1

it worked with the activation of a whole competition regime.

Be

The comparative analysis of competition laws in DCs demonstrated that, when the

fo

DCs had such four categories of support as i) an open market economy, ii) political
democratization, iii) a sophisticated legal system, and iv) economic research on

0

competition, the enforcement of their competition regime and cartel regulations could

a

be seriously pursued. Their cartel regulation and competition regime started to be

a

seriously enforced after they opened their domestic markets to foreign companies. In
order to reduce objections against the serious enforcement, political support was a key
ally which could provide institutional, financial, and public assistance. Moreover, a
substantial part of competition law development was due to legal systems which could
issue rules through sophisticated judicial and administrative decisions. Support from
economical research would play important roles in preventing political influence from
distorting competition policy.
Even though industrial policy in a strict meaning conflicts with competition policy,
inefficiency inherent in governmental policy will need competition policy in the private
sector in order to achieve economic development in the long term. As continuous
economic development requires competition policy and cartel regulation is the maxim
of competition policy, the active enforcement of cartel regulation is an important legal
institution on the way toward economic development. However, the immediate and
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general adoption of a whole competition regime should be approached cautiously
because economic situations in DCs usually consist of less competitive indigenous
companies and severe competition with competitive multinational companies might
lead to the collapse of the domestic companies as the Mongolia and Peru cases indicate.
Before enacting a whole competition regime, DCs need to place their emphasis on the
four institutional conditions for competition policy to work actively.
International competition law and cartel regulation need to acknowledge the function
of public policies within international competition law, thereby reducing DCs' concerns
about adopting a competition regime. As a countermeasure to prevent the arbitrary
abuse of the function, the degree to which the function can contribute to public interests
or economic development should be analyzed in comparison to efficiency-enhancement
through competition. Exemptions from cartel regulations can work as concrete
institutions reflecting public policies. The exemptions may allow some cartels which
promote long-term competition or which have public interests outweighing the
restriction of competition. Some of the control measures which prevent their abuse are
an independent panel consisting of competition experts, transparent decision-making,
and regular review regarding the appropriateness of the exemptions.
Competition policy needs advocacy from the public and experts so that competition
policy may be firmly positioned among the whole economic policy, through political
regime shifts. In order to have such support, the effective enforcement of cartel
regulations is necessary to create the public support by raising public awareness of
damages caused by cartels.

9

The main institutions which activate cartel enforcement are the following: leniency
programs and bounty systems. Leniency programs and bounty systems provide much
help to secure important information for cartel investigation. Several concrete measures
can help such institutions work in a more positive way, e.g. limited conditions for
leniency beneficiaries and bounty recipients, and exclusion of information obtained
through coercive or fraudulent measures.
In order to build the capacities of nascent or young competition authorities, practical
aids from advanced competition authorities and through international organizations are
needed. Besides unilateral practical aids, a bilateral agreement between countries with
similar levels of competition law under close economic relationships will help achieve
more than an agreement between countries with different levels of competition law. It
is because the countries with similar levels of competition law can cooperate well under
the mutual understanding of respective competition policy. Several following hurdles
have impeded bilateral agreements in competition law compared to the agreements in
other areas: the imbalance of power between advanced and developing competition
authorities, concern about confidentiality due to reciprocal mistrust, and the importance
of business information in competition law to national interests. Institutional reforms,
e.g. differential coverage of information which can be shared between advanced and
developing competition authorities, and the creation of a system which secures
confidentiality, can reduce the current wide gap of enforcement power. Through
leveling the playing field in competition law, international cooperation in cartel
regulation can provide more benefits to each country and strengthen the foundation for
a binding multilateral cartel agreement.
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Chapter 5 suggests two strategies for achieving a multilateral binding cartelregulatory agreement, and reform-projects for effective ICAs. The first strategy under a
narrow approach is to narrow down an object of multilateral international cartel
agreement for inducing a sufficient number of countries to accede. Bid-rigging can be
an initial object for invoking consensus for international regulation because it causes
huge damages to public revenue and it is punished with criminal penalty by many
countries. Price-fixing, output restriction, and market allocation can be the next items
of international cartel regulation. The other horizontal collusive agreements, usually
' •'

with the incidental effect of competition-restriction, might as well be under the second

, ·I

strategy of a broad approach because they generate in-detail economic analysis
regarding pro- and anti-competitive effects.
On the other hand, the broad approach argues, on the basis of experiences in countries
where cartel regulation had been under-enforced, that activating effective cartel
regulations is possible only when it goes with operating the whole competition law
system. The broad approach suggests that efforts to pursue international cartel
regulation should be with those for international competition law. Principle-based
international law can reduce conflicts in some areas where divergences in competition
law in each country have impeded reaching international law. Competition law
procedure, which has less relationship with national interests than substantive law, is an
area where international law can induce supports from the business community by
reducing business transaction costs and from competition authorities by facilitating
practical cooperation. An international institution which effectively protects

11
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confidential information is needed in order to reduce the concerns of individual country
in cooperation.

ir

The possibility that international criminal law applies to hard core cartels is weak at

c

this moment because consumers' welfare or efficiency, which is best protected by

tJ

competition, is considered by a few as an international interest significant enough to

r

constitute an international crime. The public culpability against an international cartel
has not grown yet in many DCs as the public have not been made aware of the damages
which a cartel causes and there have been few international cartel cases that were
revealed to cause huge damages in those countries and punished by themselves.
ICAs, which balanced conflicting interests between exporting and importing
countries, and regulated the primary commodities trade, have grown defunct with a few
exceptions. The main reason for the demises of most ICAs is, among other things,
because the market-intervening measures of ICAs to regulate the commodities trade
caused political disputes among members with different interests and huge operational
costs. Using market-adaptive measures, particularly, price-risk management, can help
avoid the disputes and the costs. An ICA model for productivity-enhancing and benefitsharing will work through technical assistances and exchange of information. The other
model for facilitating multi-stake holders' participation will contribute to operating
market-adaptive measures and finding out concrete measures for research and planning
on productivity-increase through allowing participation from the private sector. There
can be a hybrid model with the advantages of both models. An eco-label is a good
example in which cooperation between the public and private entities created a marketadaptive measure with focus on sustainable development and fair benefit sharing.
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Food has been seriously treated more as an object of international human rights,
including right to food and farmer's right to earn a fair return, rather than as a
commodity under free trade by international law. Current endeavors to apply the free
trade regime for the international food trade should adopt measures reflecting the
human right perspectives, preferential treatment for LIFDC and LDCs, emergency aid,
and research and assistance for productivity increase, thereby shifting toward a new
modified regime. ICAs for food commodities, faced by the challenge of a new free
trade regime, can play complimentary roles, e.g. a pool-arrangement which prepares for
urgent needs, or a research center for the productivity-increase. As an ICA has
expertise in a specific food commodity, it can create more appropriate measures in light
of the commodity market situations than other international organizations. International
organizations, e.g. UN and F AO, need to regulate and manage activities of each ICA
and provide supports to the productivity-increase project.

2. Moderation of Distinction between International Competition Law and
International Commodity Law

Distinctive development between international competition law and international
commodity law in international law had distinguished international cartels from
intergovernmental commodity agreements (ICAs) or intergovernmental producers'
associations (IPAs). However, the suggestions of this thesis that public policies or
economic development perspectives should be considered in existent efficiencyoriented competition law, and that an ICA or an IPA should use market-adjusting

13

measures and focus on structural policy, e.g. marketing through diversification, can

c

diminish the distinction between the two international law areas. The following picture

\

illustrates the relationship between international commodity law and international
competition law and the suggestions of this thesis.
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Picture: Relationship between Int'l Competition Law and Int'l Commodity Law

On the two standards of market efficiency and fair distribution, which includes the
level of state-involvement into distribution system 1, international competition law has
had more dependency on market efficiency while international commodity law has
relied upon fair distribution. International competition law has refined its objective of
improving the market efficiency under the leadership of advanced countries. Cartel
activities, which fall on (A) in the picture, occupy a part of the objects ofint'l
1

The author put high weight on state-involvement when he assesses fair distribution so
that the division between int'l commodity law and int'l competition law may be made.
As a result, an IPA and an ICA with high evaluation in fair distribution are placed above
a cartel in the picture. As fair distribution has deep relationship with public interest,
state-involvement under public policy is inevitable in most countries.
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competition law. Some activities ofthe lATA fall under the category of(A), as lATA,
which includes private airlines, restricts competition in air fare or cargo fee, and its
practices in slot allocation, e.g. historical precedence, influences fair distribution
negatively. Meanwhile, under the realm of international commodity law, an IPA has
less interest in both fair distribution and market efficiency than an ICA because an IP A
consisting of producers keeps the position of demanding unilateral reward for their
productions even at the cost of market efficiency and consumers' fair share. OPEC, as
the representative example of an IPA, falls under this category of (B) in the picture. An
ICA, comprising hybrid members ranging from producing countries to consuming
countries, is more concerned about fair distribution than an IP A. However, its activities
reflect the market efficiency perspective less than those of other private entities under
international competition law. ITU, even though telecommunication service is arguably
less considered as commodity, has been contributed to fair distribution and market
efficiency. In addition, its main members are countries. In light of the characteristics,
ITU can be located in the realm of (C).
The argument of this thesis that international competition law should adopt a
development-oriented approach and absorb the function of public policy, particularly
economic development, through cartel exemptions, lifts the efficiency-oriented
international competition law up to the middle line, as showed by the arrow in the
picture above. With the shift, international cartels that contribute to public policy or
economic development to an extent which outweighs market-inefficiency should be
approved as legitimate as long as their positive effects exist.

ol

15
1:.

The other argument that an ICA with its focus on productivity-improvement should
use market-adaptive policies along with participation from the private sector rather than
market-manipulative policies suggests that the current emphasis of int'l commodity law
should be changed. The focus should move from fair distribution toward the marketefficiency-increasing direction, which is illustrated with the shift towards the right in
the picture above.
The possibility that two international laws under different developmental paths meet
each other and be fully integrated is low because states have enjoyed different
treatments from private companies under int'llaw and because primary commodities,
in distinction from artificial products under competition law, have unique
characteristics and more interests to be harmonized. However, the past failures of ICAs
and their current demise teach a lesson that an ICA should be reformed in line with
market-friendly measures through abandoning costly and inefficient marketinterrupting measures. Meanwhile, in order to achieve a consensus sufficient for a
binding multilateral cartel regulation, it is inevitable that international competition law
should adopt a development-perspective or at least reflect the function of public policy
in competition policy. If such shifts take place, the distinguishing of international cartel
regulations from international commodity law regulating ICAs or IP As will abate.
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